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Foreword
This volume is one in a continuing series of books prepared by
the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress under
the Country Studies—Area Handbook Program sponsored by the
Department of the Army. The last page of this book lists the other
published studies.
Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign country,
describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and national
security systems and institutions, and examining the interrelation-
ships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by cultural
factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social
scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic understanding of
the observed society, striving for a dynamic rather than a static
portrayal. Particular attention is devoted to the people who make
up the society, their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their com-
mon interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature
and extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their
attitudes toward each other and toward their social system and
political order.
The books represent the analysis of the authors and should not
be construed as an expression of an official United States govern-
ment position, policy, or decision. The authors have sought to
adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. Corrections,
additions, and suggestions for changes from readers will be wel-
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Preface
Like its predecessor, this study attempts to review the history
and treat in a concise and objective manner the dominant social,
political, economic, and military aspects of South Korea. Under
Roh Tae Woo, who was elected president of the Sixth Republic
in 1987 (as well as under the previous president, Chun Doo Hwan,
1980-87), South Korea has been struggling to maintain its eco-
nomic successes. Movement in more democratic directions has been
much slower than economic development. Political unrest, labor
strikes, and student agitation continued to challenge the govern-
ment in the early 1990s.
Sources of information included books, scholarly journals, for-
eign and domestic newspapers, official reports of governments and
international organizations, and numerous periodicals on Korean
and East Asian affairs. Chapter bibliographies appear at the end
of the book, and brief comments on some of the more valuable
sources recommended for further reading appear at the end of each
chapter. A Glossary also is included.
Spellings of place-names used in the book are in most cases those
approved by the United States Board on Geographic Names.
However, the generic parts appended to some geographic names
have been dropped and their English equivalents substituted: for
example, Cheju Island, not Cheju-do, and South Ch'ungch'ong
Province, not Ch'ungch'ong-namdo. The name South Korea has
been used where appropriate in place of the official name, Repub-
lic of Korea. The McCune-Reischauer system of transliteration
has been employed, except in cases of the names of some promi-
nent national figures, internationally recognized corporations, and
the city of Seoul, where the more familiar journalistic equivalent
is used. The names of Korean authors writing in English are spelled
as given.
Measurements are given in the metric system. A conversion table
is provided to assist those readers who are unfamiliar with metric
measurements (see table 1, Appendix).
The body of the text reflects information available as of June
1990. Certain other portions of the text, however, have been up-
dated: the Introduction discusses significant events that have oc-
curred since the completion of research, and the Bibliography






Formal Name: Republic of Korea.
Short Form: South Korea.
Term for Citizens: Korean(s).
Capital: Seoul.
Date of Independence: August 15, 1948.
Geography
Location and Size: Strategic location in waters of the Sea ofJapan,
Korea Strait, and Yellow Sea. Total land area of Korean Peninsula,
including islands, 220,847 square kilometers; approximately 98,477
square kilometers (44.6 percent) constitutes territory of South Korea.
xv
Land Boundary: 238 kilometers with North Korea.
Disputes: Demarcation Line with North Korea; Liancourt Rocks
claimed by Japan.
Topography and Drainage: Approximately 70 percent of land area
mountains and uplands. Principal ranges—T'aebaek and Sobaek
range and Chiri Massif. Tallest mountain—Mount Halla at 1,950
meters, a volcanic cone located on Cheju Island. Longest rivers
—
Naktong River, 521 kilometers; Han River, which flows through
Seoul, 514 kilometers; and Kum River, 401 kilometers.
Climate: Long, cold, dry winters; short, hot, humid summers with
late monsoon rains, flooding. Seoul's January mean temperature
- 5°C to - 2.5°C; July, 22.5°C to 25°C. Cheju Island warmer,
milder weather than other parts of South Korea. Annual rainfall
varies from year to year but usually averages more than 100 cen-
timeters; two-thirds of precipitation falls between June and Sep-
tember. Droughts, particularly in southwest; approximately one
every eight years.
Society
Population: 1980 census reports total population of 37,448,836.
January 1989 estimate 42.2 million. Population in 1985 of two larg-
est cities, Seoul and Pusan, 9.6 million and 3.5 million, respec-
tively. Population growth rate in late 1980s less than 1 percent.
Language: Korean the national language. No significant linguis-
tic minorities. Regional dialects of Korean mutually intelligible with
exception of that spoken on Cheju Island. Written language uses
Chinese characters and Korean han'gul script, or han'gul alone.
Education and Literacy: Adult literacy rate in late 1980s approx-
imately 93 percent. Primary school education compulsory (grades
one through six). Approximately 95 percent of population age-group
in secondary schools (middle and high schools); 83 percent in aca-
demic high schools; 17 percent in vocational high schools in 1987.
About 35 percent of student age-group attended colleges and univer-
sities in 1989—one of world's highest rates.
Religion: Great diversity of religious traditions include Buddhism,
Confucianism, Ch'ondogyo, Catholicism, and Protestantism, and
as many as 300 new religions incorporating elements of these main-
stream religions. Shamanism, oldest religious tradition.
Health: Increase in life expectancy from 51.1 years for men and
54.2 years for women in late 1950s to 66 years for men and 73
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years for women in 1990 reflects dramatic improvements in health
conditions. Death rate declined significantly from 13.8 deaths per
1 ,000 in late 1950s to 6 per 1 ,000 in 1990. Infant mortality 23 deaths
per 1,000 live births as of mid- 1990. Health personnel and facili-
ties largely concentrated in large cities, particularly Seoul and
Pusan. Serious public health problems caused by environmental
pollution and poor sanitation. No unified national health insur-
ance system but medical insurance benefits available to almost all
South Koreans.
Economy
General Character: Export oriented although domestic market in-
creasing source of growth in late 1980s; real growth 12.5 percent
1986-88; 6.5 percent, 1989. Dominated by chaebol, or business con-
glomerates. Most industries, except mining, in urban areas of north-
west and southeast. Heavy industry generally in south. World's
tenth largest steel producer in 1989. Major electronics producer.
Automobiles and automotive parts major domestic growth and ex-
port industry of 1980s. Armaments also manufactured for domes-
tic use and export. Construction critical source of foreign currency
and invisible export earnings. Textiles, clothing, and leather
products important. Growing labor movement affects production
and costs.
Gross National Product (GNP): In 1989 US$204 billion,
US$4,830 per capita, 6.5 percent annual growth rate.
Gross Domestic Product (GDP): US$211.9 billion at market
prices, 1989; real annual growth 6.1 percent. Average growth 6.1
percent 1986-90; high, 12.4 percent in 1986; low, 6.1 percent in
1989.
Industry: Main growth sector, produced 46 percent of GDP and
employed 35 percent of work force in 1988.
Resources: Minimal resources. Mineral deposits mostly small, ex-
cept for tungsten. Anthracite coal most important mineral product
by volume and value, but also imported. Most energy needs met
by nuclear power, coal, and crude petroleum imports.
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing: Employed approximately 21
percent ofwork force in 1989; generated 10.2 percent ofGDP. Rela-
tive importance declining since mid-1960s; production grew 5.9
percent in first half of 1989. Major crops rice and barley, also mil-
let, corn, sorghum, buckwheat, soybeans, and potatoes. Fishery
xvn
products popular food and important export commodity. Inade-
quate forestry resources.
Foreign Trade: Annual trade in 1988 more than US$100 billion;
first time world's tenth largest trading nation. Major trading part-
ners United States andJapan. Main exports textiles, clothing, elec-
tronic and electrical equipment, footwear, machinery, steel, ships,
automobiles and automotive parts, rubber tires and tubes, plywood,
and fishery products. Main imports machinery, electronics and elec-
tronic equipment, petroleum and petroleum products, steel, grains,
transport equipment, raw materials, chemicals, machinery, tim-
ber and pulp, raw cotton, and cereals. Balance of payments af-
fected by oil imports and raw materials needs; surplus of US$4.6
billion in 1989, but deficit of US$1.9 billion, 1990.
Currency and Exchange Rate: January 1990, US$1 = 683.4 won (W).
Fiscal Year: January 1 through December 31.
Transportation and Telecommunications
Roads: 51,000 kilometers of roadways; 46.3 percent paved in 1988;
1,539 kilometers express highways, more under construction;
845,000 passenger cars and 748,000 commercial vehicles in 1987.
Intercity bus system; subway system in Seoul.
Railroads: State-run Korean National Railroad with
6,340-kilometer network; 761.8 kilometers double track; 1,023
kilometers electric railroads. Suburban lines connect to Seoul sub-
way system.
Major Ports: Pusan, Inch'on, Kunsan, Mokp'o, and Ulsan.
Civil Aviation: International airports at Seoul, Pusan, and Cheju.
Two airlines serve major domestic cities: Asiana Airlines and
Korean Air. Korean Air international service includes routes to
Japan, North America, Middle East, Soviet Union, and Western
Europe.
Telecommunications: Adequate domestic and international ser-
vices; approximately 9.2 million telephones in 1987; 42 million radio
receivers; by 1989 there were 79 AM and 46 FM radio stations;
256 television stations (57 of 1 kilowatt or greater) and 8.6 million
television sets; four satellite earth stations.
Government and Politics
System of Government: Constitution of Sixth Republic approved
October 1987; effective February 1988. Strong presidency; president
xvm
elected for one five-year-term by direct popular vote. 224 members
of 299-member National Assembly elected by popular vote for four-
year-term in April 1988; rest appointed by political parties according
to proportional formula.
Justice: Administration ofjustice as function of courts established
under Constitution and amended Court Organization Law of 1949.
Supreme Court highest organ of court system; appellate courts and
district courts. Constitution Court decides constitutionality of a law,
dissolution of a political party, impeachment, petitions relating to
Constitution, disputes between state agencies, or between state
agencies and local governments. Family Court adjudicates domestic
affairs and juvenile delinquency. Courts-martial have jurisdiction
over offenses committed by armed forces personnel and civilian
military employees.
Administrative Divisions: Nine provinces and six provincial-level
cities. Provinces divided into counties and ordinary cities; coun-
ties into townships and towns; townships into villages. Mostly part
of central government; increasing self-government.
Politics: Multiparty system, but political parties with contrary aims
or activities may be dissolved by Constitution Court.
Foreign Affairs: Member of most international organizations but
no formal membership in United Nations in mid- 1990. Mutual
defense treaty with United States, which along with Japan, one
of two most important foreign policy partners. Relations with
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) treated as
"internal" rather than "foreign"; public and private contacts in-
creasing.
National Security
Armed Forces: Active-duty personnel 650,000 (June 1989). Com-
ponent services: army, 575,000 (including 25,000 marines); air
force, 40,000; navy, 35,000. Reserve forces about 1.2 million in
1990. Compulsory service in army, navy, and air force, thirty to
thirty-six months.
Combat Units and Major Equipment: Ground Forces: three army
headquarters; equipment inventory includes 1,560 tanks and 1,550
armored personnel carriers, 12 surface-to-surface missiles. Air
Force: includes twenty-two ground attack/intercept squadrons and
one reconnaissance squadron; inventory includes 500 combat air-
craft. Navy: three fleet commands, one aviation command, one
amphibious command with minisubmarines, destroyers, frigates,
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missile-attack craft, minesweepers, patrol boats, and amphibious
craft.
Military Budget: 5 percent GNP, US$10 billion, 1989 estimate.
Military Production: Domestic defense industry begun in early
1970s provides approximately 70 percent of weapons, ammunition,
communication and other equipment, vehicles, clothing, and other
supplies to armed forces.
Internal Security Forces: Agency for National Security Planning
(ANSP), Defense Security Command, Korean National Police col-
lect domestic intelligence. Korean National Police strength 130,000
in 1989.
Foreign Military Treaties: Signatory to Republic of Korea-United






















































Figure 1. Administrative Divisions of South Korea, 1990
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Introduction
FOR NEARLY A HALF-CENTURY, the Republic of Korea
(South Korea) and the United States have maintained a close rela-
tionship. Since the mid-1980s, South Korea has been the seventh
or eighth largest trading partner of the United States, and the
United States has ranked as South Korea's first or second trading
partner. In 1990, nearly four decades after the end of the Korean
War (1950-53), Washington retained more than 45,000 troops on
the Korean Peninsula committed to the defense of South Korea.
During the 1991 conflict in the Persian Gulf, Seoul joined other
coalition partners of the United States and provided a military med-
ical team and several hundred million dollars in support of the cam-
paign to end the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait.
Ties between the two countries extend to language, education,
and culture. In 1991 English was the primary foreign language
studied in South Korea, and for some time it has been popularly
said that more Ph.Ds from American universities work for the South
Korean government than for the United States government.
Hundred of thousands of United States servicemen, businessmen,
Peace Corps volunteers, and missionaries have lived and worked
in South Korea, and as many as 1 .5 million South Koreans—one
fourth of all overseas Koreans—have emigrated to the United States.
The Korean Peninsula has been inhabited since paleolithic times,
and Korean historians trace the ethnic roots of the Korean people
at least as far back as the pottery-using cultures of the fourth and
third centuries B.C. Early tribal groups formed numerous federa-
tions, and over the centuries these combined into larger state-like
entities. Sometime before the fourth century B.C., at least one of
these entities had begun to refer to its leaders by the Chinese title
for king, wang. Three of these states, boasting an aristocratic so-
cial structure and centralized institutions of government, had come
to dominate Korea by the early centuries of the present era, con-
ducting trade and intermittent warfare with each other and with
China. Stretching down from Manchuria in the north was the king-
dom of Koguryo; in the southwest and southeast, respectively, the
kingdoms of Paekche and Silla held sway. Korean political, cul-
tural, and linguistic unity dates back to the unification of these three
kingdoms under Silla in the seventh century A.D., making Korea,
despite its present temporary division into two states, one of the
oldest unified nations in the world.
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Geographically poised between China and Japan, Korea devel-
oped its own social and cultural patterns. More deeply influenced
thanJapan by Chinese culture, Korea adopted the Chinese model
of monarchy and successive dynasties, rather than developing a
single imperial line from its early tribal federations. Yet Korea re-
tained its native preference for a strongly aristocratic social order
based on hereditary lineages. Korea also served as one of several
cultural bridges between its two regional neighbors, taking pride
in passing along advanced Chinese political, philosophical, reli-
gious, and literary ideas and models to what Koreans consistently
perceived as a less well-developed Japan.
Korea's geographic position often made it a focal point for re-
gional conflict. Recovering from two Japanese invasions in the late
sixteenth century and Manchu incursions several decades later,
Korea's last traditional dynasty—the kingdom of Choson (1392-
1910)—withdrew into self-protective isolation, stricdy regulating
travel and commerce with Japan while maintaining its tributary
status with China. This policy was increasingly challenged, how-
ever, during the nineteenth century, when Western diplomats,
traders, and adventurers sought to open all of East Asia, includ-
ing what they termed the Korean "Hermit Kingdom," to
European-style trade and diplomatic relations. In the end, Japan
forced open the Korean door, imposing a Western-style "unequal
treaty" on Korea in 1876.
At the turn of the century, Korea was the object of two wars
as China and Japan in turn fought to maintain footholds on the
peninsula and to exclude a Russia keenly interested in Korea's
warm-water ports. In the first half of the twentieth century, Korea
was victimized by several decades of colonization by Japan
(1910-45), becoming by the 1930s a stepping stone and industrial
base for Japanese military expansion into Manchuria and north-
ern China. Although many Koreans fought for independence from
Japanese rule, Korea's liberation in 1945 was brought about not
by Korean efforts but by the Allied victory over Japan and by the
division of Korea into two zones of occupation by the United States
and the Soviet Union. In the southern zone, the United States Army
Military Government in Korea lasted for three years before the
establishment of the Republic of Korea. South Korea's immedi-
ate postwar fate was dominated not only by the Cold War antago-
nism of the two great powers but also by seemingly irreconcilable
political differences among Koreans themselves. Separate and an-
tagonistic states controlled the two halves of the peninsula by 1948,
setting the stage for the considerable civil conflict that led to the
Korean War (1950-53).
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Given the tragic and bitter legacy of the loss of national indepen-
dence under Japanese colonial rule, the experience of national par-
tition in 1945, and the ensuing civil war, educational authorities
in South Korea have emphasized areas of national identity in school-
book treatments of Korean history and language. Despite many
differences among South Koreans, this carefully nourished national
consciousness centered perceptions on national independence and
the place of Korea on the stage of world history. Such thinking
underlies much of the vigorously pursued economic development
of the past three decades and also carried on a long tradition of
modern Korean thought. For example, after Japan seized control
of Korean foreign relations and military affairs in 1905, Korean
historian Ch'oe Nam-son compared the nation's parlous condition
with the glories of ancient Korean dynasties and asked, "How long
will it take us to accomplish the goal of flying our sacred national
flag above the world? ' ' As energetic national preparations for the
1988 Seoul Olympics—under the slogan "Korea to the world, the
world to Korea"—demonstrated, toward the end of the century
South Koreans still were striving for national success and an in-
ternational reputation in response to that same impulse.
South Korean urbanization—which increased by a rate of more
than 4 percent annually during the 1960s and 1970s—continued
at a slightly slower rate of 3 percent per year in the 1980s. Accord-
ing to the 1990 census, Seoul was one of the world's largest cities.
Its more than 10.6 million people accounted for almost one quarter
of the country's 43.5 million people. The concentration of the popu-
lation in Seoul prompted efforts by city planners to decentralize
government and other functions by moving some ministries and
agencies to Taejon. The growth of Seoul and other cities, although
partly caused by interurban migration, also was accompanied by
a reduction of the rural farming population, especially in the poorer
areas of the southwest. This migration was reflected in Seoul by
the numerous restaurants that offered regional specialties and by
the electoral districts that produced bloc votes for presidential can-
didates from one or another province in the December 1987
presidential election.
Another social change with political implications was the in-
creased emphasis on higher education during the 1980s. When army
General Chun Doo Hwan took power in 1980, he approved a plan
to double college and university enrollments within four years.
Perhaps, as some observers said, the change was intended to sub-
merge traditional student protest in a sea of aspiring professionals
and white-collar workers. Yet planners also knew that broader edu-
cation was vital to continued economic growth, inasmuch as the
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country's exports faced increasing competition from labor-rich
Third World countries and Seoul sought to shift to knowledge-
intensive and high-technology industries. By 1990, according to
a Ministry of Education study, one South Korean in four was a
student. The number of South Koreans in college by the late 1980s
comprised some 35 percent of the relevant age-group, a higher per-
centage than Japan or any country in the world except the United
States and the Philippines.
The changes in higher education corroded old political patterns
and in several ways may have set the stage for the political and
constitutional reforms of the late 1980s. With the spread of scien-
tific and technical education and the continued growth of a new
managerial elite, the military's claim—heard especially in the high-
growth years of the 1960s and early 1970s—to managerial and tech-
nical leadership became increasingly irrelevant. The more educated
populace also seemed less tolerant of press censorship and other
authoritarian practices. Meanwhile, increasing student enrollments
and the consequent rise in the number of college graduates in the
job pool created even greater discontent among many unemployed
and underemployed graduates and provided a setting in which a
small but increasingly radical student dissident movement—often
financed with sizable student association fees—could find its voice.
The steady modernization and urbanization of society were ac-
companied by a continued growth in nostalgia for Korea's past.
Even in the countryside, the 1980s saw a continuation of the late
1970s revival of folk arts, often supported by generous government
subsidies for regional festivals and * 'living cultural treasures"
—
experts in traditional technologies, crafts, and arts, such as architec-
ture, temple painting, or traditional p 'ansori folk opera. Shaman-
ism, ignored by modernizing elites in the 1950s and 1960s, was
much more openly practiced in the 1970s and 1980s, when it was
not unusual to see a new office building or major tourist hotel for-
mally opened with shamanistic rites. Many urban professionals en-
joyed taking their children to visit the Folk Village near Seoul where
they could examine a well-scrubbed reconstruction of nineteenth-
century country life and try to imagine a quieter, less hurried time.
The revival of traditional culture in the 1970s and 1980s cut across
class and political lines. It had a political dimension as well, seen
both in dissident student adaptations of traditional anti-aristocratic
mask dramas that lampooned the social and political establishment
and in government promotion of school trips to the shrine of
sixteenth-century naval hero Yi Sun- sin.
Religious commitment was strong for many South Koreans,
nearly half of whom were affiliated with an organized religious
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community in the 1980s. About 20 percent of the population was
Buddhist, whereas a somewhat larger and more rapidly growing
Christian community gave South Korea the second largest propor-
tion of Christians in Asia, following the Philippines. Although con-
servative on the whole, the country's Christian population also
included some of the most active elements of the political dissident
movement.
Confucianism was dominant during the last dynasty (1392-1910)
but declined in force as a political philosophy following the loss
of independence to Japan in 1910. Nevertheless, it retained a lin-
gering impact on social relations even in the early 1990s. Attempts
to revive Confucian ethical values, whether through the Park Chung
Hee government's campaign for filial piety and loyalty in the 1970s
or in occasional public seminars or newspaper editorials through
the early 1990s, reflected both a decline in the practice of Confu-
cianism as a living creed and the feeling of many South Koreans
that rapid modernization and the growth of materialism had created
an ethical vacuum.
Population policies begun in the 1960s continued their momen-
tum through the 1980s. Tax and medical insurance benefits for
smaller families, for example, provided additional incentives for
family planning in the early 1980s. The government also distributed
posters, such as one featuring an attractive young couple and the
slogan, "Have one child and raise it well." The effect of such ef-
forts continued to be felt in a decline in the number of primary
and middle school students; the number of middle school students
alone dropped by half a million during the 1980s. The success of
the family planning program was suggested by the desire of other
Asian countries to send officials to Seoul for training.
As the number of births per couple reached 1 .9 in 1990, the popu-
lation growth rate dropped to just over 0.9 percent from almost
1.6 a decade earlier, causing the Economic Planning Board to
predict serious labor shortages and to authorize importing increased
numbers of foreign workers. Many factories already had been com-
pensating for such shortfalls by hiring illegal immigrants (1,000
such workers were deported in 1990), or by breaking prevailing
patterns to hire married women in substantial numbers. By 1991
South Koreans also were beginning to reflect on the social and policy
implications of two emerging problems: a possible male-female im-
balance by the end of the 1990s, resulting from a continuing prefer-
ence for sons and use of family planning techniques; and projections
of a steadily increasing proportion of elderly in the population over
the coming two decades.
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South Korea's economic growth continued to be driven by the
import of raw materials and semi-finished components (the latter
proportionally declining in the late 1980s) and the export of finished
industrial products. Manufacturing accounted for more than 30
percent of the gross domestic product (GDP—see Glossary), aided
by the rapid modernization of technology and the continuous rein-
vestment of trade proceeds. By the end of the 1980s, the Republic
of Korea was the world's tenth largest steel producer and had made
major strides in mastering the production technologies required
for the home electronics and semiconductor industries. South
Korean-made televisions, personal computers, videocassette record-
ers, and microwave ovens increasingly became known under their
own brand names, although dependence onJapan for key compo-
nents and some assembly production for Japanese companies also
continued.
The automotive industry gained a firmer footing under close
government direction following overexpansion in the late 1970s.
Most of the growth in the early 1980s was fueled by overseas sales,
which began to boom in 1985, but also was stabilized by a rapidly
growing domestic market by the end of the decade. Textiles and
construction, both staples among the export industries in the 1970s,
continued to play an important role through the 1980s. As South
Korea's comparative advantage in labor became increasingly subject
to challenge from developing economies in Asia and elsewhere,
however, planners looked to even greater social investment in high-
technology fields, such as materials science, biotechnology, elec-
tronics, and aerospace, and to an economy that would become
technology-intensive sometime during the 1990s.
Growth in the service sector, comprising real estate, supply ser-
vices, entertainment, the hotel industry, and other services, con-
tinued in the late 1980s, outpacing increases in manufacturing. The
number of workers in service industries increased by 8 percent be-
tween 1988 and 1989, amounting to more than twice the rate of
increase in manufacturing-sector employees during the same period.
In the first half of 1990, the total number of workers in manufac-
turing declined for the first time since the early 1960s. In 1990 the
Economic Planning Board, concerned over this trend and a pro-
jected shortfall of 69,000 new manufacturing workers for the year,
announced its Industrial Manpower Supply Program. The pro-
gram was designed to stem the exodus of skilled manpower from
manufacturing industries by offering long-term workers preferred
admission to college and university night-school programs. The
government also prepared to use tax penalties and higher utility
rates to slow the growth in what it viewed as unproductive " con-
sumption industries."
xxvin
As South Korea continued to industrialize and urbanize during
the 1980s, the agricultural sector drifted into stepchild status. Offi-
cial support for rice prices dropped behind the rate of inflation in
the mid-1980s as Seoul attempted to reduce government costs.
Urban growth contributed to a series of problems. Young people
were sent to the cities for education or left the farms to seek em-
ployment and left behind a smaller and increasingly older farm
population. Young bachelor farmers had greater difficulty in finding
wives willing to undergo the rigors of rural life. Productivity gains
failed to keep up with changes in population, leading to greater
imports of wheat and soybeans. Rising land prices caused by the
housing squeeze and commercial and industrial construction gave
an impression of increased farmers' assets, even as modern
machinery costs and increased use of consumer credit contributed
to higher farm indebtedness. Tenancy increased from 21 percent
to more than 30 percent during the decade, as urban investors and
the larger scale farming encouraged by the government absorbed
increasingly scarce and costly farm lands. Average farm incomes
had fallen well below urban incomes by the end of the decade. By
1 990 many farmers could agree with the statement of the founder
of a matchmaking center for bachelor farmers that it was "time
to turn the government's attention to farmers' life and welfare."
Part of increasing farm indebtedness during the second half of
the 1980s was used to finance consumer durables that brought farm
families closer to national standards, even as the gap between rural
and urban incomes was increasing. A 1990 report of the Ministry
of Agriculture and Fisheries indicated that more than 90 percent
of rural households had refrigerators, electric rice cookers, and pro-
pane gas ranges. Even more significant were major increases in
rural ownership of consumer goods, such as telephones and color
television sets, which served to link rural families with national and
international developments and issues. Such linkage, in turn, may
have contributed both to an increasing awareness of the growing
rural-urban gap and to the politicization of farmers' movements
in response to foreign pressures to liberalize agricultural markets.
In political life, South Korea began the 1980s with an old pat-
tern. For the third time in two decades, a military leader or former
military leader declared a state of political crisis, rewrote the con-
stitution, and drove prominent civilian politicians from govern-
ment through farfetched legal charges or under the guise of
"political purification." Re-elected president in electoral college
voting in February 1981, former General Chun Doo Hwan con-
solidated his control through dominance over the court system, use
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of the state security apparatus, and tight restriction of the media.
By the second half of the decade, however, Chun's government
had lost considerable political capital. In the National Assembly
elections of 1985, Chun's Democratic Justice Party was able to re-
tain control of the legislature only through a system of proportion-
ality that converted its scant 35 percent of the popular vote into
54 percent of the seats. Polls taken in 1986 showed that only 41
percent of people queried expressed confidence in political leaders
and that less than 50 percent of respondents were satisfied with
the kind of society in which they lived. Dissatisfaction with govern-
ment control of the media was especially strong and was evident
in newspaper editorials and a popular campaign to withhold pay-
ment of compulsory viewers' fees to the state-run television network.
The gradual reemergence of banned political figures, such as
Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam, began in 1985 and culmi-
nated in the full restoration of political rights to all former politi-
cians in a political compromise between the ruling and opposition
political parties that followed severe civil disturbances inJune 1987.
Subsequent events marked a watershed in South Korean politics.
First, the government removed virtually all restrictions on the
media. Next, in late 1987, the Constitution was revised—the first
constitutional revision since 1960 that was drafted through a process
of multiparty discussions. The 1987 revision promised substantial
changes in the unequal power relationships among the three
branches of government that had prevailed at least since the in-
ception of theyusin constitution in 1972. Under the new fundamen-
tal law, the president lost the power to rule through emergency
decrees and to dissolve the legislature. The National Assembly
gained new rights to investigate state affairs, to hold longer an-
nual sessions, and to approve Supreme Court appointments. These
and other constitutional provisions pointed to more potential au-
tonomy for the legislature, the court system, and for the constitu-
tional review of legislation.
The presidential election of December 1987 placed a former army
general, Roh Tae Woo of the ruling Democratic Justice Party, in
the Blue House, or presidential mansion. A minority president,
he won only 36 percent of the votes cast. Kim Young Sam and
Kim Dae Jung, who together accounted for 54 percent of the votes,
accused Roh's party of election fraud, while apologizing to the pub-
lic for their failure to agree between themselves on a unified oppo-
sition candidacy. The charge of fraud on a scale great enough to
have swung the election was undermined at the time by the frag-
mentary and anecdotal evidence presented and by the insistence
of each of the two Kims that he was the one who would have
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prevailed in the absence of government misconduct. In 1990,
however, the government admitted to one serious legal breach
—
the diversion of more than US$14 million dollars from the 1987
national budget to support Roh's election campaign. For some ob-
servers, it remained an open question whether other large-scale
irregularities may have occurred, or what further steps the govern-
ment might have taken to ensure victory had the two major oppo-
sition candidates been unified.
In the National Assembly elections held in April 1988, the rul-
ing party lost a working majority for the first time in South Korea's
history. The new balance of forces in the legislature made a re-
ality of the separation of powers provided for in the new Constitu-
tion when opposition assembly members joined forces to reject
President Roh's first appointment for chiefjustice of the Supreme
Court in the summer of 1988. Through the rest of 1988 and 1989,
additional signs of the new order were seen in the distribution of
committee chairmanships among the ruling and opposition par-
ties and in the process of compromise, as floor leaders of the four
principal parties periodically met to negotiate working agendas for
the legislature and its committees. As 1989 ended, Roh's party was
engaged in secret negotiations with two of the three opposition par-
ties to bring this process of compromise under firmer control.
As a result of these talks, Roh's party merged with Kim Young
Sam's Reunification Democratic Party and Kim Chong-p'il's New
Democratic Republican Party to create a new Democratic Liberal
Party (DLP) in January 1990. Some observers likened the result-
ing coalition to Japan's Liberal Democratic Party. Each of the
former opposition party leaders clearly hoped to become an im-
portant power broker within the ruling party and perhaps also to
become the party's candidate for the 1992 presidential election.
In the short term, the formation of the DLP provided the presi-
dent with a substantial majority in the National Assembly, while
politically isolating his most uncompromising political opponent,
Kim Dae Jung. Seen in longer-term perspective, the merger cur-
tailed the broader processes of compromise and cooperation in the
National Assembly that had included even Kim's Party for Peace
and Democracy (PPD) in 1988 and 1989. It further put the new
ruling party in the awkward position of having to pass important
legislation in the absence of opposition politicians, who boycotted
the legislature on several occasions during 1990. The merger also
complicated factional politics within the ruling party.
Although politicians were permitted to change parties under the
1987 Constitution and related laws, Kim Dae Jung immediately
labelled the move a "coup d'etat against representative politics"
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and called, unsuccessfully, for new elections. A small number of
legislators from Kim Young Sam's party also objected to the new
super-party and eventually formed the small Democratic Party.
Kim Dae Jung's isolated Party for Peace and Democracy spent
much of 1990 and early 1991 fulminating against the DLP and
attempting to embarrass the government politically by boycotting
National Assembly sessions or attempting to resign. The disengage-
ment of the PPD often seemed to leave it marginalized and unable
to contribute to major legislation or even to influence issues in which
it had an immediate political interest, such as the scheduling of
small district local elections in March 1991 . Awareness of the costs
of intransigence may have prompted a more moderate approach
in the second half of 1991. In private talks with President Roh in
September, Kim DaeJung successfully lobbied for several regional
development projects in the Cholla region.
By mid- 1991 the DLP coalition was beginning to show signs of
strain, brought about by differences over questions such as the tim-
ing of the upcoming 1992 presidential and National Assembly elec-
tions and disagreement over how the party's presidential candidate
would be chosen. On most such issues, Kim Chong-p'il and Presi-
dent Roh formed a mini-coalition within the party, opposed by
Kim Young Sam and his followers. Competition for the party's
presidential nomination reintensified after National Assembly elec-
tions in March 1992, in which the DLP won slightly less than 50
percent of the seats. The DLP was able to recover a bare majority
by absorbing several members who had run as independents.
Kim Dae Jung's party encountered major defeats in local
elections in March andJune 1991 . It subsequently absorbed small
numbers of opposition lawmakers, becoming in turn the New
Democratic Party and finally, under Kim's joint leadership with
Yi Ki-t'aek, the Democratic Party (DP) in September. The DP,
which included some members from outside the Cholla region, con-
tinued to fight the ruling DLP across a variety of issues, including
tax and budget policy, hyperinflation in urban land prices, and
corruption. Like the Kim Young Sam faction within the DLP, the
DP opposed possible revision of the Constitution to create a
parliamentary system of government. In National Assembly elec-
tions in March 1992, the DP won a respectable 31.1 percent of
the seats.
Outside the world of the parties, other features of political life
changed during the 1980s. Professional associations and interest
groups, long under the domination of the state, began to strive for
more autonomy. Farmers' associations—traditionally little more
than mechanisms for communicating government policies—began
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to proliferate and to protest trade liberalization measures. Profes-
sional associations of university teachers, journalists, and lawyers
also became increasingly outspoken on political issues. The major
business conglomerates
—
chaebol—sought a greater role in economic
policy formation. The voices of industrial associations were heard
more clearly as the respective economic ministries began to gain
influence within a less centralized state planning structure. At the
fringes of politics, an extremist wing of the leftist student move-
ment conducted sporadic violence through the 1980s. The violence
peaked in dozens of arson or Molotov cocktail assaults against
government offices, commercial establishments, police boxes, and
United States diplomatic and cultural facilities in late 1988 and
1989.
South Korea's diplomacy during the 1980s, while remaining
oriented toward the West, also aggressively pursued closer ties with
China, the Soviet Union, and East European countries. Trade with
these countries, obscured by Seoul's nonpublication of the rele-
vant import-export statistics, continued to grow throughout the de-
cade, and was matched by a variety of other contacts, culminating
in the participation of the Soviet Union, China, and all the major
East European countries in the 1988 Seoul Olympics. These ef-
forts, which South Korea termed pukpang chongch'aek, meaning
"Nordpolitik" or northern policy, were intended to diversify the
country's global trade relations and to give Seoul greater leverage
in its difficult relationship with the Democratic People's Republic
of Korea (North Korea).
Seoul's northern policy alone would probably have accomplished
little without the dramatic liberalizing reforms in East European
countries, which made it possible for South Korea to establish diplo-
matic relations with all nations of Eastern Europe by the end of
the 1980s. The opening of diplomatic relations with the Soviet
Union in September 1990 followed a series of high-level bilateral
meetings in 1989 and early 1990.
South Korea's two-way trade with communist countries increased
by one-third in 1990 to reach an estimated US$5.6 billion. Increased
trade relations with the Soviet Union followed closely on the heels
of the 1988 Seoul Olympics, driven by Moscow's perception that
South Korea could play an important role in the development of
the Soviet Far East. As with other East European countries, South
Korea's exports to the Soviet Union were heavily concentrated in
electrical and electronic appliances. During 1990 and early 1991,
news of bilateral exchanges, civil aviation agreements, and pend-
ing commercial deals between the chaebol and the Soviet Union filled
the South Korean press. By the end of 1991 , South Korea had paid
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or approved slightly more than half of a promised US$3 billion
package of loans, commodity credits, and project assistance to the
Soviet Union, and it was expected that Seoul's aid program would
continue with the new Commonwealth of Independent States.
Trade with China, which began with quiet transactions in the
late 1970s, was estimated to have reached US$1 billion in 1985
and more than US$5 billion in 1991 . The importance of the Seoul-
Beijing economic relationship was demonstrated in the establish-
ment of trade offices with limited consular functions in the two cap-
itals in October 1991 and a trade agreement two months later, in
which South Korea and China exchanged most-favored-nation sta-
tus. The political component in such trade remained prominent,
as evidenced in Seoul's tolerance for sustained balance of payments
deficits. In the case of trade with China, such deficits grew from
US$1.2 billion in 1989 to a projected US$2 billion for 1991.
Probably because China remained more sensitive than the Soviet
Union to North Korea's reactions, progress in moving toward diplo-
matic relations between Seoul and Beijing was slower than the
moves establishing formal trade ties. In the mid-1980s, the two
countries had increased quasi-diplomatic contacts to include a num-
ber of negotiations to resolve a series of sea and air incidents, and
China permitted South Korea's attendance at international con-
ferences and meetings of United Nations organizations in China.
The two countries also participated jointly in a variety of athletic
competitions and sports exchanges. In September 1990, China ex-
tended courtesy diplomatic status to South Korean athletic offi-
cials attending the Asian Games in Beijing; and by mutual
agreement senior diplomats in the trade representative offices held
formal diplomatic immunities and privileges under the Vienna Con-
vention, reportedly performing consular as well as commercial
duties. Beijing sent a vice foreign minister to the Seoul meeting
of the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia
and the Pacific in April 1991; South Korean-Chinese discussions
during the meeting provided the highest level official contact to
that date between the two countries. In May 1991, when it be-
came clear that China would no longer support its North Korean
ally by vetoing South Korea's membership in the United Nations,
some observers believed that the two countries had moved even
closer to establishing formal diplomatic ties.
Over the past two decades, South Korea's relations with North
Korea have been characterized by alternating periods of tension
and dialogue. A joint communique issued by the two countries on
July 4, 1972, agreed to continue discussions concerning political
and military questions and confidence-building measures to be
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implemented through a North-South Coordinating Committee and
Red Cross channels. Through the 1970s, however, further discus-
sions stalled as each side reaffirmed its position in an effort to claim
and retain the initiative and to deny legitimacy to the other side.
In early 1980, the two countries for the first time referred to each
other by their official names and agreed to work toward prime
ministers' talks. By the following year, negotiations stalled again
after P'yongyang made a number of political demands on the Chun
Doo Hwan government—including withdrawal of United States
troops from South Korea—as a precondition for further talks and
also sponsored an abortive attempt to have Chun assassinated by
two Canadian gangsters. A second attempt—a bombing in October
1983—failed to kill the South Korean president but killed four cabi-
net ministers and thirteen other officials during a state visit to Ran-
goon, Burma. In 1984 Seoul rejected Pyongyang's proposals for
three-way talks that would have included Washington but excluded
South Korea from key discussions on military topics. Bilateral dis-
cussions during the same year concerning a joint Olympics team
failed to achieve results in time for the Los Angeles Olympics in
July.
After South Korean acceptance of North Korean rice, cement,
and medicine for southern flood victims in September 1984, the
two sides conducted talks and some exchanges on a range of issues
for a sixteen-month period through early 1986. These discussions
in the mid-1980s were sometimes acrimonious and frequently in-
terrupted, each side presenting proposals, as one observer noted,
that almost seemed intended to provoke rejection by the other or
to play to the galleries of world opinion. In retrospect, however,
it can be seen that the mid-1980s discussions were successful in
establishing institutions for dialogue on both sides and in laying
down multiple channels of contact and communication that con-
tinued to function through the early 1990s.
A series of talks to reunite families separated by national divi-
sion and the war took dozens ofRed Cross representatives and even
more journalists from each side across the Demarcation Line dur-
ing three visits in 1984. In September 1985, several dozen North
Koreans and South Koreans met with separated family members,
and a similar number of folk art performers from each side gave
concerts in the two capitals.
In the area of economic cooperation, vice-ministerial level con-
ferences met at P'anmunjom on a number of occasions during 1984
and 1985, exploring for the first time specific trade, transporta-
tion, and other joint projects. South Korean and North Korean
legislators met twice inJuly 1985 to explore political issues. Bilateral
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discussions began in 1984 concerning a North Korean proposal
to cohost the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games. After an interlude fol-
lowing the North Korean bombing of a South Korean airliner over
the Andaman Sea in November 1987, Olympic talks continued
through mid- 1988, when they broke down in disagreement over
the number of games to be hosted in P'yongyang.
The two Koreas continued to talk past each other concerning
broader political issues during much of 1988 and 1989. President
Ron's July 1988 proposal for freer contacts and expanded exchanges
between the two Koreas and the eventual establishment of a Korean
commonwealth was met with North Korean reiteration of Kim II
Sung's 1972 proposal for a transitional Democratic Confederal
Republic of Korea. Meanwhile, Seoul began to disclose the exis-
tence of a quiet trade relationship between the two countries and
in early 1989 allowed a major industrialist to travel to P'yongyang
to discuss additional forms of economic cooperation. North Korea
generally welcomed these steps but also continued to demand abro-
gation of South Korea's National Security Act, under which Seoul
prosecuted several unauthorized South Korean travellers to North
Korea.
An important breakthrough in relations between the two Koreas
began in 1990, which saw the beginning of a series of prime
ministerial talks. Held alternately in Seoul and P'yongyang, these
garnered substantial publicity but little progress until mid- 1991,
when it became clear that Seoul had won China's support for its
plan to have both Koreas simultaneously admitted to the United
Nations. That event took place in September. During the fourth
round of prime ministers' talks in P'yongyang in October, the two
Koreas agreed to work on a nonaggression accord. This document,
the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Exchange and
Cooperation, was signed in Seoul on December 13, 1991. It took
effect in mid-February 1992, at the time of the sixth round of prime
ministerial talks in P'yongyang. In late December 1991, the two
Koreas signed a separate agreement barring either side from hav-
ing or using nuclear weapons.
Although the new agreement was in itself a landmark, observers
noted that it was essentially a promissory note, in which the two
Koreas pledged to cease negative actions toward each other and to
continue to work toward resolution of several important issues. These
issues included a declaration of nonaggression, a separate peace
treaty, and measures to promote free travel and correspondence.
The question of mutual inspection of nuclear facilities, which South
Korea held to be of overriding importance, still was being discussed
by working-level negotiators in late March 1992.
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South Korea's relationship with the United States increasingly
was focused on bilateral economic issues, spurred by a current ac-
count surplus that began in the mid-1980s and increasing United
States pressures to open South Korean markets for agricultural and
industrial products as well as telecommunications and finance ser-
vices. These issues posed a problem not only for South Korean
diplomacy, but also contributed to often tumultuous domestic criti-
cism of Seoul whenever it appeared to show signs of weakness in
negotiations with Washington.
An important issue in South Korean-United States relations dur-
ing the 1980s was the joint security relationship. This relationship
not only encompassed technical issues such as the size, composi-
tion, financial support, and legal status of United States forces sta-
tioned in South Korea, but also included a psychological dimension
because of the popularly perceived role of the joint United States-
Republic ofKorea Combined Forces Command in the brutal kill-
ings of civilians in Kwangju in May 1980 during the coup d'etat
of Chun Doo Hwan. Facts surrounding the Kwangju incident
—
deliberately distorted under Chun Doo Hwan's martial law
authorities—remained unclarified until the United States govern-
ment issued a detailed statement on the subject in 1989. The state-
ment, prepared in response to a South Korean National Assembly
query, showed that the United States had not approved the coup
and that the troops used in Kwangju in 1980 were not under oper-
ational control of the Combined Forces Command but had taken
their orders from South Korean army authorities under General
Chun.
The Korean War permanently enhanced the role of the mili-
tary in South Korean society and politics as well as in the defense
of the nation. Although South Korean military officers did not seek
to intervene actively in politics under the rule of President Syng-
man Rhee (1948-60), the coups d'etat of generals Park Chung Hee
in 1961 and Chun Doo Hwan in 1980 demonstrated that some ele-
ments in the army believed that the nation's security demanded
periodic corrections in the course of politics as well as prepared-
ness against North Korea. The army's influence on society and
politics during the 1980s continued to be seen in the laws that
prevented the news media from freely covering political-military
issues, mandatory student participation in the college-level Stu-
dent Defense Corps, the custom of preferential placement of re-
tired senior officers in the civil service and in state-run corporations,
and in the frequent practice of punitively drafting students expelled
for demonstrating against the government. At an even broader level,
harsh discipline within the military probably provided the most
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significant political socialization for the more than 75 percent of
South Korean males who served in the regular army, the reserves,
or the Homeland Reserve Force.
Many of these practices were the subject of reforms outlined in
the Ministry of National Defense White Paper in 1988, when the
Roh administration abolished the Student Defense Corps and made
efforts to standardize conscription practices and to provide some
protection to the rights of recruits. As opinion surveys conducted
in 1990 indicated, however, the public continued to support re-
forms that would improve conditions of service, eliminate preferen-
tial placement of retired military officers in the civil service, and
move military installations away from populated areas. In the same
year, the government promulgated additional regulations intended
to reduce the more severe aspects of military life and protect the
basic rights of recruits.
As the 1990s began, however, some observers believed that
change in many military practices would come slowly. One of the
most outspoken criticisms, voiced in a South Korean army publi-
cation in 1990, was by an army major general who charged that
"a trend characterized by assaults, abusive language and torture
prevails in the barracks." He called upon the army to reform it-
self to regain the trust of the public. The charges were given addi-
tional credence two months later when a former marine corps officer
was convicted on charges of torturing a subordinate. In October
1990, the minister of national defense was relieved of his position
after a former undercover agent of the Defense Security Command
disclosed that the military counterintelligence organization had con-
tinued to maintain dossiers and conduct surveillance on some 1 ,300
prominent civilians, including politicians, clergymen, and jour-
nalists. The government pledged its efforts to return the Defense
Security Command to its original function. The following year,
however, the government admitted as true new media charges that
the DSC was investigating several student activists.
Under President Chun Doo Hwan's force modernization pro-
gram, military spending increased dramatically during the 1980s,
exceeding estimated North Korean military spending during most
of the decade and nearly doubling to US$10 billion a year by 1990.
As a result of improvements in the defense industrial base that began
in the mid-1970s, 70 percent of the equipment and weaponry used
by the armed forces was being produced by domestic defense in-
dustries by the late 1980s.
At the end of the 1980s, the armed forces numbered about
650,000. The army continued to divide responsibilities among three
commands. The First Army and the Third Army defended the
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country from the threat of North Korean attack in their positions
along the Demilitarized Zone. The Second Army, positioned well
south of Seoul, was charged with logistical and training responsi-
bilities and managing the military reserve system. Some of the coun-
try's forward defense was also provided by the marine corps, which
was charged with defense of the Han River estuary and five is-
lands located close to North Korea. Specialized army units, such
as the Capital Defense Command, defended the seat of govern-
ment, while the Defense Security Command in Seoul was respon-
sible for military counterintelligence and monitoring politics within
and outside of the military.
The air force expanded its fighter squadrons during the 1980s,
operating almost 700 combat, transport, and training aircraft under
its three commands. In wartime, it assumed control of civilian air-
ports and sections of major highways adapted for use as runways.
During the 1980s, the air force added the F-16 and the Republic
of Korea-United States coproduced F-5 to its fighter inventory.
The smaller navy also modernized during the decade, focusing on
antisubmarine warfare and the deployment of new, domestically
produced submarines, frigates, fast-attack craft, and patrol boats.
In 1 990 Roh moved the headquarters of the army and air force
(with navy to follow) to Taejon in an effort to promote more effec-
tive interservice cooperation and more efficient command and con-
trol of the armed forces during wartime. In that same year, the
armed forces began a three- to five-year plan to reorganize the com-
mand structure. Under the Armed Forces Organization Act passed
in July and promulgated in October, the joint chiefs of staff sys-
tem in use since the Korean War would be replaced with a more
centralized Joint Chiefs of Staff headquarters in which operational
control of the military forces would be centralized in the hands of
the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The new Joint Chiefs
of Staff structure was designed to give Seoul a wartime command
structure separate from the United States-Republic of Korea Com-
bined Forces Command.
Fundamental to the restructuring was the separation of the oper-
ational and administrative functions immediately below the minister
of national defense. Under the reorganization, which took effect
on Armed Forces Day, October 1, 1990, the minister of national
defense defined military policy, consolidated planning, and allo-
cated resources. The newly invigorated Joint Chiefs of Staff had
the authority to employ military units of all the military services,
including task forces organization for joint operations. Unified oper-
ations, strategic planning, intelligence, and logistic directorates con-
solidated functions previously controlled by the separate services,
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and the service headquarters were reduced to maintenance, sup-
port, logistics, personnel, and administrative functions. The ser-
vices were to have reduced intelligence organizations, but most of
their intelligence assets were to be transferred to the newly created
Joint Chiefs of Staff Defense Intelligence Command.
The 45,000 United States troops in Korea in 1990 included a
small contingent at P'anmunjom with the United Nations Com-
mand, some 32,000 United States Army members under the Eighth
Army, and 12,000 United States Air Force personnel under the
Seventh Air Force. Military issues relating to the Combined Forces
Command and other topics were discussed in annual bilateral Secu-
rity Consultative Meetings and in other joint talks. In April 1990,
the United States Department of Defense announced a program
to shift gradually the United States military presence in South Korea
to a smaller and more supportive role as international political con-
ditions and strengthened South Korean defense capabilities per-
mitted. As part of this program, the United States and South Korea
also agreed to disband the United States-Republic of Korea Com-
bined Field Army and to separate the Ground Component Com-
mand from the Combined Forces Command during the 1991-93
period. The two countries further agreed to appoint a South Korean
senior officer as commander of the Ground Component Command
and to replace the senior member of the United Nations Command
to the Military Armistice Commission (MAC)—who had been a
United States officer since the signing of the armistice in 1953—with
a South Korean general. The appointment of a South Korean army
major general to the senior MAC position was made in March 1991
.
At the twenty-second Security Consultative Meeting in Novem-
ber 1990, Seoul agreed to increase its financial support for United
States forces stationed in South Korea from US$2.7 billion in 1990
to US$2.8 billion the following year. This figure includes valua-
tions for contributions in real estate, logistics support, discounted
costs, and tax. Other issues discussed included Seoul's requests for
eased United States restrictions on its exports of coproduced mili-
tary hardware and improved terms for United States Foreign Mili-
tary Sales to South Korea. Discussions also occurred concerning
possible reductions in the Team Spirit exercise scheduled for 1991,
in part because of United States military commitments in the Per-
sian Gulf and in part because of budgetary reasons. The exercise
was reduced in scale in 1990 and 1991 and cancelled in 1992
In January 1991, South Korea and the United States signed an
amended Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) governing the legal
position of United States forces in South Korea. This agreement, the
first major revision of the 1966 SOFA, expanded Seoul's criminal
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jurisdiction over United States personnel. Other provisions of the
agreement concerned customs procedures and the disposition of
property no longer used by United States forces in South Korea.
In 1991 President Bush announced that the United States would
withdraw its nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula, and later
in the year, in a statement accepted by United States authorities,
President Roh Tae Woo declared that the country was free of such
weapons. In 1989 the United States had stated that North Korea
had a plutonium reprocessing facility theoretically capable of sup-
porting nuclear weapons development. By mid- 1991, United States,
Japanese, and South Korean estimates held that North Korea was
much closer to producing a nuclear weapon than previously real-
ized. By the end of the year, North Korea, which had signed the
Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1985, still
had not set a date for on-site inspections of nuclear facilities by
the International Atomic Energy Agency. In the joint statement
issued after the close of the twenty-third United States-Republic
of Korea Security Consultative Meeting in November 1991, both
countries declared that they had "agreed to postpone the second
stage reduction of United States forces in Korea until such time
as the North Korean threat and uncertainties of developing nuclear
weapons have disappeared and the security in this region is fully
guaranteed." This fact meant that withdrawals would stop once
United States forces were drawn down to the 36,000 target for stage
one. It was also confirmed at the meeting that the United States-
Republic of Korea Combined Field Army would be dissolved and
that a Korean general would be made Combined Forces Command
ground component commander in 1992, further decreasing the
United States profile.
March 31, 1992 William Shaw
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Chapter 1. Historical Setting
Panghwasuru Pavilion, port of Suwon Castle
A SMALL COUNTRY, approximately the size of Britain, Korea
is located on a peninsula that protrudes southward from the north-
eastern corner of the Asian continent. It is an old country, whose
people evolved as one nation from the seventh century until 1945,
when the country was divided by the United States and the Soviet
Union at the end of World War II. The ensuing cold war created
two Korean governments, one in the north known as the Demo-
cratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), and another in the south
known as the Republic of Korea (ROK). The two Koreas engaged
in a bitter war between 1950 and 1953 and remained divided as
of 1990, even though the two governments began to talk to each
other in 1971.
South Korea and North Korea took distinctly different paths of
development after they were divided. By 1990 North Korea had
emerged as a staunch communist society, while South Korea was
evolving into a liberal democracy after many years of military dic-
tatorship. The two societies, however, shared a common tradition
and culture.
Origins of the Korean Nation
As is true of all countries, Korea's geography was a major fac-
tor in shaping its history; geography also influenced the manner
in which the inhabitants of the peninsula emerged as a people shar-
ing the common feeling of being Koreans (see Physical Environ-
ment, ch. 2). The Korean Peninsula protrudes southward from
the northeastern corner of the Asian continent and is surrounded
on three sides by large expanses of water. Although Japan is not
far from the southern tip of this landmass, in ancient times events
on the peninsula were affected far more by the civilizations and
political developments on the contiguous Asian continent than by
those in Japan (see fig. 1).
Because the Yalu and Tumen rivers have long been recognized
as the border between Korea and China, it is easy to assume that
these rivers have always constituted Korea's northern limits. But
such was not the case in the ancient period. Neither of the rivers
was considered to be sacrosanct by the ancient tribes that dotted
the plains of Manchuria and the Korean Peninsula. Because the
rivers freeze in the winter, large armies were able to traverse them
with ease. Even when the rivers were not frozen, armies equipped
with iron tools could easily build ships to cross them.
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The Korean people trace their origins to the founding of the state
of Choson. Choson rose on the banks of the Taedong River in the
northwestern corner of the peninsula and prospered as a civiliza-
tion possessing a code of law and a bronze culture. The Choson
people gradually extended their influence not only over other tribes
in the vicinity, but also to the north, conquering most of the Liao-
dong Basin. However, the rising power of the feudal state of Yen
in northern China (1122-225 B.C.) not only checked Choson's
growth, but eventually pushed it back to the territory south of the
Ch'ongch'on River, located midway between the Yalu and Taedong
rivers. The Chinese had discovered iron by this time and used it
extensively in farming and warfare; the Choson people were not
able to match them. Yen became established in the territory vacated
by Choson.
Meanwhile, much of what subsequentiy came to constitute China
proper had been unified for the first time under Qin Shi Huangdi.
Subsequently, Yen fell to the Qin state; the Qin Dynasty (221-207
B.C.) was in turn replaced by a new dynasty, the Han (206 B.C.
-
A.D. 220). In 195 B.C. a former officer ofYen took over the throne
of Choson by trickery, after which he and his descendants ruled
the kingdom for eighty years; but in 109-108 B.C. China attacked
Choson and destroyed it as a political entity. The Han Chinese
then ruled the territory north of the Han River as the Four Eastern
Districts; the original territory of Choson became Lolang (or Nang-
nang in Korean). (North Korean historians have argued that the
Lolang District was located more to the northwest of the Korean
Peninsula, perhaps near Beijing. This theory, however, has not
been universally accepted.) Until the Han period, the Korean
Peninsula had been a veritable Chinese colony. During some 400
years, Lolang, the core of the colony, had become a great center
of Chinese art, philosophy, industry, and commerce. Many Chinese
immigrated into the area; the influence of China extended
beyond the territory it administered. The tribal states south of the
Han River paid tribute to the Chinese and patterned much of their
civilization and government after Chinese models.
The Three Kingdoms Period
The territory south of the Han River is relatively distant from
the Asian continent; hence, the people living there were initially
able to develop independently, without much involvement with
events on the continent. The early settlers of this region gradually
organized themselves into some seventy clan states that were in
turn grouped into three tribal confederations known as Chinhan,
Mahan, and Pyonhan. Chinhan was situated in the middle part of
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the peninsula, Mahan in the southwest, and Pyonhan in the
southeast. Their economies were predominantly agricultural, and
their level of development was such that they built reservoirs and
irrigation facilities. These tribal states began to be affected by what
was happening in the region north of the Han River around the
first century B.C.
About the middle of the third century A.D., the Chinese threat
began to serve as a unifying political force among the loose con-
federations of tribes in the southern part of the peninsula. Adopt-
ing the Chinese political system as a model, the tribes eventually
merged into two kingdoms, thereby increasing their chances of sur-
vival against Chinese expansionism. The two kingdoms eventually
came to play an important role in Korean history.
Geographic features of the southern parts of the land, in partic-
ular the configuration of mountain ranges, caused two kingdoms
to emerge rather than one. In the central part of Korea, the main
mountain range, the T'aebaek Range, runs north to south along
the edge of the Sea of Japan, which lies off the east coast of the
peninsula. Approximately three-fourths of the way down the penin-
sula, however, at roughly the thirty-seventh parallel, the moun-
tain range veers southwest, dividing the peninsula almost in the
middle. This extension, the Sobaek Range, proved politically sig-
nificant; the tribes west of it were not shielded by any natural bar-
riers against the Chinese-occupied portion of the peninsula, whereas
those to the southeast were protected. Moreover, the presence of
the mountains prevented the tribes in the two regions from estab-
lishing close contacts.
The tribal states in the southwest were the first to unite, calling
their centralized kingdom Paekche. This process occurred in the
mid-third century A.D., after the Chinese army of the Wei Dy-
nasty (A.D. 220-65), which controlled Lolang, threatened the tribes
in A.D. 245. The Silla Kingdom evolved in the southeast. Silla
historians traced the kingdom's origin to 57 B.C., but contemporary
historians regard King Naemul (A.D. 356-402) as having been the
earliest ruler. Some of the tribal states in the area of the lower Nak-
tong River, along the south central coast of the peninsula, did not
join either of these kingdoms. Under the name Kaya, they formed
a league of walled city-states that conducted extensive coastal trade
and also maintained close ties with the tribal states in westernJapan.
Sandwiched between the more powerful Silla and Paekche, Kaya
eventually was absorbed by its neighbors during the sixth century
(see fig. 2).
The northern kingdom of Koguryo emerged from among the
indigenous people along the banks of the Yalu River. The Han
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ca. A.D. 475 ca. A.D. 575
— — — Kingdom boundary 50 100 150 Kilometers
• Populated place 25 50 100 150 Miles
Figure 2. Korea During the Three Kingdoms Period, Fifth to Sixth Cen-
turies A.D.
Chinese seized the area in 108 B.C., but from the beginning
Chinese rulers confronted many uprisings against their rule. Start-
ing from a point along the Hun River (a tributary of the Yalu),
the rebels expanded their activities to the north, south, and
southeast, increasingly menacing Chinese authority. By A.D. 53
Koguryo had coalesced into an independent centralized kingdom;
the subsequent fall of the Han Dynasty and ensuing political divi-
sions in China enabled Koguryo to consolidate and extend its power.
Despite repeated attacks by Chinese and other opposition forces,
by 391 the kingdom's rulers had achieved undisputed control of
all of Manchuria east of the Liao River as well as of the northern
and central regions of the Korean Peninsula. Koguryo 's best-known
ruler, King Kwanggaet'o—whose name literally means "broad ex-
pander of territory"—lived to be only thirty-nine years of age, but
reigned twenty-one years, from 391 to 412. During that period,
Kwanggaet'o conquered 65 walled cities and 1,400 villages, in ad-
dition to aiding Silla when it was attacked by the Japanese. His
accomplishments are recorded on a monument erected in 414 in
southern Manchuria. Koguryo moved its capital to P'yongyang in
427 and ruled the territory north of the Han River. But Koguryo 's
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expansion caused it to come into conflict with the Sui Dynasty of
China (581-617) in the west and Silla, which was beginning to ex-
pand northward, in the south.
Although Koguryo had been strong enough to repulse the forces
of the Sui Dynasty, combined attacks by Silla and the Tang Dy-
nasty of China (618-907) proved too formidable. Koguryo' s ally
in the southwest, Paekche, fell before Tang and Silla in 660; the
victorious allies continued their assault on Koguryo for the next
eight years and eventually vanquished the weary kingdom, which
had been suffering from a series of famines and internal strife.
Silla thus unified Korea in 668, but the kingdom's reliance on
China's Tang Dynasty had its price. Eventually Silla had to forcibly
resist the imposition of Chinese rule over the entire peninsula, which
Silla' s rulers did, but their strength did not extend beyond the Tae-
dong River. Much of the former Koguryo territory was given up
to the Chinese and to other tribal states. It remained for later dy-
nasties to push the border northward to the Yalu and Tumen rivers.
The Evolution of Korean Society
After the Three Kingdoms period, Korea witnessed the rise and
fall of three dynasties—unified Silla (668-935), Koryo (918-1392),
and Choson (1392-1910). Each of these dynasties was marked by
initial periods of consolidation, the flourishing of civilization, and
eventual decline.
Silla
The first 215 years of the Silla Dynasty were marked by the estab-
lishment of new political, legal, and education institutions of con-
siderable vigor. Domestic and foreign trade (with Tang China and
Japan) prospered. Scholarship in Confucian learning, mathematics,
astronomy, and medicine also flourished. Buddhism, introduced to
the peninsula in A.D. 372, reached its zenith (see Religion, ch. 2).
Silla began to decline, however, in the latter part of the eighth
century when rebellions began to shake its foundations. By the latter
half of the ninth century, two rivals had emerged. The chaotic sit-
uation eventually led to the emergence of a new Koryo Dynasty
in 918 under a former officer, Wang Kon.
KoryO
The founder of Koryo and his heirs consolidated control over
the peninsula and strengthened its political and economic founda-
tions by more closely following the bureaucratic and land-grant
systems of Tang China. The rise of the Kitan Liao tribe in the
north, however, threatened the new dynasty. The Liao invaded
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in 1010; Koryo was engulfed in devastating wars for a decade. After
peace was restored, Koryo' s inhabitants witnessed nearly a century
of thriving commercial, intellectual, and artistic activities parallel
to those taking place under the Song Dynasty (960-1279) in China.
The Koryo leaders actively sought to imitate the Song's advanced
culture and technology. In turn, the Song looked upon Koryo as
a potential ally against the tribal invaders to whom it had been
forced to abandon northern China in 1127. Stimulated by the rise
of printing in Song China, Koryo also made great headway in print-
ing and publication, leading to the invention of movable metal type
in 1234, two centuries before the introduction of movable type in
Europe.
By the twelfth century, Koryo was plagued by internal and ex-
ternal problems. Power struggles and avariciousness among the
ruling classes led to revolts by their subjects. The situation was ag-
gravated by the rise in the north of the Mongols, who launched
a massive invasion in 1231. The Koryo armies put up fierce
resistance but were no match for the highly organized mounted
troops from the north, whose forces swept most of the Eurasian
continent during this period.
The Mongol Empire under Khubilai Khan enlisted Koryo in
its expeditions against Japan, mustering thousands of Korean men
and ships for ill-fated invasions in 1274 and 1281 . In each instance,
seasonal typhoons shattered the Mongol-Koryo fleets, giving rise
to the myth of kamikaze, or the " divine wind." Korea, in the mean-
time, was completely under Mongol domination. Koryo kings mar-
ried Mongol princesses. Only in the early fourteenth century, when
the Mongol Empire began to disintegrate and the Ming Dynasty
(1368-1644)—founded by a former Chinese peasant
—
pushed the
Mongols back to the north, did Koryo regain its independence.
In 1359 and 1361, however, Koryo suffered invasions by a large
number of Chinese rebel armies, known as the Red Banner Ban-
dits, who sacked and burned the capital at Kaesong, just north of
the mouth of the Han River. The country was left in ruins.
As the Mongols retreated to the north and the Ming established
a garrison in the northeastern part of the Korean Peninsula, the
Koryo court was torn between pro-Ming and pro-Mongol factions.
General Yi Song-gye, who had been sent to attack the Ming forces
in the Liaodong region of Manchuria, revolted at the Yalu and
turned his army against his own capital, seizing it with ease. Yi took
the throne in 1392, founding Korea's most enduring dynasty. The
new state was named Choson, the same name used by the first
Korean kingdom fifteen centuries earlier, although the later entity
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Fifth- or sixth-century gold
crown excavatedfrom a
Silla Dynasty tomb
Courtesy Embassy of the
Republic of Korea, Washington
usually has been called simply the Choson Dynasty or the Yi Dy-
nasty. The capital of Choson was at Seoul.
The ChosOn Dynasty
The Koryo Dynasty had suffered from a number of internal
problems; Yi and his followers implemented drastic reforms to place
the new dynasty on firmer ground. One of these problems revolved
around the deterioration of land administration, a basic issue in
a predominantly agrarian society. Contrary to the law specifying
public (governmental) ownership of land, powerful clans and Bud-
dhist temples had acquired a sizable proportion of farmland. By
exacting a disproportionate share of crops in the form of rents, the
"landlords" were causing economic destitution and social discon-
tent among the peasants. By illicitly removing the farms from tax
rolls, these clans and temples reduced the government's income,
thus straining the treasury. Yi had sided with reformists even be-
fore he took power, hence it was natural for him to rectify past
inequities after ascending to the throne.
The reform of the land system, however, had direct repercus-
sions on the practice of Buddhism because Buddhist temples and
monks had been among those exacerbating the land problem. The
economic influence of the temples was eliminated when they lost
vast lands. The rectification went beyond economic reform,
however, because the dominant forces in the new dynasty were
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devout Confucianists who regarded Buddhism as a false creed. The
fact that Buddhist monks had wielded a strong influence in poli-
tics, the economy, and society during the latter part of the Koryo
Dynasty—and that many of them had been corrupted by power
and money—strengthened the opposition to Buddhism. Accord-
ingly, the new dynasty launched a sweeping attack on Buddhism
and its institutions, an attack that had profound and enduring ef-
fects on the character of civilization on the peninsula.
Many of the outstanding temples were permitted to remain in-
tact; indeed, a few Choson monarchs were devout Buddhists.
Nevertheless, Buddhism exerted little influence over the religious
life of Korea under the Choson Dynasty; nor did any organized
religion replace it. Although many people adhered to shamanism,
geomancy, fortunetelling, and superstitions, Korea effectively be-
came a secular society.
The Choson Dynasty had an auspicious beginning. During the
reign of the fourth monarch, King Sejong (1418-50), a Buddhist,
enormous strides were made in the arts, science, and technology.
The Korean script, known as han'gul (see Glossary), which even-
tually came into common usage in the twentieth century, was de-
veloped by scholars at that time.
After Sejong, however, the dynasty fell into the hands of lesser
men, and in the late fifteenth century the country began a long
decline. Succession to the throne often caused long and bitter strug-
gles, particularly when a ruler did not leave behind an heir who
had reached the age of majority. Members of the Confucian-
educated, scholar-official eliteyangban (see Glossary) class quarreled
over minor points of Confucian ritual and etiquette, especially the
proper period of mourning upon the death of a royal personage.
Factional groups began vying for power, frequently going to the
extreme of exterminating the members of defeated factions. The
civil service examination became a sham, and corruption ran ram-
pant. Royal relatives and members of powerful factions increased
their landholdings, which became exempt from taxes and thereby
reduced the dynasty's sources of revenue. The farmers suffered
more and more from tax burdens and other extractions imposed
by greedy officials and landlords. In short, the country was not
being effectively governed. To make matters worse, Japanese at-
tacks in 1592 and 1597 and Manchu assaults in 1627 and 1636
ravaged the country's economy and turned much of the farmland
to waste for a long period thereafter.
The resulting social and economic depression of the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries fostered the rise of a new intellectual move-
ment advocating the practical use ofhuman knowledge. Pioneered
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by a Confucian scholar named Yi Su-kwang, the new thought
—
soon to be called Sirhak (practical learning)—was partly inspired
by the firsthand knowledge of occidental sciences that Yi Su-kwang
had acquired while on official visits to Beijing. As historian Ki-
baik Lee has noted, Sirhak thought encompassed a variety of in-
tellectual activities and several diverse viewpoints. These included
proposals for refinement of the traditional administrative and land
systems, advocacy of commercial and manufacturing activity, and
a renewed interest in Korean history and language. Brought to
maturity in the late eighteenth century by Chong Yag-yong, the Sir-
hak Movement was supported by a group of discontented schol-
ars, petty officials, former bureaucrats, and commoners.
The Sirhak Movement found itself in direct confrontation with
the dominant trend in neo-Confucian thought, which stressed the
metaphysical and abstract teachings of the renowned Chinese
philosopher Zhu Xi (see Traditional Social Structure, ch. 2). Nei-
ther the efforts of such wise and able kings as Yongjo (1725-75) and
Chongjo (1776-1800), nor those of the Sirhak scholars, were able to
reverse the trend against empirical studies and good government.
Western ideas, including Christianity, reached Korea through
China in the seventeenth century. By 1785, however, the govern-
ment had become incensed over the rejection of ancestor worship
by Roman Catholic missionaries, and it banned all forms ofWestern
learning. Western ships began to approach Korean shores after
1801, seeking trade and other contacts, but the government rejected
all overtures from abroad. When news of the Opium War in China
(1839-42) reached Korea, the dynasty had all the more reason to
shut the doors tighdy against Western "barbarians." In the mean-
time, the Choson Dynasty suffered from a series of natural calam-
ities including floods, famines, and epidemics, as well as large-scale
revolts of the masses in the northwest (1811-12) and southwest (1862
and 1894-95).
The expansion of Western powers in East Asia in the nineteenth
century significantly altered the established order, in which Korea
had been dominated by China. China under the Qing Dynasty
(1644-191 1) was in decline; its power waned rapidly under the con-
certed attacks of such Western nations as France, Britain, and Rus-
sia. Stimulated by these events, Japan proceeded to modernize after
having been forced to open its ports by Commodore Matthew C.
Perry of the United States Navy in 1853-54. Korea, however, re-
mained dormant, having closed itself to all outside contacts in the
early eighteenth century.
The Japanese were the first foreign power in recent history to
succeed in penetrating Korea's isolation. After a warlike Japanese
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provocation against Korea in 1875 (when China failed to come to
Korea's aid), the Japanese forced an unequal treaty on Korea in
February 1876. The treaty gave Japanese nationals extraterritorial
rights and opened up three Korean ports to Japanese trade. In retali-
ation, China sought to counterJapan by extending Korea's exter-
nal relations and playing off one Western power against another.
Accordingly, Korea signed treaties with the United States, Britain,
Italy, Russia, and other countries within the decade after the one
with Japan.
Internally, the Korean court split into rival pro-Chinese, pro-
Japanese, and pro-Russian factions, the latter two having more
reformist and modernizing orientations. In 1895 the Japanese
minister to Korea masterminded the assassination of the Korean
queen, who with her clan had opposed reform-oriented, Japanese-
supported leaders. The Korean king, however, rejected not only
Japan but also the various reform measures and turned for sup-
port to one ofJapan's adversaries—Russia. The king fled to the
Russian legation in Seoul to avoid possible Japanese plots against
him and conducted the nation's business from there. The Japanese
blunder had served the Russians well.
In the meantime, under the leadership of So Chae-p'il, who had
exiled himself to the United States after participating in an unsuc-
cessful palace coup in 1884, a massive campaign was launched to
advocate Korean independence from foreign influence and con-
trols. As well as supporting Korean independence, So also advo-
cated reform in Korea's politics and customs in line with Western
practices. Upon his return to Korea in 1896, So published Tong-
nip simmun (The Independent), the first newspaper to use the han-
gul writing system and the vernacular language, which attracted
an ever-growing audience (see The Korean Language, ch. 2). He
also organized the Independence Club to introduce Korea's elite
to Western ideas and practices. Under his impetus and the influence
of education provided by Protestant mission schools, hundreds of
young men held mass meetings on the streets and plazas demand-
ing democratic reforms and an end to Russian and Japanese domi-
nation. But the conservative forces proved to be too deeply
entrenched for the progressive reformers, who trashed the paper's
offices. The reformers, including Syngman Rhee, then a student
leader, were jailed. So was compelled to return to the United States
in 1898, and under one pretext or another the government sup-
pressed both the reform movement and its newspaper.
The revolt of 1894-95, known as the Tonghak Rebellion, had
international repercussions. Like the Taiping rebels in China thirty
years earlier, the Tonghak (see Glossary) participants were fired
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by religious fervor as well as by indignation about the corrupt and
oppressive government. The rebellion spread from the southwest
to the central region of the peninsula, menacing Seoul. The Korean
court apparendy felt unable to cope with the rebels and invited Chi-
na to send troops to quell the rebellion. This move gave Japan a
pretext to dispatch troops to Korea. The two countries soon en-
gaged in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-95), which accelerat-
ed the demise of the Qing Dynasty in China.
The victorious Japanese established their hegemony over Korea
via the Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895) and dictated to the Korean
government a wide-ranging series of measures to prevent further
domestic disturbances. In response, the government promulgated
various reforms, including the abolition of class distinctions, the
liberation of slaves, the abolition of the ritualistic civil service ex-
amination system, and the adoption of a new tax system.
Russian influence had been on the rise in East Asia, in direct
conflict with the Japanese desire for expansion. In alliance with
France and Germany, Russia had just forced Japan to return the
Liaodong Peninsula to China (which Japan had seized during the
First Sino-Japanese War) and then promptly leased the territory
from China. The secret Sino-Russian treaty signed in 1896 also
gave the Russians the right to build and operate the Chinese Eastern
Railway across northern Manchuria, which served as a link in the
Russian Trans-Siberian Railway to Vladivostok. Russia proceed-
ed to acquire numerous concessions over Korea's forests and mines.
The strategic rivalry between Russia andJapan exploded in the
Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, won by Japan. Under the peace
treaty signed in September 1905, Russia acknowledged Japan's
'
'paramount political, military, and economic interest" in Korea.
A separate agreement signed in secret between the United States
and Japan at this time subsequentiy aroused anti-American senti-
ment among Koreans. The Taft-Katsura Agreement was cynical
by modern standards, exchanging what amounted to a lack of in-
terest and military capability in Korea on the part of the United
States (Japan was given a free hand in Korea) for a lack of interest
or capability in the Philippines on the part ofJapan (Japanese im-
perialism was diverted from the Philippines). Given the diplomatic
conventions of the times, however, the agreement was a much weak-
er endorsement of the Japanese presence in Korea than either the
Russo-Japanese peace treaty or a separate Anglo-Japanese accord.
Two months later, Korea was obliged to become a Japanese pro-
tectorate. Thereafter, a large number of Koreans organized them-
selves in education and reform movements, but by then Japanese
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dominance in Korea was a reality. Japan annexed Korea as a colony
on August 22, 1910.
Characteristics of Society under the Dynasties
Cultural Expression
Koreans, like the other East Asian peoples, have a highly devel-
oped aesthetic sense and over the centuries have created a great
number of paintings, sculptures, and handicrafts of extraordinary
beauty. Among the very earliest are the paintings found on the
walls of tombs of the Koguryo Kingdom (located in what is now
North Korea) and around the China-North Korea border area.
These paintings are colorful representations of birds, animals, and
human figures that possess remarkable vitality and animation. Simi-
lar, though less spectacular, tombs are found around the old capi-
tals of the kingdoms of Paekche and Silla in present-day South
Korea. A number of gold objects, including a gold crown of great
delicacy and sophistication dating from the Three Kingdoms period,
have been found in South Korea.
Buddhism was the dominant artistic influence during the later
Three Kingdoms period and the Silla and Koryo dynasties. Themes
and motifs that had originated in India passed to Korea through
Central Asia and China. A number of bronze images of Buddha
and the Bodhisattvas were made during the sixth, seventh, and
eighth centuries. The images are not mere copies of Indian or north
Chinese models, but possess a distinctly ' 'Korean" spirit that one
critic has described as 4 'as indifference to sophistication and ar-
tificiality and a predisposition toward nature." The striking stone
Buddha found in the Sokkuram Grotto, a cave temple located near
Kyongju in North Kyongsang Province, was carved during the Silla
Dynasty and is considered to be the finest of Korean stone carvings.
During the centuries of Buddhism's ascendancy, a large number
of stone pagodas and temples were built, one of the most famous
being the Pulguksa Temple near Koyngju.
The Koryo Dynasty is best remembered for its celadons, or
bluish-green porcelains, considered by many specialists to be the
best in the world, surpassing even the Chinese porcelains upon
which they were originally modeled. Many have intricate designs
of birds, flowers, and other figures rendered in light and dark-
colored clay on the blue-green background; some are delicately
formed into the shapes of flowers, animals, and objects. Choson
Dynasty pottery tended to be simpler and more rustic and had a
great influence on the development ofJapanese artistic appreciation
from the late sixteenth century on. After the attempted Japanese
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invasions of Korea in the 1590s, Korean potters were taken back
to Japan.
During the Choson Dynasty, Buddhism was no longer a source
of artistic inspiration. The art, music, and literature of theyangban
were deeply influenced by Chinese models, yet exhibited a distinc-
tively Korean style. Korean scholar-officials cultivated their skills
in the arts of Confucian culture—Chinese poetry, calligraphy, and
landscape painting. Poetry was considered to be the most impor-
tant of these arts; men who lacked poetic ability could not pass the
civil service examinations. Scholars were expected to refine their
skill in using the brush both in calligraphy, the ornamental writ-
ing of Chinese characters that was considered an art in itself, and
in landscape painting, which borrowed Chinese themes and styles.
However, scholarly calligraphers and landscape painters were con-
sidered amateurs. Professional artists were members of the chung-
in (see Glossary) class and were of low status, not only because their
painting tended to diverge from the style favored by the upper class
but because it was too realistic. Particularly among the yangban,
Chinese dominance of cultural expression was assured by the fact
that Korean intellectual discourse was largely dependent on Chinese
loanwords. Scholars preferred to write in Chinese rather than in
native Korean script.
One uniquely Korean style of painting that developed during
this period was found in the usually anonymous folk-paintings (min-
hwa), which depicted the daily life of the common people and used
genuine Korean rather than idealized or Chinese settings. Other
folk paintings had shamanistic themes and frequentiy depicted her-
mits and mountain deities.
A distinctive position in traditional Korean literature is occupied
by a type of poem known as the sijo—a poetic form that began to
develop in the twelfth century. It is composed of three couplets and
characterized by great simplicity and expressiveness:
My body is mortal, commonly mortal.
My bones end in dust, soul or no soul.
My lord owns my heart, though, and that cannot
change.
This poem is by Chong Mong-ju (1337-92), a Koryo Dynasty
loyalist who was assassinated at the foundation of the Yi Dynasty.
The poet refers to his political choice not to side with the new
government.
Many of these poems reveal a sensitivity to the beauties of na-
ture, delight in life's pleasures, and a tendency toward philosophical
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contemplation that together produce a sense of serenity and, some-
times, loneliness. Frequently the poems reveal a preoccupation with
purity, symbolized by whiteness:
Do not enter, snowy heron, in the valley where the
crows are quarreling.
Such angry crows are envious of your whiteness,
And I fear that they will soil the body you have
washed in the pure stream.
The development of a Korean alphabet (today known as han 'gul)
in the fifteenth century gave rise to a vernacular, or popular, liter-
ature. Although the native alphabet was looked down upon by the
yangban elite, historical works, poetry, travelogues, biographies, and
fiction written in a mixed script of Chinese characters and han 'gul
were widely circulated. Some vernacular literature had what could
be interpreted as social protest themes. Probably the earliest of these
was The Tale ofHong Kil-tong hy Ho Kyun. The protagonist, Hong
Kil-tong, was the son of a nobleman and his concubine; his ambi-
tion to become a great official was frustrated because of his mother's
lowly background. He became a Robin Hood figure, stole from
the rich to give to the poor, and eventually left Korea in order to
establish a small kingdom in the south. Other vernacular writers
included Kim Man-jung, who wrote The Nine Cloud Dream, which
dealt with Buddhist themes of karma and destiny, and The Story
ofLady Sa. Pak Chi-won's Tale ofa Yangban gave a realistic account
of social life in eighteenth-century Korea. In 1980 Korean schol-
ars discovered a nineteenth-century vernacular novel that told of
the complicated relationships among members of fouryangban and
commoner clans over five generations in a very detailed and realistic
manner. At 235 volumes, this work is one of the longest novels
ever written.
P'ansori combine music and literary expression in ballad-form
stories, which are both recited and sung by a performer accompa-
nied by a drummer who sets the rhythms—a kind of "one-man
opera" in the words of one observer. P'ansori usually are inspired
by myths or folk tales and have Confucian, Buddhist, or folkloric
themes. In the 1970s and 1980s, dissident students often drew on
the techniques of traditional folk drama to satirize contemporary
politics.
Korean folk tales are closely tied to religious traditions and usually
have shamanistic, Buddhist, or Confucian themes. While Confucian
tales tend to be moralistic and didactic, Buddhist and shamanistic
tales are highly imaginative and colorful, depicting the relationships
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among spirits, ghosts, gods, and men in many different and often
humorous ways.
Korean Identity
That the Korean kingdoms were strongly affected by Chinese
civilization and its institutions was not surprising. Not only were
the Chinese far more numerous and often more powerful militarily
than the Koreans, but they also had a more advanced technology
and culture. Chinese supremacy in these realms was acknowledged
not only by the Koreans, who were militarily inferior, but also by
those who were powerful enough to conquer China, such as the
Kitan Liao, who ruled parts of northern China, Manchuria, and
Mongolia between 907 and 1127; the Mongols who ruled China
from 1279 to 1368; the Jurchen tribes, who later seized northern
Manchuria; and the Manchus, who ruled China between 1644 and
1911. The adoption of Chinese culture was more than simply an
expression of submission to China, it also was the indispensable
condition of being civilized in the East Asian context. This situa-
tion continued until the inroads of Western civilization substan-
tially altered the political and cultural map ofAsia in the latter part
of the nineteenth century.
The adoption of Chinese culture and institutions by the Korean
kingdoms, however, did not obliterate the identity of the Korean
people. Koguryo had risen against the Chinese conquerors, and
Silla had stubbornly resisted Chinese attempts to turn it into a
colony. While Silla and subsequent dynasties were obliged to pay
tribute to the various Chinese, Mongol, and Jurchen dynasties,
and although Korea was subjected to direct overlordship by the
Mongols for a century, the Korean kingdoms were able to survive
as independent entities, enabling their citizens to maintain an iden-
tity as a separate people.
Further contributing to the maintenance of this identity was the
Korean language, which linguists generally agree belongs to the
Altaic language family of Inner Asia. There is no doubt that the
indigenous language was deeply affected by the country's long con-
tact with China. Not only did its written form rely on Chinese
characters until the fifteenth century, but about half of its vocabu-
lary was ofChinese origin. Nevertheless, the language is very differ-
ent from Chinese in its lexicon, phonology, and grammar. Although
at one time the ruling classes were set apart from the rest of the
population by their knowledge of Chinese characters and their abil-
ity to use Chinese in its written form, since the unification of the




Political and Social Institutions
Despite the fact that Korea would undergo numerous reforms,
palace coups, and two dynastic changes after the Silla period, many
of the political and social systems and practices instituted during
the Silla Dynasty persisted until the nineteenth century. Their
Chinese inspiration, of course, had much to do with the durability
of these systems. One lasting principle was that of centralized rule.
From the time of the Koguryo, Paekche, and Silla states of the Three
Kingdoms period, royal houses always governed their domains
directly, without granting autonomous powers to local adminis-
trators. The effectiveness of the central government varied from
dynasty to dynasty and from period to period, but the principle
of centralization—involving a system of provinces, districts, towns,
and villages—was never modified.
Another feature that endured for centuries was the existence of
a stratified social system characterized by a clear distinction be-
tween the rulers and the ruled. Under the Silla Dynasty, society
was rigidly organized into a hereditary caste system. The Koryo
Dynasty, which succeeded Silla, instituted a system of social class-
es according to which the rest of the population was subordinate
to an elite composed of scholar-officials. By passing the higher civil
service examination and becoming a government official a com-
moner could become a member of the elite, but since examina-
tions presupposed both the time and wealth for education, upward
mobility was not the rule. This system continued during the Cho-
son Dynasty. The strength of the aristocratic tradition may have
been one factor contributing to the relative weakness of the Korean
monarchy, in which the king usually presided over a council of
senior officials as primus inter pares, rather than governing as ab-
solute ruler.
During the Choson Dynasty, family and lineage groups came
to occupy tremendous importance. Because one's social and polit-
ical status in society was largely determined by birth and lineage,
it was only natural that a great deal of emphasis was placed on
family. Each family maintained a genealogical table with meticulous
care. Only male offspring could prolong the family, and clan lines
and theirs were the only names registered in the genealogical ta-
bles; therefore, the birth of a son was regarded as an occasion of
great joy. The Confucian stress on the family reinforced the im-
portance Koreans attached to the family.
The Confucian principle of Five Relationships (see Glossary)
governing social behavior became the norm of Korean society.
Righteousness toward the sovereign, filial piety, deference to older
19
South Korea: A Country Study
and superior persons, and benevolence to the younger and inferior
became inviolable rules of conduct. Transgressors of these rules
were regarded as uncultured beings unfit to be members of society.
Whether in the family or society at large, people in positions of
authority or occupying superior status commanded respect.
Still another enduring feature of traditional society under the
Choson Dynasty was the dominance of theyangban class. Theyangban
not only held power but also controlled the national wealth in the
form of land. The court permitted the yangban to collect revenues
on the land as remuneration for their services. Because much com-
mercial activity was related to tributary missions to China or to
government procurements, the wealth of the merchants often was
dependent upon the discretion of the yangban.
Finally, because under the Choson Dynasty one could enter into
the scholar-official elite by passing examinations based on Confu-
cian writings and penmanship, the entire society stressed classical
education. The arts of war were accorded a lesser status, even
though the founders of both the Koryo and Choson dynasties were
generals and despite the fact that the country had suffered from
numerous foreign invasions.
Korea under Japanese Rule
Korea underwent drastic changes underJapanese rule. Even be-
fore the country was formally annexed by Japan in 1910, the
Japanese caused the last ruling monarch, King Kojong, to abdi-
cate the throne in 1907 in favor of his feeble son, who was soon
married off to a Japanese woman and given a Japanese peerage.
Japan then governed Korea under a residency general and subse-
quently under a governor general directly subordinate to Japanese
prime ministers. All of the governor generals were high-ranking
Japanese military officers.
In theory the Koreans, as subjects of the Japanese emperor, en-
joyed the same status as the Japanese; but in fact the Japanese
government treated the Koreans as a conquered people. Until 1921
they were not allowed to publish their own newspapers or to or-
ganize political or intellectual groups.
Nationalist sentiments gave rise to a Korean student demonstra-
tion in Japan, and on March 1, 1919, to a Proclamation of In-
dependence by a small group of leaders in Seoul. With the
consolidation of what became known as the March First Move-
ment, street demonstrations led by Christian and Ch'ondogyo (a
movement that evolved from Tonghak) groups erupted through-




In the wake of the protest, Japan granted considerable latitude
to Korea. As historians have noted, the ensuing intellectual and
social ferment of the 1920s marked a seminal period in modern
Korean history. Many developments of the period, including the
organization of labor unions and other social and economic move-
ments, had continuing influence into the postliberation period. In
the 1930s, however, the ascendancy of the military in Japanese poli-
tics reversed the change. Particularly after 1937, when Japan
launched the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-45) against China,
the colonial government decided on a policy of mobilizing the entire
country for the cause of the war. Not only was the economy reor-
ganized onto a war footing, but the Koreans were to be totally assim-
ilated as Japanese. The government also began to enlist Korean
youths in the Japanese army as volunteers in 1938 and as conscripts
in 1943. Worship at Shinto shrines became mandatory, and every
attempt at preserving Korean identity was discouraged.
The Korean economy also underwent significant change. Japan's
initial colonial policy was to increase agricultural production in
Korea to meet Japan's growing need for rice. Japan had also be-
gun to build large-scale industries in Korea in the 1930s as part
of the empire-wide program of economic self-sufficiency and war
preparation. Between 1939 and 1941, the manufacturing sector
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represented 29 percent of Korea's total economic production. The
primary industries—agriculture, fishing, and forestry—occupied
only 49.6 percent of total economic production during that period,
in contrast to having provided 84.6 percent of total production be-
tween 1910 and 1912.
The economic development taking place under Japanese rule,
however, brought little benefit to the Koreans. Virtually all indus-
tries were owned either byJapan-based corporations or byJapanese
corporations in Korea (see The Japanese Role in Korea's Economic
Development, ch. 3). As of 1942, Korean capital constituted only
1 .5 percent of the total capital invested in Korean industries. Korean
entrepreneurs were charged interest rates 25 percent higher than
their Japanese counterparts, so it was difficult for Korean enter-
prises to emerge. More and more farmland was taken over by the
Japanese, and an increasing proportion of Korean farmers either
became sharecroppers or migrated to Japan or Manchuria. As
greater quantities of Korean rice were exported to Japan, per capita
consumption of rice among the Koreans declined; between 1932
and 1936, per capita consumption of rice declined to half the level
consumed between 1912 and 1916. Although the government im-
ported coarse grains from Manchuria to augment the Korean food
supply, per capita consumption of food grains in 1944 was 35 per-
cent below that of 1912 to 1916.
UnderJapanese rule, intellectual influences different from tradi-
tional Buddhist, Confucianist, and shamanistic beliefs flooded the
country. Western-style painting was introduced, and literary trends,
even among writers who emphasized themes of social protest and
national independence, tended to follow Japanese and European
models, particularly those developed during the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries. The works of Russian, German, French,
British, American, and Japanese authors were read by the more
educated Koreans, and Korean writers increasingly adopted
Western ideas and literary forms. Social and political themes were
prominent. Tears ofBlood, the first of the "new novels," published
by Yi In-jik in serial form in a magazine in 1906, stressed the need
for social reform and cultural enlightenment, following Western
and Japanese models. Yi Kwang-su's The Heartless, published in
1917, stressed the need for mass education, Western science, and
the repudiation of the old family and social system. Ch'ae Man-
sik's Ready Made Life, published in 1934, protested the injustices
of colonial society.
In the 1920s and 1930s, socialist ideas began to influence the
development of literature. In 1925 left-wing artists, rejecting the
romanticism of many contemporary writers, established the Korean
22
Japan's Residency General
Courtesy Carpenter Collection, Library of Congress
Proletarian Artists' Federation, which continued until it was sup-
pressed by Japanese authorities in 1935. One of the best represen-
tatives of this group was Yi Ki-yong, whose 1936 novel Home tells
of the misery of villagers under Japanese rule and the efforts of
the protagonist, a student, to organize them. Poets during the coloni-
al period included Yi Sang-hwa, Kim So-wol, and Han Yong-un.
But the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War marked a
period of unprecedented repression in the cultural sphere by
Japanese authorities, which continued until Korea's liberation in
1945.
From the late 1930s until 1945, the colonial government pur-
sued a policy of assimilation whose primary goal was to force the
Koreans to speak Japanese and to consider themselves Japanese
subjects. In 1937 the Japanese governor general ordered that all
instruction in Korean schools be in Japanese and that students not
be allowed to speak Korean either inside or outside of school. In
1939 another decree "encouraged" Koreans to adopt Japanese
names, and by the following year it was reported that 84 percent
of all Korean families had done so. During the war years, Korean-
language newspapers and magazines were shut down. Belief in
the divinity of the Japanese emperor was encouraged, and Shinto
shrines were built throughout the country. Had Japanese rule not
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ended in 1945, the fate of indigenous Korean language, culture,
and religious practices would have been extremely uncertain (see
Korea and Japan, ch. 2).
Japanese rule was harsh, particularly after the Japanese militarists
began their expansionist drive in the 1930s. Internal Korean
resistance, however, virtually ceased in the 1930s as the police and
the military gendarmes imposed strict surveillance over all people
suspected of subversive inclinations and meted out severe punish-
ment against recalcitrants. Most Koreans opted to pay lip service
to the colonial government. Others actively collaborated with the
Japanese. The treatment of collaborators became a sensitive and
sometimes violent issue during the years immediately following
liberation.
World War II and Korea
On August 8, 1945, during the final days of World War II, the
Soviet Union declared war against Japan and launched an inva-
sion of Manchuria and Korea. By then, Japan had been depleted
by the drawn-out war against the United States and its Allies, and
Japanese forces were in no position to stave off the Soviets. The
dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August
6 and August 9, respectively, had led the Japanese government
to search for ways to end the war. On August 15, 1945, Japan sur-
rendered unconditionally.
The Japanese surrender and the Soviet landing on the Korean
Peninsula totally altered the history of contemporary Korea. At
the Cairo Conference of December 1943, the Allies had decided
to strip Japan of all the territories it had acquired since 1894, the
beginning ofJapan's expansionist drive abroad. The United States,
China, and Britain had agreed at Cairo that Korea would be allowed
to become free and independent in due course after the Allied vic-
tory. The Soviet Union agreed to the same principle in its decla-
ration of war against Japan.
Although the United States president, Franklin D. Roosevelt,
and Marshal Josef V. Stalin of the Soviet Union had agreed to
establish an international trusteeship for Korea at the Yalta Con-
ference of February 1945, no decision had been made on the exact
formula for governing the nation in the aftermath of Allied victory.
The landing of Soviet forces, however, compelled the United States
government to improvise a formula for Korea. Unless an agree-
ment were reached, the Soviets could very well occupy the entire
peninsula and place Korea under their control. Thus, on August
15, 1945, President Harry S Truman proposed to Stalin the divi-
sion of Korea at the thirty-eighth parallel. The next day Stalin
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agreed. Evidently Stalin did not wish to confront the United States
by occupying the entire peninsula. He may also have hoped that
the United States, in return, would permit the Soviet Union to
occupy the northern half of the northernmost major Japanese is-
land, Hokkaido (see fig. 3).
The Allied foreign ministers subsequently met in Moscow on
December 7, 1945, and decided to establish a trusteeship for a five-
year period, during which a Korean provisional government would
prepare for full independence; they also agreed to form a joint
United States-Soviet commission to assist in organizing a single
4
'provisional Korean democratic government." The trusteeship
proposal was immediately opposed by nearly all Koreans, espe-
cially the Korean right under Syngman Rhee, who used the issue
to consolidate his domestic political base. The Korean communists
objected at first, but quickly changed their position under Soviet
direction.
The joint commission met intermittently in Seoul from March
1946 until it adjourned indefinitely in October 1947. The Soviet
insistence that only those "democratic" parties and social organi-
zations upholding the trusteeship plan be allowed to participate in
the formation of an all-Korean government was unacceptable to
the United States. The United States argued that the Soviet for-
mula, if accepted, would put the communists in controlling posi-
tions throughout Korea.
South Korea under United States Occupation,
1945-48
The three-year occupation by the United States of the area ap-
proximating present-day South Korea, following the liberation of
Korea from Japan, was characterized by uncertainty and confu-
sion. This difficult situation stemmed largely from the absence of
a clearly formulated United States policy for Korea, the intensifi-
cation of the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet
Union, and the polarization of Korean politics between left and
right. Although the United States had maintained diplomatic ties
with the Choson Dynasty between 1882 and 1905, Korea in 1945
still was a remote country known only to a small number of mis-
sionaries and adventurous businessmen, holding little importance
in the official scheme of things. And although the United States
had proposed the thirty-eighth parallel as a dividing line between
the two occupation armies, United States policymakers still were
unsure of the strategic value of South Korea. United States policy
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toward Korea became more uncertain after the deadlock of the
United States-Soviet joint commission. While United States officials
were pessimistic about resolving their differences with the Soviet
Union, they remained committed to the December 1945 decision
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of the Allied foreign ministers (made during their Moscow meet-
ing) that a trusteeship under four powers, including China, should
be established with a view toward Korea's eventual independence.
Thus, United States officials were slow to draw up long-range
alternative plans for South Korea.
Moreover, as the Soviet Union consolidated its power in North
Korea and the Nationalist Party (Guomindang or Kuomintang
—
KMT) government of Chiang Kai-shek began to falter in China,
United States strategists began to question the long-run defensibility
of South Korea. By 1947 it appeared that South Korea would become
the only area of mainland Northeast Asia not under communist con-
trol. According to one highly placed official, this was an "exposed,
unsound military position, one that [was] doing no good."
Lieutenant GeneralJohn R. Hodge, commander of the United
States occupation forces in Korea, was obliged to work under a
severe handicap—a mission of maintaining peace and order until
the international conflict over Korea was resolved. Possessing very
limited resources, Hodge was expected to pursue the "ultimate
objective" of fostering "conditions which would bring about the
establishment of a free and independent nation."
General Hodge had to contend with hostile Korean political
groups. Before United States forces had landed in Korea in Sep-
tember 1945, the Koreans had established self-governing bodies,
or people's committees. The leaders of these committees had organ-
ized the Central People's Committee, which proclaimed the estab-
lishment of the "Korean People's Republic" on September 6, 1945.
Exiles abroad, mainly in China, had organized the "Korean Provi-
sional Government" in Shanghai as early as 1919 and had sus-
tained a skeletal organization in other parts of China until 1945.
The United States recognized neither the republic nor the provi-
sional government. The provisional government was headed by
Syngman Rhee, its first president, and Kim Ku and Kim Kyu-
sik, premier and vice premier, respectively. The United States
would not recognize any group as a government until an agree-
ment was reached among the Western Allies. The exiles were mol-
lified by the favorable treatment they received when they returned
to South Korea, but were incensed by the order to disband issued
by the United States Army Military Government in Korea. The
military government that administered the American-occupied zone
proceeded to disband the local people's committees and impose
direct rule, assigning military personnel who lacked language skills
and knowledge of Korea as governors at various levels.
The Korean Communist Party, resuscitated in October 1945,
had been a major force behind the Central People's Committee
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and the "Korean People's Republic" and quickly built a substan-
tial following among the workers, farmers, and students. The party
eventually changed its stance on trusteeship and came out in sup-
port of it on January 3, 1946. Because the party was under the
control of the Soviet command in P'yongyang, it came into direct
confrontation with the United States Army military government.
The situation was exacerbated in December 1945 when the de-
cision to establish a trusteeship was announced. To the Koreans,
who had anticipated immediate independence, the decision to
implement a five-year trusteeship was humiliating, and the initially
warm welcome to United States troops as liberators cooled. By early
1946, the United States Army military government had come to
rely heavily on the advice and counsel of ideologically conserva-
tive elements, including landlords and other propertied persons.
The United States initially supported the returned exiles and the
conservative elements, but between May 1946 and April 1947, the
military government tried to mobilize support behind a coalition
between the moderate left represented by Yo Un-hyong (or Lyuh
Woon Hyung), who had been the figurehead of the Central People's
Committee, and the moderate right, represented by Kim Kyu-sik,
vice premier of the exiled government. This attempt only intensi-
fied splits within the left-wing and right-wing camps without produc-
ing any positive results. The moderates' argument that the Koreans
should oppose the trusteeship was unacceptable to the other par-
ties. Communist leaders, on the other hand, were driven under-
ground in May 1946 after the discovery of a currency-counterfeiting
operation run by the party. The left-wing and right-wing groups,
in the meantime, frequently engaged in violent clashes not only
on ideological grounds, but also because of their opposing views
about the trusteeship decision.
In December 1946, the military government established the South
Korean Interim Legislative Assembly to formulate draft laws to
be used as "the basis for political, economic, and social reforms."
South Korea's problems, however, required solutions at a much
higher level. The left-wing political groups, consolidated under the
rubric of the South Korean Workers' Party, ignored the assem-
bly. The conservative Korean Democratic Party, supported by land-
lords and small-business owners, opposed the assembly because their
principal leaders were excluded from it. Although many of the as-
sembly's forty-five elected members were conservatives, most of
the forty-five appointed members were moderates nominated by
Kim Kyu-sik, who had emerged as Hodge's choice for political
leadership. Unfortunately, Kim lacked dynamism and broad sup-




These circumstances had thrown South Korea's economy into
complete chaos. Even if the occupation forces had arrived with a
carefully laid economic plan, the situation would have been difficult
because the Japanese had developed Korea's economy as an in-
tegral part of their empire, linking Korea toJapan and Manchuria.
The division of Korea into two zones at an arbitrary line fur-
ther aggravated the situation. There were many inherent problems
in building a self-sufficient economy in the southern half of the
peninsula. Most of the heavy industrial facilities were located in
northern Korea—the Soviet zone—including the chemical plants
that produced necessary agricultural fertilizers. Light industries in
southern Korea had been dependent on electricity from the hydrau-
lic generators located on the Yalu River on the Korean-Manchurian
border; electric generating facilities in the south supplied only 9
percent of the total need. Railroads and industries in the south also
had been dependent upon bituminous coal imported from Man-
churia, Japan, and the north (although the south had been exporting
some excess anthracite to the north).
The problems were compounded by the fact that most of Korea's
mines and industries had been owned and operated by Japan. As
the United States Army military government let the 700,000
Japanese depart from South Korea in the months following the start
of the American occupation, almost all of the mines and factories
—
now enemy properties vested in the military government—were
without managers, technicians, and capital resources. This situa-
tion led to severe problems of unemployment and material
shortages.
The months after the arrival of occupation forces also witnessed
a vast inflow of population. South Korea's population, estimated
at just over 16 million in 1945, grew by 21 percent during the next
year. By 1950 more than 1 million workers had returned from
Japan, 120,000 from China and Manchuria, and 1 .8 million from
the north. The annual rate of increase of births over deaths con-
tinued at about 3.1 percent. Since rural areas were inhospitable
to newcomers, most of the refugees settled in urban areas; Seoul
received upwards of one-third of the total. The situation was fur-
ther aggravated by scarcities of food and other commodities and
by runaway inflation, caused in part by the fact that the departing
Japanese had flooded Korea with newly printed yen.
The social unrest created by these developments can be easily
surmised. By 1947 only about half the labor force of 10 million
was gainfully employed. Labor strikes and work stoppages were
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recurrent phenomena, and demonstrations against the United States
Army military government's policies drew large crowds. Temporary
stoppages of electricity—supplied from the northern areas—in the
early part of 1946 and late 1947 plunged the southern region into
darkness on each occasion, deepening the despair of the populace.
The disillusioned and disconcerted people paid keen atten-
tion to political leaders of various persuasions who offered new ways
of solving the Korean problem.
Establishment of the Republic of Korea
In this atmosphere, the United States scuttled an earlier plan
to provide US$500 million over five years for South Korean devel-
opment. It then submitted the Korean problem to the United
Nations (UN) in September 1947. In November the UN General
Assembly recognized Korea's claim to independence and made
preparations for the establishment of a government and the with-
drawal of occupation forces. The United Nations Temporary Com-
mission on Korea arrived to supervise the election of a national
assembly, which was held in May 1948. The Soviet Union,
however, objected to the UN resolution and refused to admit the
commission to the Soviet-controlled zone in the north. It was becom-
ing increasingly clear that two separate regimes would be estab-
lished on the peninsula.
The prospect of perpetuating the division of Korea catapulted
some of the southern political leaders to action, significantly alter-
ing the political configuration there. The choice they faced was be-
tween immediate independence at the price of indefinite division,
or postponement of independence until the deadlock between the
United States and the Soviet Union was resolved. Rhee had cam-
paigned actively within Korea and the United States for the first
alternative since June 1946. Other major figures in the right-wing
camp, including Kim Ku and Kim Kyu-sik, decided to oppose the
"separate elections" in the south, hoping to resolve the interna-
tional impasse by holding talks with their northern counterparts.
The group led by the two Kims made their way to P'yongyang,
the future capital of North Korea, in April 1948, boycotted the
May 1948 elections, and were discredited when P'yongyang cut
off electricity, leaving Rhee a clear field although he lacked grass
roots support apart from the Korean Democratic Party. By this
time, the communists in the south had lost much of their political
following, particularly after a serious riot in October 1946; most
of their leaders congregated in the north. The moderate left-wing
camp was in disarray after their leader, Yo Un-hyong, was assas-
sinated in July 1947. Kim Kyu-sik had been the clear choice of the
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United States Army military government, but he could not be dis-
suaded from his fruitless trip to P'yongyang.
The National Assembly elected in May 1948 adopted a consti-
tution setting forth a presidential form of government and specifying
a four-year term for the presidency. Syngman Rhee, whose sup-
porters had won the elections, became head of the new assembly.
On this basis, when on August 15, 1948, the Republic of Korea
(South Korea) was proclaimed, Rhee assumed the presidency. Four
days after the proclamation, communist authorities completed the
severing of north-south ties by shutting off power transmission to
the south. Within less than a month, a communist regime, the Demo-
cratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), was proclaimed
under Premier Kim II Sung, who claimed authority over the entire
country by virtue of elections conducted in the north and the under-
ground elections allegedly held in the south. Rhee scarcely had time
to put his political house in order before North Korea launched
its attack on South Korea in June 1950.
The South Korean army had come into being in September 1948
(see The South Korean Army after World War II, ch. 5). A commu-
nist-led revolt of army regiments in the southern part of the penin-
sula in October of the same year, known as the Yosu-Sunch'on
rebellion, had consumed much of the army's attention and
resources, however, and a massive purge in the aftermath of that
revolt weakened the entire military establishment. Given South
Korea's precarious future and the communist victory in China,
the United States was not eager to provide support. By June 29,
1949, United States occupation forces had been withdrawn, save
for a handful of military advisers, and Korea had been placed out-
side of the United States defense perimeter.
The Korean War, 1950-53
In the meantime, the communists had built a formidable politi-
cal and military structure in North Korea under the aegis of the
Soviet command. They had created a regional Five-Province Ad-
ministrative Bureau in October 1945, which was reorganized into
the North Korean Provisional People's Committee in February 1946
and shed the "Provisional" component of its name twelve months
later. The communists also expanded and consolidated their party's
strength by merging all of the left-wing groups into the North
Korean Workers' Party in August 1946. Beginning in 1946, the
armed forces also were organized and reinforced. Between 1946
and 1949, large numbers of North Korean youths—at least
10,000—were taken to the Soviet Union for military training. A
draft was instituted, and in 1949 two divisions—40,000 troops
—
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of the former Korean Volunteer Army in China, who had trained
under the Chinese communists and had participated in the Chinese
civil war (1945-49), returned to North Korea.
ByJune 1950, North Korean forces numbered between 150,000
and 200,000 troops, organized into ten infantry divisions, one tank
division, and one air force division. Soviet equipment, including
automatic weapons of various types, T-34 tanks, and Yak fighter
planes, had also been pouring into North Korea in early 1950.
These forces were to fight the ill-equipped South Korean army of
less than 100,000 men—an army lacking in tanks, heavy artillery,
and combat airplanes
—
plus a coast guard of 4,000 men and a police
force of 45,000 men.
The events following the June 1950 invasion proved the superi-
ority of North Korean military forces and the soundness of their over-
all invasion strategy. South Korea's army was simply overwhelmed;
Seoul fell within three days. By early August, South Korean forces
were confined in the southeastern corner of the peninsula to a terri-
tory 140 kilometers long and 90 kilometers wide. The rest of the ter-
ritory was completely in the hands of the North Korean army.
The only unforeseen event complicating North Korea's strategy
was the swift decision by the United States to commit forces in sup-
port of South Korea. On June 26, 1950, Truman ordered the use
of United States planes and naval vessels against North Korean
forces, and onJune 30 United States ground troops were dispatched.
The United States, fearing that inaction in Korea would be inter-
preted as appeasement of communist aggression elsewhere in the
world, was determined that South Korea should not be over-
whelmed and asked the UN Security Council to intervene. When
Douglas MacArthur, the commanding general of the United
Nations forces in Korea, launched his amphibious attack and landed
at Inch'on on September 15, the course of the war changed
abruptly. Much of North Korea was taken by United States and
South Korean forces before Chinese "volunteers" intervened in
October, enabling North Korea to eventually restore its authority
over its domain. The war lasted until July 27, 1953, when a cease-
fire agreement was signed at P'anmunjom. By then, the war had
involved China and the Soviet Union, which had dispatched air
force divisions to Manchuria in support of North Korea and had
furnished the Chinese and North Koreans with arms, tanks, mili-
tary supplies, fuel, foodstuffs, and medicine. Fifteen member-
nations of the United Nations had contributed armed forces and
medical units to South Korea.
The war left indelible marks on the Korean Peninsula and the
world surrounding it. The entire peninsula was reduced to rubble;
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casualties on both sides were enormous. The chances for peaceful
unification had been remote even before 1950, but the war dashed
all such hopes. Sizable numbers of South Koreans who either had
been sympathetic or indifferent to communism before the war be-
came avowed anticommunists afterwards. The war also intensi-
fied hostilities between the communist and noncommunist camps
in the accelerating East-West arms race. Moreover, a large num-
ber of Chinese volunteer troops remained in North Korea until
October 1958, and China began to play an increasingly important
role in Korean affairs. Because tension on the Korean Peninsula
remained high, the United States continued to station troops in
South Korea over the strenuous objections of North Korean leaders.
The war also spurred Japan's industrial recovery and the United
States' decision to rearm Japan.
The Syngman Rhee Era, 1948-60
The Political Environment
Even though Syngman Rhee had been handily elected president
by the National Assembly in 1948—with 180 of the 196 votes cast
in his favor—he quickly ran into difficulties. South Korean poli-
tics during Rhee's regime (1948-60) essentially revolved around
Rhee's struggle to remain in power and the opposition's efforts
to unseat him. Constitutional provisions concerning the presidency
became the focal point.
Because Rhee's four-year term of office was to end in August
1952 under the 1948 constitution, and because he had no prospect
of being reelected by the National Assembly, he supported a con-
stitutional amendment, introduced in November 1951, to elect the
president by popular vote. The proposal was resoundingly defeated
by a vote of 143 to 19, prompting Rhee to marshal his supporters
into the Liberal Party. Four months later, in April 1952, the opposi-
tion introduced another motion calling for a parliamentary form
of government. Rhee declared martial law in May, rounded up
the assembly members by force, and called for another vote. His
constitutional amendment to elect the president by popular vote
was railroaded through, passing with 163 votes of the 166 assem-
bly members present. In the subsequent popular election in August,
Rhee was reelected by 72 percent of the voters.
The constitution, however, limited the president to only two
terms. Hence, when the end of Rhee's second term of office ap-
proached, the constitution again was amended (in November 1954)
by the use of fraudulent tactics that allowed Rhee to succeed him-
self indefinitely.
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In the meantime, South Korea's citizens, particularly the urban
masses, had become more politically conscious. The press frequently
exposed government ineptitude and corruption and attacked Rhee's
authoritarian rule. The Democratic Party capitalized on these par-
ticulars; in the May 1956 presidential election, Rhee won only 55
percent of the votes, even though his principal opponent, Sin Ik-hiii,
had died of a heart attack ten days before the election. Rhee's run-
ning mate, Yi Ki-bung, fared much worse, losing to the Democratic
Party candidate, Chang Myon (John M. Chang). Since Rhee was
already eighty-one years old in 1956, Chang's victory caused a
major tremor among Rhee's supporters.
Thereafter, the issue of Rhee's age and the goal of electing Yi
Ki-bung became an obsession. The administration became increas-
ingly repressive as Liberal Party leaders came to dominate the
political arena, including government operations, around 1958. Yi,
formerly Rhee's personal secretary, and his wife (Mrs. Rhee's con-
fidant and a power-behind-the-scenes) had convinced the child-
less Rhee to adopt their son as his legal heir. For fear that Rhee's
health might be impaired, he was carefully shielded from all infor-
mation that might upset him. Thus, the aged and secluded pres-
ident became a captive of the system he had built, rather than its
master.
In March 1960, the Liberal Party managed to reelect Rhee and
to elect Yi Ki-bung vice president by the blatant use of force. Rhee
was reelected by default because his principal opponent had died
while receiving medical treatment in the United States just before
the election. As for Yi, he was largely confined to his sickbed—
a
cause of public anger—but "won" 8.3 million votes as against 1.8
million votes for Chang Myon. The fraudulent election touched
off civil disorders, known and celebrated as the April 19 Student
Revolution, during which 142 students were killed by the police.
As a result, Rhee resigned on April 26, 1960. The next day all
four members of the Yi family died in a suicide pact. This account
has been challenged by some who believed Yi's family was killed
by his bodyguards in hopes of enabling Rhee to stay on.
Rhee, a self-righteous man convinced of his indispensability to
Korea, loathed his critics and opponents and equated criticism with
treason. Although his record as a national hero and his skill in han-
dling United States-Korean relations won him admiration during
the immediate years after the Korean War, Rhee became a cap-
tive of the people surrounding him. In the late 1950s, his policies
were largely without results as rapid changes in the economy and




The transformation of South Korean society during the Rhee
era was of revolutionary proportions because of the convergence
of a number of forces. A major impetus for social change was the
greatly enhanced opportunity for education. Although Japan had
introduced a modern education system to Korea, opportunities for
Koreans were purposely limited, particularly at the secondary and
university levels. Educational opportunities were greatly expand-
ed immediately after the Japanese defeat, and the trend continued
through the Korean War and afterwards. Higher education provided
more opportunities for upward mobility to a large number of young
people. This opening also meant greater political awakening among
the young, particularly in view of the strong emphasis placed on
democratic values and ideas by teachers and intellectuals. For the
first time, Korean youths were provided open access to democratic
ideas both at school and through the mass media. These Western
ideas became the norm against which to judge the government in
power when the exigencies of the war period were removed.
A land reform law enacted in June 1949 also had a leveling effect
on Korean society. Under this law, nearly 1 million sharecroppers,
or approximately 40 percent of total farm households, became small
landowners. The reform also brought about the decline of the land-
lord class that had formed the backbone of traditional Korean society
for centuries. Because big business and industrial groups did not
emerge until the late 1950s and early 1960s, almost everyone in soci-
ety was placed on an equal footing.
The Korean War had the most significant effect on the social
system. The movement of large armies up and down the length of
the peninsula was accompanied by civilian refugees. People of diverse
backgrounds intermingled for prolonged periods, deeply affecting
everyone's way of life. The indiscriminate destruction of property
during the war also had the effect of homogenizing Korean society.
The war caused hundreds of thousands ofyoung men from rural
areas to enlist in the army, exposing them to modern organiza-
tion, technologies, and a new world outlook. The war also gave
rise to a large officer corps that later developed into an increasingly
significant social group.
Better education and the government's postwar economic poli-
cies contributed to accelerated urbanization. Reconstruction projects
created jobs in the cities, while the government's effort to control
the prices of farm products made it unprofitable to till small farm
plots. The urban population increased rapidly from 11.6 percent
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in 1940 to 24.4 percent in 1955 and 28.3 percent in 1960. These
changes had a direct impact on politics because the better-educated
and urbanized elements became increasingly vocal and more in-
dependent in their political judgments.
The Postwar Economy
The war had destroyed most of South Korea's production facil-
ities. The South Korean government began rehabilitation as soon
as the battle zone near the thirty-eighth parallel stabilized in 1952.
The United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency and members
of the UN, principally the United States, also provided badly needed
financial assistance. Seoul depended heavily on foreign aid, not
only for defense, but also for other expenditures. Foreign aid con-
stituted a third of total budget in 1954, rose to 58.4 percent in 1956,
and was approximately 38 percent of the budget in 1960. The first
annual United States economic aid bill after the armistice was
US$200 million; aid peaked at US$365 million in 1956 and was
then maintained at the US$200 million level annually until the
mid-1960s.
The scarcity of raw materials and the need to maintain a large
army caused a high rate of inflation, but by 1958 prices had stabi-
lized. The government also intensified its effort to increase indus-
trial production, emphasizing power generation and textile and
cement production. In order to reduce dependence on imports, such
principal items as fertilizer and steel began to be produced domes-
tically.
The average rise in the gross national product (GNP—see Glos-
sary) was 5.5 percent from 1954 through 1958. Industrial produc-
tion led the advance, growing by nearly 14 percent per year. The
tightening of fiscal and monetary policies in 1958, coupled with
the phasing out of the United Nations Korean Reconstruction
Agency program and the reduction in direct aid from the United
States in 1957, caused a shortage of raw materials for import-
dependent industries and led to an overall economic decline. By
1958 Liberal Party leaders paid more attention to political survival
than to economic development. The government adopted a com-
prehensive Seven-Year Economic Development Plan in January
1960, but before the plan could be implemented, the student revo-
lution brought down the government.
The Democratic Interlude
Rhee's resignation left a political void subsequently filled by Ho
Chong, whom Rhee had appointed foreign minister the day be-
fore he resigned. Although Ho was a lifelong friend of Rhee, he had
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maintained amicable relations with Democratic Party leaders and
thus was acceptable to all concerned. Between April andJuly 1960,
Ho's transitional government maintained order, exiled Rhee and
his wife to Hawaii, and prepared for a new general election of the
National Assembly in July. That body revised the constitution on
June 15, instituting a parliamentary form of government with a
bicameral legislature. In the July election, the Democratic Party
won 175 of the 233 seats in the lower house of the National Assem-
bly. The second largest group, the independents, won forty-nine
seats. The Liberal Party won only two seats. In the upper house,
the Democratic Party won thirty-one of the fifty-eight seats.
The Democratic Party had been a coalition of two divergent ele-
ments that had merged in 1955 to oppose Rhee. When the com-
mon enemy—Rhee and his Liberal Party—had been removed from
the scene and opportunities for power were presented, each group
sought to obtain the spoils for itself.
The Democratic Party candidate for the presidency in the March
1960 election, Cho Pyong-ok, died of illness shortly before the elec-
tion, just as his predecessor, Sin Ik-hui, had in 1956. The two
groups openly struggled against each other during the July elec-
tions for the National Assembly. Although they agreed on Yun
Po-son as presidential candidate and Chang Myon as their choice
for premier, neither had strong leadership qualities nor commanded
the respect of the majority of the party elite. Yun and Chang could
not agree on the composition of the cabinet. Chang attempted to
hold the coalition together by reshuffling cabinet positions three
times within a five-month period. In November 1960, the group
led by Yun left the Democratic Party and formed the New
Democratic Party (Simmindang) .
In the meantime, the tasks confronting the new government were
daunting. The economy suffered from mismanagement and cor-
ruption. The army and police needed to be purged of the political
appointees who had buttressed the dictatorship. The students, to
whom the Democratic Party owed its power, filled the streets almost
daily, making numerous wide-ranging demands for political and
economic reforms, but the Democratic Party had no ready-made
programs. Law and order could not be maintained because the
police, long an instrument of the Rhee government, were demoral-
ized and totally discredited by the public. Continued factional wran-
gling caused the public to turn away from the party.
This situation provided a fertile ground for a military coup.
Whereas Rhee had been able to control the military because of
his personal prestige, his skill in manipulating the generals, and
the control mechanisms he had instituted, Chang lacked all these
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advantages. When the demands of the young army officers under
Major General Park Chung Hee were rebuffed, and as political
power appeared to be increasingly hanging in the balance with no
one clearly in charge, the army carried out a coup d'etat on May
16, 1961. Chang's own army chief of staff, Chang To-yong, joined
the junta, and Chang's fragile government was toppled. (The junta
subsequently tried and convicted General Chang for attempting
to take over the junta.) The young officers' initial complaint had
been that Chang Myon had not kept a campaign pledge to weed
out corrupt generals from the South Korean army, and some
Korean sources attributed this failure to the intervention of high-
ranking United States military officers, who feared the weakening
of South Korea's national security.
Yun Po-son sided with the junta and persuaded the United States
Eighth Army and the commanders of various South Korean army
units not to interfere with the new rulers. Yun stayed on as presi-
dent for ten months after the military junta took over power, thereby
legitimizing the coup. A small number of young officers command-
ing 3,600 men had succeeded in toppling a government with
authority over an army of 600,000.
South Korea under Park Chung Hee, 1961-79
The junta under Park Chung Hee quickly consolidated its power,
removed those it considered corrupt and unqualified from govern-
ment and army positions, and laid plans for the future. The thirty-
two-member Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR)
became all-powerful.
The Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) was created
in June 1961 to prevent a countercoup and to suppress all poten-
tial enemies. It was to have not only investigative power, but also
the power to arrest and detain anyone suspected of wrongdoing
or harboring antijunta sentiments. The KCIA extended its power
to economic and foreign affairs under its first director, Colonel (re-
tired) Kim Chong-p'il, a relative of Park, and one of the original
planners of the coup against Chang.
In May 1961 , the junta pledged to make an all-out effort to build
a self-reliant economy and to carry out a " great human revolu-
tion" by wiping out all corruption and evil practices in the govern-
ment and by introducing a "fresh and clean morality." The
National Assembly was dissolved, and high-level civilian officials
were replaced by military officers. By 1963 the junta's economic
policies had not produced any favorable results.
The KCIA under Kim Chong-p'il was involved in a number
of scandals that considerably tarnished the junta's image. The
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military leaders had worked actively to establish a political party,
later known as the Democratic Republican Party (DRP), which
existed from 1963 to 1980, in preparation for the return of politics
to the civilians. Former politicians, however, were prohibited from
engaging in organizational activities. Although Park had announced
in February 1963 that he would not participate in civilian politics,
the following month he announced a popular referendum to decide
whether the junta should extend its rule for another four years.
Facing stiff opposition from both the South Korean public and the
United States, the plan for a referendum was canceled.
The Military in Politics
The junta had drawn up a new constitution and had put it before
a popular referendum in December 1962, receiving 78.8 percent
of the vote. Under the new constitution, the president was to be
elected by direct popular vote and have strong powers—including
the authority to appoint the premier and cabinet members without
legislative consent and to order emergency financial and economic
measures. Under United States pressure, Park, who had held the
position of acting president following Yun's resignation in March
1962, retired from the army as a four-star general and ran as the
DRP candidate in the October 1963 presidential election. He was
elected by a narrow margin, winning 46.6 percent of the vote, as
compared with 45. 1 percent for Yun Po-son, the New Democratic
Party candidate. In the subsequent election for the unicameral legis-
lature, held in November 1963, the government won 110 of the
175 seats.
Until 1971 South Korea operated under the political framework
it had adopted in 1963. Even though Park imposed some restric-
tions on members of the press, intellectuals, and opposition politi-
cians, these groups were permitted considerable latitude to criticize
the government and to engage in organizational activities. Although
there were numerous student demonstrations, particularly in 1965
when the government normalized its relations withJapan and sent
45,000 combat troops to support the Republic of Vietnam in
response to a request from the United States, the students were
controlled and there were no casualties in confrontations with the
police. The presidential and National Assembly elections in 1967
and 1971 were closely contested but won by Park. In order to suc-
ceed himself for the third time in 1971, Park amended the consti-
tution in 1969.
In December 1971, Park again tightened his control over the
country. He proclaimed a national emergency and forced through
the National Assembly a bill granting him complete power to
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control, regulate, and mobilize the people, the economy, the press,
and everything else in the public domain. In October 1972, he
proclaimed martial law, dissolved the National Assembly, closed
all universities and colleges, imposed strict press censorship, and
suspended political activities. Within a few days he "submitted"
a new draft constitution—designated the yusin (revitalization)
constitution—to a national referendum. The 1972 constitution al-
lowed Park to succeed himself indefinitely, to appoint one-third
of the National Assembly's members, and to exercise emergency
powers at will. The president was to be chosen by the more than
2,000 locally elected deputies of the supposedly nonpartisan National
Conference for Unification, who were to cast their votes as an elec-
toral college without debate.
Students and intellectuals conducted a national campaign to
revise the 1972 constitution in the fall of 1973. As the student cam-
paign began to gather momentum, the president issued his first
emergency decree in January 1974 outlawing all such campaigns.
Successive emergency measures imposed further restrictions on
other segments of society, but the harshest and most comprehen-
sive restrictions were imposed by Emergency Measure Number
Nine, issued in May 1975, which made it a crime either to criti-
cize the constitution or to provide press coverage of such an activity,
subject to a penalty of more than a year's imprisonment. Student
participation in politics or coverage of student political activities
in the press were subject to the same punishment. The president
justified the harsh measures by citing the need for national unity
in the face of an alleged threat of attack from North Korea.
Having concentrated all power around himself, Park suppressed
his opponents harshly. KCIA agents abducted Kim Dae Jung,
Park's opponent in the 1971 presidential elections, from a hotel
in Tokyo in August 1973, precipitating a major crisis in South
Korean-Japanese relations. Kim had been abroad after the elec-
tion and remained there after Park declared martial law, traveling
between Japan and the United States and conducting anti-Park
activities. Students demonstrating against theyusin constitution were
summarily incarcerated. In March 1976, prominent political lead-
ers, including former President Yun and presidential candidate
Kim, issued the Democratic Declaration calling for the restoration
of democracy. Park had them arrested and sentenced to five to eight
years in prison.
In the meantime, Park narrowly avoided an assassination at-
tempt by a South Korean youth (resident in Japan), whose stray
bullets killed the president's wife instead in August 1974. After this
incident, Park became more reclusive and came to rely more and
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more on his chief bodyguard, Ch'a Chi-ch'ol, of the Presidential
Security Force.
Force alone could not sustain the authoritarian system. Park's
strongest defense against his critics had been the high rate of eco-
nomic growth under his leadership (see The Government Role in
Economic Development, ch. 3). By 1978, however, the growth rate
had begun to decline, and inflation had become a serious problem.
Seoul successfully weathered the first "oil shock" when Middle
Eastern suppliers drastically raised prices in 1973, but was hard
hit by the second shock in 1978-79. In December 1978, Park be-
latedly adopted a stabilization plan to cool down the economy, but
the plan caused a serious recession, leading to a succession of
bankruptcies and increased unemployment.
The first overt manifestation of workers' discontent appeared
in August 1979 with demonstrations by 200 women employees of
the Y.H. Industrial Company, which had just gone bankrupt.
Women workers occupied the headquarters of the opposition New
Democratic Party and demanded the right to manage the compa-
ny themselves. When the workers refused to obey the government's
order to disperse, some 1,000 riot policemen raided the building.
Pandemonium occurred, and one of the workers died— it was
unknown whether she had jumped, was pushed, or was jostled to
her death. Despite the government's efforts, the "Y.H. Incident"
became a rallying cry of the opposition.
Aside from the visible social unrest caused by political suppres-
sion and economic recession, the opposition camp had reason to
become emboldened in its criticism of the government in 1979. Dis-
affection was particularly severe in urban areas. Although the New
Democratic Party was suffering from internal dissension, it won
a plurality in the December 1978 general elections for the Nation-
al Assembly, the first general elections to be held since 1973. In
the 1978 elections, the Democratic Republican Party won only 30.9
percent of the popular vote, a decline of 7.8 percent from 1973.
In contrast, the opposition obtained 34.7 percent, an increase of
2.2 percent from 1973. Independent candidates won 27.2 percent
of the vote (twenty-two seats in the National Assembly); fifteen of
the twenty-two subsequently joined the New Democratic Party,
although three were "persuaded" to switch to the government
party. Because one-third of the National Assembly's members were
government-appointed, the opposition could not command a
majority.
The new leader of the New Democratic Party, Kim Young
Sam, began his challenge to the government inJune 1979. He an-
nounced to the foreign press his readiness to meet with Kim II Sung,
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the North Korean president, to discuss matters relating to unifi-
cation and delivered a scathing attack on the government in the
National Assembly. He argued that the government had been in
power too long and had been clearly discredited by the elections;
that Emergency Measure Number Nine suffocated peoples' free-
dom and was clearly unconstitutional; that Seoul had colluded with
hoodlums to assault the New Democratic Party headquarters and
to harass him; that the suppression of human rights had become
an international disgrace; that the people should be permitted to
elect their own president through direct elections and be allowed
to live without fear; and that a fair distribution of wealth should
be permitted without government interference. The government
immediately retaliated and ousted Kim from the National Assem-
bly. In a show of solidarity, all opposition members of the Nation-
al Assembly resigned on October 13, 1979.
The Y.H. Incident and the harsh confrontation between the
government and the opposition parties agitated the college students.
Students in Taegu and Seoul staged campus rallies and demon-
strations in September 1979. In mid-October, students in Pusan
poured into the streets and clashed with police, leading the govern-
ment to declare martial law in that city. In late October, students
in Masan launched a demonstration. The government placed the
city under 4 'garrison decree, ' ' and the army took over the respon-
sibility for public order.
Close Park associates such as Kim Chong-p'il were reported to
have counseled the president to meet some of the student demands
and reduce repression, but were opposed by presidential security
chief Gh'a Chi-ch'ol. Ch'a also sharply disagreed with Kim Chae-
gyu, the director of the KCIA, who had counseled moderation in
the government's handling of the student protesters. On October
26, 1979, the nation's most powerful figures—Park, Ch'a, and Kim
Chae-gyu—met in a KCIA safe house restaurant for dinner to dis-
cuss, among other things, the Pusan situation. In the sharply divided
discussion that followed, Kim gunned down Park, Ch'a, and their
bodyguards.
It could be argued that Park had created his own dilemma by
instituting theyusin constitution and by assuming unlimited pow-
ers. If he had loosened control, however, the demand for reforms
might have spread, proving impossible to contain. The system had
provided for neither a pressure-release valve nor an escape hatch.
In his eighteen years in power (1961-79), Park had been obsessed
with ushering the country into the ranks of developed nations, had
pursued his goal relentlessly, and had achieved considerable results.
Having been trained under the Japanese, he closely patterned his
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development strategies after Japan's, where a feudal society had
been turned into a modern nation between the 1860s and 1930s.
The Japanese leaders of the Meiji era (1868-1912), however,
possessed two advantages over Park. First, they had operated in
a period when the masses were less politically conscious and
authoritarian control was more easily accepted. This was not the
situation in South Korea, where students had already toppled a
government in 1960. Second, the Japanese also had a built-in sys-
tem of checks and balances because the top-echelon leaders oper-
ated in a council where different leaders interacted among
themselves as equals. Park, by contrast, operated on a one-man-
rule basis, unchecked by constraints on his own decision-making
powers.
Economic Development
South Korea's economy grew rapidly under Park. The military
leaders, with little previous political or administrative experience,
and lacking a developmental program, later turned to the
economists and planners for assistance. The Economic Planning
Board was established in 1961. A program of rapid industrializa-
tion based on exports was launched. The shift in orientation was
reflected in the First Five-Year Economic Development Plan
(1962-66), and the subsequent second (1967-71), third (1972-76),
and fourth (1977-81) five-year economic development plans.
Park's policies encouraged private entrepreneurs. Businesses were
given powerful incentives to export, including preferential treat-
ment in obtaining low-interest bank loans, import privileges, per-
mission to borrow from foreign sources, and tax benefits. Some
of these businesses later became the chaebol (see Glossary; The Ori-
gins and Development of Chaebol, ch. 3).
Toward these ends, the currency was drastically devalued in 1961
and 1964, and import quotas for raw materials eased. Private saving
was encouraged by raising interest rates, and funds were borrowed
from abroad. Exports also were encouraged by direct subsidies;
all taxes and restrictions on the import of intermediate goods that
were to be used to produce export products were removed. As the
existing industries—textiles, clothing, and electrical machinery,
among others—had been stagnant because of a lack of imported
raw materials, these policies produced immediate results.
These developmental programs required enormous amounts of
capital. As the level of United States assistance stabilized, the Park
regime turned to "financial diplomacy" with other countries. The
normalization of relations with Japan in 1965 brought Japanese
funds in the form of loans and compensation for the damages
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suffered during the colonial era. Park made a state visit to the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany in 1964 that resulted in the extension
of government aid and commercial credits. The availability of funds
and the increasing level of exports elevated Seoul's credit rating,
making it possible to increase borrowing in the open international
market. Further, the conflict in Indochina stimulated economic
growth. Seoul's export drive also owed much to the availability
of an educated labor force and a favorable international market.
South Korean businesses discovered that they could successfully
compete abroad. As idle capacity was used up and the demand for
new manufacturing investment rose, increasing numbers of for-
eign investors were attracted to South Korea.
Foreign exchange earnings improved as export and foreign
receipts rose. The government also took steps to increase tax
revenues and stabilize consumer prices. Much of the price stabiliza-
tion program was carried out at the expense of farmers, who were
forced to accept the government's policy oflow grain prices. Agricul-
tural development lagged behind until 1971, when the government
shifted to a policy of high grain prices and inaugurated the Sae-
maul undong (New Community Movement) aimed at improving
the farm village environment and increasing agricultural produc-
tion and income (see The Agricultural Crisis of the Late 1980s,
ch. 3).
Official statistics indicated rapid economic growth. Substantial
successes were achieved under the first two five-year economic devel-
opment plans. The manufacturing sector provided the main stimu-
lus, growing by 15 percent and 21 percent, respectively, during
the two plans. Domestic savings rates grew and exports expanded
significantly (see Economic Plans, ch. 3). A new economic strategy
emphasizing diversification in production and trade proved gener-
ally successful in the 1970s. Under the third plan, the government
made a bold move to expand South Korea's heavy and chemical
industries, investing in steel, machinery, shipbuilding, electron-
ics, chemicals, and nonferrous metals. South Korea's capability
for steel production and oil refining rose most notably. Refineries
for zinc and copper and modern shipbuilding facilities were con-
structed; automobiles began to be exported to a few markets. The
plan sought to better prepare South Korea for competition in the
world market and to facilitate domestic production of weaponry.
The quadrupling of oil prices beginning in 1973 severely threat-
ened the South Korean economy, which depended heavily on
imported oil for energy production. Construction contracts in the
Middle East, however, provided the necessary foreign exchange
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to forestall a balance-of-payments crisis and to continue the high
rate of growth.
The growth-oriented economic strategy emphasizing exports in-
evitably produced side effects. Although the government previously
had been able to manage these side effects and effectively surmount
various economic crises, the situation began to deteriorate in 1978.
The emphasis on exports had produced a shortage of domestic con-
sumer goods that was exacerbated by the increasing demands
brought about by rising wages and the advance in living standards.
Price controls imposed on producers of consumer goods discouraged
the manufacture of these goods. Meanwhile, the inflow of dollars
rapidly expanded the money supply and inflation became a seri-
ous problem. According to a Bank of Korea report, consumer prices
rose only 14.4 percent in 1978, but most observers agreed that the
actual rate was near 30 percent.
The high rate of inflation continued into 1979. According to a
report issued by the Economic Planning Board in August 1979,
the average household's cost of living had gone up 26.3 percent
from the previous year. Although wages had been rising rapidly
during the previous several years—spurred by shortages of skilled
and semiskilled workers—the rise in wages began to slow down.
The average wage increased 1 2 percent during the year preceding
August 1979.
To address these ills, Park had replaced the economic team in
the cabinet in December 1978 and adopted stabilization measures
entailing the lowering of the growth rate: a stringent tight-money
policy; a switch of investment capital planned for heavy industries
to light industries producing consumer products; a reduction of
price controls to encourage more production of consumer goods;
and assistance for the poor. But these measures caused a reces-
sion, produced a succession of bankruptcies among small and medi-
um loan-dependent enterprises, and increased unemployment.
Society under Park
The rapid pace of industrialization not only changed much of
the South Korean landscape, as farmlands were converted into high-
ways and factory sites, but also profoundly modified social struc-
ture, social values, and behavior. As late as 1965, some 58.7 percent
of the labor force was engaged in agriculture and fishery, but the
percentage declined to 50.4 percent in 1970 and 38.4 percent in
1978. The percentage of workers engaged in secondary industries,
including mining and manufacturing, rose from 10.3 percent in
1965 to 35.2 percent in 1970 and 38.4 percent in 1978. Industri-
alization led to a rapid increase in South Korea's urban population,
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which rose from 28.3 percent of the total in 1960 to 54.9 percent
in 1979. Rapid urbanization compounded the problems of hous-
ing, transportation, sanitation, and pollution, and exacerbated other
social problems.
Improved living standards and ever-increasing job opportuni-
ties accelerated the desire among South Koreans for education, par-
ticularly at secondary schools and institutions of higher learning.
In 1960 about one-third of children between twelve and fourteen
years of age attended middle schools; that proportion increased to
53.3 percent in 1970 and 74.0 percent in 1975. In 1960 some 19.9
percent of the population between fifteen and seventeen years of
age attended high schools; that proportion increased to 29.3 per-
cent in 1970 and 40.5 percent in 1975. By 1970 about 9.3 percent
of college-age youths attended colleges and universities, and the
number of university graduates exceeded 30,000 a year. Eight years
later, 41,680 students graduated from four-year institutions of
higher learning (see Education, ch. 2).
Most workers with higher education qualifications were absorbed
by the rapidly growing industrial and commercial sectors, joining
the ranks of the growing middle class. Demands and rewards for
people in the more prestigious fields—doctors, lawyers, economists,
scientists, and managers—were increasing. The number of white-
collar workers in commerce, industry, banking, civil service, and
the teaching profession also rose, as did the number of small en-
trepreneurs and retailers.
A high proportion of those people who regarded themselves as
middle class resided in Seoul, the locale for much of the nation's
wealth, talent, and many of its cultural resources. As beneficiaries
of the rapidly expanding economy, much of the middle class either
was content with its situation or indifferent to politics. Many highly
educated persons in this group who found themselves in less well-
paid positions than they would have liked remained dissatisfied,
and together with students and intellectuals they formed the core
of opposition to the Park regime.
Rural villages also underwent changes of revolutionary propor-
tions, particularly after 1971. As the government had emphasized
industrial growth and slighted the agrarian sector, agricultural
production lagged; its annual rate of growth during the 1967-72
period was only about 2.5 percent. With overall GNP growing at
over 10 percent a year during the same period, the rural economy
steadily lost ground, until by 1969 farm income was only a little
more than half that earned by urban workers. This situation con-
tributed to the high rate of migration to the cities and eroded po-
litical support for the president (see Agriculture, ch. 3).
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This situation led the government to take active measures to in-
crease farm productivity and income in 1971. Government subsi-
dies to farmers were increased by setting relatively high prices for
grains. Higher-yield rice varieties were introduced. Advanced
agricultural technology was made more widely available through
extension services, and more fertilizers and credits were provided.
As a result of these measures, farm productivity and farm income
increased very rapidly during the ensuing years, and the rate of
emigration to the cities tapered off.
The Saemaul Movement was instituted with great fanfare by
Park in the fall of 1971 . The movement was envisioned as a higlily
organized, intensively administered campaign to improve the ' 'en-
vironment" quality of rural life through projects undertaken by the
villagers themselves with government assistance. The bureaucracy,
particularly at the regional and local levels, was mobilized on a
massive scale to ensure that the program would be carried through
to completion in all 36,000 villages. The initial emphasis was on
improving village roads and bridges and replacing thatch with tile
or composition roofs.
The momentum was maintained and increased in subsequent
years as the Saemaul Movement evolved into a major ideological
campaign aimed at the psychological mobilization of the entire coun-
try in support of "nation building." During the first two or three
years, emphasis continued to be on improving the village environ-
ment, but later focus was shifted toward projects designed to raise
agricultural productivity and farm income.
As local government officials were jolted out of their traditional
lethargy by the continuing insistence of higher authorities that
essential services be delivered to farmers, the farmers began to have
ready access to agricultural extension services, rural credit, and
market information. The result of improved services and increased
resource allocation was that farmers became more confident of their
ability to improve the village environment through their own
cooperative efforts and became more convinced of the usefulness
of outside official help. As a result of the Saemaul Movement, about
85 percent of villages had electricity, and about 60 percent of farm
households had television sets by the late 1970s. Some 85 percent
of rural children continued from free, obligatory primary school-
ing to middle school, and over 50 percent of these middle school
pupils were entering high schools. Many farmers also acquired
modern amenities that had been available only to city dwellers just
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Foreign Relations
Relations with North Korea
Even though the Korean War ended in a truce agreement in
July 1953, a high level of tension remained between the two coun-
tries. Although North Korea presented numerous proposals for
peaceful unification after signing the truce, none was premised on
the notion of the continuation of the existing South Korean govern-
ment, which made the proposals unacceptable to Seoul.
Throughout the Park era, relations with North Korea were
marked by mutual distrust and discord, with only a brief respite
between July 1972 and June 1973 when the two sides engaged in
high-level negotiations. Hopes were raised that tensions might be
reduced and a way toward unification of the divided nation found.
Entrenched suspicions made the contentious issues separating the
two sides even more difficult to solve, and the talks were broken
off (see Relations with North Korea, ch. 4). Meanwhile, the armed
confrontation continued (see The Threat from the North, ch. 5).
The continuing failure of the negotiations reflected the depth of
the gap separating the two Koreas
—
particularly noteworthy in view
of the mellowing international environment evidenced, for exam-
ple, by China's much-improved relations with both the United
States and Japan. There were indications that both China and the
United States exerted considerable influence on the Korean negoti-
ations, but without marked effect. Leaders in the north and the
south found their ideologies and aims totally incompatible. South
Korea's leaders were determined to keep their society free from
communism, while North Korea's leaders were committed to the
cause of bringing "people's democratic revolution" to the south.
Relations with Japan
The most important development in South Korea's diplomacy
under Park was the normalization of relations with Japan. Although
South Korea had traded with Japan since 1948 and the two coun-
tries had engaged in negotiations since 1951, disagreement on a
number of issues had prevented diplomatic ties. The junta under
Park actively sought to normalize relations. Negotiations resumed
in October 1961
,
culminating in an agreement in June 1965 to es-
tablish diplomatic relations (see Relations with Japan, ch. 4). Park
settled for a fraction of the "reparations" earlier demanded by
Rhee, andJapanese fishermen were given access to South Korean
waters outside of the three-mile territorial limit (Rhee had prohib-
ited Japanese fishermen from coming any closer than the medial
line between Japan and Korea). Under the treaty, the Japanese
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government was to provide the capital necessary for an industri-
alization program and to open up ever-increasing loans, invest-
ments (both public and private), and trade (see Foreign Economic
Relations, ch. 3). The treaty normalizing relations was denounced
as a sellout by the opposition and the intellectuals and touched off
prolonged, widespread student demonstrations.
South Korean-Japanese relations since normalization have been
amicable, but were considerably strained by the abduction from
Tokyo of Kim Dae Jung in August 1973, which resulted in long
and embarrassing negotiations. In 1979 South Korean-Japanese
relations entered a new era as the two countries began informal
ties on defense matters, such as the establishment of the Korean-
Japanese Parliamentary Conference on Security Affairs.
Relations with the United States
South Korea continued to depend on United States military as-
sistance. In spite of initial United States hesitation about support-
ing Park in 1961, the two countries maintained close economic,
military, and diplomatic ties. South Korea dispatched combat troops
to the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) in 1965 to augment
United States forces there, and President Lyndon B. Johnson paid
a personal visit to Seoul in October 1966 to show his appreciation.
Friction began to develop in the Washington-Seoul relationship
after the United States withdrew one of its two divisions from South
Korea in 1971 and intensified after Park instituted rigorous authori-
tarian measures under his 1972 constitution. This tension led to
an accelerated effort by the Park government to gain support in
the United States Congress. The methods used by Seoul's lobbyists
ultimately resulted in the embarrassing "Koreagate" affair of 1977,
involving former Ambassador Kim Dong-jo and rice dealer Park
Tong Sun. Investigations by the Ethics Committee and by the Sub-
committee on International Organizations of the Committee on
International Relations of the United States House of Represen-
tatives received much press coverage and weakened United States
support for South Korea.
During his presidential election campaign in 1976, Jimmy Carter
pledged, if elected, to withdraw all combat troops from South Korea.
His victory aggravated United States-South Korean relations con-
siderably (see Relations with The United States, ch. 4). In March
1977, the United States decided to withdraw its ground combat
forces over a four-to-five year period. Some 3,600 troops subse-
quently were withdrawn, but further reductions were suspended
in 1979. In the meantime, President Carter and the Congress con-
tinued to press for the improvement of the human rights climate
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in South Korea. Relations between the two countries were at a low
point in 1979, just before Park's assassination. In early 1981, Presi-
dent Ronald Reagan's administration announced that further with-
drawals were not being considered.
The Transition
Soon after Park's October 26, 1979 assassination, South Korea
went through kaleidoscopic changes—intense and open competi-
tion for power, student upheavals, a military takeover, a gruesome
massacre, and the emergence of a new authoritarian order. Since
Park had concentrated virtually all political power around him-
self, his assassination created a political vacuum. One of his main
pillars of power, the director of the Presidential Security Force,
was assassinated with him; the director of the other major political
instrument, the KCIA, was quickly arrested by the Martial Law
Command for conducting the assassinations. In addition, the
National Assembly, one-third of its members presidential appoin-
tees, had been rendered impotent by the yusin constitution.
Ch'oe Kyu-ha, premier under Park, was elected president in
December 1979 by the National Conference for Unification, a rub-
ber stamp electoral college. Ch'oe had no independent political base.
He reaffirmed the need for a new constitution in his December
21 inaugural speech, stating that a new constitution supported by
a majority of the people would be adopted within a year and that
a fair general election would be held soon afterward.
Even before his inauguration, Ch'oe, as acting president, had
abolished Emergency Measure Number Nine. Several hundred in-
dividuals serving prison terms or being investigated on charges of
violating that decree were released on December 8. One of those
benefiting from the release was Kim Dae Jung, who had been un-
der house arrest and whose civil rights were to be restored on Febru-
ary 29, 1980. Also affected were student activists who had been
arrested for staging campus demonstrations.
Lieutenant General Chun Doo Hwan, the head of the Defense
Security Command, was responsible for conducting the investiga-
tion of Park's assassination. Chun used the factionalism rife with-
in the military to assert his control over the army on December
12, 1979. He promptly set about uprooting the Park-era power
elite and building a new political base. This power play, combined
with increasing social and labor unrest, economic instability, and
the factionalism within and between the ruling and opposition par-
ties, set the scene for the military's consolidation of power and cul-
minated in Chun's assumption of the presidency in August 1980.
Politics in South Korea in 1980 mainly revolved around framing
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a new constitution. The principal opposition party, the New
Democratic Party under Kim Young Sam, advocated concluding
the process by August 15, but President Ch'oe, evidently under
military pressure, was not ready to expedite the constitutional
process. The scheduling issue led to a major student upheaval in
May 1980, followed by a military takeover.
The Democratic Republican Party
In the meantime, the country underwent a brisk process of poli-
tical realignment. Although Park had organized and headed the
Democratic Republican Party in 1963 to mobilize mass support
behind his regime, by 1972 he had discarded it when he imposed
the yusin constitution. As a result, the DRP had only a nominal
existence at the time of Park's death. It was incumbent upon the
new president of the DRP, Kim Chong-p'il, to revive the party.
The DRP had suffered a disastrous loss in the December 1978 Na-
tional Assembly elections. This situation led to a call for "rectifi-
cation" (chongp'ung) within the party, which meant removing certain
top leaders who had attracted notoriety for illicit wealth and un-
democratic political behavior.
The New Democratic Party
The New Democratic Party (NDP), the principal opposition
party, also had its share of problems. Kim Young Sam was elected
as NDP leader for three years in 1979, so his position would have
been secure had not the Ch'oe government restored Kim Dae
Jung's civil rights. Even though Kim Dae Jung, the NDP presiden-
tial candidate in 1971 , had been out of the political arena for more
than seven years, he commanded a large political following. Be-
cause the NDP was expected to win the forthcoming election by
a wide margin, the presidency of the republic was at stake in the
negotiations for Kim Dae Jung's reinstatement in the party. In
the end, negotiations broke off, and on April 7, 1980, Kim Dae
Jung declared that he would no longer seek to rejoin the NDP.
Although Kim Young Sam and his supporters had waged a fierce
political struggle against President Park toward the end of his rule,
many of those in leadership positions in the NDP had tended to
be accommodating to the Park regime. Kim DaeJung and his fol-
lowers, on the other hand, represented the active dissident students,
intellectuals, and progressive Christians who had engaged in direct
struggle against the Park regime. The chaeya serydk (literally, forces
in the field, but the term also means an opposing political force)
were more radical in orientation. Kim Dae Jung and his group
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wished to expedite the process of restoring democracy, even if it
meant forcing the hands of Ch'oe and his supporters.
Students in 1980
While professional politicians engaged in the struggle for realign-
ment, college students were restless for action. The students ini-
tially were concerned with campus affairs. As soon as the new
semester began in March 1980, students on various campuses began
to demand the removal of professors with close ties to the Park
regime and of university owner-presidents who had amassed for-
tunes by operating their institutions. They also demanded autonomy
from government control. The students held rallies and on-campus
demonstrations and in some cases occupied college offices. As a
result of the unrest, many university presidents resigned.
In early May 1980, however, the students' slogans began to
change. Students demanded that martial law be lifted immediately
and that the "remnants of the yusin system," including Chun, be
removed. They also demanded the guarantee of labor rights, the
removal of "compradore capital," and the protection of farmers'
rights. Although student demonstrations had been confined to their
campuses when the issues raised concerned institutional matters,
they now began to spill out into the streets.
The massive demonstrations by the students continued until May
16, when Premier Sin Hyon-hwak promised that the government
would attempt to speed up the process of adopting a new constitu-
tion. Ch'oe even shortened his Middle Eastern trip by a day and
returned home on the evening ofMay 1 7 . Student demonstrations
paralyzed the nation and sent politicians and government leaders
to their council meetings. According to an unconfirmed report, Sin
even offered his resignation to the president upon his return and
advised the president to remove Chun.
General Chun Doo Hwan Takes Over
Whatever counsel the civilian leaders may have offered Ch'oe,
the military's position prevailed. Chun Doo Hwan, as head of the
Defense Security Command, had already replaced the army chief
of staff in December 1979 and had taken the command of the KCIA
in April 1980.
Chun's methodical and speedy actions after May 17 clearly re-
vealed that he had a well-laid plan. He issued a decree closing down
the colleges and universities and prohibiting all political gather-
ings. All publications and broadcasts were to receive prior censor-
ship, criticism of the incumbent and past presidents was outlawed,
and the manufacture and spreading of rumors were forbidden.
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Chun's plan aimed not only at quelling demonstrations but also
at destroying the power base of all existing political figures and
groups.
The arrest of Kim Dae Jung and other arch enemies of Park
was to be expected as soon as the military stepped in on May 1 7
.
But the arrest of Kim Chong-p'il and other people who had been
influential under Park came as a total surprise.
The Kwangju Uprising
Chun's hard-line policy led to a confrontation in Kwangju, a
city of 600,000 people located 170 miles south of Seoul, in South
Cholla Province, the scene of an uprising and bloodbath between
May 18 and 27. As noted in a report issued by the Martial Law
Command, the students and ''hot-blooded young soldiers" con-
fronted each other; angry citizens joined in, driven by alleged
rumors that the 1 soldiers of Kyongsang Province origin came to
exterminate the seeds of the Cholla people."
The Kwangju massacre was to became an important landmark
in the struggle for South Korean democracy. It heightened provin-
cial hostility and marked the beginning of the rise of anti-American
sentiment in South Korea.
According to the report, the sequence of events was triggered
by student demonstrations on the morning of May 18 in defiance
of the new edict. Some 200 Chonnam University students began
demonstrating in the morning, and by 2:00 P.M. they had been
joined by more than 800 additional demonstrators. City police were
unable to control the crowd. At about 4:00 P.M., the Martial Law
Command dispatched a Special Forces detachment consisting of
paratroopers trained for assault missions. The report did not men-
tion it, but the paratroopers killed a large number of people.
On May 20, some 10,000 people demonstrated in Kwangju. On
May 21, the Special Forces were withdrawn, and the city was left
to the rioters. A memorial service was held on May 24, with ap-
proximately 15,000 citizens in attendance.
On May 25, approximately 50,000 people gathered for a rally
and adopted a resolution calling for the abolition of martial law
and the release ofKim Dae Jung. A committee of leading citizens
was organized on May 23 to try to settle the impasse, but "im-
pure elements" and "maneuverers behind the scene" allegedly ob-
structed an effective solution. On May 27, at 3:30 A.M., an army
division that had been circling the city for three days launched an
attack. After light skirmishes, the army quashed the revolt in less
than two hours. The army arrested 1 ,740 rioters, ofwhom 730 were
detained for investigation.
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A number of conclusions can be drawn from the Martial Law
Command's account. The uprising started with student demon-
strations. The Martial Law Command dispatched assault troops
whose random killings angered citizens who had not participated
in the initial student demonstrations. According to later reports
by the command, nearly 200 persons were killed, including 22 sol-
diers and 4 policemen; of the civilians killed, only 17 died on the
final day of assault. And, regardless of who spread the "wanton
rumors," they evidently were credible enough to prompt the gather-
ing of 50,000 Kwangju citizens.
Chun, touring the city after the revolt had ended, told the peo-
ple of Kwangju not to make an issue of what had happened, but
to learn from it. The specter of Kwangju, however, was to haunt
him for years to come.
There were several aftereffects resulting from the Kwangju in-
cident. It deepened the chasm that had existed between the Kyong-
sang provinces (from which Park and Chun originated) and the
Cholla provinces, of which Kwangju is a capital and from which
the opposition leader Kim Dae Jung came (see Population Settle-
ment Patterns, ch. 2). The United States' role also was controver-
sial. General John A. Wickham, Jr. had released South Korean
troops from the South Korea-United States Combined Forces Com-
mand to end the rebellion, and President Reagan had strongly en-
dorsed Chun's actions (see Relations with the United States, ch. 4).
The Chun Regime
Having suppressed the Kwangju uprising with brute force,
General Chun Doo Hwan further tightened his grip on the govern-
ment. He and three of his close associates served as the core of
the junta committee, known as the Special Committee for National
Security Measures. The three were Lieutenant General Ch'a Kyu-
hon (deputy chief of staff of the army), Major General Roh Tae
Woo (commander of the Capital Garrison Command), and Major
General Chong Ho-yong (commander of the Special Forces). The
junta vested in itself the authority to pass laws and to make all de-
cisions affecting the state until a new National Assembly came into
being.
On August 5, 1980, Chun promoted himself from lieutenant
general to full general in preparation for retiring from the army
on August 22. On August 27 he was elected president by the
National Conference for Unification, receiving 2,524 of the 2,525




Chun presented his objective at his September 1
,
1980, inaugu-
ration: to create a new society where all past corrupt practices would
be replaced by mutual trust and justice. In order to accomplish
this goal, he planned to remove the old politicians from the scene;
only those certified as "clean" would be permitted to participate
in building the new order.
In the economic field, Chun intended to do away with excessive
protection of industries and to encourage creativity. An increase
in employment opportunities would be facilitated, and coopera-
tion and coprosperity between labor and management would be
brought about. Farmers' income would be increased by continu-
ing the Saemaul Movement.
The 1980 Constitution
One of Chun's inaugural promises was the promulgation of a
new constitution and the holding of a national referendum to ap-
prove it. On September 29, 1980, the government announced the
draft of a constitution that in many ways was the most democratic
South Korea had ever had—except for the supplementary provi-
sions and the procedure for presidential election. The guarantee
of peoples' democratic rights was absolute, including the right to
privacy in communications, the prohibition of torture, and the in-
admissability in court trials of confessions obtained by force. The
president, who was to be elected by an electoral college and to serve
a single seven-year term, was given strong powers, including the
right to dissolve the National Assembly, which in turn could bring
down cabinets but not the president. In the event that the consti-
tution was amended to extend the president's term of office, such
changes were not to be applied to the incumbent. The document
received the overwhelming approval of the voters—91 .6 percent—at
the national referendum held on October 22, 1980.
The constitution, however, was a "promissory note." Until the
new National Assembly was elected and inaugurated, the Legisla-
tive Council for National Security, to be appointed by Chun, would
enact all laws. A supplementary provision in the constitution also
called for the dissolution of all existing political parties. In effect,
by offering to bring in a democratic government by June 1981,
Chun had obtained a mandate to change the political landscape
in whatever form he chose. The new constitution placed South
Korea under a constitutional dictatorship from October 1980 to
June 1981.
Purges
Chun zealously pushed his campaign to weed out corruption.
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The clean-up campaign began in May 1980 when Kim Chong-
p'il and others were forced to give up their wealth and retire from
politics. In June some 300 senior KCIA agents were dismissed.
In July 1980, more than 230 senior officials, including former cabi-
net officers, were dismissed on corruption charges. The ax also fell
on 4,760 low-level officials in the government, state-owned firms,
and banks, with the proviso that the former officials not be rehired
by such firms within two years. The Martial Law Command ar-
rested 1 7 prominent politicians of both the government and oppo-
sition parties for investigation and removed some 400 bank officials,
including 4 bank presidents and 21 vice presidents. The govern-
ment also announced the dismissal of 1 ,819 officials of public enter-
prises and affiliated agencies, including 39 (some 25 percent) of
the presidents and vice presidents of such enterprises and banks
and 128 board directors (more than 22 percent).
The "clean-up campaign" also extended to the mass media. On
July 31
,
1980, the 172 periodicals that allegedly caused "social decay
and juvenile delinquency" were summarily abolished, among them
some of the finest intellectual magazines of liberal inclination and
prestigious journals for general audiences. This action resulted in
the dismissal of hundreds of journalists and staff. The daily
newspapers not affected by the purge also were directed to weed
out "corrupting," that is, liberal writers (see The Media, ch. 4).
Chun's "Cultural Revolution"
In the wake of Chun's purge, the government also launched a
massive reeducation program for the nation's elites. High govern-
ment officials, judges, prosecutors, business executives, college
professors, and their spouses—32,000 persons in all—were brought
together for an intensive three-day training program at Saemaul's
New Community Training Centers in Suwon and elsewhere. The
training regimen included morning exercises, environmental
cleanup, lectures on the New Community Movement, and discus-
sion sessions on "the proper way of life."
This training program, initiated under Park's regime, eventu-
ally was to be extended to the general public. In August 1980, the
government launched another massive propaganda campaign, or-
ganizing "Bright Society Rallies" in major cities where tens of thou-
sands of citizens were mobilized to hear speeches. In addition,
"Cleansing Committees" were established at all levels of govern-





The new regime inherited an economy suffering from all the side
effects of Park's export-oriented development program and policy
of expanding heavy and chemical industries (see Economic Develop-
ment, this ch.; Industrial Policies, ch. 3). The international eco-
nomic environment of the early 1980s was extremely unfavorable,
a situation that further restricted South Korea's exports. It was
necessary, therefore, for the Chun regime to concentrate on stabili-
zation, and it devoted its first two years to controlling inflation while
attempting to bring about economic recovery. Investment was
redirected from the capital-intensive heavy and chemical industries
towards labor-intensive light industries that produced consumer
goods. Import restrictions were lifted.
The economy began to improve in 1983 because of stringent anti-
inflationary measures and the upturn in the world economy. While
South Korea had suffered a negative growth rate in 1980, it at-
tained an 8.1 percent growth rate in 1983. Exports began increas-
ing in mid- 1983 and the economy began to gain strength. A good
harvest in 1983 also helped. South Korea attained its 1983 export
target of US$23.5 billion, a 7.6 percent increase from 1982.
In December 1983, Seoul unveiled its revised Fifth Five-Year
Economic and Social Development Plan. The plan called for steady
growth for the next three years, low inflation, and sharply reduced
foreign borrowing. Exports were to rise by 15 percent a year, infla-
tion was projected to be held at 1.8 percent, and per capita GNP
was to rise to US$2,325 by 1986. The annual growth rate was plan-
ned to average 7.5 percent though the actual performance was
higher. The real GNP growth rate was 7 percent in 1985, but for




One of the most salient elements of the Chun regime was its close
ties with the Reagan administration. The ties were in sharp con-
trast to the strained Washington-Seoul relationship under presi-
dents Carter and Park, when the United States government had
criticized Park's dictatorial policies and attempted to implement
Carter's campaign pledge to withdraw United States ground combat
troops from South Korea. The relationship also had been strained
because of the 1977 Koreagate scandal.
Reagan provided unmitigated support to Chun and to South
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Korea's security. Chun was Reagan's first official guest in the White
House. Reagan reaffirmed his support of Chun by visiting Seoul
in November 1983.
While Reagan's support considerably buttressed Chun's stature
in domestic politics and the international arena, it also fueled the
subculture of anti-Americanism. The opposition forces in South
Korea, suffering from the government's stringent suppression,
denounced United States' support for the Chun regime as a cal-
lous disregard for human rights and questioned the United States'
motives in Korea. The past image of the United States as a staunch
supporter of democracy in South Korea was replaced with that of
defender of its own interests, a policy impervious to injustices com-
mitted in South Korea. This view was accentuated by the fact that
Chun's White House visit occurred only several months after the
Martial Law Command had brutally suppressed the student up-
rising in Kwangju. (It was later revealed by Richard V. Allen, Na-
tional Security Advisor to President Reagan, that Chun's visit was
part of Washington's diplomatic effort to spare the life ofKim Dae
Jung, who had been sentenced to death.) This atmosphere led some
of South Korea's radical elements to take extreme measures, such
as arson committed at the United States Information Service build-
ing in Pusan in March 1982 and the occupation of the United States
Information Service Library in Seoul in May 1985. Students who
demonstrated against the Chun government invariably carried anti-
American slogans.
Japan
The Chun government also brought about a significant change
in South Korea's relations with Japan. In 1981 Chun utilized the
United States' support and its strategy of allocating greater respon-
sibility to Japan in the East Asian region to persuade Tokyo to
grant Seoul a large public loan. The negotiations lasted until early
1983 and aroused many conflicting emotions in both countries.
However, Chun was able to obtain a US$4 billion low-interest loan
that significantiy contributed to boosting South Korea's credit rating
and to accelerating its economic recovery; Seoul's foreign debt had
reached US$41 billion at the end of 1983 and was badly in need
of an improved credit rating. Japanese prime minister Nakasone
Yasuhiro capped the negotiation process by paying a state visit to
Seoul in January 1983. Whereas other Japanese prime ministers
had visited Seoul for inaugurations or funerals, this was the first
state visit to South Korea by a Japanese leader since the country
was liberated from Japan in 1945.
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China and the Soviet Union
Chun continued Park's policy of improving relations with Chi-
na and the Soviet Union and attached considerable importance to
these two countries, long the allies of North Korea. Beijing and
Moscow were thought to have much influence in charting the fu-
ture of the Korean Peninsula and were thus a part of Nordpolitik
(see Relations with the Soviet Union; Relations with China, ch. 4).
Seoul's official contact with Beijing was facilitated by the land-
ing of a hijacked Chinese civilian airliner in May 1983. China sent
a delegation of thirty-three officials to Seoul to negotiate the return
of the airliner, marking the beginning of frequent exchanges of per-
sonnel. For example, in March 1984, a South Korean tennis team
visited Kunming for a Davis Cup match with a Chinese team. In
April 1984, a thirty-four-member Chinese basketball team arrived
in Seoul to participate in the Eighth Asian Junior Basketball Cham-
pionships. Some Chinese officials reportedly paid quiet visits to
South Korea to inspect its industries, and South Korean officials
visited China to attend various international conferences. Since Chi-
na and South Korea began indirect trade in 1975, the volume has
steadily increased (see Foreign Trade Policy, ch. 3).
The Soviet Union's unofficial relationship with South Korea be-
gan in 1973, when it permitted South Koreans to attend an inter-
national conference held in the Soviet Union. In October 1982,
a Soviet official attended an international conference in South Korea
on the preservation of cultural relics. The uproar following the
Korean Air (KAL) 007 incident in September 1983, when the Soviet
air force shot down the KAL passenger airplane, brought about
a hiatus in contacts, but the unofficial relationship resumed in 1988.
The Demise of the Chun Regime
Even though Chun Doo Hwan's government had attained con-
siderable results in economy and diplomacy, his government failed
to win public trust or support. In spite of Chun's lofty pronounce-
ments, the public basically regarded Chun as a usurper of power
who had deprived South Korea of its opportunity to restore
democracy. Chun lacked political credentials; his access to power
derived from his position as the head of the Defense Security
Command—the army's nerve center of political intelligence—and
his ability to bring together his generals in the front lines.
Chun and his military followers failed to overcome the stigma
of the Kwangju incident, and the new "just society" that he
promised did not materialize. In fact, between 1982 and 1983, at
least two of the major financial scandals in South Korea involved
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Chun's in-laws. The Chun government's slogans became hollow.
While Park had gained respect and popularity through the record-
breaking pace of economic development, Chun could not repeat
such a feat. In the 1985 National Assembly elections, opposition
parties together won more votes than the government party, clearly
indicating that the public wanted a change. Moreover, increasing
numbers of people had become more sympathetic to the students,
who presented increasingly radical demands.
One of the most serious problems the government faced was that
the argument for restricting democracy became less and less credi-
ble. The people had long been tolerant of various restrictions im-
posed by succeeding governments because of the perceived threat
from the north, but the consensus eroded as the international en-
vironment moderated. More and more people became cynical about
repeated government pronouncements, viewing them as self-serving
propaganda by those in power. This tendency was particularly
pronounced among the post-Korean War generation that constitut-
ed a majority of the South Korean population.
The unpopular Chun regime and its constitutional framework
was brought down in 1987 largely by the student agitation that
beset the regime. Student activists set the tone and agenda of the
society as a whole because the government and the government-
controlled press had lost their credibility. The opposition parties
worked with the students, although they disagreed on the ultimate
aim—the politicians wanted reform, while the students demanded
revolution. The opposition politicians wanted constitutional reform
to replace the existing system of electing the president through the
handpicked electoral college with direct popular election. The stu-
dents attacked not only the military leaders in power but also the
entire socio-political and economic establishment.
A small number of confirmed radicals led the student movement.
They argued that the basic cause for the political and social malaise
in South Korea was "American imperialism," which they believed
had dominated South Korea ever since it was liberated fromJapan
in 1945. In their view, "American imperialism" buttressed the
military dictatorship and the exploitative capitalist system; the strug-
gle against the military dictatorship and American imperialism was
inseparable. This position was the same argument that North Korea
had been advancing since 1946, but a more important source of
intellectual persuasion came from the revisionist school of histori-
ography that swept United States academia during the 1970s.
The revisionist argument was very similar to that of Lenin on
imperialism. The Cold War was seen as the inevitable outcome of
the United States capitalist system's need for continuous economic
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expansion abroad. United States participation in the Korean War
and the subsequent stationing of United States forces in South Korea
satisfied such a need, according to this perspective. For the revi-
sionists, it was irrelevant that the United States had decided to aban-
don Korea in September-October 1947, or that the United States
had withdrawn its occupation forces from South Korea in 1949.
The communist countries, whether the Soviet Union or North
Korea, were seen as passive entities reacting against the aggres-
sive actions of ' 'American imperialists' ' rather than pursuing their
own goals. The fact that the United States had interjected itself
into the Korean War in 1950, and that it continued to station its
troops in South Korea after the war, was evidence enough.
The revisionist arguments found a fertile soil among the univer-
sity students. The inquisitive students had long viewed the one-
sided anticommunist propaganda emanating from official and
established sources as stifling and as leaving too many questions
unanswered. The new arguments sounded logical and convincing,
particularly when some of the revisionists took liberty with histor-
ical evidence. Increasing numbers of students took to the streets
to denounce the military dictatorship and American imperialism.
Initially, the public was apathetic to the confrontation between
the student demonstrators and government, but the daily fracas
on the streets and the never-ending smell of tear gas aroused their
ire. The news about the torture and death of a student, Pak Chong-
ch'ol, by the police touched the sore nerves of the people. Presi-
dent Chun attempted to squash the opposition by issuing a decla-
ration on April 13, 1987, to suspend the ''wasteful debate" about
constitutional reform until a new government was installed at the
end of his seven-year term. The declaration was, instead, his re-
gime's swan song. Chun wanted to have his successor "elected"
by his handpicked supporters; the public greeted the declaration
with universal outrage. Even the Reagan administration, which
had been taciturn about South Korea's internal politics, urged the
Chun government not to ignore the outrage. Finally, on June 29,
1987, Roh Tae Woo, the government party's choice as Chun's suc-
cessor, made a dramatic announcement in favor of a new democratic
constitution that embodied all the opposition's demands.
* * *
Extensive literature is available in English on all the subjects co-
vered in this chapter. Ki-baik Lee's A New History of Korea is the
best account of Korean history available in English. The follow-
ing sources are also helpful: Han Woo-kuen's The History ofKorea;
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William Henthorn's A History ofKorea; The History ofKorea by Sohn
Pow-key, Kim Chol-choon, and Hong Yi-sup; and East Asia: Tra-
dition and Transformation, coauthored by John K. Fairbank, Edwin
O. Reischauer, and Albert M. Craig.
Aspects of the Choson Dynasty are dealt with in JaHyun Kim
Haboush's^l Heritage ofKings, William Shaw's Legal Norms in a Con-
fucian State, and Young-ho Ch'oe's The Civil Examinations and the
Social Structure in Early Yi Dynasty Korea. Late nineteenth-century
developments are covered in Vipan Chandra's Imperialism,
Resistance, and Reform in Late Nineteenth-Century Korea, James B.
Palais 's Politics and Policy in Traditional Korea, and C.I. Eugene Kim
and Han-Kyo Kim's Korea and the Politics ofImperialism, 1876-1910.
Various aspects ofJapanese rule are detailed in Andrew J. Graj-
danzev's Modern Korea and Chong-Sik Lee's Japan and Korea: The
Political Dimension. Korea's reaction to Japanese colonialism is re-
counted in Chong-Sik Lee's The Politics of Korean Nationalism.
George McAfee McCune's Korea Today is particularly valuable for
the period between 1945 and 1948. The period ofJapanese colonial
rule is also treated in Dennis L. McNamara's The Colonial Origins
ofKorean Enterprise and Michael Edson Robinson's Cultural Nation-
alism in Colonial Korea, 1920-1925.
Among the numerous works that have taken advantage of declas-
sified documents concerning the period leading up the Korean War
areJames Irving Matray's The Reluctant Crusade, the second volume
of Bruce Cuming's work on that period, Hie Roaring of the Cataract,
1947-50, and Peter Lowe's The Origins of the Korea War.
Information about Korea under Syngman Rhee can be found
in Gregory Henderson's book, Korea: The Politics of the Vortex; in
Joungwon Alexander Kim's Divided Korea: The Politics of Develop-
ment, 1945-1972; and in Chi-young Pak's Political Opposition in Korea,
1945-1960. Robert T. Oliver, a close associate of Rhee, explains
Rhee's actions in Syngman Rhee and American Involvement in Korea,
1942-1960. Lee Hahn-Been's Korea: Time, Change, andAdministra-
tion analyzes governmental performance under Rhee and subse-
quent regimes. Han Sung-Joo's The Failure of Democracy in South
Korea provides an incisive analysis of both the Rhee regime and
the Chang Myon government.
A number of books treat Korea in the modern era, although most
of them emphasize the political aspect of the society. Gregory
Henderson's book is particularly valuable for its treatment of
modern and contemporary periods through the late 1960s. The 1961
coup d'etat and the government under Park Chung Hee are dis-
cussed in Kim Se-Jin's The Politics of Military Revolution in Korea,
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John Kie-Chiang Oh's Korea: Democracy on Trial, David C. Cole
and Princeton N. Lyman's Korean Development: The Interplay of
Politics and Economics, Young Whan Kihl's Politics and Policies in Divi-
ded Korea, Sung Chul Yang's Korea and Two Regimes, and The Eco-
nomic and Social Modernization of the Republic of Korea by Edward S.
Mason and others. For the government under Chun Doo Hwan,
see Harold C. Hinton's Korea under New Leadership; for South
Korea's foreign policy, see Youngnok Koo and Sung-joo Han's
Foreign Policy of the Republic ofKorea and Byung Chul Koh's The For-
eign Policy Systems ofNorth and South Korea. South Korea's relations
with North Korea are treated in detail by Robert A. Scalapino and
Chong-Sik Lee's Communism in Korea and Ralph N. Clough's Em-
battled Korea.
Studies on Korea: A Scholar's Guide, edited by Kim Han-Kyo, lists
numerous books and articles; many items are annotated. Far Eastern
Economic Review, Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Asian Wall Street
Journal, and Asian Survey regularly provide analyses of South Korea's
politics and economy. A comprehensive source of publications deal-
ing with Korean history is the Association for Asian Studies' an-
nual Bibliography of Asian Studies. (For further information and
complete citations, see Bibliography.)
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Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment
North Watergate, Suwon Castle, has a stone bridge with
seven arches spanning the Namch'on River.
FEW SOCIETIES HAVE CHANGED as rapidly or as dramati-
cally since the end ofWorld War II as that of the Republic of Korea
(South Korea). When the war ended in 1945, the great majority
of the people living in the southern half of the Korean Peninsula
were poor peasants. The Japanese colonial regime from 1910 to
1945 had promoted modernization of the economy and society. The
regime's efforts, however, had a limited, and mainly negative, im-
pact on most Koreans inasmuch as the main intent of the modern-
ization program was to serve Japan. The poverty and distress of
the South Koreans were deepened by the Korean War of 1950-53
when numerous people died and cities and towns were devastated.
During the next four decades, however, South Korea evolved into
a dynamic, industrial society. By 1990 educational and public health
standards were high, most people lived in urban areas, and a com-
plex structure of social classes had emerged that resembled the social
structures of developed Western countries or Japan. The country
also was making substantial progress in its evolution from a mili-
tary dictatorship similar to that of many Third World regimes to
a democratic, pluralistic political system. In the mid-1950s, few
observers could have imagined that Seoul, the country's capital,
would emerge from the devastation of war to become one of the
world's most vibrant metropolitan centers—rivaling Tokyo, Hong
Kong, and Los Angeles.
Colonial occupation, war, and the tragedy of national division
fostered abrupt social changes. Rapid economic growth engendered
profound changes in values and human relationships. Yet there
also was continuity with the past. Confucian and neo-Confucian
ideas and institutions, which flourished during the Choson Dynasty
(1392-1910), continued to have an important impact in 1990. The
Confucian influence was most evident in the tremendous value
placed on education, a major factor in South Korea's economic
progress. Equally evident was the persistence of hierarchical, often
authoritarian, modes of human interaction that reflected neo-
Confucianism's emphasis on inequality.
The complex kinship structures of the past, sanctified by Con-
fucianism, had eroded because of urbanization but did not disap-
pear. In 1990 Koreans were more likely to live in nuclear families
than their parents or grandparents, but old Confucian ideas of filial
piety still were strong. At the same time, contemporary social values
were influenced by traditional but non-Confucian Korean values,
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such as shamanism and Buddhism, and by ideas brought into the
country from the West and Japan.
The population of the Korean Peninsula, sharing a common lan-
guage, ethnic identity, and culture, was one of the world's most
homogeneous. Although there were significant regional differences
even within the relatively small land area of South Korea, neither
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) nor
South Korea had significant non-Korean ethnic minorities. This
homogeneity, and the sense of a shared historical experience that
it promoted, gave the people of South Korea a strong sense of
national purpose. However, the years of Japanese colonial rule,
the division of the peninsula after World War II, the establishment
of two antagonistic states in the north and south, and the profound
changes in the economy and society caused by industrialization and
urbanization since the 1950s led many South Koreans to search
anew for their national identity and place in the world. Often, the
concern for identity expressed itself as xenophobia, the creation
of a "national mythology" that was given official or semiofficial
sanction, or the search for the special and unique "essence" of
Korean culture.
Physical Environment
Land Area and Borders
The Korean Peninsula extends for about 1,000 kilometers south-
ward from the northeast part of the Asian continental landmass.
The Japanese islands of Honshu and Kyushu are located some 200
kilometers to the southeast across the Korea Strait; the Shandong
Peninsula of China lies 190 kilometers to the west. The west coast
of the peninsula is bordered by the Korea Bay to the north and
the Yellow Sea to the south; the east coast is bordered by the Sea
ofJapan (known in Korea as the East Sea). The 8,640-kilometer
coastline is highly indented. Some 3,579 islands lie adjacent to the
peninsula. Most of them are found along the south and west coasts.
The northern land border of the Korean Peninsula is formed
by the Yalu and Tumen rivers, which separate Korea from the
provinces of Jilin and Liaoning in China. The original border
between the two Korean states was the thirty-eighth parallel of lati-
tude. After the Korean War, the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ—see
Glossary) formed the boundary between the two. The DMZ is a
heavily guarded, 4,000-meter-wide strip of land that runs along
the line of cease-fire, the Demarcation Line (see Glossary), from
the east to the west coasts for a distance of 241 kilometers (238 kilo-
meters of that line form the land boundary with North Korea).
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The total land area of the peninsula, including the islands, is
220,847 square kilometers. Some 44.6 percent (98,477 square
kilometers) of this total, excluding the area within the DMZ, con-
stitutes the territory of the Republic of Korea. The combined ter-
ritories of North Korea and South Korea are about the same size
as the state of Minnesota. South Korea alone is about the size of
Portugal or Hungary and is slightly larger than the state of Indiana.
The largest island, Cheju, lies off the southwest corner of the
peninsula and has a land area of 1,825 square kilometers. Other
important islands include Ullung in the Sea ofJapan and Kangh-
wa Island at the mouth of the Han River. Although the eastern
coastline of South Korea is generally unindented, the southern and
western coasts are jagged and irregular. The difference is caused
by the fact that the eastern coast is gradually rising, while the
southern and western coasts are subsiding.
Lacking formidable land or sea barriers along its borders and
occupying a central position among East Asian nations, the Korean
Peninsula has served as a cultural bridge between the mainland
and the Japanese archipelago. Korea contributed greatly to the de-
velopment of Japan by transmitting both Indian Buddhist and
Chinese Confucian culture, art, and religion. At the same time,
Korea's exposed geographical position left it vulnerable to inva-
sion by its stronger neighbors. When, in the late nineteenth cen-
tury, British statesman Lord George Curzon described Korea as
a "sort of political Tom Tiddler's ground between China, Rus-
sia, and Japan," he was describing a situation that had prevailed
for several millennia, as would be tragically apparent during the
twentieth century.
Topography and Drainage
Early European visitors to Korea remarked that the land resem-
bled "a sea in a heavy gale" because of the large number of suc-
cessive mountain ranges that crisscross the peninsula. The tallest
mountains are in North Korea. The tallest mountain in South
Korea is Mount Halla (1,950 meters), which is the cone of a vol-
canic formation constituting Cheju Island. There are three major
mountain ranges within South Korea: the T'aebaek and Sobaek
ranges and the Chiri Massif (see fig. 4).
Unlike Japan or the northern provinces of China, the Korean
Peninsula is geologically stable. There are no active volcanoes, and
there have been no strong earthquakes. Historical records, however,
describe volcanic activity on Mount Halla during the Koryo Dy-
nasty (918-1392 A.D.).
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Over the centuries, Korea's inhabitants have cut down most of
the ancient Korean forests, with the exception of a few remote,
mountainous areas. The disappearance of the forests has been a
major cause of soil erosion and flooding. Because of successful
reforestation programs and the declining use of firewood as a source
of energy since the 1960s, however, most of South Korea's hills
in the 1980s were amply covered with foliage. South Korea has
no extensive plains; its lowlands are the product of mountain ero-
sion. Approximately 30 percent of the area of South Korea con-
sists of lowlands, with the rest consisting of uplands and mountains.
The great majority of the lowland area lies along the coasts, particu-
larly the west coast, and along the major rivers. The most important
lowlands are the Han River plain around Seoul, the P'yongt'aek
coastal plain southwest of Seoul, the Kum River basin, the Nak-
tong River basin, and the Yongsan and the Honam plains in the
southwest. A narrow littoral plain extends along the east coast.
The Naktong is South Korea's longest river (521 kilometers).
The Han River, which flows through Seoul, is 514 kilometers long,
and the Kum River is 401 kilometers long. Other major rivers in-
clude the Imjin, which flows through both North Korea and South
Korea and forms an estuary with the Han River; the Pukhan, a
tributary of the Han that also flows out of North Korea; and the
Somjin. The major rivers flow north to south or east to west and
empty into the Yellow Sea or the Korea Strait. They tend to be
broad and shallow and to have wide seasonal variations in water
flow.
News that North Korea was constructing a huge multipurpose
dam at the base of Mount Kumgang (1,638 meters) north of the
DMZ caused considerable consternation in South Korea during
the mid-1980s. South Korean authorities feared that once it was
completed, a sudden release of the dam's waters into the Pukhan
River during north-south hostilities could flood Seoul and para-
lyze the capital region. During 1987 the Kumgang-san Dam was
a major issue that Seoul sought to raise in talks with P'yongyang.
Although Seoul completed a "Peace Dam" on the Pukhan River
to counteract the potential threat of Pyongyang's dam project
before the 1988 Olympics, the North Korean project apparently
still was in its initial stages of construction in 1990.
Climate
Part of the East Asian monsoonal region, South Korea has a tem-
perate climate with four distinct seasons. The movement of air mass-
es from the Asian continent exerts greater influence on South
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Winters are usually long, cold, and dry, whereas summers are short,
hot, and humid. Spring and autumn are pleasant but short in du-
ration. Seoul's mean temperature inJanuary is - 5°C to - 2.5°C;
in July the mean temperature is about 22.5°C to 25°C. Because
of its southern and seagirt location, Cheju Island has warmer and
milder weather than other parts of South Korea. Mean tempera-
tures on Cheju range from 2.5°C in January to 25°C in July.
The country generally has sufficient rainfall to sustain its agricul-
ture. Rarely does less than 75 centimeters of rain fall in any given
year; for the most part, rainfall is over 100 centimeters. Amounts
of precipitation, however, can vary from year to year. Serious
droughts occur about once every eight years, especially in the rice-
producing southwestern part of the country. About two-thirds of
the annual precipitation occurs between June and September.
South Korea is less vulnerable to typhoons thanJapan, Taiwan,
the east coast of China, or the Philippines. From one to three
typhoons can be expected per year. Typhoons usually pass over
South Korea in late summer, especially in August, and bring tor-
rential rains (see fig. 5). Flooding occasionally causes considera-
ble damage. In September 1984, record floods caused the deaths
of 190 people and left 200,000 homeless. This disaster prompted
the North Korean government to make an unprecedented offer of
humanitarian aid in the form of rice, medicine, clothes, and building
materials. South Korea accepted these items and distributed them
to flood victims.
Population
Although a variety of different Asian peoples had migrated to
the Korean Peninsula in past centuries, very few have remained
permanentiy. Hence, by 1990 both South Korea and North Korea
were among the world's most ethnically homogeneous nations. The
number of indigenous minorities was negligible. In South Korea,
people of foreign origin, including Westerners, Chinese, and
Japanese, were a small percentage of the population, whose resi-
dence was generally temporary. Like their Japanese neighbors,
Koreans tend to equate nationality or citizenship with member-
ship in a single, homogeneous ethnic group or "race" (minjok, in
Korean). A common language and culture also are viewed as impor-
tant elements in Korean identity. The idea of multiracial or mul-
tiethnic nations, like India or the United States, strikes many
Koreans as odd or even contradictory. Consciousness of homogenei-
ty is a major reason why Koreans on both sides of the DMZ viewed



























Figure 5. Average Annual Rainfall
Against the background of ethnic homogeneity, however, sig-
nificant regional differences exist. Within South Korea, the most
important regional difference is between the Kyongsang region,
embracing North Kyongsang and South Kyongsang provinces in
the southeast, and the Cholla region, embracing North Cholla and
South Cholla provinces in the southwest. The two regions, sepa-
rated by the Chiri Massif, nurture a rivalry said to reach back to
the Three Kingdoms Period, which lasted from the fourth century
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to the seventh century A.D., when the kingdoms of Paekche and
Silla struggled for control of the peninsula (see The Origins of the
Korean Nation, ch. 1; fig. 2). Observers noted that interregional
marriages are rare, and that as of 1990 a new four-lane highway
completed in 1984 between Kwangju and Taegu, the capitals of
South Cholla and North Kyongsang provinces, respectively, had
not been successful in promoting travel between the two areas.
South Korea's political elite, including presidents Park Chung
Hee, Chun Doo Hwan, and Roh Tae Woo, have come largely from
the Kyongsang region. As a result, Kyongsang has been a special
beneficiary of government development assistance. By contrast,
the Cholla region has remained comparatively rural, undeveloped,
and poor. Chronically disaffected, its people righdy or wrongly have
a reputation for rebelliousness. Regional bitterness was intensified
by the May 1980 Kwangju incident, in which about 200 and
perhaps many more inhabitants of the capital of South Cholla
Province were killed by government troops sent to quell an insur-
rection. Many of the troops reportedly were from the Kyongsang
region (see Students in 1980, ch. 1; United States Forces in South
Korea, ch. 5).
Regional stereotypes, like regional dialects, have been breaking
down under the influence of centralized education, nationwide me-
dia, and the several decades of population movement since the
Korean War. Stereotypes remain important, however, in the eyes
of many South Koreans. For example, the people of Kyonggi
Province, surrounding Seoul, are often described as being cultured,
and Ch'ungch'ong people, inhabiting the region embracing North
Ch'ungch'ong and South Ch'ungch'ong provinces, are thought
to be mild-mannered, manifesting trueyangban virtues (see Tradi-
tional Social Structure, this ch.). The people of Kangwon Province
in the northeast are viewed as poor and stolid, whereas Koreans
from the northern provinces of P'yongan, Hwanghae, and Ham-
gyong, now in North Korea, are perceived as being diligent and
aggressive. Cheju Island is famous for its strong-minded and in-
dependent women.
Population Trends
The population of South Korea has grown rapidly since the
republic's establishment in 1948. In the first official census, taken
in 1949, the total population of South Korea was calculated at
20,188,641 people. The 1985 census total was 40,466,577. Popu-
lation growth was slow, averaging about 1 . 1 percent annually during
the period from 1949 to 1955, when the population registered at
21.5 million. Growth accelerated between 1955 and 1966 to 29.2
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million or an annual average of 2.8 percent, but declined signifi-
cantly during the period 1966 to 1985 to an annual average of 1.7
percent (see fig. 6). Thereafter, the annual average growth rate
was estimated to be less than 1 percent, similar to the low growth
rates of most industrialized countries and to the target figure set
by the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs for the 1990s. As of
January 1, 1989, the population of South Korea was estimated to
be approximately 42.2 million.
The proportion of the total population under fifteen years of age
has risen and fallen with the growth rate. In 1955 approximately
41.2 percent of the population was under fifteen years of age, a
percentage that rose to 43.5 percent in 1966 before falling to 38.3
percent in 1975, 34.2 percent in 1980, and 29.9 percent in 1985.
In the past, the large proportion of children relative to the total
population put great strains on the country's economy, particu-
larly because substantial resources were invested in education fa-
cilities (see Primary and Secondary Schools, this ch.). With the
slowdown in the population growth rate and a rise in the median
age (from 18.7 years to 21.8 years between 1960 and 1980), the
age structure of the population has begun to resemble the colum-
nar pattern typical of developed countries, rather than the pyra-
midal pattern found in most parts of the Third World.
The decline in the population growth rate and in the proportion
of people under fifteen years of age after 1966 reflected the success
of official and unofficial birth control programs. The government
of President Syngman Rhee (1948-60) was conservative in such
matters. Although Christian churches initiated a family planning
campaign in 1957, it was not until 1962 that the government of
Park Chung Hee, alarmed at the way in which the rapidly increas-
ing population was undermining economic growth, began a nation-
wide family planning program. Other factors that contributed to
a slowdown in population growth included urbanization, later mar-
riage ages for both men and women, higher education levels, a
greater number ofwomen in the labor force, and better health stan-
dards (see Public Health and Welfare, this ch.).
Public and private agencies involved in family planning included
the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, the Ministry of Home
Affairs, the Planned Parenthood Federation of Korea, and the
Korea Institute of Family Planning. In the late 1980s, their activi-
ties included distribution of free birth control devices and infor-
mation, classes for women on family planning methods, and the
granting of special subsidies and privileges (such as low-interest
housing loans) to parents who agreed to undergo sterilization. There
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were 502,000 South Koreans sterilized in 1984, as compared with
426,000 in the previous year.
The 1973 Maternal and Child Health Law legalized abortion.
In 1983 the government began suspending medical insurance
benefits for maternal care for pregnant women with three or more
children. It also denied tax deductions for education expenses to
parents with two or more children.
As in China, cultural attitudes pose problems for family plan-
ning programs. A strong preference for sons—who in Korea's Con-
fucian value system are expected to care for their parents in old
age and carry on the family name—means that parents with only
daughters usually continue to have children until a son is born.
The government has encouraged married couples to have only one
child. Such encouragement has been a prominent theme in public
service advertising, which stresses "have a single child and raise
it well."
Total fertility rates (the average number of births a woman will
have during her lifetime) fell from 6.1 births per female in 1960
to 4.2 in 1970, 2.8 in 1980, and 2.4 in 1984. The number of live
births, recorded as 711,810 in 1978, grew to a high of 917,860 in
1982. This development stirred apprehensions among family plan-
ning experts of a new "baby boom." By 1986, however, the number
of live births had declined to 806,041.
Given the size and age structure of the population in 1990,
however, substantial increases are expected over the next few de-
cades. According to the government's Economic Planning Board,
the country's population will increase to between 46 and 48 mil-
lion by the end of the twentieth century, with growth rates rang-
ing between 0.9 and 1.2 percent. The population is expected to
stabilize (that is, cease to grow) in the year 2023 at around 52.6
million people. In the words ofAsiaweek magazine, the "stabilized
tally will approximate the number of Filipinos in 1983, but squeezed
into less than a third of their [the Philippines'] space."
Population Settlement Patterns
South Korea was one of the world's most densely populated coun-
tries, with an estimated 425 people per square kilometer in
1989—over sixteen times the average population density of the Unit-
ed States in the late 1980s. By comparison, China had an estimat-
ed 1 14 people, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany)
246 people, and Japan 323 people per square kilometer in the late
1980s. Because about 70 percent of South Korea's land area is
mountainous and the population is concentrated in the lowland
areas, actual population densities were in general greater than the
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average. As early as 1975, it was estimated that the density of South
Korea's thirty-five cities, each of which had a population of 50,000
or more inhabitants, was 3,700 people per square kilometer. Be-
cause of continued migration to urban areas, the figure was doubt-
less higher in the late 1980s.
In 1988 Seoul had a population density of 17,030 people per
square kilometer as compared with 13,816 people per square kilo-
meter in 1980. The second largest city, Pusan, had a density of
8,504 people per square kilometer in 1988 as compared with 7,272
people in 1980. Kyonggi Province, which surrounds the capital and
contains Inch'on, the country's fourth largest city, was the most
densely populated province; Kangwon Province in the northeast
was the least densely populated province.
The extreme crowding in South Korea in 1990 was a major fac-
tor not only in economic development and in the standard of liv-
ing but also in the development of social attitudes and human
relationships. More than most other peoples, South Koreans have
had to learn to live peacefully with each other in small, crowded
spaces, in which the competition for limited resources, including
space itself, is intense. Continued population growth means that
the shortage of space for living and working will grow more se-
vere. According to the government's Economic Planning Board,
the population density will be 530 people per square kilometer by
2023, the year the population is expected to stabilize.
Urbanization
Like other newly industrializing economies, South Korea ex-
perienced rapid growth of urban areas caused by the migration of
large numbers of people from the countryside. In the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, Seoul, by far the largest urban settle-
ment, had a population of about 190,000 people. There was a strik-
ing contrast with Japan, where Edo (Tokyo) had as many as 1
million inhabitants and the urban population comprised as much
as 10 to 15 percent of the total during the Tokugawa Period
(1600-1868). During the closing years of the Choson Dynasty and
the first years ofJapanese colonial rule, the urban population of
Korea was no more than 3 percent of the total. After 1930, when
the Japanese began industrial development on the Korean Penin-
sula, particularly in the northern provinces adjacent to Manchuria,
the urban portion of the population began to grow, reaching 11.6
percent for all of Korea in 1940.
Between 1945 and 1985, the urban population of South Korea
grew from 14.5 percent to 65.4 percent of the total population (see
fig. 7). In 1988 the Economic Planning Board estimated that the
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urban portion of the population will reach 78 . 3 percent by the end
of the twentieth century. Most of this urban increase was attributa-
ble to migration rather than to natural growth of the urban popu-
lation. Urban birth rates have generally been lower than the national
average. The extent of urbanization in South Korea, however, is
not fully revealed in these statistics. Urban population was defined
in the national census as being restricted to those municipalities
with 50,000 or more inhabitants. Although many settlements with
fewer than 50,000 inhabitants were satellite towns of Seoul or other
large cities or mining communities in northeastern Kangwon
Province, which would be considered urban in terms of the living
conditions and occupations of the inhabitants, they still were offi-
cially classified as rural.
The dislocation caused by the Korean War accounted for the
rapid increase in urban population during the early 1950s.
Hundreds of thousands of refugees, many of them from North
Korea, streamed into the cities. During the post-Korean War period,
rural people left their ancestral villages in search of greater economic
and educational opportunities in the cities. By the late 1960s, migra-
tion had become a serious problem, not only because cities were
terribly overcrowded, but also because the rural areas were losing
the most youthful and productive members of their labor force.
In the early 1970s, the Park Chung Hee government launched
the Saemaul undong (New Community Movement) as a rural
reconstruction and self-help movement to improve economic con-
ditions in the villages, close the wide gap in income between rural
and urban areas, and stem urban migration—as well as to build
a political base. Despite a huge amount of government-sponsored
publicity, especially during the Park era, it was not clear by the
late 1980s that the Saemaul undong had achieved its objectives.
By that time many, if not most, farming and fishing villages con-
sisted of older persons; relatively few able-bodied men and women
remained to work in the fields or to fish. This trend was apparent
in government statistics for the 1986-87 period: the proportion of
people fifty years old or older living in farming communities grew
from 28.7 percent in 1986 to 30.6 percent in 1987, whereas the
number of people in their twenties living in farming communities
declined from 11.3 percent to 10.8 percent. The nationwide per-
centages for people fifty years old or older and in their twenties
were, in 1986, 14.9 percent and 20.2 percent, respectively (see
Agriculture, ch. 3).
In 1985 the largest cities were Seoul (9,645,932 inhabitants), Pusan
(3,516,807), Taegu (2,030,672), Inch'on (1,387,491), Kwangju
(906,129), and Taejon (866,695). According to government statistics,
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the population of Seoul, one of the world's largest cities, surpassed
10 million people in late 1988. Seoul's average annual population
growth rate during the late 1980s was more than 3 percent. Two-
thirds of this growth was attributable to migration rather than to
natural increase. Surveys revealed that "new employment or seek-
ing a new job," "job transfer," and "business" were major rea-
sons given by new immigrants for coming to the capital. Other
factors cited by immigrants included "education" and "a more
convenient area to live." To alleviate overcrowding in Seoul's
downtown area, the city government drew up a master plan in the
mid-1980s that envisioned the development of four "core zones"
by 2000: the original downtown area, Yongdungp'o-Yoido, Yong-
dong, and Ch'amsil. Satellite towns also would be established or
expanded. In the late 1980s, statistics revealed that the daytime
or commuter population of downtown Seoul was as much as six
times the officially registered population. If the master plan is suc-
cessful, many commuters will travel to work in a core area nearer
their homes, and the downtown area's daytime population will
decrease. Many government ministries have been moved out of
Seoul, and the army, navy, and air force headquarters have been
relocated to Taejon.
In 1985 the population of Seoul constituted 23.8 percent of the
national total. Provincial cities, however, experienced equal and,
in many cases, greater expansion than the capital. Growth was par-
ticularly spectacular in the southeastern coastal region, which en-
compasses the port cities of Pusan, Masan, Yosu, Chinhae, Ulsan,
and P'ohang. Census figures show that Ulsan 's population increased
eighteenfold, growing from 30,000 to 551,300 inhabitants between
1960 and 1985. With the exception of Yosu, all of these cities are
in South Kyongsang Province, a region that has been an especial-
ly favored recipient of government development projects. By com-
parison, the population of Kwangju, capital of South Cholla
Province, increased less than threefold between 1960 and 1985,
growing from 315,000 to 906,129 inhabitants.
Rapid urban growth has brought familiar problems to developed
and developing countries alike. The construction of large numbers
of high-rise apartment complexes in Seoul and other large cities
alleviated housing shortages to some extent. But it also imposed
hardship on the tens of thousands of people who were obliged to
relocate from their old neighborhoods because they could not af-
ford the rents in the new buildings. In the late 1980s, squatter areas
consisting of one-story shacks still existed in some parts of Seoul.
Housing for all but the wealthiest was generally cramped. The con-
centration of factories in urban areas, the rapid growth of motorized
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traffic, and the widespread use of coal for heating during the severe
winter months have caused dangerous levels of air and water pol-
lution. Although environmental awareness is increasing, a polluted
environment will adversely affect the quality of life in the cities for
some time to come.
Koreans Living Overseas
Large-scale emigration from Korea began around 1904 and con-
tinued until the end of World War II. During the Japanese colonial
occupation, many Koreans emigrated to Manchuria (present-day
China's northeastern provinces of Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilong-
jiang), other parts of China, the Soviet Union, Hawaii, and the
continental United States. Most emigrated for economic reasons;
employment opportunities were scarce, and many Korean farm-
ers lost their land after the Japanese introduced a system of land
registration and private land tenure, imposed higher land taxes,
and promoted the growth of an absentee landlord class charging
exorbitant rents. Koreans from the northern provinces of Korea
went mainly to Manchuria, China, and Siberia. Many people from
the southern provinces went to Japan. Koreans were conscripted
into Japanese labor battalions or the Japanese army, especially dur-
ing World War II. In the 1940-44 period, nearly 2 million Koreans
lived in Japan, 1.4 million in Manchuria, 600,000 in Siberia, and
130,000 in China. An estimated 40,000 Koreans were scattered
among other countries. At the end ofWorld War II, approximately
2 million Koreans were repatriated from Japan and Manchuria.
More than 4 million ethnic Koreans lived outside the peninsula
during the early 1980s. The largest group, about 1.7 million peo-
ple, lived in China. Most had assumed Chinese citizenship. The
Soviet Union had about 430,000 ethnic Koreans. One observer
noted that Koreans had been so successful in running collective
farms in Soviet Central Asia that being Korean was often associated
by other Soviets with being rich.
By contrast, many ofJapan's approximately 700,000 Koreans
had below-average standards of living. This situation occurred part-
ly because of discrimination by the Japanese majority and partly
because of the fact that a large number of resident Koreans, loyal
to the North Korean regime of Kim II Sung, preferred to remain
separate from and hostile to the Japanese mainstream. The pro-
North Korea Chosen soren (General Association of Korean Resi-
dents in Japan) initially was more successful than the pro-South
Korea Mindan (Association for Korean Residents in Japan) in at-
tracting adherents among residents in Japan. Since diplomatic re-
lations were established between Seoul and Tokyo in 1965, however,
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the South Korean government has taken an active role in promot-
ing the interests of their residents in Japan in negotiations with
the Japanese government (see Relations with Japan, ch. 4). It also
has provided subsidies to Korean schools inJapan and other com-
munity activities.
By the end of 1988, there were over 2 million South Korean over-
seas residents. North America was the preferred destination—the
choice of over 1.2 million of these residents. Korean immigrants
in the United States and Canada gained a reputation for hard work
and economic success. South Koreans also were overseas residents
ofJapan (at least 680,000), Central America and South America
(85,000), the Middle East (62,000), Western Europe (40,000), other
Asian countries (27,000), and Africa (25,000). A limited number
of South Korean government-sponsored migrants setded in Chile,
Argentina, and other Latin American countries. Because of South
Korea's rapid economic expansion, an increasing number of its
citizens resided abroad on a temporary basis as business execu-
tives, technical personnel, foreign students, and construction work-
ers. A small number of overseas South Koreans had migrated back
to South Korea, primarily because of the much improved economic
conditions and the difficulties in adjusting to living abroad.
Social Structure and Values
The social values of contemporary South Korea reflect the syn-
thesis and development of diverse influences, both indigenous and
foreign. Probably the most important of these is the neo-Confucian
doctrine of the Chinese philosopher Zhu Xi (1130-1200), first in-
troduced into Korea during the closing years of the Koryo Dynasty
(918-1392). The rulers of the Choson Dynasty (1392-1910) adopted
it as their state ideology. The most important Korean neo-
Confucian philosopher, Yi Hwang, also known as Yi T'oe-gye
(1501-70), had a great influence on later generations of Confu-
cianists not only in Korea but also in Japan.
Neo-Confucianism combines the social ethics of the classical
Chinese philosophers Confucius (Kong Zi, 551-479 B.C.) and
Mencius (Meng Zi, 372-289 B.C.) with Taoist, or Daoist, and
Buddhist metaphysics. One of the doctrine's basic ideas is that the
institutions and practices of the ideal human community are an
expression of the immutable principles or laws that govern the move-
ments of the cosmos. Through correct social practice, as defined
by the Confucian sages and their commentators, individuals can
achieve a kind of spiritual unity with heaven. Neo-Confucianism
defines formal social relations on all levels of society. Social relations
are not conceived of in terms of the happiness or satisfaction of
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the individuals involved, but in terms of the harmonious integra-
tion of individuals into a collective whole that mirrors the harmo-
ny of the natural order.
Neo-Confucianism in Korea was becoming rigid and increasingly
conservative by the mid-1 500s. The practice of neo-Confucianism
emphasized hierarchy in human relations and self-control on the
individual level. Society was defined in terms of the Five Relation-
ships (o ryun in Korean; wu lun in Chinese) that had been formulated
by classical Chinese thinkers, such as Mencius, and subsequently
sanctified by the neo-Confucian metaphysicians: "between father
and son there should be affection; between ruler and minister there
should be righteousness; between husband and wife there should
be attention to their separate functions; between old and young
there should be a proper order; and between friends there should
be faithfulness." Only the last was a relationship between equals.
The others were based on authority and subordination, including
the first relationship, which involved not so much mutual love as
the unquestioning subordination of the son to the will of his father.
Throughout traditional Korean society, from the royal palace
and central government offices in Seoul to the humblest household
in the provinces, the themes of hierarchy and inequality were per-
vasive. Persons were expected to nurture "sincere" attitudes, which
meant not so much expressing what one "really" felt as "reflect-
ing on" or "clarifying" one's thoughts and feelings until they con-
formed to traditional norms. There was no concept of the rights
of the individual. The ideal man or woman was one who controlled
his or her passions or emotions in order to fulfill to the letter a host
of exacting social obligations.
In the context of wider society, a well-defined elite of scholar-
officials versed in neo-Confucian orthodoxy was legitimized in terms
of the traditional ethical distinction between the educated "superior
man" or "gentieman" and the "small man" who seeks only profit.
The distinction was a central theme in the writings of Confucius
and Mencius. Confucianism as a political theory proposed a benevo-
lent paternalism: the masses had no role in government, but the
scholar-officials were supposed to look after them as fathers look
after their children.
Just as the father commanded unquestioning obedience in the
household and the scholar-official elite did so in the nation as a
whole, there was also a hierarchy in international relations. China,
the homeland of neo-Confucianism and the most powerful nation
in the region, was the center of Choson Korea's cultural universe
for most of the dynasty's duration.
Foreign observers have been impressed with the diversity of the
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Korean character as expressed in day-to-day human relations.
There is, on one hand, the image of Koreans as self-controlled,
deferential, and meticulous in the fulfillment of their social obli-
gations; on the other hand, there is the Korean reputation for vola-
tility and emotionalism, for being the "Irish of the East." The
ecstasy and euphoria of shamanistic religious practices, one of
Korea's most characteristic cultural expressions, contrasts sharply
with the austere self-control of Confucian ancestor rituals (see
Religion, this ch.).
Although relatively minor themes in the history of Korean ethics
and social thought, the concepts of equality and respect for individu-
als are not entirely lacking. The doctrines of Ch'ondogyo (see Glos-
sary), an indigenous religion that originated in the nineteenth
century and combines elements of Buddhism, Taoism, shaman-
ism, Confucianism, and Catholicism, teach that every human
"bears divinity" and that one must "treat man as god."
Western social and political values such as democracy, individua-
lism, the equality of the sexes (also seen in Ch'ondogyo), and na-
tional self-determination were introduced by late nineteenth-century
Korean reformers and by West European and North American mis-
sionaries, who had a profound effect upon the development ofKorean
education and political values. These concepts have played an in-
creasingly prominent role in South Korean life in recent decades.
Although by no means democratic, the Confucian tradition it-
self contains anti-authoritarian themes. Mencius taught that the
sovereign and his officials must concern themselves with the wel-
fare of the people and that a king who misuses his power loses the
right to rule—the doctrine of the Mandate of Heaven. In Korean
as well as Chinese history, there were many Confucian statesmen
who, often at the cost of their own lives, opposed the misuse of
power by those in authority. The tradition of political protest in
South Korea, particularly by university students, owes as much
to this aspect of the Confucian tradition as it does to democratic
and Marxist concepts imported from the West. Just as out-of-power
"rustic literati," or sarim, pursued purely moral and academic
studies and disdained government service at various times during
the Choson period, so modern-day university students, claiming
to be the "conscience of the nation, ' ' have opposed the bureaucratic
and professional elite in government and private business.
Thus, to depict traditional Korean social values in terms of an
authoritarian Confucian tradition is overly simplistic. A more com-
prehensive account of social values might describe them in terms
of interacting dualities, a kind of yin-yang opposition and synthe-
sis. There is the tension, for example, between self-control and
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solemnity, on the one hand, and almost explosive volatility at the
level of individual behavior, on the other; between the duty-bound
austerity of Confucian family life and ritualism, and the ecstasy
and abandon of shamanistic rites; between the conservatism of
agricultural villages and the looser social organization of fishing
communities; between the orthodox concept of male supremacy
and the reality of much "hidden" female power; between the
"higher" rationalized, humanistic, or scientific culture imported
from China, Japan, or the West, and much older indigenous or
native cultural themes; between hierarchy and equality; and be-
tween slavish deference to authority and principled resistance.
Traditional Social Structure
In Choson Dynasty Korea, four rather distinct social strata de-
veloped: the scholar-officials, collectively referred to as the yang-
ban; the chungin (literally "middle people"), technicians and ad-
ministrators subordinate to theyangban; the sangmin, or commoners,
a large group composed of farmers, craftsmen, and merchants; and
the ch'ommin (despised people)," at the bottom of society. To en-
sure stability, the government devised a system of personal tallies
in order to identify people according to their status.
In the strictest sense of the term, yangban referred to government
officials or officeholders who had passed the civil service examina-
tions that tested knowledge of the Confucian classics and their neo-
Confucian interpreters. They were the Korean counterparts of the
scholar-officials, or mandarins, of imperial China. The termyang-
ban, first used during the Koryo Dynasty, means literally "two
groups," that is, civil and military officials. Over the centuries,
however, its usage became rather vague, so that the term can be
said to have several overlapping meanings. Strictly speaking, ayang-
ban lineage was one that consistently combined examination suc-
cess with appointments to government office over a period of some
generations. During the Choson period, examination candidates
had to show several generations of such ancestry on both sides to
be admitted to the civil service examinations. A broader use of the
term included within the yangban two other groups that could be
considered associated with, but outside of, the ruling elite. The
first group included those scholars who had passed the preliminary
civil service examination and sometimes the higher examinations
but had failed to secure government appointment. In the late Cho-
son Dynasty, there were many more successful examination candi-
dates than there were positions. The second group included the
more remote relatives and descendants of government officials.
Even if these people were poor and did not themselves serve in the
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government, they were considered members of a "yangban family"
and thus shared the aura of the elite as long as they retained Con-
fucian culture and rituals.
An interesting development in the social history of the Choson
Dynasty occurred after the government began to sell honorary
patents of office to people who were not yangban to raise revenue
following the dislocations of the Hideyoshi invasions. Wealthy com-
moners sometimes went beyond such status symbols to commis-
sion forged genealogies or to take on other trappings ofyangban
status. This form of social climbing was highly irritating to tradi-
tionalyangban families of the types mentioned above. Probably even
more common were formeryangban families that had drifted down
into genteel poverty and commoner status. Both developments show
that the Choson Dynasty class system was beginning to lose some
of its rigidity on the eve of the momentous changes of the late
nineteenth century.
Yangban serving as officials could enrich themselves because they
were given royal grants of land and had many opportunities for
graft; but unemployed scholars and local gentry often were poor.
They were a kind of "twilight elite" that was both feared and yet
often mocked in peasant entertainments. In his satirical Tale of a
Yangban, the writer Pak Chi-won (1737-1805) describes the life of
ayangban, however poor, as one of enforced idleness, exacerbated
by the need to maintain appearances. Ayangban had to study Con-
fucian literature and pass at least the preliminary examinations.
He was prohibited from engaging in manual labor or commerce
and had to present an image of poise and self-control. A yangban
could not, among other things, "poke and play with his chopsticks,"
"eat raw onions, ' ' or "puff hard on his pipe, pulling in his cheeks. '
'
Yet he exercised much arbitrary power in his own village. In prin-
ciple, the yangban were a meritocratic elite. They gained their po-
sitions through educational achievement. Certain groups of persons
(artisans, merchants, shamans, slaves, Buddhist monks, and others)
were prohibited from taking the higher civil service examinations,
but these formed only a small minority of the population. In the-
ory, the examinations were open to the large majority of people
who were farmers. In the early years of the Choson Dynasty, some
commoners may have been able to attain high positions by pass-
ing the examinations and advancing on sheer talent. In later years,
talent was a necessary but not sufficient prerequisite for entry into
the core elite because of the surplus of successful examinees. In-
fluential family connections were virtually indispensable for ob-
taining high official positions. Moreover, special posts called
"protection appointments" were inherited by descendants of the
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Choson royal family and certain high officials. Despite the emphasis
on educational merit, the yangban became in a very real sense a
hereditary elite.
Below theyangban yet superior to the commoners were the chung-
in, a small group of technical and administrative officials. They
included astronomers, physicians, interpreters, and professional
military officers, as well as artists. Local functionaries, who were
members of a lower hereditary class, were an important and fre-
quentiy oppressive link between theyangban and the common people.
They were often the de facto rulers of a local region.
The commoners, or sangmin, composed about 75 percent of the
total population. These farmers, craftsmen, and merchants alone
bore the burden of taxation and were subject to military conscrip-
tion. Farmers had higher prestige than merchants, but lived a hard
life. Below the commoners, the ''base people," or ch'dmmin, did
what was considered vile or low-prestige work. They included ser-
vants and slaves in government offices and resthouses, jailkeepers
and convicts, shamans, actors, female entertainers (kisaeng), profes-
sional mourners, shoemakers, executioners, and, for a time at least,
Buddhist monks and nuns. Also included in this category were the
paekchong, apparentiy descended from Inner Asian nomads, who
dealt with meat and the hides of animals, were considered "un-
clean," and lived in segregated communities. Slaves were treated
as chattels but could own property and even other slaves. Although
numerous at the beginning of the Choson Dynasty, their numbers
had dwindled by the time slavery was officially abolished at the
end of the nineteenth century.
During their invasions in 1592 and 1597, the armies of the
Japanese warlord Toyotomi Hideyoshi destroyed many genealogical
records, making it difficult to determine who was and who was not a
member of &yangban family. Also, as Japanese armies were approach-
ing Seoul, slaves in the capital rose up and burned documentary
evidence of their servitude. By the late eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, the old social distinctions were breaking down. During
the early Choson Dynasty, commoners did not have family names
or class affiliations (see Traditional Family Life, this ch.). However,
they began to adopt names in order to avoid the stigma of low sta-
tus. Counterfeit genealogies could frequendy be purchased, and
commoners sometimes attached their names toyangban genealogies
to avoid military service taxes. Other late Choson Dynasty social
changes included the gradual shift of agricultural labor from slave
status to contractual arrangements and the emergence of "en-
trepreneurial farmers"—commoners who earned small surpluses
through innovative agricultural techniques.
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The Emergence of a Modern Society
In 1894 a program of social reforms, known as the Kabo Re-
forms, was initiated by pro-Japanese Korean officials. Yangban and
commoners were made equal before the law, the old Confucian
civil service examinations were abolished, and slavery and ch'dm-
min status was ended. Modern forms of government and adminis-
tration, largely borrowed from Japan, were adopted. In the years
before annexation, a self-strengthening movement and government
reforms attempted to regain Korean control of the pace and direc-
tion of change. However, it was only following theJapanese annex-
ation in 1910 that the rapid social transformation of Korea began.
Rural society was radically transformed. Traditionally, all land
belonged to the king and was granted by him to his subjects.
Although specific parcels of land tended to remain within the same
family from generation to generation (including communal land
owned by clans and lineages), land occupancy, use, and owner-
ship patterns often were legally ambiguous and widely divergent
from one part of the country to another. There was no institution
of private property during the Choson Dynasty. The Japanese,
however, conducted a comprehensive land survey between 1910
and 1920 in order to place landownership on a modern legal foot-
ing. Farmers whose families had tilled the same soil for genera-
tions but could not prove ownership in a way satisfactory to the
colonial authorities had their land confiscated. Such land came into
the hands of the colonial government, to be sold to Japanese land
companies, such as the Oriental Development Company, or to
Japanese immigrants. As research by Edward Graegert has shown,
however, the survey also helped to confirm, or in some cases even
to improve, the position of some members of the existing Korean
landlord class. Many were formeryangban who cooperated with the
Japanese. Thoseyangban who remained aloof from their country's
new overlord often fell into poverty. The farmers themselves either
became tenants or were forced to leave the land. During the depres-
sion of the 1930s, thousands emigrated to the cities or overseas.
Many others fled to the hills to become 'Tire-field" (slash-and-burn)
farmers, living under extremely harsh and primitive conditions.
By 1936 this last group numbered more than 1.5 million people.
The Japanese built railroads, highways, schools, and hospitals
and established a modern system of administration. These changes
were intended to link the colonial economy more effectively to that
ofJapan. The new, modern sector required technically trained ex-
perts. Although the top positions were invariably occupied by
Japanese, Koreans worked on the lower levels as secondary technical
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and administrative personnel. Thus, while the number of Korean
high officials in the colonial administration increased from only 354
to 442 people between 1915 and 1942, the number ofjunior offi-
cials increased from 15,543 to 29,998 in the same period. Japan's
industrial development policies during the 1930s and 1940s,
although concentrated in the northern half of the peninsula adja-
cent to Manchuria, created a new class of workers and lower-level
industrial managers who played an important role in the industrial
development of South Korea after 1945.
The great majority of Koreans suffered under Japanese rule. A
large number of farmers were forced off their land after 1910; in-
dustrial workers and miners working forJapanese-owned firms were
often treated little better than slaves. Under colonial agricultural
policies, rice cultivation was maximized, although most rice was
grown for consumption in Japan.
Nevertheless, development under Japanese colonial rule provided
some foundation, however unintentionally, for South Korea's im-
pressive post- 1945 economic growth (see Korea under Japanese
Rule, ch. 1). A small group of Korean entrepreneurs emerged who
fostered close ties with the colonial government, and Japanese busi-
ness interests established family-held firms that were the precursors
of South Korea's present-day chaebol, or business conglomerates.
It is a tribute to their acumen that these entrepreneurs were able
to survive and prosper in a colonial economy dominated overwhelm-
ingly by Japanese capital.
Three developments after 1945 were particularly important for
South Korea's social modernization. The first was the land reform
carried out by United States and South Korean authorities between
1945 and 1950. The institution of private property was retained,
but the American occupation authorities confiscated and redistribut-
ed all land held by the Japanese colonial government, Japanese
companies, and individual Japanese colonists. The Korean govern-
ment also carried out a reform whereby Koreans with large land-
holdings were obliged to divest most of their land. A new class of
independent, family proprietors was created.
The second development was the great influx from North Korea
and other countries of repatriates and refugees. In the 1945-49 peri-
od, between 1.5 million and 2 million Koreans returned to South
Korea from Japan, the northeast provinces of China, and other
foreign countries. With the establishment of a communist state in
North Korea, a large number of refugees fled to South Korea and
were joined by many more during the Korean War. A conservative
estimate of the total number of refugees from the north is 1 .2 million.
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Most of the northerners settled in the cities—new recruits for the
country's industrial labor force.
The third development was a direct result of the Korean War.
Traditionally Koreans, like their Chinese and unlike their Japanese
neighbors, considered the military to be a low-status occupation.
Korea did not have its own armed forces during the colonial peri-
od, although some Koreans served in the Japanese military, espe-
cially after 1941, and a handful, such as former President Park
Chung Hee, received officer's training. The North Korean inva-
sion ofJune 1950 and the three years of fighting that followed cast
the South Korean military establishment into the role of savior of
the country. And since the coup d'etat of May 1961 that estab-
lished Park Chung Hee, the military establishment has held con-
siderable political power. Roh Tae Woo, elected president in 1987,
was a retired general with close connections to the military elite.
Universal military conscription of men has played an important
role in South Korea's development, both in political socialization
and in integrating a society divided by strong regional prejudices.
It also has exposed the nation's young men to technical training
and to a disciplined way of life.
During the three decades after Park's 1961 coup d'etat, the goal
of the military elite was to create a harmonious, disciplined society
that was both technically advanced and economically efficient. Eco-
nomic modernization, however, has brought social changes
—
especially in education and urbanization—that have had a corro-
sive effect on the military's authoritarian view of society and have
promoted the emergence of a more contentious, pluralistic society
than many in the military have found desirable.
Social Classes in Contemporary South Korea
Rapid economic growth, industrialization, and urbanization have
caused a profound transformation in the class structure of South
Korean society since the end of the Korean War. One of the most
important changes has been the emergence of a "new" middle class
consisting of civil servants, salaried white-collar workers in large
private companies, and professionals with specialized training, such
as engineers, health care professionals, university professors, archi-
tects, and journalists. The number of factory workers also has grown
impressively. According to figures provided by Kim Kyong-Dong,
a sociologist at Seoul National University, the portion of the popula-
tion that can be labeled "new middle class" (excluding self-
employed professionals) grew from 6.6 percent to 17.7 percent
between 1960 and 1980. The proportion of industrial workers
expanded from 8.9 percent to 22.6 percent of the labor force during
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the same period. Independent farmers and members of the rural
lower class, including agricultural laborers, experienced correspond-
ing declines in percentage: together, they accounted for 64 per-
cent of the population in 1960 but only 31.3 percent in 1980.
The urban lower class, consisting to a great extent of recent arri-
vals from rural parts of the country living in squatter areas, com-
posed an estimated 6.6 percent of the population in 1960 and 5.9
percent in 1980. An "old" middle class consisting of shopkeepers
and small business proprietors in urban and rural areas, self-
employed professionals, and self-employed craftsmen grew modestiy
from 13 percent to 20.8 percent of the population between 1960
and 1980. Kim's figures also include what he euphemistically calls
an "upper-middle" class—the country's economic and social elites,
whose numbers grew from 0.9 percent to 1 .8 percent of the popu-
lation between 1960 and 1980.
Another way of viewing contemporary South Korean society is
to consider the sources of social inequality. In a 1988 article, Korea
specialist David I. Steinberg focused on several of these sources,
which include the disparity in living standards between urban and
rural areas—the main motivation behind sustained urban migra-
tion. Although the Saemaul Movement was successful in narrowing
the gap between rural and urban incomes during the mid-1970s,
disparities subsequently reemerged. Steinberg also noted that
despite the land reform of the late 1940s, tenancy has grown, and
that by 1981 as many as 46 percent of all farmers were "full or
partial tenants."
Discrimination on both the community and individual levels
against the people of North Cholla and South Cholla provinces re-
mains a second important source of inequality. Disparities in per
capita income between Seoul and the provinces of North and South
Kyongsang had virtually disappeared by the early 1980s, but per
capita incomes in the capital were still 1 .8 times those in the Chol-
la region in 1983. As in most other Asian (and most Western) coun-
tries, gender differences remain another source of major inequalities
(see Changing Role of Women, this ch.).
Government control of the financial system has created substan-
tial inequalities between the favored chaebol, which at least until
the late 1980s had access to credit at low rates, and capital-starved
smaller businesses that had to rely on nonbank sources of credit.
Official support of the chaebol as the engines of South Korean eco-
nomic growth and industrialization was clearly reflected in the dif-
ferences between salaries and working conditions of employees in
large and small enterprises. Also, the Park and Chun regimes'
hostile policies toward labor unions kept workers' wages low—and
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internationally competitive. In Steinberg's words, "The Korean
worker has been asked to suffer for the good of society as a
whole . . . . " Activists who tried to organize independent unions
were harassed, arrested, imprisoned, and frequently tortured by
the authorities. During the liberalization that began in 1987,
however, the government permitted the establishment of indepen-
dent labor unions and assumed a new attitude, at times approaching
neutrality in labor-management disputes (see Interest Groups, ch. 4).
Education remained the single most important factor affecting
social mobility in the 1990s. With the exception of the military,
whose top echelons were educated at the Korea Military Academy,
the postwar elites of South Korea shared one characteristic: they
were graduates of the most prestigious universities. There was a
well-defined hierarchy of such schools, starting with Seoul National
University at the top and followed by Yonse University and Koryo
University (more commonly known as Korea University in En-
glish). Ehwa Woman's University was the top institution for women
(see Education, this ch.).
A survey conducted in the mid-1970s by the Korea Develop-
ment Institute, a research organization funded by the government
but having considerable operational independence, revealed that
25 percent of a sample of entrepreneurs and 35 percent of a sam-
ple of higher civil servants had attended Seoul National Universi-
ty. The university's control of entry into the government and
business elites is comparable to that exercised by the University
of Tokyo in Japan. One major difference, however, is that for a
Japanese student an extended period of study or residence abroad
is not considered advisable because it interrupts one's career
"track" within a single bureaucracy or corporation; many promi-
nent South Koreans, however, obtain advanced degrees at univer-
sities in the United States and in Western Europe.
The social importance of education is one of the major continui-
ties between traditional and contemporary Korea. People at the
top require blue-ribbon educational backgrounds, not only because
education gives them the cultural sophistication and technical ex-
pertise needed to manage large, complex organizations, but also
because subordinates will not work diligently for an uneducated
person—especially if subordinates are educated themselves. "Old
school ties" are also increasingly necessary for advancement in a
highly competitive society. At the bottom of the steep higher-
education pyramid are low-prestige "diploma mills" whose gradu-
ates have little chance of breaking into elite circles. Yet gradua-
tion even from these institutions confers a sort of middle-class status.
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Despite impressive increases in university enrollments, the cen-
tral importance of education credentials for social advancement has
tended to widen the gap between the middle and lower classes. In-
come distribution is more unequal than in Japan or Taiwan, with
pronounced disparities between college and secondary-school gradu-
ates. Many workers know that their comparatively low wages make
it virtually impossible for them to give their children a college edu-
cation, a heavy financial burden even for middle-class families.
In the workplace, men and women with a middle-school or
secondary-school education are often treated with open contempt
by university graduate managers. The latter address them with rude
or abrupt words whose impact is amplified by the status-sensitive
nature of the Korean language (see The Korean Language, this
ch.). The result has been bitter resentment and increasing labor
militancy bordering on political opposition to the status quo.
During the 1980s, the concept of minjung (the masses) became
prominent in the thinking and rhetoric of radical students, mili-
tant labor unionists, activists identified with the Christian churches,
and progressive but generally non-Marxist intellectuals. Although
its meaning is vague, minjung encompasses not only the urban
proletariat in the Marxist sense but also the groups, including farm-
ers, small bourgeoisie, students, and skilled craftsmen, who allegedly
have been exploited by the country's numerically small ruling class
(the military elite, top bureaucrats, and big business). National
elites were viewed as collaborating with foreign (particularly United
States and Japanese) capitalists in order to create a situation of per-
manent dependence on foreign capital. The emphasis on neo-
colonialist themes by minjung spokespeople drew deeply on South
Korean populist, nationalist, and xenophobic sentiments to place
the origin of social evils outside the Korean race.
Traditional Family Life
Filial piety {hyo in Korean; xiao in Chinese), the second of the
Five Relationships, defined by Mencius as affection between father
and son, traditionally has been the normative foundation of Korean
family life. Though its influence has diminished over time, this rela-
tionship remains vitally important in contemporary South Korea.
Entailing a large number of reciprocal duties and responsibilities
between the generations of a single family, it generally has been
viewed as an unequal relationship in which the son owed the father
unquestioning obedience. Neo-Confucianists thought that the
subordination of son to father was the expression, on the human
level, of an immutable law of the cosmos. This law also imposed
a rigidity on family life.
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Family and lineage continuity traditionally was, and to a great
extent remains, a supremely important principle. This principle
reflects Mencius's view that of all possible unfilial acts, to deprive
one's parents of posterity is the worst. Historically, the Korean
family has been patrilineal. The most important concern for the
family group was producing a male heir to carry on the family line
and to perform ancestor rituals in the household and at the family
gravesite. The first son customarily assumed leadership of the fam-
ily after his father's death and inherited his father's house and a
greater portion of land than his younger brothers. This inheritance
enabled him to carry out the ritually prescribed obligations to his
ancestors.
Ancestor worship was, simultaneously, a social ethic and a
religion. In some ways, it was the most optimistic of faiths. It taught
that deceased family members do not pass into oblivion, to an after-
life, or, as the Buddhists believe, to rebirth as humans or animals
in some remote place, but remain, in spiritual form, securely within
the family circle. For traditionally minded Koreans, the presence
of the deceased could be an intensely real and personal one. Fear
of death was blunted by the consoling thought that even in the grave
one would be cared for by one's own people. Succeeding genera-
tions had the obligation of remembering the deceased in a yearly
cycle of rituals and ceremonies.
Traditionally, the purpose of marriage was to produce a male
heir to carry on the family line rather than to provide mutual com-
panionship and support for husband and wife. Marriages were
arranged. A go-between or matchmaker, usually a middle-aged
woman, carried on the negotiations between the two families in-
volved who, because of a very strict law of exogamy, sometimes
did not know each other and often lived in different communities.
The bride and groom met for the first time at the marriage cere-
mony, a practice that ended in the cities by the 1930s.
The traditional Korean kinship system, defined by different obli-
gations in relation to ancestor worship, was complex. Anthropolo-
gists generally view it in terms of four separate levels, beginning
with the household on the lowest level and reaching to the clan,
which included a large number of persons often spread over an
extensive geographical area. The household, chip orjip (see Glos-
sary) in Korean, consisted of husband and wife, their children, and
if the husband were the eldest son, his parents as well. The eldest
son's household, the stem family, was known as the "big house"
(k'unjip), whereas that of each of the younger sons, a branch family
containing husband, wife and children only, was known as the "little
house" (chagunjip). It was through the stem family of the eldest son
100
"Spring Time, " a traditional
dance performance
Courtesy Robert L. Worden
that the main line of descent was traced from generation to gener-
ation. The eldest son was responsible for rituals in honor of the
ancestors, and his wife was responsible for producing the all-
important male heir.
The second level of kinship was the "mourning group" (tangnae),
which consisted of all those descendants of a common patrilineal
forbearer up to four generations back. Its role was to organize
ceremonies at the grave site. These rites included the reading of
a formal message by the eldest male descendant of the tangnae pro-
genitor and the offering of elaborate and attractive dishes to the
ancestral spirits.
Similar rituals were carried out at the third level of kinship or-
ganization, the lineage (p'a—see Glossary). A lineage might com-
prise only a handful of households, but in some cases included
hundreds and even thousands of households. The lineage was
responsible for the rites honoring ancestors of the fifth generation
or above, performed at a common grave site. During the Choson
Dynasty, the lineage commonly possessed land, grave sites, and
buildings. Croplands were allocated to support the ancestral ceremo-
nies. The lineage also performed other functions: the aid of poor
or distressed lineage members, the education of children at schools
maintained by the p 'a, and the supervision of the behavior of youn-
ger lineage members. Because most villagers were members of a
common lineage during the Choson Dynasty, the p'a performed
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many of the social services on the local level that are now provided
by public schools, police, and social welfare agencies.
The fourth and most inclusive kinship organization was the clan,
or, more accurately, the tongjok (surname origin group). Among
ordinary South Koreans, this group was commonly known as the
pongwan, or "clan seat." Members of the same tongjok shared both
a surname and origins in the generally remote past. Unlike mem-
bers of the smaller kinship groups, however, they often lacked strong
feelings of solidarity. Important tongjok include the Chonju Yi, whose
lineage seat was in Chonju in North Cholla Province and who
claimed as their progenitor the founder of the Choson Dynasty,
Yi Song-gye; and the Kimhae Kim, whose lineage seat was in Kim-
hae in South Kyongsang Province and who claimed as their com-
mon ancestor either the founder of the ancient kingdom of Kaya
or one of the kings of the Silla Dynasty (A.D. 668-935).
Approximately 249 surnames were used by South Koreans in
the late 1980s. The most common were Kim (about 22 percent of
the population), Li or Yi (15 percent of the population), Pak or
Park (8.5 percent), Ch'oe (4.8 percent), and Chong (4.2 percent).
There are, however, about 150 surname origin groups bearing the
name Kim, 95 with the name Yi, 35 with the name Pak, 40 with
the name Ch'oe, and 27 with the name Chong.
In many if not most cases, the real function of the tongjok was
to define groups of permissible marriage partners. Because of the
strict rule of exogamy, people from the same tongjok were not per-
mitted to marry, even though their closest common ancestors in
many cases might have lived centuries ago. This prohibition, which
originated during the Choson Dynasty, had legal sanction in
present-day South Korea. An amendment to the marriage law pro-
posed by women's and other groups in early 1990 would have
changed this situation by prohibiting marriages only between per-
sons who had a common ancestor five generations or less back.
However, the amendment was strongly opposed by conservative
Confucian groups, which viewed the exogamy law as a crystalli-
zation of traditional Korean values. Among older South Koreans,
it is still commonly thought that only uncivilized people marry
within their clan group.
Family and Social Life in the Cities
Contemporary urban family and social life in South Korea at
the start of the 1990s exhibits a number of departures from tradi-
tional family and kinship institutions. One example is the tenden-
cy for complex kinship and family structures to weaken or break
down and be replaced by structurally simpler two-generation,
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nuclear families. Another closely related trend is the movement
toward equality in family relations and the resulting improvement
in the status of women. Thirdly, there is a movement away from
lineage- and neighborhood-based social relations toward functionally
based relations. People in the cities no longer work among their
relatives or neighbors in the fields or on fishing boats, but among
unrelated people in factories, shops, and offices. Finally, there is
an increasing tendency for an individual's location and personal
associations to be transitory and temporary rather than permanent
and lifelong, although the importance of school ties is pivotal. There
is greater physical mobility as improved transportation facilities,
superhighways, and rapid express trains make it possible to travel
between cities in a few hours. Subsidiary transportation networks
have broken down barriers between once-isolated villages and the
urban areas (see Transportation and Telecommunications, ch. 3).
Mobility in human relations also is becoming more apparent as
people change their residences more frequently, often because of
employment, and an increasing proportion of the urban popula-
tion lives in large, impersonal apartment complexes.
Matchmaking was a big business in Seoul and other cities in con-
temporary society; coffee shops and lounges often were crowded
on weekends. In a change from traditional society, prospective
brides and grooms held scores of interviews, sonpogi, before deciding
on the companion they would like to date-for-marriage. Many of
these young men and women changed their minds after these dates,
and the process began again. Yonae, or "love match" marriages,
occurred with increasing frequency.
Contrary to the Confucian ideal, the nuclear family consisting
of a husband, wife, and children is becoming predominant in con-
temporary South Korea. It differs from the traditional "branch
family," or "little house" (chagunjip), for two reasons: the conju-
gal relationship between husband and wife tends to take precedence
over the relationship between the son and his parents, and the
nuclear family unit is becoming increasingly independent, both eco-
nomically and psychologically, of larger kinship groups. These
developments have led to greater equality among the family units
established by the eldest and younger sons. Whereas the isolated
nuclear family was perceived in the past as a sign of poverty and
misfortune, the contemporary nuclear family is often viewed as the
result of a conscious choice made by those who do not wish their
privacy invaded by intrusive relatives.
Economic relations between the generations of a single family
changed radically in the transition from traditional rural to modern
urban society. In the past, the male head of the patrilineal family
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controlled all the property, usually in the form of land, and was
generally the sole provider of economic support. With the develop-
ment of modern industry and services, however, each adult gener-
ation and nuclear family unit has become more or less economi-
cally independent, although sons might depend upon their parents
or even their wife's parents for occasional economic assistance
—
for example, in purchasing a house. Because urban families usually
live apart from their paternal in-laws, even when the householder
is the eldest son, the wife no longer has to endure the domination
of her mother-in-law and sister-in-law. In many cases, the family
is closer to the wife's parents than to the husband's. The modern
husband and wife often are closer emotionally than in the old fam-
ily system. They spend more time together and even go out so-
cially, a formerly unheard-of practice. Yet the expectation still
remains that elderly parents will live with one of their children,
preferably a son, rather than on their own or in nursing homes.
This expectation could change in the last decade of the century,
however, with the expansion of health care and social welfare fa-
cilities.
Outside the nuclear family, blood relationships still are impor-
tant, particularly among close relatives, such as members of the
same tangnae, or mourning group. Relations with more distant rela-
tives, such as members of the same lineage, tend to be weak, espe-
cially if the lineage has its roots in a distant rural village, as most
do. Ancestor rites are practiced in urban homes, although for few-
er generations than formerly: the majority of urban dwellers seem
to conduct rites only in honor of the father and mother of the fam-
ily head. As a result, there are far fewer ancestors to venerate and
far fewer occasions on which to hold the household ceremonies.
In some ways, however, increased geographical mobility has helped
to preserve family solidarity. In the late 1980s, during New Year's,
Hansik (Cold Food Day in mid-April), and Ch'usok (the Autumn
Harvest Festival in mid-September), the airplanes, trains, and high-
ways were jammed with people traveling to visit both living rela-
tives and grave sites in their ancestral communities.
Changing Role of Women
During the Koryo and early Choson Dynasties, it was customary
for the married couple to live in the wife's parents' household. This
arrangement suggests that the status of women was then higher
than it was later during most of the Choson Dynasty. Neo-
Confucian orthodoxy dictated that the woman, separated from her
parents, had a primary duty of providing a male heir for her hus-
band's family. According to Confucian custom, once married, a
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woman had to leave her parents' household permanently and then
occupy the lowest position in her husband's family. She was often
abused and mistreated by both her mother-in-law and sisters-in-
law—at least until the birth of a son gave her some status in her
husband's family. The relationship between wife and husband was
often, if not usually, distant, aptiy described by the Korean proverb:
"By day, like seeing a stranger; by night, like seeing a lover." Cho-
son Dynasty law prohibited widows from remarrying, although a
similar prohibition was not extended to widowers. Further, the sons
and grandsons ofwidows who defied the ban, like children of second-
ary wives, were not allowed to take the civil service examinations
and become scholar-officials.
The duty of a woman to her husband, or rather to her husband's
family, was absolute and unquestionable. In the traditional society,
only men could obtain a divorce. A husband could divorce his spouse
if she were barren—barrenness being defined simply as the inabili-
ty to bear sons. Even if a husband did not divorce his wife, he had
the right to take a second wife, although the preferred solution for
a man without a son during the Choson Dynasty was to adopt a
son of one of his brothers, if available. The incompatibility
of a wife and her in-laws was also grounds for divorce.
In contemporary society, both men and women have the right
to obtain a divorce. Social and economic discrimination, however,
makes the lot of divorced women more difficult. The husband may
still demand custody of the children, although a revision of the Family
Law in 1977 made it more difficult for him to coerce or to deceive
his wife into agreeing to an unfair settlement. The rate of divorce
in South Korea is increasing rapidly. In 1975 the number of divorces
was 17,000. In the mid-1980s, the annual number of divorces was
between 23,000 and 26,000, and in 1987 there were 45,000 divorces.
The tradition of total female submission persisted in Korean vil-
lages until relatively recent times. One Korean scholar who came
from the conservative Ch'ungch'ong region south of Seoul recalled
that when a high school friend died of sickness during the 1940s,
his young bride committed suicide. Her act was commemorated in
her own and the surrounding communities as an outstanding ex-
ample of devotion to duty.
Traditionally, men and women were strictiy segregated, both in-
side and outside the house. Yangban women spent most of their lives
in seclusion in the women's chamber. It is said that the traditional
pastime of nolttwigi, a game ofjumping up and down on a seesaw-
like contraption, originated among bored women who wanted to
peek over the high walls of their family compounds to see
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what the outside world was like. Economic necessity gave women
of the lower classes some freedom as they participated in farm work
and sometimes earned supplemental income through making and
selling things.
A small minority of women played an active role in society and
even wielded political influence. These people included female sha-
mans (mudang), who were called upon to cure illnesses, tell fortunes,
or in other ways enlist the help of spirits in realizing the wishes
of their clients. Despite its sponsorship of neo-Confucianism, the
Ghoson Dynasty had an office of shamanism, and female shamans
often were quite influential in the royal palace. The female physi-
cians who treated female patients (because male physicians were
forbidden to examine them) constituted another important group
ofwomen. Sometimes they acted as spies or policewomen because
they could get into the female quarters of a house. Still another
group of women were the kisaeng. Some kisaeng, or entertainers,
were merely prostitutes; but others, like their Japanese counter-
parts the geisha, were talented musicians, dancers, painters, and
poets and interacted on nearly equal terms with their male patrons.
The kisaeng tradition perpetuated one of the more dubious legacies
of the Confucian past: an extreme double standard concerning the
sexual behavior of married men and women that still persists. In
the cities, however, many middle class women have begun to break
with these traditions.
An interesting regional variation on traditional female roles con-
tinued in the late 1980s. In the coastal villages of Cheju Island,
women divers swam in search of seaweed, oysters, and other ma-
rine products and were economically self-sufficient. Often they
provided the main economic support for the family while the hus-
band did subsidiary work—took care of the children and did house-
hold chores—in sharp contrast to the Confucian norm. The number
of women divers was dwindling, however, and men were increas-
ingly performingjobs in service industries. Confucian ancestor wor-
ship was rarely practiced; female-centered shamanistic rites,
however, were widespread.
The factories of South Korea employ hundreds of thousands of
young women on shop floors and assembly lines making, among
other things, textiles and clothes, shoes, and electronic components.
South Korea's economic success was bought in large measure with
the sweat of these generally overworked and poorly paid female
laborers. In the offices of banks and other service enterprises, young
women working as clerks and secretaries are indispensable. Un-
like their sisters on Cheju Island, however, the majority of these
women work only until marriage.
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Although increasing numbers ofwomen work outside the home,
the dominant conception, particularly for the college-educated mid-
dle class, is that the husband is the "outside person," the one whose
employment provides the main source of economic support; the
wife is the "inside person," whose chief responsibility is main-
tenance of the household, Women tend to leave the labor force when
they get married. Many women manage the family finances, and
a large number join kye, informal private short-term credit associ-
ations that give them access to funds that might not be obtainable
from a conventional bank. Probably the most important responsi-
bility of married women is the management of their children's
education.
On the surface, Korean women often appear docile, submissive,
and deferential to the wishes of their husbands and in-laws. Yet
behind the scenes, there is often considerable "hidden" female pow-
er, particularly within the private sphere of the household. In areas
such as household finances, South Korean husbands usually defer
to their wives' judgment. Public assertion of a woman's power,
however, is socially disapproved, and a traditional wife maintained
the image, if not the reality of submissiveness. And, as in other
male-dominated societies, Korean men oftenjokingly complain that
they are henpecked.
In traditional Korean society, women received little formal edu-
cation. Christian missionaries began establishing schools for girls
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Ehwa
Woman's University, the most prestigious women's institution,
began as a primary school established by Methodist missionaries
in 1886 and achieved university status after 1945. Chongsin Girls'
School and Paehwa Girls' School were founded in 1890 and 1898,
respectively, in Seoul. Songui Girls' School was established in 1903
in P'yongyang. By 1987 there were ten institutions of higher edu-
cation for women, including universities, colleges, and junior col-
leges; women accounted for approximately 28 percent of total en-
rollment in higher education. There were approximately 262,500
women students in colleges and universities in 1987. However, only
about 16 percent of college and university teachers were women
in 1987.
The growing number of women receiving a college education
has meant that their sex role differs from that of their mothers and
grandmothers. Many college-educated women plan independent
careers and challenge the right of parents to choose a marriage part-
ner. The often fierce battles between university students and police
during the late 1980s included female participants. A correspon-
dent for the Far Eastern Economic Review quoted a male student leader
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as saying that "short girls make great demonstrators, as they're
very tough and very hard to catch. ' ' Whether politically active South
Korean university women will follow theirJapanese counterparts,
who demonstrated during the 1960s and 1970s, into a world of child-
raising and placid consumerism remains to be seen. The number
of employed married women, however, increased by approximately
12.6 percent annually in the years since 1977.
In 1983, 51.8 percent of women living in rural areas were em-
ployed as compared with 37.8 percent of women living in urban
areas. Most of the women working in rural areas were over the
age of thirty, as young females (and males) tended to move to, and
seek employment in, cities and industrial areas.
Official South Korean statistics indicated that 43.6 percent of
women were in the work force by 1988. Prospects for lower class
women, however, were frequendy grim. In some cases, they were
obliged to become part of the "entertainment industry" in order
to survive economically. According to one estimate, brothels, bars,
massage parlors, discos, and what are known as "Taiwan style"
barbershops (that is, those often employing a greater number of
masseuses than barbers) employed as many as 1 million women,
though not all were prostitutes. This underworld of abuse, exploi-
tation, and bitter shame had begun to be criticized and exposed
by women's activists.
Cultural Identity
South Korea's homogeneous population shares a common eth-
nic, cultural, and linguistic heritage. National self-image is, on one
level, unambiguously defined by the convergence of territorial, eth-
nic, linguistic, and cultural identities (see Population, this ch.). Yet
intense feelings of nationalism, so evident in athletic events like
the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Olympic Games held in Seoul,
revealed anxiety as well as pride concerning South Korea's place
in the world. More than Western peoples and even more than the
Japanese, South Korean individuals are inclined to view themselves
as a tightly knit national community with a common destiny. In
a rapidly changing world, however, it is often difficult for them
to define exactly what being a South Korean is. To outsiders, the
intense concern with identity is perhaps difficult to understand;
it reflects a history of subordinate relations to powerful foreign states
and the tragedy of national division after World War II.
Many modernized, urban-dwelling South Koreans embark on a
search for the "essence" of their culture, which commonly expresses
itself as hostility to foreign influences. For example, the poet Kim
Chi-ha, whose opposition to the Park regime in the 1970s was a
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model for a younger generation of dissidents, attacked the govern-
ment as much for its neglect of traditional values as for its antidemo-
cratic tendencies.
Seoul has not been slow to employ traditionalism for its own ends.
In 1987 the government adopted guidelines for the revision of his-
tory textbooks, instructing publishers to describe the foundation
of the Korean nation by Tan'gun in 2333 B.C. as "a reflection
of historical facts" rather than simply a myth. The legendary Tan-
gun was, according to the myth, the son of god and a bear-woman.
According to a Far Eastern Economic Review commentator, "... peo-
ple ranging from reputable university scholars to chauvinist mys-
tics regard Tan'gun as the personification of ethics and values that
emphasize a native Korean identity against the foreign religions
and philosophies of Buddhism, neo-Confucianism, Christianity and
Marxism that have otherwise dominated Korean history and
thought. ' ' Tan'gun's legendary kingdom is older than China's first
legendary dynasty, the Xia (2205-1766 B.C.), and its antiquity
asserts Korea's cultural autonomy in relation to its largest neigh-
bor. There have been proposals that the government subsidize the
rites of the numerically small community of believers in Taejong-
gyo and other cults that worship Tan'gun.
Problems of cultural identity are closely connected to the trage-
dy of Korea's division into two hostile states. Many members of
the younger generation of South Koreans born after the Korean
War fervently embrace the cause of t'ongil, or reunification, and
believe that it is the superpowers, the United States and the Soviet
Union, who are to blame for Korea's national division. The South
Korean government's dependence on the United States has been
cited as one of the principal reasons for the lack of improvement
in north-south ties. While a majority of South Koreans remain sus-
picious of the North Koreans, many South Koreans also share the
sentiments expressed by Kim Chi-ha: "Our name is division, and
this soiled name, like an immovable destiny, oppresses all of us."
When parts of the wall dividing East Berlin and West Berlin were
knocked down in November 1989, Koreans reflected sadly that
breaching the DMZ would not be such a simple task.
Korea and Japan
National or ethnic groups often need an "other," a group of
outsiders against whom they can define themselves. While Western
countries with their individualistic and, from a Confucian perspec-
tive, self-centered ways of life provide important images of "other-
ness" for South Koreans, the principal source of such images for
many years has been Japan. Attitudes towardJapan as an "other"
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are complex. On the most basic level, there is hostility fed by
memories of invasion and colonial oppression, present-day economic
frictions, and the Japanese government's inability or unwilling-
ness to do anything about discriminatory treatment of the large
Korean minority in Japan. The two countries have a long history
of hostility. Admiral Yi Sun-sin, whose armor-plated boats even-
tually defeated the Japanese navy's damaging attacks in the 1590s,
is South Korea's most revered national hero.
The Japanese Ministry of Education, Science, and Culture's
adoption in the 1980s of revised textbook guidelines, softening the
language used to describe Japan's aggression during World War
II, inspired outrage in South Korea as well as in other Asian coun-
tries. The textbook controversy was a major impetus for a nation-
al campaign to build an Independence Hall, located about 100
kilometers south of Seoul, to keep alive memories of Japanese
colonial exploitation. Opened on August 15, 1987, the anniver-
sary of Korea's liberation from Japan, the building houses grim
exhibits depicting the atrocities of the Japanese military against
Korean nationalists during the colonial period.
During the colonial period, and particularly during World War
II, the Japanese initiated assimilation policies designed to turn
Koreans into obedient subjects of the Japanese emperor. Under
the slogan "Nissen ittai" (Japan and Korea as One), newspapers
and magazines published in the Korean language were closed, the
Korean Language Society was disbanded, and Korean writers were
forced to publish only in Japanese. Students who spoke Korean
in school were punished. There was pressure to speak Japanese
at home, adopt Japanese family and given names, and worship at
Shinto shrines, the religious basis for which had been transplant-
ed from the home islands. Korean Christians who refused to show
reverence to the emperor as a divinity were imprisoned or ostra-
cized. In the words of historian Ki-baik Lee (called Yi Ki-baek in
Korean), ''Japan's aim was to eradicate consciousness of Korean
national identity, roots and all, and thus to obliterate the very ex-
istence of the Korean people from the face of the earth."
This shared historical experience has provoked not only hostili-
ty but also a desire to purge Korean culture of lingering Japanese
influences. In the late 1980s, the government continued to pro-
hibit the distribution ofJapanese-made movies and popular mu-
sic within the country in order to prevent unwanted contemporary
influences from crossing the Korea Strait.
On a more polite level, depiction of Japan as the "other" in-
volves contrasting the "essences" of the two countries' cultures.
This process has spawned a popular literature that compares, among
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other things, the naturalness and "resonance" of Korean art and
music and the alleged imitativeness and constriction of their
Japanese counterparts; the "individualism" (of a non-Western sort)
of Koreans and the "collectivism" or group consciousness of the
Japanese; and the lyric contrast between the rose of Sharon, Korea's
national flower, which blooms robustly all summer long, and the
Japanese cherry blossom, which has the "beauty of frailty" in
springtime.
The search for a cultural "essence" involves serious contradic-
tions. The literature of Korean cultural distinction is strikingly simi-
lar to Japanese attempts to prove the "uniqueness" of their own
cultural heritage, although "proof ofJapan's uniqueness is usually
drawn from examples of Western countries (the significant "other"
for modernized Japanese). Ironically, official and unofficial spon-
sorship of the Tan'gun myth, although a minor theme, bears an
uncanny resemblance to pre-World War II Japanese policies
promoting historical interpretations of the nation's founding based
on Shinto mythology.
Mixed in with feelings of hostility and competition, however,
is genuine admiration for Japanese economic, technological, and
social achievements. Japan has become an important market for
South Korean manufactured products. Both countries have been
targets of criticism by Western governments accusing them of un-
fair trading practices. Friendly interest in South Korea is growing
among the Japanese public despite old prejudices, and large num-
bers of youngJapanese and South Koreans visit each others' coun-
tries on school and college excursions. Like South Koreans,
Japanese liberals have been disturbed by official attempts to re-
vise wartime history.
The Korean Language
Modern Korean language is descended from the language of the
Silla Kingdom, which unified the peninsula in the seventh centu-
ry. As Korean linguist Yi Ki-mun notes, the more remote origins
of the Korean language are disputed, although many Korean lin-
guists, together with a few western scholars, continue to favor the
now widely-contested nineteenth-century theory of an Altaic fam-
ily of languages supposed to include Korean, Japanese, and Mon-
golian, among other languages. Although a historical relationship
between Korean and Japanese has not been established, modern
Korean and Japanese have many similar grammatical features, no
doubt in part because of close contacts between the two during the
past century. These similarities have given rise to considerable
speculation in the popular press. The linguist Kim Chin-wu, for
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example, has hypothesized that Korea andJapan stood at the end
of two routes of large-scale migration in ancient times: a northern
route from Inner Asia and a southern route from southern China
or Southeast Asia. In a variant on the "southern origins" theory
of some Japanese scholars, he views the two languages as reflect-
ing disparate "northern' ' and "southern" influences, with Korean
showing more influence from the northern, Inner Asian strain.
Both Korean and Japanese possess what is sometimes called "po-
lite" or "honorific" language, the use of different levels of speech
in addressing persons of superior, inferior, or equal rank. These
distinctions depend both on the use of different vocabulary and
upon basic structural differences in the words employed. For ex-
ample, in Korean the imperative "go" can be rendered kara when
speaking to an inferior or a child, kage when speaking to an adult
inferior, kaseyo when speaking to a superior, and kasipsio when speak-
ing to a person of still higher rank. The proper use of polite lan-
guage, or levels of polite speech, is an extremely complex and subde
matter. The Korean language, like Japanese, is extremely sensi-
tive to the nuances of hierarchical human relationships. Two per-
sons who meet for the first time are expected to use the more distant
or formal terms, but they will shift to more informal or "equal"
terms if they become friends. Younger people invariably use for-
mal language in addressing elders; the latter will use "inferior"
terms in "talking down" to those who are younger.
The Korean language may be written using a mixture of Chinese
ideograms (hancha) and a native Korean alphabet known as han 'gul,
or in han 'gul alone, much as in a more limited way Indo-European
languages sometimes write numbers using Arabic symbols and at
other times spell numbers out in their own alphabets or in some
combination of the two forms. Han'gul was invented by scholars
at the court of King Sejong (1418-50), not solely to promote liter-
acy among the common people as is sometimes claimed, but also,
as Professor Gari K. Ledyard has noted, to assist in studies of
Chinese historical phonology. According to a perhaps apocryphal
decree of the king, an intelligent man could learn han 'gul in a morn-
ing' s time, and even a fool could master it in ten days. As a result,
it was scorned by scholars and relegated to women and merchants.
The script, which in its modern form contains forty symbols, is
considered by linguists to be one of the most scientific ever devised;
it reflects quite consistently the phonemes of the spoken Korean
language.
Because of its greater variety of sounds, Korean does not have the
problem of the Japanese written language, which some experts have
argued needs to retain a sizable inventory of Chinese characters
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to distinguish a large number of potentially ambiguous homo-
phones. Since 1948 the continued use of Chinese characters in South
Korea has been criticized by linguistic nationalists and some edu-
cators and defended by cultural conservatives, who fear that the
loss of character literacy could cut younger generations off from
a major part of their cultural heritage. Since the early 1970s, Seoul's
policy governing the teaching and use of Chinese characters has
shifted several times, although the trend clearly has been toward
writing in han'gul alone. By early 1990, all but academic writing
used far fewer Chinese characters than was the case in the 1960s.
In 1989 the Korean Language and Education Research Associa-
tion, citing the need for Chinese character literacy "at a time when
the nation is entering into keen competition withJapan and China"
and noting that Japanese educators were increasing the number
of Chinese characters taught in elementary schools, recommended
to the Ministry of Education that instruction in Chinese charac-
ters be reintroduced at the primary-school level.
Although the Korean and Chinese languages are not related in
terms of grammatical structure, more than 50 percent of all Korean
vocabulary is derived from Chinese loanwords, a reflection of the
cultural dominance ofChina over 2 millennia. In many cases there
are two words—a Chinese loanword and an indigenous Korean
word—meaning the same thing. The Chinese-based word in
Korean sometimes has a bookish or formal flavor. Koreans select
one or the other variant to achieve the proper register in speech,
or in writing, and to make subtle distinctions of meaning in accor-
dance with established usage.
Large numbers of Chinese character compounds coined inJapan
in the nineteenth or twentieth centuries to translate modern Western
scientific, technical, and political vocabulary came into use in Korea
during the colonial period. Post- 1945 United States influence has
been reflected in a number of English words that have been ab-
sorbed into Korean.
Unlike Chinese, Korean does not encompass dialects that are
mutually unintelligible, with the possible exception of the variant
spoken on Cheju Island. There are, however, regional variations
both in vocabulary and pronunciation, the range being compara-
ble to the differences that might be found between Maine and Ala-
bama in the United States. Despite several decades of universal
education, similar variations also have been heard between highly
educated and professional speakers and Koreans of working class
or rural backgrounds. Standard Korean is derived from the language
spoken in and around Seoul. More than forty years of division has
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meant that there are also some divergences in the development of
the Korean language north and south of the DMZ.
Education
Like other East Asian countries with a Confucian heritage, South
Korea has had a long history of providing formal education.
Although there was no state-supported system of primary educa-
tion, the central government established a system of secondary
schools in Seoul and the provinces during the Choson Dynasty.
State schools suffered a decline in quality, however, and came to
be supplanted in importance by the sowon, private academies that
were the centers of a neo-Confucian revival in the sixteenth cen-
tury. Students at both private and state-supported secondary schools
were exempt from military service and had much the same social
prestige as university students enjoy today in South Korea. Like
modern students, they were frequently involved in politics. Higher
education was provided by the Confucian national university in
the capital, the Songgyungwan. Its enrollment was limited to 200
students who had passed the lower civil service examinations and
were preparing for the higher examinations.
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, modern
private schools were established both by Koreans and by foreign
Christian missionaries. The latter were particularly important be-
cause they promoted the education of women and the diffusion of
Western social and political ideas. Japanese educational policy af-
ter 1910 was designed to turn Koreans into obedient colonial sub-
jects and to teach them limited technical skills. A state university
modeled on Tokyo Imperial University was established in Seoul
in 1923, but the number of Koreans allowed to study there never
exceeded 40 percent of its enrollment; 60 percent of its students
were Japanese expatriates.
When United States military forces occupied the southern half
of the Korean Peninsula in 1 945
,
they established a school system
based on the American model: six years of primary school, six years
of secondary school (divided into junior and senior levels), and four
years of higher education. Other occupation period reforms included
coeducation at all levels, popularly elected school boards in local
areas, and compulsory education up to the ninth grade. The govern-
ment of Syngman Rhee reversed many of these reforms after 1948:
in most cases only primary schools remained coeducational and
education was compulsory only up to the sixth grade because of
a lack of resources. The school system in 1990, however, reflects
the system established under the United States occupation.
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During the years when Rhee and Park Chung Hee were in pow-
er, the control of education was gradually taken out of the hands
of local school boards and concentrated in a centralized Ministry
of Education. In the late 1980s, the ministry was responsible for
administration of schools, allocation of resources, setting of enroll-
ment quotas, certification of schools and teachers, curriculum de-
velopment (including the issuance of textbook guidelines), and other
basic policy decisions. Provincial and special city boards of educa-
tion still existed. Although each board was composed of seven mem-
bers who were supposed to be selected by popularly elected
legislative bodies, this arrangement ceased to function after 1973.
Subsequently, school board members were approved by the minister
of education.
Most observers agree that South Korea's spectacular progress
in modernization and economic growth since the Korean War is
largely attributable to the willingness of individuals to invest a large
amount of resources in education: the improvement of "human
capital." The traditional esteem for the educated man, originally
confined to the Confucian scholar as a cultured generalist, now
extends to scientists, technicians, and others working with special-
ized knowledge. Highly educated technocrats and economic plan-
ners could claim much of the credit for their country's economic
successes since the 1960s. Scientific professions were generally
regarded as the most prestigious by South Koreans in the 1980s.
Statistics demonstrate the success of South Korea's national edu-
cation programs. In 1945 the adult literacy rate was estimated at
22 percent; by 1970 adult literacy was 87.6 percent, and by the
late 1980s various sources estimated it at around 93 percent. South
Korean students have performed exceedingly well in internation-
al competitions in mathematics and science. Although only primary
school (grades one through six) was compulsory, percentages of
age-groups of children and young people enrolled in primary, second-
ary, and tertiary level schools were equivalent to those found in
industrialized countries, including Japan. Approximately 4.8 mil-
lion students in the eligible age-group were attending primary school
in 1985. The percentage of students going on to optional middle
school the same year was more than 99 percent. Approximately
34 percent, one of the world's highest rates of secondary-school
graduates, attended institutions of higher education in 1987, a rate
similar to Japan's (about 30 percent) and exceeding Britain's (20
percent).
Government expenditure on education has been generous. In
1975 it was W220 billion (for value of the won—see Glossary), the
equivalent of 2.2 percent of the gross national product (GNP—see
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Glossary), or 13.9 percent of total government expenditures. By
1986 education expenditure had reached won 3.76 trillion, or 4.5
percent of the GNP, and 27.3 percent of government budget
allocations.
Social emphasis on education was not, however, without its
problems, as it tended to accentuate class differences. In the late
1980s, possession of a college degree was considered necessary for
entering the middle class; there were no alternative pathways of
social advancement, with the possible exception of a military career.
People without a college education, including skilled workers with
vocational school backgrounds, often were treated as second-class
citizens by their white-collar, college-educated managers, despite
the importance of their skills for economic development. Intense
competition for places at the most prestigious universities—the sole
gateway into elite circles
—
promoted, like the old Confucian sys-
tem, a sterile emphasis on rote memorization in order to pass sec-
ondary school and college entrance examinations. Particularly after
a dramatic expansion of college enrollments in the early 1980s,
South Korea faced the problem of what to do about a large num-
ber of young people kept in school for a long time, usually at great
sacrifice to themselves and their families, and then faced with limited
job opportunities because their skills were not marketable.
Primary and Secondary Schools
In the late 1980s, primary schools were coeducational, although
coeducation was quite rare at the middle-school and high-school
levels. Enrollment figures for 1987 on the primary-school level were
4,771,722 pupils in 6,531 schools, with 130,142 teachers. A decline
from the 1980 figure of 5,658,002 pupils was caused by popula-
tion trends. Some 54 percent of primary school teachers were male.
In 1987 there were approximately 4,895,354 students enrolled
in middle schools and high schools, with approximately 150,873
teachers. About 69 percent of these teachers were male. The
secondary-school enrollment figure also reflected changing popu-
lation trends; there were 3,959,975 students in secondary schools
in 1979. Given the importance of entry into higher education, the
majority of students attended general or academic high schools in
1987: 1 ,397,359 students, or 60 percent of the total, attended general
or academic high schools, as compared with 840,265 students in
vocational secondary schools. Vocational schools specialized in a
number of fields: primarily agriculture, fishery, commerce, trades,
merchant marine, engineering, and the arts.
Enrollment in kindergartens or preschools expanded impressively
during the 1980s. In 1980 there were 66,433 children attending
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901 kindergartens or preschools. By 1987 there were 397,020 chil-
dren in 7,792 institutions. The number of kindergarten and
preschool teachers rose from 3,339 to 1 1 ,920 during the same peri-
od. The overwhelming majority of these teachers—approximately
92 percent—were women. This growth was attributable to several
factors: Ministry of Education encouragement of preschool edu-
cation, the greater number of women entering the work force,
growth in the number of nuclear families without a grandparent
available to take care of children, and the feeling that kindergar-
ten might give children an 4 'edge" in later educational competi-
tion. Kindergartens often paid homage to the expectations of parents
with impressive graduation ceremonies, complete with diplomas,
academic caps, and gowns.
Competitive entrance examinations at the middle-school level
were abolished in 1968. Although as of the late 1980s, students
still had to pass noncompetitive qualifying examinations, they were
assigned to secondary institutions by lottery, or else by location
within the boundary of the school district. Secondary schools, for-
merly ranked according to the quality of their students, have been
equalized, with a portion of good, mediocre, and poor students
being assigned to each one. The reform, however, did not equal-
ize secondary schools completely. In Seoul, students who performed
well in qualifying examinations were allowed to attend better quality
schools in a "common" district, whereas other students attended
schools in one of five geographical districts. The reforms applied
equally to public and private schools, both of whose enrollments
were strictly controlled by the Ministry of Education.
Although primary- and secondary-school teachers traditionally
enjoyed high status, they often were overworked and underpaid
during the late 1980s. Salaries were less than those for many other
white-collar professions and even some blue-collar jobs. High school
teachers, particularly those in the cities, did however, receive siz-
able gifts from parents seeking attention for their children, but teach-
ing hours were long and classes crowded (the average class contained
around fifty to sixty students).
In May 1989, teachers established an independent union, the
National Teachers Union (NTU—Chon'gyojo). Their aims includ-
ed improving working conditions and reforming a school system
that they regarded as overly controlled by the Ministry of Educa-
tion. Although the government promised large increases in allo-
cations for teachers' salaries and facilities, it refused to give the
union legal status. Because teachers were civil servants, the govern-
ment claimed they did not have the right to strike and, even if they
did have the right to strike, unionization would undermine the status
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of teachers as "role models" for young Koreans. The government
also accused the union of spreading subversive, leftist propaganda
that was sympathetic to the communist regime in North Korea.
According to a report in the Asian Wall Street Journal, the union
claimed support from 82 percent of all teachers. The controversy
was viewed as representing a major crisis for South Korean edu-
cation because a large number of teachers (1,500 by November
1989) had been dismissed; violence among union supporters, op-
ponents, and police had occurred at several locations; and class
disruptions had caused anxieties for families of students preparing
for the college entrance examinations. The union's challenge to
the Ministry of Education's control of the system and the charges
of subversion had made compromise seem a very remote possibil-
ity at the start of 1990.
Higher Education
In the late 1980s, the university a South Korean high school
graduate attended was perhaps the single most important factor
in determining his or her life chances. Thus, entrance into a pres-
tigious institution was the focus of intense energy, dedication, and
self-sacrifice. Prestigious institutions included the state-run Seoul
National University, originally established by the Japanese as Seoul
Imperial University in 1923, and a handful of private institutions
such as Yonse University, Koryo University, and Ehwa Woman's
University.
Because college entrance depends upon ranking high in objec-
tively graded examinations, high school students face an "exami-
nation hell," a harsh regimen of endless cramming and rote
memorization of facts that is probably even more severe than the
one faced by their counterparts in Japan. Unlike the Confucian
civil service examinations of the Choson Dynasty, their modern
reincarnation is a matter of importance not for an elite, but for
the substantial portion of the population with middle-class aspira-
tions. In the late 1980s, over one-third of college-age men and wom-
en (35.2 percent in 1989) succeeded in entering and attending
institutions of higher education; those who failed faced dramati-
cally reduced prospects for social and economic advancement.
The number of students in higher education had risen from
100,000 in 1960 to 1 .3 million in 1987, and the proportion of college-
age students in higher-education institutions was second only to
the United States. The institutions of higher education included
regular four-year colleges and universities, two-year junior voca-
tional colleges, four-year teachers' colleges, and graduate schools.
The main drawback was that college graduates wanted careers that
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would bring them positions of leadership in society, but there sim-
ply were not enough positions to accommodate all graduates each
year and many graduates were forced to accept lesser positions.
Ambitious women, especially, were frustrated by traditional bar-
riers of sex discrimination as well as by the lack of positions.
A college-bound high school student, in the late 1980s, typical-
ly rose at dawn, did a bit of studying before school began at 7:30
or 8:00 A.M., attended school until 5:00 P.M., had a quick dinner
(often away from home), and then attended evening cramming
classes that could last until 10:00 or 11:00 P.M. Sundays and holi-
days were devoted to more cramming. Because tests given in high
school (generally once every two or four weeks) were almost as im-
portant in determining college entrance as the final entrance ex-
aminations, students had no opportunity to relax from the study
routine. According to one contemporary account, a student had
to memorize 60 to 100 pages of facts to do well on these periodic
tests. Family and social life generally were sacrificed to the supreme
end of getting into the best university possible.
The costs of the ' 'examination hell" have been evident not only
in a grim and joyless adolescence for many, if not most, young
South Koreans, but also in the number of suicides caused by the
constant pressure of tests. Often suicides have been top achievers
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who despaired after experiencing a slump in test performance. In
addition, the multiple choice format of periodic high school tests
and university entrance examinations has left students little oppor-
tunity to develop their creative talents. A "facts only" orientation
has promoted a cramped and unspontaneous view of the world that
has tended to spill over into areas of life other than academic work.
The prospects for basic change in the system—a deemphasis on
tests—were unlikely in the late 1980s. The great virtue of facts-
based testing is its objectivity. Although harsh, the system is believed
to be fair and impartial. The use of nonobjective criteria such as
essays, personal recommendations, and the recognition of success
in extracurricular activities or personal recommendations from
teachers and others could open up all sorts of opportunities for cor-
ruption. In a society where social connections are extremely impor-
tant, connections rather than merit might determine entry into a
good university. Students who survive the numbing regimen of
examinations under the modern system are at least universally
acknowledged to have deserved their educational success. Top
graduates who have assumed positions of responsibility in govern-
ment and business have lent, through their talents, legitimacy to
the whole system.
Following the assumption of power by General Chun Doo Hwan
in 1980, the Ministry of Education implemented a number of re-
forms designed to make the system fairer and to increase higher
education opportunities for the population at large. In a very popu-
lar move, the ministry dramatically increased enrollment at large.
The number of high school graduates accepted into colleges and
universities was increased from almost 403,000 students in 1980
to more than 1.4 million in 1989. This reform decreased, temporar-
ily, the acceptance ratio from one college place for every four ap-
plicants in 1980 to one for every three applicants in 1981 . In 1980
the number of students attending all kinds of higher educational
institutions was almost 600,000; that number grew almost 100 per-
cent to 1,061,403 students by 1983. By 1987 there were 1,340,381
students attending higher educational institutions. By 1987 junior
colleges had an enrollment of almost 260,000 students, and col-
leges and universities had an enrollment of almost 990,000 students.
Other higher education institutions enrolled the balance.
A second reform was the prohibition of private, after-school tutor-
ing. Formerly, private tutors could charge exorbitant rates if they
had a good "track record" of getting students into the right schools
through intensive coaching, especially in English and in mathemat-
ics. This situation gave wealthy families an unfair advantage in
the competition. Under the new rules, students receiving tutoring
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could be suspended from school and their tutors dismissed from
their jobs. There was ample evidence in the mid-1980s, however,
that the law had simply driven the private tutoring system under-
ground and made the fees more expensive. Some underpaid teachers
and cash-starved students at prestigious institutions were willing
to run the risk of punishment in order to earn as much as W300,000
to W500,000 a month. Students and their parents took the risk
of being caught, believing that coaching in weak subject areas could
give students the edge needed to get into a better university. By
the late 1980s, however, the tutorial system seemed largely to have
disappeared.
A third reform was much less popular. The ministry established
a graduation quota system, in which increased freshman enroll-
ments were counterbalanced by the requirement that each four-
year college or university fail the lowest 30 percent of its students;
junior colleges were required to fail the lowest 15 percent. These
quotas were required no matter how well the lowest 30 or 15 per-
cent of the students did in terms of objective standards. Ostensi-
bly designed to ensure the quality of the increased number of college
graduates, the system also served, for a while to discourage stu-
dents from devoting their time to political movements. Resentment
of the quotas was widespread, and family counterpressures were
intense. The government abolished the quotas in 1984.
College Student Activism
Student activism has a long and honorable history in Korea. Stu-
dents in Choson Dynasty secondary schools often became involved
in the intense factional struggles of the scholar-official class. Stu-
dents played a major role in Korea's independence movement, par-
ticularly the March 1
,
1919, country-wide demonstrations that were
harshly suppressed by the Japanese military police. Students pro-
tested against the Rhee and Park regimes during the 1950s, 1960s,
and 1970s. Observers noted, however, that while student activists
in the past generally embraced liberal and democratic values, the
new generation of militants in the 1980s was far more radical. Most
participants have adopted some version of the minjung ideology that
was heavily influenced by Marxism, Western "dependence the-
ory," and Christian "liberation theology," but was also animat-
ed by strong feelings of popular nationalism and xenophobia.
The most militant university students, perhaps about 5 percent
of the total enrollment at Seoul National University and compara-
ble numbers at other institutions in the capital during the late 1980s,
were organized into small circles or cells rarely containing more
than fifty members. Police estimated that there were seventy-two
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such organizations of varying orientation (see Political Extremism




Koreans, like other East Asians, have traditionally been eclec-
tic rather than exclusive in their religious commitments. Their re-
ligious outlook has not been conditioned by a single, exclusive faith
but by a combination of indigenous beliefs and creeds imported
into Korea. Belief in a world inhabited by spirits is probably the
oldest form of Korean religious life, dating back to prehistoric times.
There is a rather unorganized pantheon of literally millions of gods,
spirits, and ghosts, ranging from the "god generals" who rule the
different quarters of heaven to mountain spirits (sansiri). This pan-
theon also includes gods who inhabit trees, sacred caves, and piles
of stones, as well as earth spirits, the tutelary gods of households
and villages, mischievous goblins, and the ghosts of persons who
in many cases met violent or tragic ends. These spirits are said
to have the power to influence or to change the fortunes of living
men and women.
Korean shamans are similar in many ways to those found in
Siberia, Mongolia, and Manchuria. They also resemble the yuta
found on the Ryukyu Islands, in Okinawa Prefecture, Japan. Cheju
Island is also a center of shamanism.
Shamans, most ofwhom are women, are enlisted by those who
want the help of the spirit world. Female shamans hold hut, or ser-
vices, in order to gain good fortune for clients, cure illnesses by
exorcising evil spirits, or propitiate local or village gods. Such ser-
vices are also held to guide the spirit of a deceased person to heaven.
Often a woman will become a shaman very reluctantly—after
experiencing a severe physical or mental illness that indicates "pos-
session" by a spirit. Such possession allegedly can be cured only
through performance of a hut. Once a shaman is established in her
profession, she usually can make a good living.
Many scholars regard Korean shamanism as less a religion than
a "medicine" in which the spirits are manipulated in order to
achieve human ends. There is no notion of salvation or moral and
spiritual perfection, at least for the ordinary believers in spirits.
The shaman is a professional who is consulted by clients whenever
the need is felt. Traditionally, shamans had low social status and
were members of the ch'dmmin class. This discrimination has con-
tinued into modern times.
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Animistic beliefs are strongly associated with the culture of fish-
ing villages and are primarily a phenomenon found in rural com-
munities. Shamans also treat the ills of city people, however,
especially recent migrants from the countryside who find adjust-
ment to an impersonal urban life stressful. The government has
discouraged belief in shamanism as superstition and for many years
minimized its persistence in Korean life. Yet in a climate of grow-
ing nationalism and cultural self-confidence, the dances, songs, and
incantations that compose the hut have come to be recognized as
an important aspect of Korean culture. Beginning in the 1970s,
rituals that formerly had been kept out of foreign view began to
resurface, and occasionally a Western hotel manager or other execu-
tive could even be seen attending a shamanistic exorcism ritual in
the course of opening a new branch in Seoul. Some of these aspects
of hut have been designated valuable cultural properties that should
be preserved and passed on to future generations.
The future of shamanism itself was uncertain in the late 1980s.
Observers believed that many of its functions in the future proba-
bly will be performed by the psychiatric profession as the govern-
ment expands mental health treatment facilities. Given the
uncertainty of social, economic, and political conditions, however,
it appears certain that shamans will find large numbers of clients
for some time to come.
Taoism and Buddhism
Taoism, which focuses on the individual in nature rather than
the individual in society, and Buddhism entered Korea from Chi-
na during the Three Kingdoms period (fourth to seventh centu-
ries A.D.). Taoist motifs are seen in the paintings on the walls of
Koguryo tombs. Buddhism was the dominant religious and cul-
tural influence during the Silla (A.D. 668-935) and Koryo
(918-1392) dynasties. Confucianism also was brought to Korea from
China in early centuries, but it occupied a subordinate position
until the establishment of the Choson Dynasty and the persecu-
tion of Buddhism carried out by the early Choson Dynasty kings
(see Social Structures and Values, this ch.).
Christianity
Roman Catholic missionaries did not arrive in Korea until 1794,
a decade after the return of the first baptized Korean from a visit
to Beijing. However, the writings of the Jesuit missionary, Mat-
teo Ricci, who was resident at the imperial court in Beijing, had
been brought to Korea from China in the seventeenth century. It
appears that scholars of the Sirhak, or practical learning, school
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were interested in these writings. Largely because converts refused
to perform Confucian ancestor rites, the government prohibited
the proselytization of Christianity. Some Catholics were executed
during the early nineteenth century, but the anti-Christian law was
not stricdy enforced. By the 1860s, there were some 17,500 Roman
Catholics in the country. There followed a more rigorous persecu-
tion, in which thousands of Christians died, that continued until
1884.
Protestant missionaries entered Korea during the 1880s and,
along with Catholic priests, converted a remarkable number of
Koreans. Methodist and Presbyterian missionaries were especially
successful. They established schools, universities, hospitals, and
orphanages and played a significant role in the modernization of
the country. During the Japanese colonial occupation, Christians
were in the front ranks of the struggle for independence. Factors
contributing to the growth of Protestantism included the degener-
ate state of Korean Buddhism, the efforts made by educated Chris-
tians to reconcile Christian and Confucian values (the latter being
viewed as purely a social ethic rather than a religion), the encourage-
ment of self-support and self-government among members of the
Korean church, and the identification of Christianity with Korean
nationalism.
A large number of Christians lived in the northern part of the
peninsula where Confucian influence was not as strong as in the
south. Before 1948 P'yongyang was an important Christian center:
one-sixth of its population of about 300,000 people were converts.
Following the establishment of a communist regime in the north,
however, most Christians had to flee to South Korea or face perse-
cution.
New Religions
Ch'ondogyo, generally regarded as the first of Korea's "new
religions," is another important religious tradition. It is a synthe-
sis of Confucian, Buddhist, shamanistic, Taoist, and Catholic in-
fluences. Ch'ondogyo grew out of the Tonghak Movement (also
called Eastern Learning Movement) established by Ch'oe Che-u,
a man ofyangban background who claimed to have experienced a
mystic encounter with God, who told him to preach to all the world.
Ch'oe was executed by the government as a heretic in 1863, but
not before he had acquired a number of followers and had com-
mitted his ideas to writing. Tonghak spread among the poor peo-
ple of Korea's villages, especially in the Cholla region, and was
the cause of a revolt against the royal government in 1894. While
some members of the Tonghak Movement—renamed Ch'ondogyo
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(Teachings of the Heavenly Way)—supported the Japanese annex-
ation in 1910, others opposed it. This group played a major role,
along with Christians and some Confucians, in the Korean nation-
alist movement. In the 1920s, Ch'ondogyo sponsored Kaebyok (Cre-
ation), one of Korea's major intellectual journals during the colonial
period (see The Media, ch. 4).
Ch'ondogyo' s basic beliefs include the essential equality of all
human beings. Each person must be treated with respect because
all persons "contain divinity;" there is "God in man." Moreover,
men and women must sincerely cultivate themselves in order to
bring forth and express this divinity in their lives. Self-perfection,
not ritual and ceremony, is the way to salvation. Although Ch'oe
and his followers did not attempt to overthrow the social order and
establish a radical egalitarianism, the revolutionary potential of
Ch'ondogyo is evident in these basic ideas, which appealed espe-
cially to poor people who were told that they, along with scholars
and high officials, could achieve salvation through effort. There
is reason to believe that Ch'ondogyo had an important role in the
development of democratic and anti-authoritarian thought in Korea.
In the 1970s and 1980s, Ch'ondogyo' s antecedent, the Tonghak
Movement, received renewed interest among many Korean in-
tellectuals.
Apart from Ch'ondogyo, major new religions included Taejong-
gyo, which has as its central creed the worship of Tan' gun, legend-
ary founder of the Korean nation. Chungsanggyo, founded in the
early twentieth century, emphasizes magical practices and the cre-
ation of a paradise on earth. It is divided into a great number of
competing branches. Wonbulgyo, or Won Buddhism, attempts to
combine traditional Buddhist doctrine with a modern concern for
social reform and revitalization. There are also a number of small
sects which have sprung up around Mount Kyeryong in South
Ch'ungch'ong Province, the supposed future site of the founding
of a new dynasty originally prophesied in the eighteenth century.
Several new religions derive their inspiration from Christianity.
The Chondogwan, or Evangelical Church, was founded by Pak
T'ae-son. Pak originally was a Presbyterian, but was expelled from
the church for heresy in the 1950s after claiming for himself unique
spiritual power. By 1972 his followers numbered as many as 700,000
people, and he built several "Christian towns," established a large
church network, and managed several industrial enterprises.
Because of its overseas evangelism, the Hold Spirit Association
for the Unification of the World Christianity, or Unification Church
(T'ongilgyo), founded in 1954 by Reverend Sun Myong Moon
(Mun Son-myong), also a former Christian, is the most famous
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Korean new religion. During its period of rigorous expansion during
the 1970s, the Unification Church had several hundred thousand
members in South Korea and Japan and a substantial (although
generally overestimated) number of members in North America
and Western Europe. Moon claimed that he was the "messiah"
designated by God to unify all the peoples of the world into one
"family," governed theocratically by himself.
Like Pak's Evangelical Church, the Unification Church has been
highly authoritarian, demanding absolute obedience from church
members. Moon, for example, has arranged marriages for his youn-
ger followers; United States television audiences were treated some
years ago to a mass ceremony at which several hundred young
"Moonies" were married. Also like Pak, Moon has coupled the
church's fortunes to economic expansion. Factories in South Korea
and abroad manufacture arms and process ginseng and seafood,
artistic bric-a-brac, and other items. Moon's labor force has worked
long hours and been paid minimal wages in order to channel profits
into church coffers. Virulently anticommunist, Moon has sought
to influence public opinion at home and abroad by establishing
generally unprofitable newspapers such as the Segye ilbo in Seoul,
the Sekai nippo in Tokyo, and the Washington Times in the United
States capital and by inviting academics to lavish international con-
ferences, often held in South Korea. At home, the Unification
Church was viewed with suspicion by the authorities because of
its scandals and Moon's evident desire to create a "state within
a state." His influence, however, had declined by the late 1980s.
Religion in Contemporary South Korea
According to government statistics, 42.6 percent or more than
17 million of South Korea's 1985 population professed adherence
to an organized religious community. There were at least 8 mil-
lion Buddhists (about 20 percent of the total population), about
6.5 million Protestants (16 percent of the population), some 1.9
million Roman Catholics (5 percent), nearly 500,000 people who
belonged to Confucian groups (1 percent), and more than 300,000
others (0.7 percent). Significantly, large metropolitan areas had
the highest proportions of people belonging to formal religious
groups: 49.9 percent in Seoul, 46.1 percent in Pusan, and 45.8
percent in Taegu. The figures for Christians revealed that South
Korea had the highest percentage of Christians of any country in
East Asia or Southeast Asia, with the exception of the Philippines.
Except for the Christian groups, which maintain a fairly clear-
cut distinction between believers and nonbelievers, there is some
ambiguity in these statistics. As has been pointed out, there is no
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exact or exclusive criterion by which Buddhists or Confucianists
can be identified. Many people outside of formal groups have been
deeply influenced by these traditions. Moreover, there is nothing
contradictory in one person's visiting and praying at Buddhist tem-
ples, participating in Confucian ancestor rites, and even consult-
ing a shaman and sponsoring a kut. Furthermore, the statistics may
underrepresent the numbers of people belonging to new religions.
Some sources have given the number of adherents of Ch'ondogyo
as over 1 million.
Given the great diversity of religious expression, the role of
religion in South Korea's social development has been a complex
one. Some traditions, especially Buddhism, are identified primar-
ily with the past. Buddhist sites such as the Pulguksa Temple and
the Sokkuram Grotto in Kyongju and the Haeinsa Temple near
Taegu are regarded by most South Koreans as important cultural
properties rather than as places of worship. Confucianism remains
important as a social ethic; its influence is evident in the immense
importance Koreans ascribe to education. Christianity is identi-
fied with modernization and social reform. Many Christians in con-
temporary South Korea, such as veteran political opposition leader
Kim Dae Jung, a Catholic, have been outspoken advocates of hu-
man rights and critics of the government. Christian-sponsored or-
ganizations such as the Urban Industrial Mission promote labor
organizations and the union movement. New religions draw on
both traditional beliefs and on Christianity, achieving a baffling
variety and diversity of views. It has been estimated that there were
as many as 300 new religions in South Korea in the late 1980s,
although many were small and transient phenomena.
Public Health and Welfare
Health conditions have improved dramatically since the end of
the Korean War. Between 1955 and 1960, life expectancy was es-
timated at 51.1 years for men and 54.2 years for women. In 1990
life expectancy was sixty-six years for men and seventy-three years
for women. The death rate declined significantly, from 13.8 deaths
per 1,000 in 1955-60 to 6 deaths per 1,000 in 1989—one of the
lowest rates among East Asian and Southeast Asian countries.
Nevertheless, serious health problems remained in 1990. South
Korea's infant mortality rate was significandy higher than the rates
of other Asian countries and territories such as Japan, Taiwan,
Hong Kong, Singapore, and peninsular Malaysia. Although prac-
tically all the inhabitants of Seoul and other large cities had access to
running water and sewage disposal in the late 1980s, environmental
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pollution and poor sanitation still posed serious threats to public
health in both rural and urban areas.
Health Conditions
The main causes of death traditionally have been respiratory
diseases—tuberculosis, bronchitis, and pneumonia—followed by
gastrointestinal illnesses. However, the incidence and fatality of
both types of illness declined during the 1970s and 1980s. Diseases
typical of developed, industrialized countries—cancer, heart, liver
and kidney ailments, diabetes, and strokes—were rapidly becom-
ing the primary causes of death. The incidence of parasitism, once
a major health problem in farming communities because of the
widespread use of night soil as fertilizer, was reported in the late
1980s to be only 4 percent of what it had been in 1970. Encephali-
tis, a viral disease that can be transmitted to humans by mosqui-
toes, caused ninety-four deaths in 1982. To reduce fatalities, the
Ministry of Health and Social Affairs planned to vaccinate 17.2
million persons against the disease by 1988.
The tensions and social dislocations caused by rapid urbaniza-
tion apparently increased the incidence of mental illness. In 1985
the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs began a large-scale pro-
gram to expand mental health treatment facilities by opening mental
institutions and requiring that new hospitals have wards set aside
for psychiatric treatment. The ministry estimated the number of
persons suffering from mental ailments at around 400,000.
South Korea has not been entirely immune from the health and
social problems generally associated with the West, such as acquired
immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) and addictive drugs. A hand-
ful ofAIDS cases was reported during the late 1980s. Seoul respond-
ed by increasing the budget for education programs and instituting
mandatory AIDS testing of prostitutes and employees of entertain-
ment establishments. An AIDS Prevention Law was promulgated
in November 1987. In late 1989, the government drafted a law
requiring AIDS testing of foreign athletes and entertainers intending
to reside in South Korea without their spouses for more than three
months. Previously, the majority of those infected with AIDS had
been prostitutes working near United States military bases, ocean-
going seamen, and South Koreans working abroad. In the late
1980s, however, homosexuals began to account for an increasing
number of those infected with the AIDS virus. The traditional
Korean attitude toward homosexuality, which was to deny its ex-
istence, made it extremely difficult to treat this part of the popula-
tion. The 200-percent annual increase in the number
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of AIDS-infected persons (from one reported case in 1985 to twenty-
two cases in 1988) worried health officials.
While the use of heroin and other opiates was rare in South Korea
and the use of cocaine limited, the use of crystalline methampheta-
mine, or "ice," known in South Korea as hiroppon, had become
a serious problem by the late 1980s. Estimates of the number of
South Korean abusers of this illegal drug (known in the United
States as speed) ranged from 100,000 to 300,000 people in the late
1980s. Because use of the drug was believed to involve just low-
status members of society, such as prostitutes and gangsters, the
problem of hiroppon abuse had long been ignored in South Korea.
The problem received greater attention from police and other
government agencies during the late 1980s as the drug increased
in popularity among professionals, students, office workers, house-
wives, entertainers, farmers, and laborers. Some observers sug-
gested the drug's popularity was caused in part by a high-pressure
work environment, in which people used hiroppon to cope with long
working hours. It also has been suggested that the tighter border
controls imposed by Seoul have resulted in diverting the product
to the domestic market and contributing to greater domestic con-
sumption.
An estimated 2,000 to 4,000 kilograms ofmethamphetamine were
produced within South Korea annually, much of this total destined
for shipment to Taiwan, Japan, and the United States by South
Korean and Japanese yakuza, or gangsters. Since the majority of
users injected the drug intravenously (although smoking and snort-
ing it were becoming popular), South Korean health officials were
concerned that the drug could contribute to the spread of AIDS.
In 1989 Seoul established a new antinarcotics division attached to
the prosecutor general's office and increased almost fourfold the
number of drug agents.
Health Care and Social Welfare
The traditional practice of medicine in Korea was influenced
primarily, although not exclusively, by China. Over the centuries,
Koreans had used acupuncture and herbal remedies to treat a wide
variety of illnesses. Large compilations of herbal and other prescrip-
tions were published during the Choson Dynasty: the 85-volume
Hyangyak chipsongbang (Great Collection of Korean Prescriptions)
published in 1433 and the 365-volume Uibangyuch'wi (Great Col-
lection of Medicines and Prescriptions) published in 1445. Shops
selling traditional medicines, including ginseng, a root plant be-
lieved to have strong medicinal and aphrodisiac qualities, still were
common in the 1980s. Because of the expense of modern medical
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care, people still had to rely largely on such remedies to treat seri-
ous illnesses until the 1980s, particularly in rural areas.
The number of physicians, nurses, dentists, pharmacists, and
other health personnel and the number of hospitals and clinics have
increased dramatically since the Korean War (see fig. 8). In 1974
the population per physician was 2,207; by 1983 this number had
declined to 1 ,509. During the same period, the number of general
hospitals grew from 36 to 156 and the number of hospital beds tri-
pled from 19,062 to 59,099. Most facilities, however, tended to
be concentrated in urban areas, particularly in Seoul and Pusan.
Rural areas had limited medical facilities because in the past there
had been little incentive for physicians to work in areas outside
the cities, where the major of the people could not pay for treat-
ment. Several private rural hospitals had been established with
government encouragement but had gone bankrupt in the late
1980s. The extension of medical insurance programs to the rural
populace, however, was expected to alleviate this problem to some
extent during the 1990s.
The South Korean government committed itself to making med-
ical security (medical insurance and medical aid) available to vir-
tually the entire population by 1991 . There was no unified national
health insurance system, but the Ministry of Health and Social Af-
fairs coordinated its efforts with those of employers and private in-
surance firms to achieve this goal. Two programs were established
in 1977: the Free and Subsidized Medical Aid Program for people
whose income was below a certain level and a medical insurance
program that provided coverage for individuals and their immediate
families working in enterprises of 500 people or more. Expenses
were shared equally by employers and workers. In 1979 coverage
was expanded to enterprises comprising 300 or more people, as
well as to civil servants and teachers in private schools. In 1981
coverage was extended to enterprises employing 100 or more peo-
ple and in 1984 to firms with as few as 16 employees. In that year,
16.7 million persons, or 41 .3 percent of the population, had medi-
cal insurance. By 1988 the government had expanded medical in-
surance coverage in rural areas to almost 7.5 million people. As
of the end of 1988, approximately 33.1 million people, or almost
79 percent of the population, received medical insurance benefits.
At that time, the number of those not receiving medical insurance
benefits totaled almost 9 million people, mostly independent small
business owners in urban areas. In July 1989, however, Seoul ex-
tended medical insurance to cover these self-employed urbanites,
so that the medical insurance system extended to almost all South
Koreans. Differences in insurance premiums among small business
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owners, government officials and teachers, people in farming and
fishing areas, and those employed by business firms remained a
divisive and unresolved issue.
Medical insurance programs for farming and fishing communi-
ties, where the majority of people were self-employed or worked
for very small enterprises, also were initiated by the government.
In 1981 three rural communities were selected as experimental sites
for implementation of a comprehensive medical insurance program.
Three more areas, including Mokp'o in South Cholla Province,
were added in 1982. Industrial injury compensation schemes were
begun in the early 1960s and by 1982 covered 3.5 million workers
in most major industries.
During the 1980s, government pension or social security insur-
ance programs covered designated groups, such as civil servants,
military personnel, and teachers. Private employers had their own
schemes to which they and workers both contributed. Government
planners envisioned a public and private system of pensions covering
the entire population by the early 1990s. In the wake of rapid eco-
nomic growth, large sums have been allocated for social develop-
ment programs in the national budget. In FY (fiscal year—see
Glossary) 1990, total spending in this area increased 40 percent
over the previous year. Observers noted, however, that serious defi-
ciencies existed in programs for the handicapped, single-parent
families, and the unemployed.
* * *
A New History of Korea by Ki-baik Lee provides ample coverage
of social developments during the Three Kingdoms, Silla, Koryo,
and Choson Dynasty periods and during the Japanese colonial oc-
cupation. James B. Palais 's Politics and Policy in Traditional Korea
gives a succinct overview of Choson Dynasty social structure.
Michael C. Kalton's translation and commentary on Yi T'oe-gye's
The Ten Diagrams on Sage Learning contains a valuable discussion
not only of the career of Korea's most noted Confucian scholar,
but also of the philosophical and ethical fundamentals of neo-
Confucian orthodoxy. Donald N. Clark's Christianity in Modern Korea
provides excellent coverage of Christianity in contemporary Korea.
Vincent S.R. Brandt's A Korean Village and Han Sang-Bok's
Korean Fishermen remain among the best descriptions of rural Korean
life during the mid-1960s. Although published in 1971, Lee Hyo-
jae et al.'s "Life in Urban Korea" remains informative. Korean
family and kinship organizations are described exhaustively by Lee
Kwang-Kyu in his two-volume Kinship System in Korea.
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Virtues in Conflict, a collection of essays edited by Sandra Matiel-
li, and Kim Yung-chung's Women of Korea discuss women's roles
in Korean society. Female shamans are discussed in Kim Harvey
Youngsook's Six Korean Women and Laurel Kendall's The Life and
Hard Times of a Korean Shaman. Kim Chin-wu's The Making of the
Korean Language provides an informative account of that subject.
Interesting discussions of South Korea's changing social classes
are contained in David I. Steinberg's The Republic of Korea and in
Kim Kyong-Dong's "Social Change and Societal Developments
in Korea since 1945." Although its 1980 publication date precludes
discussion of the major changes that have occurred since that year,
Education and Development in Korea by Noel F. McGinn et al. pro-
vides excellent background on this important subject. Recent de-
velopments are covered in some depth by publications such as the
Far Eastern Economic Review, whose weekly "Arts and Society" sec-
tion deals extensively with education and other social matters. Other
periodicals containing discussions of South Korean society, edu-
cation, and cultural expression include KoreaJournal, the Social Science




Southwest Hidden Gate, Suwon Castle, largest of the five hidden gates,
where a hidden road for transporting military provisions begins
IN THE FIRST THREE decades after the Park Chung Hee
government launched the First Five-Year Economic Development
Plan in 1962, the South Korean economy grew enormously and
the economic structure was radically transformed. South Korea's
real gross national product (GNP—see Glossary) expanded by an
average of more than 8 percent per year, from US$2.3 billion in
1962 to US$204 billion in 1989. Per capita annual income grew
from US$87 in 1962 to US$4,830 in 1989. The manufacturing sec-
tor grew from 14.3 percent of the GNP in 1962 to 30.3 percent
in 1987. Commodity trade volume rose from US$480 million in
1962 to a projected US$127.9 billion in 1990. The ratio of domes-
tic savings to GNP grew from 3.3 percent in 1962 to 35.8 percent
in 1989.
The rapid economic growth of the late 1980s, however, slowed
considerably in 1989. The growth rate was cut almost in half from
the previous year (to a still-robust approximate 6.5 percent), the
inflation rate increased as wages soared even higher, and there was
speculation concerning a small trade deficit in the early 1990s. These
developments all pointed to a gradual slowing of the expansion of
the rapidly maturing economy. Nevertheless, it also was clear that
rapidly rising domestic demand would keep the economy healthy
(even with a slight drop-off of exports), unless a major political crisis
were to shock the country.
The most significant factor in rapid industrialization was the
adoption of an outward-looking strategy in the early 1960s. This
strategy was particularly well suited to that time because of South
Korea's poor natural resource endowment, low savings rate, and
tiny domestic market. The strategy promoted economic growth
through labor-intensive manufactured exports, in which South
Korea could develop a competitive advantage. Government initia-
tives played an important role in this process. The inflow of for-
eign capital was greatly encouraged to supplement the shortage of
domestic savings. These efforts enabled South Korea to achieve
rapid growth in exports and subsequent increases in income.
By emphasizing the industrial sector, Seoul's export-oriented de-
velopment strategy left the rural sector relatively underdeveloped.
Increasing income disparity between the industrial and agricultural
sectors became a serious problem by the 1970s and remained a
problem, despite government efforts to raise farm income and im-
prove living standards in rural areas.
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By the early 1970s, however, the industrial sector had begun to
face problems of its own. Up to that time, the industrial structure
had been based on low value-added and labor-intensive products,
which faced increasing competition and protectionism from other
developing countries. The government responded to this problem
in the mid-1970s by emphasizing the development of heavy and
chemical industries and by promoting investment in high value-
added, capital-intensive industries.
The structural transition to high value-added, capital-intensive
industries was difficult. Moreover, it occurred at the end of the
1970s, a time when the industrial world was experiencing a pro-
longed recession following the second oil price shock of the decade
and protectionism was resulting in a reduction of South Korean
exports. By 1980 the South Korean economy had entered a period
of temporary decline: negative growth was recorded for the first
time since 1962, inflation had soared, and the balance-of-payments
position had deteriorated significantly.
In the early 1980s, Seoul instituted wide-ranging structural re-
forms. In order to control inflation, a conservative monetary policy
and tight fiscal measures were adopted. Growth of the money supply
was reduced from the 30 percent level of the 1970s to 15 percent.
Seoul even froze its budget for a short while. Government inter-
vention in the economy was greatly reduced and policies on imports
and foreign investment were liberalized to promote competition.
To reduce the imbalance between rural and urban sectors, Seoul
expanded investments in public projects, such as roads and com-
munications facilities, while further promoting farm mechanization.
These measures, coupled with significant improvements in the
world economy, helped the South Korean economy regain its lost
momentum in the late 1980s. South Korea achieved an average
of 9.2 percent real growth between 1982 and 1987 and 12.5 per-
cent between 1986 and 1988. The double digit inflation of the 1970s
was brought under control. Wholesale price inflation averaged 2.1
percent per year from 1980 through 1988; consumer prices increased
by an average of 4.7 percent annually. Seoul achieved its first sig-
nificant surplus in its balance of payments in 1986 and recorded
a US$7.7 billion and a US$11.4 billion surplus in 1987 and 1988
respectively. This development permitted South Korea to begin
reducing its level of foreign debt. The trade surplus for 1989,
however, was only US$4.6 billion dollars, and a small negative
balance was projected for 1990 (see table 2, Appendix).
In the late 1980s, the domestic market became an increasing
source of economic growth. Domestic demand for automobiles and
other indigenously manufactured goods soared because South
138
The Economy
Korean consumers, whose savings had been buoyed by double-
digit wage increases each year since 1987 and whose average wages
in 1990 were about 50 percent above what they had been at the
end of 1986, had the wherewithal to purchase luxury items for the
first time. The result was a gradual reorientation of the economy
from a heavy reliance on exports toward greater emphasis on meet-
ing the needs of the country's nearly 43 million people. The shifts
in demand and supply indicated that economic restructuring was
underway, that is, domestic consumption was rising as net foreign
demand was falling. On the supply side, the greater growth in ser-
vices mirrored what the people wanted—more goods, especially
imports, and many more services.
By 1990 there was evidence that the high growth rates of the
late 1980s would slow during the early 1990s. In 1989 real growth
was only 6.5 percent. One reason for this development was the
economic restructuring that began in the late 1980s—including
the slower growth of major export industries that were no longer
competitive on the world market (for example, footwear) and the
expansion of those industries that were competitive, such as elec-
tronics.
The Japanese Role in Korea's Economic Development
The Japanese, who dominated Korea from the late 1890s to 1945
and who governed Korea as a colony from 1910 to 1945, were
responsible for the initial economic modernization of Korea. Be-
fore 1900 Korea had a relatively backward agricultural economy.
According to scholar Donald S. Macdonald, for centuries most
Koreans lived as subsistence farmers of rice and other grains and
satisfied most of their basic needs through their own labor or through
barter. The manufactures of traditional Korea
—
principally cloth,
cooking and eating utensils, furniture, jewelry, and paper—were
produced by artisans in a few population centers.
Following the annexation of Korea in 1910, Japan thrust a
modern blend of industrial capitalism onto a feudal agrarian society.
By the end of the colonial period, Japan had built an extensive in-
frastructure of roads, railroads, ports, electrical power, and govern-
ment buildings that facilitated both the modernization of Korea's
economy andJapan's control over the modernization process. The
Japanese located various heavy industries—steel, chemicals, and
hydroelectric power—across Korea, but mainly in the north.
The Japanese government played an even more active role in
developing Korea than it had played in developing the Japanese
economy in the late nineteenth century. Many programs drafted
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in Korea in the 1920s and 1930s originated in policies drafted in
Japan during the Meiji period (1868-1912). The Japanese govern-
ment helped to mobilize resources for development and provided
entrepreneurial leadership for these new enterprises. Colonial eco-
nomic growth was initiated through powerful government efforts
to expand the economic infrastructure, to increase investment in hu-
man capital through health and education, and to raise productivity.
In some respects, South Korean patterns of development after
the early 1960s closely followed the methodology introduced by the
Japanese fifty years earlier—industrialization from above using a
strong bureaucracy that formulated and implemented economic
policies. Many of the developments that took place in Chosen, the
Japanese name for Korea during the period of colonization, had
also occurred in pre-World War II Japan; they were implementa-
tion of a strong education system and the spread of literacy; the
rise of a strong, authoritarian government that combined civilian
and military administration to govern the state with strict discipline;
the fostering and implementation of comprehensive economic pro-
grams by the state through its control of the huge national
bureaucracy; the close collaboration between government and busi-
ness leaders; and the development of industries by the major
Japanese zaibatsu (commercial conglomerates).
Some political analysts, for example, Bruce Cumings and Gavan
McCormick, have been impressed with the common elements in
prewar and postwar economic growth in South Korea and espe-
cially with top-down government management of the economy.
Economists, such as Paul W. Kuznets, however, also draw atten-
tion to the dysfunctional aspects of the colonial legacy and find some
of the discontinuities important.
Between the end ofWorld War II and Park Chung Hee's ascen-
sion to power in 1961 , South Korea's political and economic links
to the Japanese colonial period were ruptured. There was consider-
able disruption after 1945 because of plant exhaustion; the loss of
linkages withJapanese capital and with upstream and downstream
industrial facilities; the loss of technical expertise, distribution sys-
tems, and markets; and the subsequent obliteration of the indus-
trial plant during the Korean War (1950-53).
The Government Role in Economic Development
In 1961 General Park Chung Hee overthrew the popularly elected
regime of Prime Minister Chang Myon. A nationalist, Park wanted
to transform South Korea from a backward agricultural nation into
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a modern industrial nation that would provide a decent way of life
for its citizens while at the same time defending itself from outside
aggression. Lacking the anti-Japanese nationalist credentials of Syng-
man Rhee, for example, Park sought both legitimacy for his regime
and greater independence for South Korea in a vigorous program
of economic development that would transform the country from
an agricultural backwater into a modern industrial nation.
Park's government was the beneficiary of the Syngman Rhee
administration's decision to use foreign aid from the United States
during the 1950s to build an infrastructure that included a nation-
wide network of primary and secondary schools, modern roads,
and a modern communications network. The result was that by
1961, South Korea had a well-educated young work force and a
modern infrastructure that provided Park with a solid foundation
for economic growth.
The Park administration decided that the central government
must play the key role in economic development because no other
South Korean institution had the capacity or resources to direct
such drastic change in a short time. The resulting economic sys-
tem incorporated elements of both state capitalism and free enter-
prise. The economy was dominated by a group of chaebol (see
Glossary), large private conglomerates, and also was supported by
a significant number of public corporations in such areas as iron
and steel, utilities, communications, fertilizers, chemicals, and other
heavy industries. The government guided private industry through
a series of export and production targets utilizing the control of
credit, informal means of pressure and persuasion, and tradition-
al monetary and fiscal policies (see The Origins and Development
of Chaebol, this ch.).
The government hoped to take advantage of existing technolo-
gy to become competitive in areas where other advanced industri-
al nations had already achieved success. Seoul presumed that the
well-educated and highly motivated work force would produce low-
cost, high-quality goods that would find ready markets in the United
States and the rest of the industrial world. Profits generated from
the sale of exports would be used to further expand capital, pro-
vide new jobs, and eventually pay off loans.
In 1961 Park extended government control over business by na-
tionalizing the banks and merging the agricultural cooperative
movement with the agricultural bank. The government's direct con-
trol over all institutional credit further extended Park's command
over the business community. The Economic Planning Board was
created in 1961 and became the nerve center of Park's plan to
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promote economic development. It was headed by a deputy prime
minister and staffed by bureaucrats known for their high intellec-
tual capability and educational background in business and eco-
nomics. Beginning in the 1960s, the board allocated resources,
directed the flow of credit, and formulated all of South Korea's
economic plans. In the late 1980s, the power to allocate resources
and credit was restored to the functional ministries. In 1990 the
Economic Planning Board primarily was charged with economic
planning; it also coordinated and often directed the economic func-
tions of other government ministries, including the Ministry of
Finance. The board was complemented by the Korea Development
Institute, an independent economic research organization funded
by the government. Other government bodies directing the econ-
omy included the Office of the President, which included a senior
secretary for economic affairs; the Ministry of Finance; the Ministry
of Trade and Industry; the Ministry of Labor; and the Bank of
Korea, which was controlled by the Ministry of Finance.
Park's first major goal, which was immediately successful, was
to establish a self-reliant industrial economy independent of the
massive waves of United States aid that had kept South Korea afloat
during the Rhee years. Modernizing the economy and maintain-
ing overall sustained growth were additional goals in the 1970s.
Significant economic policies included strengthening key industries,
increasing employment, and developing more effective manage-
ment systems. Because South Korea was dependent on imports of
raw materials, such as oil, a major government objective was to sig-
nificantly increase the level of exports, which meant stressing greater
international competitiveness and higher productivity. The early
economic plans emphasized agriculture and infrastructure, the latter
were closely tied to construction. Later, the emphasis shifted consecu-
tively to light industry, electronics, and heavy and chemical indus-
tries. Using these strategies, an export-driven economy developed.
The government combined a policy of import substitution with
the export-led approach. Policy planners selected a group of stra-
tegic industries to back, including electronics, shipbuilding, and
automobiles. New industries were nurtured by making the impor-
tation of such goods difficult. When the new industry was on its
feet, the government worked to create good conditions for its ex-
port. Incentives for exports included a reduction of corporate and
private income taxes for exporters, tariff exemptions for raw materi-
als imported for export production, business tax exemptions, and
accelerated depreciation allowances.
The export-led program took off in the 1960s; during the 1970s,
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economy. The annual industrial production growth rate was about
25 percent; there was a fivefold increase in the GNP from 1965 to
1978. In the mid-1970s, exports increased by an average of 45 per-
cent a year.
Industrial Policies
The major issue facing the Park regime in the early 1960s was
the grinding poverty of the nation and the need for economic poli-
cies to overcome this poverty. A critical problem was raising funds
to foster needed industrial development. Domestic savings were very
low, and there was little available domestic capital. This obstacle
was overcome by introducing foreign loans and inaugurating attrac-
tive domestic interest rates that enticed local capital into produc-
tion. Of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, only
South Korea financed its economic development with a dramatic
build-up of foreign debt, debt that totaled US$46.8 billion in 1985,
making it the fourth largest Third World debtor. Foreign corporate
investments were primarily of Japanese origin.
As noted by consultant David I. Steinberg, Seoul administered
a series of economic development plans. The government mobilized
domestic capital by encouraging savings, determined what kinds of
plants could be constructed with these funds, and reviewed the poten-
tial of the products for export. In this sense, the will of the govern-
ment to undertake economic development played a crucial role; the
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role of the government, however, was not limited to such mea-
sures as mobilizing capital and allocating investments.
Steinberg also pointed out that Park's government restructured
industries, such as defense and construction, sometimes to stimu-
late competition and other times to reduce or eliminate it. The Eco-
nomic Planning Board established export targets that, ifmet, yielded
additional government-subsidized credit and further access to the
growing domestic market. Failure to meet such targets led to Seoul's
withdrawal of credit.
Economic Plans
Economic programs were based on a series of five-year plans
that began in 1962. The First Five-Year Economic Development
Plan (1962-66) consisted of initial steps toward the building of a
self-sufficient industrial structure that was neither consumption
oriented nor overdependent on oil. Such areas as electrification,
fertilizers, oil refining, synthetic fibers, and cement were empha-
sized. The Second Five-Year Economic Development Plan (1967-71)
stressed modernizing the industrial structure and rapidly building
import-substitution industries, including steel, machinery, and chem-
ical industries. The Third Five-Year Economic Development Plan
(1972-76) achieved rapid progress in building an export-oriented
structure by promoting heavy and chemical industries. Industries
receiving particular attention included iron and steel, transport
machinery, household electronics, shipbuilding, and petrochemicals.
The developers of heavy and chemical industries sought to supply
new industries with raw materials and capital goods and to reduce
or even eliminate dependence on foreign capital. New (and criti-
cal) industries were to be constructed in the southern part of the
peninsula, far from the border with North Korea, thus encourag-
ing economic development and industrialization outside the Seoul
area and providing new employment opportunities for residents of
the less developed areas.
The Fourth Five-Year Economic Development Plan (1977-81)
fostered the development of industries designed to compete effec-
tively in the world's industrial export markets. These major stra-
tegic industries consisted of technology-intensive and skilled
labor-intensive industries such as machinery, electronics, and ship-
building. The plan stressed large heavy and chemical industries, such
as iron and steel, petrochemicals, and nonferrous metal. As a result,
heavy and chemical industries grew by an impressive 51.8 percent
in 1981; their exports increased to 45.3 percent of total output. These
developments can be ascribed to a favorable turn in the export per-
formance of iron, steel, and shipbuilding, which occurred because
144
The Economy
high-quality, low-cost products could be produced in South Korea.
By contrast, the heavy and chemical industries of advanced coun-
tries slumped during the late 1970s. In the machinery industries,
investments were doubled in electric power generation, integrat-
ed machinery, diesel engines, and heavy construction equipment;
the increase clearly showed that the industries benefited from the
government's generous financial assistance program.
The late 1970s, however, witnessed worldwide recession, rising
fuel costs, and growing inflation. South Korea's industrial struc-
ture became somewhat unbalanced, and the economy suffered from
acute inflation because of an overemphasis on investment in heavy
industry at a time when many potential customers were not in a
position to buy heavy industrial goods.
The Fifth Five-Year Economic and Social Development Plan
(1982-86) sought to shift the emphasis away from heavy and chem-
ical industries, to technology-intensive industries, such as preci-
sion machinery, electronics (televisions, videocassette recorders,
and semiconductor-related products), and information. More at-
tention was to be devoted to building high-technology products in
greater demand on the world market.
The Sixth Five-Year Economic and Social Development Plan
(1987-91) to a large extent continued to emphasize the goals of
the previous plan. The government intended to accelerate import
liberalization and to remove various types of restrictions and non-
tariff barriers on imports. These moves were designed to mitigate
adverse effects, such as monetary expansion and delays in indus-
trial structural adjustment, which can arise because of a large sur-
plus of funds. Seoul pledged to continue phasing out direct assistance
to specific industries and instead to expand manpower training and
research and development in all industries, especially the small and
medium-sized firms that had not received much government atten-
tion previously. Seoul hoped to accelerate the development of science
and technology by raising the ratio of research and development
investment from 2.4 percent of the GNP to over 3 percent by 1991
.
The goal of the Seventh Five-Year Economic and Social Develop-
ment Plan (1992-96), formulated in 1989, was to develop high-
technology fields, such as microelectronics, new materials, fine
chemicals, bioengineering, optics, and aerospace. Government and
industry would work together to build high-technology facilities in
seven provincial cities to better balance the geographic distribu-
tion of industry throughout South Korea.
Revenues and Expenditures
The central government budget has generally expanded, both
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in real terms and as a proportion of real GNP, since the end of
the Korean War, stabilizing at between 20 and 21 percent ofGNP
during most of the 1980s. Government spending in South Korea
has been less than that for most countries in the world (excepting
the other rapidly growing Asian economies ofJapan, Taiwan, and
Singapore). The share of government spending devoted to invest-
ment and other capital formation activities increased steadily through
the periods of the first and second five-year plans (1962-71), peaking
at more than 41 percent of the budget in 1969. Since 1971 invest-
ment expenditures have remained at less than 30 percent of the
budget, while the share of the budget occupied by direct govern-
ment consumption and transfer payments has continued to increase,
averaging more than 70 percent during the 1980s.
During the 1980s, the largest areas of government expenditure
were economic services (including infrastructural projects and
research and development), national defense, and education. Eco-
nomic expenditures averaged several percentage points higher than
defense expenditures, which remained stable at about 22 to 23 per-
cent of the budget (about 6 percent of GNP) during the decade.
In 1990 the government was studying plans to lower defense ex-
penditures to 5 percent of GNP. Some observers noted a trend
toward a slight increase in the portion of the budget devoted to
social spending during the 1980s. In 1987 expenditures for social
services—including health, housing, and welfare—were 16.4 per-
cent of the budget, up from 13.9 percent in 1980, and slighdy higher
than 1987 government oudays for education (see table 3, Appendix).
The government revenue structure was virtually totally depen-
dent on taxes (see table 4, Appendix). By the early 1980s, nearly
two-thirds of tax money was collected in the form of indirect taxes.
Revenues collected by the central government in 1987 rose to
19,270.3 billion won (for value of the won—see Glossary), up from
13.197.5 billion won in 1984.
The Government and Public and Private Corporations
Following the Korean War, foreign aid became the most im-
portant source of funds for the reconstruction and rehabilitation
of the economy. What was left of the Japanese-built industrial plant,
most of which by the 1950s either was obsolete or had been de-
stroyed by warfare), generally was turned over to private owners,
who were chosen more often for their political loyalty than for their
economic acumen. Moreover, Rhee favored certain businessmen
and companies with government contracts in exchange for finan-
cial support of his political endeavors. It was during this period
that a group of entrepreneurs began companies that later became
146
The Economy
the chaebol, or business conglomerates. The chaebol were groups of
specialized companies with interrelated management. These group-
ings of affiliated companies dominated South Korea's economy in
the late 1980s and often included businesses involved in heavy and
consumer industries and electric and electronic goods, as well as
trading companies and real estate and insurance concerns.
The chaebol were responsible for the successful expansion of South
Korea's export capacity. According to Steinberg, in 1987 the
revenues of the four largest chaebol were US$80.7 billion, a figure
equivalent to two-thirds of Seoul's total GNP. In that year, the
Samsung Group had revenues ofUS$24 billion; Hyundai, US$22.7
billion; Daewoo, US$16 billion; and Lucky-Goldstar, US$18 bil-
lion. The revenues of the next largest chaebol, Sunkyong, totaled
US$7.3 billion in 1987. The top ten chaebol represented 40 percent
of all bank credit in South Korea, 30 percent of value added in
manufacturing, and approximately 66 percent of the value of all
South Korean exports in 1987. The five largest chaebol employed
8.5 percent of the manufacturing work force and produced 22.3
percent of all manufacturing shipments. Despite a rash of strikes
against the chaebol beginning in 1987, the chaebol generally had higher
compensation and better working conditions than their lesser South
Korean competitors.
The Origins and Development of Chaebol
Although South Korea's major industrial programs did not be-
gin until the early 1960s, the origins of the country's entrepreneur-
ial elite were found in the political economy of the 1950s. Very
few Koreans had owned or managed larger corporations during
the Japanese colonial period. After the departure of the Japanese
in 1945, some Korean businessmen obtained the assets of some
of the Japanese firms, a number of which grew into the chaebol of
the 1990s. These companies, as well as certain other firms that were
formed in the late 1940s and early 1950s, had close links with Syng-
man Rhee's First Republic, which lasted from 1948 to 1960 (see
The Syngman Rhee Era, 1948-60, ch. 1). It was alleged that many
of these companies received special favors from the government
in return for kickbacks and other payments.
When the military took over the government in 1961, military
leaders announced that they would eradicate the corruption that
had plagued the Rhee administration and eliminate injustice from
society. Some leading industrialists were arrested and charged with
corruption, but the new government realized that it would need
the help of the entrepreneurs if the government's ambitious plans
to modernize the economy were to be fulfilled. A compromise was
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reached, under which many of the accused corporate leaders paid
fines to the government. Subsequentiy, there was increased cooper-
ation between corporate and government leaders in modernizing
the economy.
Government-chaebol cooperation was essential to the subsequent
economic growth and astounding successes that began in the early
1960s. Driven by the urgent need to turn the economy away from
consumer goods and light industries toward heavy, chemical, and
import-substitution industries, political leaders and government
planners relied on the ideas and cooperation of the chaebol leaders.
The government provided the blueprints for industrial expansion;
the chaebol realized the plans. However, the chaebol-led industriali-
zation accelerated the monopolistic and oligopolistic concentration
of capital and economically profitable activities in the hands of a
limited number of conglomerates.
Park used the chaebol as a means towards economic growth. Ex-
ports were encouraged, reversing Rhee's policy of reliance on im-
ports. Performance quotas were established.
The chaebol were able to grow because of two factors—foreign
loans and special favors. Access to foreign technology also was crit-
ical to the growth of the chaebol through the 1980s. Under the guise
of 4 'guided capitalism," the government selected companies to un-
dertake projects and channeled funds from foreign loans. The
government guaranteed repayment should a company be unable
to repay its foreign creditors. Additional loans were made avail-
able from domestic banks. In the late 1980s, the chaebol dominated
the industrial sector and were especially prevalent in manufactur-
ing, trading, and heavy industries.
The chaebol were often compared with Japanese keiretsu (the suc-
cessor of the zaibatsu), but as David I. Steinberg has noted, there
were at least three major differences. First, the chaebol were family
dominated. In 1990, for example, in most cases the family that
founded the major business in the chaebol remained in control, while
in Japan the keiretsu were controlled by professional corporate
management. Second, individual chaebol were prevented from buy-
ing controlling shares of banks, and in 1990 government regula-
tions made it difficult for a chaebol to develop an exclusive banking
relationship. The keiretsu usually worked with an affiliated bank and
had almost unlimited access to credit. Third, the chaebol often formed
subsidiaries to produce components for exports, while large
Japanese corporations often employed outside contractors.
The tremendous growth that the chaebol experienced, beginning
in the early 1960s, was closely tied to the expansion of South Korean
exports. Growth resulted from the production of a diversity of goods
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rather than just one or two products. Innovation and the willing-
ness to develop new product lines were critical. In the 1950s and
early 1960s, chaebol concentrated on wigs and textiles; by the
mid-1970s and 1980s, heavy, defense, and chemical industries had
become predominant. While these activities were important in the
early 1990s, real growth was occurring in the electronics and high-
technology industries. The chaebol also were responsible for turn-
ing the trade deficit in 1985 to a trade surplus in 1986. The cur-
rent account balance, however, fell from more than US$14 billion
in 1988 to US$5 billion in 1989.
The chaebol continued their explosive growth in export markets
in the 1980s. By the late 1980s, the chaebol had become financially
independent and secure—thereby eliminating the need for further
government-sponsored credit and assistance. By 1990 the chaebol
also had begun to produce for a growing domestic market.
The chaebol were powerful independent entities acting in the econ-
omy and politics, but sometimes they cooperated with the govern-
ment in the areas of planning and innovation. The government
worked hard to encourage competition among the chaebol in cer-
tain areas and to avoid total monopolies.
Another reason for the success of the chaebol was their access to
foreign technology. Rather than having to develop new areas
through research and technology, South Korean firms could pur-
chase foreign patents and technology and produce the same goods
made elsewhere at lower costs. Hyundai cars, for example, used
an engine developed by the Mitsubishi Corporation of Japan.
The role of big business extended to the political arena. In 1988
a member of a chaebol family, Chong Mong-jun, president of Hyun-
dai Heavy Industries, successfully ran for the National Assembly.
Other business leaders also were chosen to be members of the Na-
tional Assembly through the proportional representation system.
The Role of Public Enterprise
A government-led economic development policy during the 1960s
was necessary because the less experienced and capital-poor pri-
vate entrepreneurs lacked the wherewithal to develop several crit-
ical industries that were necessary to the nation's economic growth.
The government determined that establishing public corporations
to develop and manage these highly strategic industries was the
fastest and most efficient way to foster growth in a variety of key
areas.
During the 1960s, public enterprises were concentrated in such
areas as electrification, banking, communications, and manufac-
turing. In 1990 these enterprises were, in many cases, efficient
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revenue-producing concerns that produced essential goods and ser-
vices at low costs, but which also produced profits that were used
for new capital investments or to produce funds for public use else-
where. In the 1980s, Seoul was slowly privatizing a number of these
firms by selling stocks, but the government remained the principal
stockholder in each company. In the 1980s, an important func-
tion of public enterprises was the introduction of new and expen-
sive technology ventures.
In 1985 the public enterprise sector consisted of about 90 enter-
prises employing 305,000 workers, or 2.7 percent of total employ-
ment in the nonagricultural sector. There were four categories of
public enterprises: government enterprises (staffed and run by
government officials), government-invested enterprises (with at least
50 percent government ownership), subsidiaries of government-
invested enterprises (usually having indirect government funding),
and other government-backed enterprises. Government-invested
public enterprises, such as the Korea Electric Power Corporation
(KEPCO) and the Pohang Iron and Steel Company (POSCO),
represented the core of the new enterprises established during Park's
regime. In the late 1980s, roughly 30 percent of the revenues
produced by public enterprises came from the manufacturing sec-
tor and the other 70 percent from such service sectors as the elec-
trical, communications, and financial industries.
Pohang Iron and Steel Company
In the 1960s, the Park government concluded that self-sufficiency
in steel and the construction of an integrated steelworks were es-
sential to economic development. Because South Korea had not
had a modern steel plant before 1968, many foreign and domestic
businesses were skeptical of Seoul's decision to invest heavily in
constructing a steel plant. Despite the skepticism, however, POSCO
began production in 1972, just four years after the company's in-
auguration in April 1968 with only thirty-nine employees.
Japan provided the money for the construction of the initial plant,
following an agreement made at the Third South Korea-Japan
Ministerial Meeting in 1969. Financing included US$73.7 million
in government grants and loans, US$50 million in credit from the
Japan Export-Import Bank, and technical assistance from Nippon
Steel and other corporations. This cooperation was one consequence
of the normalization of relations with Japan in 1965 and reflected
the view of the government ofJapan as noted in the Nixon-Sato
communique of November 21, 1969, that "the security of the
Republic of Korea is essential to the security of Japan."
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POSCO is located in the southeastern port city of P'ohang. Previ-
ously a fishing port whose major industry was processing fish and
marine products, P'ohang is now a major industrial center with
almost 250,000 people. In addition to the huge integrated steel mill,
P'ohang has an industrial complex housing companies that
manufacture finished steel products of raw materials provided by
POSCO.
POSCO first began to sell plate products in 1972 and focused
its sales policies on the domestic market to improve steel self-
sufficiency at home. Special efforts were made to supply quality
iron and steel to related domestic companies at below export price
to strengthen their international competitiveness.
POSCO's growth has been immense. By the late 1980s, POSCO
was the fifth biggest steel company in the noncommunist world,
with an annual production approaching 12 million tons worth 3
trillion won. The further expansion ofPOSCO's productivity and
size, however, was sought at a time when the steel industries of
the United States and Japan were declining. POSCO's second-
phase mill at Kwangyang was completed in August 1988. A third-
phase mill was expected, by the early 1990s, to further increase
crude steel production to a total output of approximately 17.2 mil-
lion tons a year. In terms of productivity, POSCO was rated the
world's best steel manufacturer throughout the late 1980s and also
was rated at the top in terms of facilities.
In 1987 Seoul announced that it was going to transform POSCO
into a private company in line with the government's new policy
of privatizing state-run corporations. The government planned to
retain a majority share of the stock; initial reports in the South
Korean press in 1988 indicated that the sale of public shares was
going slower than anticipated.
Korea Electric Power Corporation
KEPCO is a government agency whose goal is to provide abun-
dant electric power and to develop reliable power resources. The
south of Korea traditionally had received its electric power from
power stations in present-day North Korea, but the Pyongyang
government cut off power to South Korea in 1948. The catastrophes
of the Korean War also posed electrical supply problems. The sit-
uation had not improved greatly by 1961 when the new military
junta merged three smaller electric companies to form the Korea
Electric Company (KECO). Seoul invested heavily in KECO,
realizing that adequate sources of power were a basic prerequisite
to industrialization. In 1982 KECO was reorganized as a public
corporation and became known as KEPCO. All shares were owned
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by the government. In 1988 Seoul decided to sell 30 percent of all
shares to the public.
KEPCO, one of the largest public corporations in South Korea,
with 30,289 employees, serviced about 99.8 percent of the populace
in 1988. It derived about 12 percent of its electricity from hydro-
electric sources, 50 percent from thermal sources (coal, oil, and
gas-fired), and the rest from a growing number of nuclear power
plants. It was hoped that nuclear power would be developed fur-
ther to lower reliance on oil, gas, and coal imports. KEPCO offi-
cials pronounced their nuclear power plants safe from any potential
nonmilitary accidents and said that extraordinary measures had
been taken to protect the plants in case of a North Korean attack.
Financing Development
Financing South Korea's economic development in the 1990s
was expected to differ from previous decades in two main respects:
greater reliance on domestic sources and more emphasis on equity
relative to debt. Beginning in the 1960s, foreign credit was used
to finance development, but the amount of foreign debt had
decreased since the mid-1980s. According to the Sixth Five-Year
Economic and Social Development Plan (1987-91), an average an-
nual growth rate of 8 percent was expected, together with account
surpluses of about US$5 billion a year through 1991.
To realize these growth targets, South Koreans needed the gross
domestic savings rate to exceed the domestic investment rate; ad-
ditionally, they needed the financing of future economic growth
to come entirely from domestic sources. Such a situation would
involve reducing foreign debt by US$2 billion a year; and South
Korea would become a net creditor nation in the mid-1990s.
Through the promotion and reform of the securities markets, es-
pecially the stock market, and increased foreign investment, the
sixth plan encouraged the diversification of sources and types of
corporate finance, especially equity finance.
Domestic savings were very low before the mid-1960s, equiva-
lent to less than 2 percent ofGNP in the 1960 to 1962 period. The
savings rate jumped to 10 percent between 1970 and 1972 when
banks began offering depositors rates of 20 percent or more on sav-
ings accounts. This situation allowed banks to compete effectively
for deposits with unorganized money markets that had previously
offered higher rates than the banks. The savings rate increased to
16.8 percent of GNP in 1975 and 28 percent in 1979, but tem-
porarily plunged to 20.8 percent in 1980 because of the oil price
rise. After 1980, as incomes rose, so did the savings rate. The
surge of the savings rate to 36.3 percent in 1987 and 35.8 percent in
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1989 reflected the sharp growth ofGNP in the 1980s. The prospects
for continued high rates of saving were associated with continued
high GNP growth, which nevertheless declined to 6.5 percent in
1989.
According to Donald S. Macdonald, through the early 1980s
funds for investment came primarily from bilateral government
loans (mainly from the United States and Japan), international lend-
ing organizations, and commercial banks. In the late 1980s,
however, domestic savings accounted for two-thirds or more of total
investment.
Throughout the 1980s, the financial sector underwent signifi-
cant expansion, diversification of products and services, and struc-
tural changes brought about by economic liberalization policies.
As noted by Park Yung-chul, financial liberalization eased interest
ceilings. Deregulation increased competition in financial markets,
which in turn accelerated product diversification. In the early 1980s,
securities companies were permitted to sell securities through a
repurchase agreement. By 1985 banks also were allowed to engage
in the repurchase agreements of government and public bonds. In
1981 finance and investment corporations started dealing in large-
denomination commercial paper. The new form of commercial
paper was issued in minimum denominations of 10 million won,
compared to the previous minimum value for commercial paper
of 1 million won.
In order to extend their ability to raise cash, investment and
finance companies introduced a new cash-management account with
a 4 million won minimum deposit in 1983. Investment and finance
corporations managed client funds by investing them in commer-
cial paper corporate bonds and certificates of deposit. Money-
deposit banks in the mid-1980s began offering similar accounts,
known as household money-in-trust. Trust business formerly had
been the exclusive domain of the Bank of Seoul and Trust Com-
pany; however, after 1983 all money-deposit banks were autho-
rized to offer trust services.
The financial system underwent two major structural changes
in the late 1970s and 1980s. First, money-deposit banks saw a sus-
tained erosion of their once-dominant market position (from 80
percent in the 1970 to 1974 period to 55 percent by 1984). One
reason for this decline was that in the 1970s nonbank financial in-
termediaries, such as investment trust corporations, finance com-
panies, and merchant banking corporations, were given preferential
treatment. Further, because the costs of intermediation at these
nonbank financial institutions were lower than at banks (with their
many branches nationwide and their multitudes of small savers and
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borrowers), their cost advantages and higher lending rates allowed
them a larger market share.
The second structural change was the rapid increase of commer-
cial paper and corporate debenture markets. Another development
was the steady growth of investment trust corporations in the 1980s.
Because of the introduction of tax and financing incentives by
the government that encouraged companies to list their shares on
the stock market, the Korean Stock Exchange grew rapidly in the
late 1980s. In 1987 more than 350 companies were listed on the
exchange. There was an average daily trading volume of 10 mil-
lion shares, with a turnover ratio of 80 percent. In 1989 the stock
market was tarnished by accusations of insider trading among the
five major South Korean securities firms. The Securities and Ex-
change Commission launched an investigation in late 1989. The
popular index of the market soared to a high of 1,007.77 points
on April 1, 1989, but plunged back to the 800s in late 1989 and
early 1990.
Business financing was obtained primarily through bank loans
or borrowing on the informal and high-interest "curb market" of
private lenders. The curb market served individuals who needed
cash urgently, less reputable businesspeople who engaged in specu-
lation, and the multitudes of smaller companies that needed oper-
ating funds but could not procure bank financing. The loans they
received, often in exchange for weak collateral, had very high in-
terest rates. The curb market played a critical role in the 1960s
and 1970s in pumping money into the economy and in assisting
the growth of smaller corporations. The curb market continued
to exist, along with the formal banking system, through the 1980s.
Industry
The growth of the industrial sector was the principal stimulus
to economic development. In 1987 manufacturing industries ac-
counted for approximately 30 percent of the gross domestic product
(GDP—see Glossary) and 25 percent of the work force. Benefit-
ing from strong domestic encouragement and foreign aid, Seoul's
industrialists introduced modern technologies into outmoded or
newly built facilities at a rapid pace, increased the production of
commodities—especially those for sale in foreign markets—and
plowed the proceeds back into further industrial expansion. As a
result, industry altered the country's landscape, drawing millions
of laborers to urban manufacturing centers.
A downturn in the South Korean economy in 1989 spurred by
a sharp decrease in exports and foreign orders caused deep concern
in the industrial sector. Ministry of Trade and Industry analysts
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stated that poor export performance resulted from structural
problems embedded in the nation's economy, including an overly
strong won, increased wages and high labor costs, frequent strikes,
and high interest rates. The result was an increase in inventories
and severe cutbacks in production at a number of electronics, auto-
mobile, and textile manufacturers, as well as at the smaller firms
that supplied the parts. Factory automation systems were introduced
to reduce dependence on labor, to boost productivity with a much
smaller work force, and to improve competitiveness. It was esti-
mated that over two-thirds of South Korea's manufacturers spent
over half of the funds available for facility investments on auto-
mation.
In 1990 South Korean manufacturers planned a significant shift
in future production plans toward high-technology industries. In
June 1989, panels of government officials, scholars, and business
leaders held planning sessions on the production of such goods as
new materials, mechatronics—including industrial robotics, bioen-
gineering, microelectronics, fine chemistry, and aerospace. This
shift in emphasis, however, did not mean an immediate decline
in heavy industries such as automobile and ship production, which
had dominated the economy in the 1980s.
Except for mining, most industries were located in the urban
areas of the northwest and southeast. Heavy industries generally
were located in the south of the country. Factories in Seoul con-
tributed over 25 percent of all manufacturing value-added in 1978;
taken together with factories in surrounding Kyonggi Province,
factories in the Seoul area produced 46 percent of all manufactur-
ing that year. Factories in Seoul and Kyonggi Province employed
48 percent of the nation's 2.1 million factory workers.
Steel
In 1989 South Korea was the world's tenth largest steel producer,
accounting for 2.3 percent of world steel production. South Korea
continued to expand crude steel production— 19.3 million tons for
1988, up 14.9 percent over 1987. Domestic demand for steel
products increased 8.5 percent from 15 million tons to 16.3 mil-
lion tons over the same period because of the growing demands
of South Korean industry. Domestic demand accounted for 70 per-
cent of the total, mostly because of the increased needs of such steel-
consuming industries as automobiles, shipbuilding, and electronics.
The steel industry grew in the 1970s after the government con-
structed the POSCO mill to service Seoul's rapidly growing au-
tomobile, shipbuilding, and construction industries. In 1988 South
Korea's steel industry included 200 steel companies. Iron and steel
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production was expected to increase in the early 1990s, given the
output increases in domestic user industries. Exports were likely
to be flat or to decline because of decreased international demand.
Electronics
In 1989 South Korea was a major producer of electronics, produc-
ing color televisions, videocassette recorders, microwave ovens, ra-
dios, watches, personal computers, and videotapes. In 1988 the
electronics industry produced US$23 billion worth of goods (up
35 percent from 1987), to become the world's sixth largest manufac-
turer. The total value of parts and components (including semi-
conductors) produced in 1988 totaled US$9.7 billion, overtaking
consumer electronics production (US$9.2 billion) for the first time.
Manufacture of industrial electronics also grew significantly in 1988
and totaled US$4.6 billion (20 percent of total production). Elec-
tronics exports grew rapidly in the late 1980s to more than US$15
billion in 1988, up 40 percent from 1987—to become Seoul's leading
export industry. Although South Korean electronic goods enjoyed
substantial price competitiveness overJapanese products, the elec-
tronics industry continued to be heavily dependent on Japanese
components, an important factor in South Korea's chronic trade
deficit with Japan. Some South Korean firms formed joint ven-
tures with foreign concerns to acquire advanced technology. In the
late 1980s, South Korea's leading electronics firms (Samsung,
Lucky-Goldstar, and Hyundai) began establishing overseas plants
in such markets as the Federal Republic of Germany (West Ger-
many), Britain, Turkey, and Ireland.
By 1 990 significant shifts were occurring within the electronics
industry. In 1989 South Korea had lost some of its cost advantage
to newer consumer electronics producers in Southeast Asia. At the
same time, production of electronic components and of industrial
electronics, particularly computers and telecommunications equip-
ment, continued to expand to such an extent that overall demand
for South Korean electronics products was expected to increase
modesdy in the early 1990s. In 1990 Seoul projected that the micro-
electronics industry would grow at an annual rate of 17.2 percent
in the early 1990s.
Shipbuilding
During the 1970s and 1980s, South Korea became a leading
producer of ships, including oil supertankers, and oil-drilling plat-
forms. The country's major shipbuilder was Hyundai, which built
a 1 -million-ton capacity drydock at Ulsan in the mid-1970s. Daewoo
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joined the shipbuilding industry in 1980 and finished a 1 .2-million-
ton facility at Okp'o on Koje Island, south of Pusan, in mid-1981
.
The industry declined in the mid-1980s because of the oil glut and
because of a worldwide recession. There was a sharp decrease in
new orders in the late 1980s; new orders for 1988 totaled 3 million
gross tons valued at US$1.9 billion, decreases from the previous
year of 17.8 percent and 4.4 percent, respectively. These declines
were caused by labor unrest, Seoul's unwillingness to provide finan-
cial assistance, and Tokyo's new low-interest export financing in
support ofJapanese shipbuilders. However, the South Korean ship-
ping industry was expected to expand in the early 1990s because
older ships in world fleets needed replacing.
Automobiles and Automotive Parts
The automobile industry was one of South Korea's major growth
and export industries in the 1980s. By the late 1980s, the capacity
of the South Korean motor industry had increased more than
fivefold since 1984; it exceeded 1 million units in 1988. Total in-
vestment in car and car-component manufacturing was over US$3
billion in 1989. Total production (including buses and trucks) for
1988 totaled 1.1 million units, a 10.6 percent increase over 1987,
and grew to an estimated 1.3 million vehicles (predominantly pas-
senger cars) in 1989. Almost 263,000 passenger cars were produced
in 1985—a figure that grew to approximately 846,000 units in 1989.
In 1988 automobile exports totaled 576,134 units, of which 480,119
units (83.3 percent) were sent to the United States. Throughout
most of the late 1980s, much of the growth of South Korea's auto-
mobile industry was the result of a surge in exports; 1989 exports,
however, declined 28.5 percent from 1988. This decline reflected
sluggish car sales to the United States, especially at the less expen-
sive end of the market, and labor strife at home.
The industry continued to grow, however, because of a surge
in domestic demand, up 47 percent during the first half of 1989.
In 1989, for the first time since car exports had doubled in 1985,
domestic sales surpassed exports; two-thirds of the cars manufac-
tured were sold domestically. Most of the domestic demand came
from first-time car buyers whose savings had been buoyed by
double-digit wage increases each year since 1987. Other factors lead-
ing to the growing domestic demand for motor vehicles included
stable or slightly decreased new car prices because of cuts in spe-
cial consumption taxes, reduced fuel taxes, and growing econo-
mies of scale by manufacturers.
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the automobile industry was
subject to a series of government controls and directives designed
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to nurture the industry and prevent excess competition. For most
of the 1980s, Hyundai was the only company permitted to manufac-
ture passenger cars, but in 1989 Kia Motors and Daewoo were
allowed to reenter the passenger car business. In 1989 Ssangyong
Motors became South Korea's fourth car manufacturer.
South Korea's auto parts industry grew rapidly in the late 1980s,
from US$3.8 billion in 1987 to US$4.6 billion in 1988 (US$4 bil-
lion produced locally). Automotive parts imports, most of which
came from Japan, totaled US$610 million in 1988 (down from
US$700 million in 1987). In 1989 South Korean automobile and
parts manufacturers planned to spend more than 2 trillion won
(US$2.8 billion) on facility expansion, research, and development.
Armaments
South Korea is an important manufacturer of armaments, both
for domestic use and for export (see Military Production, ch. 5).
During the 1960s, South Korea was largely dependent on the United
States to supply its armed forces, but after the elaboration of Presi-
dent Richard M. Nixon's policy of Vietnamization in the early
1970s, South Korea began to manufacture many of its own
weapons. These included M-16 rifles, artillery, ammunition, tanks,
other military vehicles, and ships. Aircraft were assembled under
coproduction arrangements with United States firms. Arms exports,
including quartermaster goods, vehicles, and weaponry, reached
nearly US$975 million in 1982 but declined during the rest of the
decade, reaching only US$50 million in 1988. In 1989 Seoul an-
nounced that its fledgling aerospace industry was planning to
produce an indigenously designed high-performance jetfighter for
its air force within two decades. The South Korean aerospace in-
dustry also developed a Korean Fighters Program in cooperation
with McDonnell Douglas of the United States, with the goal of "ac-
quiring the capacity to design and manufacture supersonic jet-
fighters."
Construction
Construction has been an important South Korean export in-
dustry since the early 1960s and remains a critical source of for-
eign currency and "invisible" export earnings. By 1981 overseas
construction projects, most of them in the Middle East, accounted
for 60 percent of the work undertaken by South Korean construc-
tion companies. Contracts that year were valued at US$13.7 bil-
lion. In 1988, however, overseas construction contracts totaled only
US$1 .6 billion (orders from the Middle East were US$1 .2 billion),
a 1 percent increase over the previous year, while new orders for
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domestic construction projects totaled US$13.8 billion, an 8.8 per-
cent increase over 1987. The result was that South Korean con-
struction companies concentrated on the rapidly growing domestic
market in the late 1980s. By 1989 there were signs of a revival of
the overseas construction market—the Dong Ah Construction Com-
pany signed a US$5.3 billion contract with Libya for the second
phase of Libya's Great Man-Made River Project, which, when all
five phases were completed, was projected to cost US$27 billion.
South Korean construction companies signed over US$7 billion
of overseas contracts in 1989.
Textiles and Footwear
Textiles, clothing, and leather products made up about 24 per-
cent of South Korea's manufacturing output in 1980. Over 10,000
textile and footwear enterprises employed more than four workers
each, and 34,000 smaller shops manufactured such products in
1978. Throughout the 1980s, textiles played a critical role in Seoul's
exports, accounting for US$11.9 billion, or 19.6 percent of total
export earnings. In 1989 the export of textiles (valued at US$15,340
million) grew 8.5 percent over the 1988 level. Textile manufac-
turers, concerned about diminishing export competitiveness because
of wage increases and won revaluation, expanded their overseas
investments in 1987 and 1988. Seoul approved sixty-six investment
projects totaling US$38.4 million from January 1, 1978, through
the end of September 1988. Most of these investments were locat-
ed in the Caribbean Basin region and Southeast Asia. Upgrading
product lines
—
particularly towards high fashion—and further shift-
ing to the expanding domestic market were expected to cause slow
growth in the industry in the early 1990s.
South Korea's footwear industry also expanded in the late 1980s.
Footwear exports in 1988 totaled US$3.8 billion, a 34.7 percent
increase over 1987, 6.3 percent of Seoul's total exports by value.
Economic forecasters, however, predicted that the industry would
decline in the 1990s despite the surge of orders in 1989; they at-
tributed the 1989 surge to political unrest in China, normally a
major producer of footwear.
Chemicals
The chemical industry began full production in the 1970s.
Although dependent on imports of raw materials and certain high-
technology commodities, the chemical industry supplied many of
the intermediate inputs for textile, plastic, synthetic rubber, rub-
ber shoe, and paint factories, and had made South Korea virtually
self-sufficient in fertilizers. The chemical fertilizer industry, a
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large part of the chemical industry, met most of South Korea's
domestic consumption demands.
In 1987 chemical and pharmaceutical exports increased by 27
percent over the previous year, but accounted for only 2.8 percent
of total exports; imports in that category comprised 11.2 percent
of total imports. The chemical industry was expected to expand
in the early 1990s, with new capacity coming online and Seoul com-
mitted to spending money for research and development and con-
structing new production facilities. Pharmaceuticals, agricultural
chemicals, dyes, pigments, paint, perfumes, surface active agents
(surfactants) including synthetic detergents, and catalysts were tar-
geted as major areas for investment.
In the late 1980s, petrochemical production facilities included
twenty-five companies, thirty-six plants, two naphtha crackers, and
three aromatics extraction plants, with an aggregate total produc-
tion capacity of 505,000 tons of ethylene per annum. There were
two large petrochemical complexes, one in Ulsan, the other in Yosu.
South Korea was an important producer of chemical fertilizers in
the late 1970s (671,000 nutrient tons exported in 1980), but both
exports and production declined in the 1980s.
Energy
The Korean Peninsula is only modestly endowed with natural
resources, and North Korea has far more natural resources than
South Korea. During the Japanese colonial period (1910-45), the
north served as the center for mining and industry whereas the
south, with somewhat greater rainfall, a warmer climate, and slight-
ly greater arable terrain, served as the center for rice production,
(see Physical Environment, ch. 2).
South Korea's mineral production is not adequate to supply its
manufacturing output. Energy needs are also met by importing
bituminous and anthracite coal and crude petroleum. In 1987 ap-
proximately 23.4 million tons of anthracite coal, approximately
4,000 tons of tungsten, 565,000 tons of iron ore, and 47,000 tons
of zinc ore were mined. Lesser amounts of copper, lead, molybde-
num, gold, silver, kaolin, and fluorite also were mined (see fig. 9).
Energy producers were dominated by government enterprises,
although privately operated coal mines and oil refineries also ex-
isted. In 1990 South Korea still had no proven oil reserves. Off-
shore oil possibilities in the Yellow Sea and on the continental shelf
between Korea and Japan yielded nothing through the 1980s, but
exploration continued. South Korea's coal supply was both insuffi-
cient and of low quality. The potential for hydroelectric power was
very limited because of tremendous seasonal variations in the
162
The Economy
weather and the concentration of most of the rainfall in the sum-
mer months. Accordingly, Seoul placed an increasingly heavy em-
phasis on developing nuclear power generation.
Electric power in South Korea was provided by the Korea Elec-
tric Power Corporation (KEPCO). When KEPCO's predecessor,
KECO, was founded in 1961, annual power production was 1,770
million kilowatt-hours (kwhr); production reached 73,992 million
kwhr in 1987. The ratio of usage during 1987 was 17.9 percent
for residential customers, 16.2 percent for public and service busi-
nesses, and 65.9 percent for the industrial sector. Energy used in
electric power generation consisted primarily of nuclear, coal, oil,
and liquified natural gas (LNG). Of the 54,885 million kwhr of
electricity generated in 1985, 22 percent came from nuclear plants
then in operation, 74 percent from thermal plants (oil and coal),
and 4 percent from hydroelectric sites. It was predicted in 1988
that the generation structure by the year 2000 would be 10.2 per-
cent hydroelectric, 12.2 percent oil, 22.9 percent coal, 10.2 per-
cent LNG, and 44.5 percent nuclear.
South Korea placed a heavy emphasis on nuclear power gener-
ation. The country's first nuclear power plant, the Kori Number
One located near Pusan, opened in 1977. Eight plants were oper-
ational in 1987 when atomic power generation was an estimated
71,158 million kilowatts, or 53.1 percent of total electric power.
South Korea's first antinuclear protests occurred in December
1988 when residents near the Kori complex demonstrated against
low-level waste that had been secretly buried just outside the plant.
In 1989 residents near other nuclear reactors protested the environ-
mental damage they said was caused by the units. Sixteen antinuclear
groups joined together to form the Movement for the Eradication
of Nuclear Power Plants. The government, however, asserted that
the South Korean nuclear program was well run and that none
of the 193 antinuclear protests reported since 1977 was serious.
Agriculture
At the start of the economic boom in 1963, the majority of South
Koreans were farmers. Sixty-three percent of the population lived
in rural areas. In the next twenty-five years, South Korea grew
from a predominandy rural, agricultural nation into an urban, new-
ly industrialized country and the agricultural workforce shrunk to
only 21 percent in 1989 (see fig. 10). Government officials expected
that urbanization and industrialization would further reduce the
number of agricultural workers to well under 20 percent by 2000.
South Korea's agriculture had many inherent problems. South
Korea is a mountainous country with only 22 percent arable land
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Source: Based on information from K.P. Wang et al., Mineral Industries of the Far East and
South Asia, Washington, 1988, 74-75.
Figure 9. Selected Industrial and Mining Activity, 1988
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and less rainfall than most other neighboring rice-growing coun-
tries (see Land Area and Borders; Climate, ch. 2). A major land
reform in the late 1940s and early 1950s spread ownership of land
to the rural peasantry. Individual holdings, however, were too small
(averaging one hectare, which made cultivation inefficient and dis-
couraged mechanization) or too spread out to provide families with
much chance to produce a significant quantity of food. The enor-
mous growth of urban areas led to a rapid decrease of available
farmland, while at the same time population increases and bigger
incomes meant that the demand for food greatly outstripped sup-
ply. The result of these developments was that by the late 1980s
roughly half of South Korea's needs, mainly wheat and animal feed
corn, was imported.
Compared with the industrial and service sectors, agriculture
remained the most sluggish sector of the economy. In 1988 the con-
tribution of agriculture to overall GDP was only about 10.8 per-
cent, down from approximately 12.3 percent the previous year.
Most economists agreed that the country's rural areas had gained
more than they had contributed in the course of industrialization.
Still, the growth of agricultural output, which averaged 3.4 per-
cent per year between 1945 and 1974, 6.8 percent annually dur-
ing the 1974-79 period, and 5.6 percent between 1980 and 1986,
was credible. The gains were even more impressive because they
added to a traditionally high level of productivity. On the other
hand, the overall growth of the agriculture, forestry, and fishing
sector was only 0.6 percent in 1987 as compared with the manufac-
turing sector, which grew 16 percent during 1986 and 1987. Dur-
ing the first half of 1989, the agriculture, forestry, and fisheries
sector grew 5.9 percent, as opposed to manufacturing's 2.9 percent.
Major Crops
Rice was the most important crop and yields were impressive.
As noted by Donald S. Macdonald, however, rising wage levels
and land values have made it expensive to produce. Rice represent-
ed about 90 percent of total grain production and over 40 percent
of farm income; the 1988 rice crop was 6.5 million tons. Rice was
imported in the 1980s, but the amount depended on the success
of domestic harvests. The government's rice support program
reached a record US$1 .9 billion in 1986, as compared with US$890
million in 1985. By raising procurement prices by 14 percent over
the 1986 level, Seoul achieved a rice price structure that was about
five times that of the world market in 1987.
Barley was the second most important crop. Its production
declined from about 1 .5 million tons in 1970 to about 561 ,500 tons
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Figure 10. Employment by Sector, 1980 and 1988
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in 1988. Other crops included such grains as millet, corn, sorghum,
buckwheat, soybeans, and potatoes. Fruits and vegetables includ-
ed pears, grapes, mandarin oranges, apples, peaches, Welsh on-
ions, Chinese cabbage, red peppers, persimmons, cabbage, peaches,
and radishes. Other important cash crops included cotton, hemp,
sesame, tobacco, and ginseng. In 1988, livestock heads included
native Korean cattle (2 million), hogs (4.9 million), and poultry
(almost 59 million).
Forestry and Fishing
South Korean farmers have always used the nation's forests for
fuel and household products, but centuries of overutilization and
poor resource management had practically denuded the country-
side by the end of the Choson Dynasty (1392-1910). World War
II interrupted Japanese efforts to replace the ravaged forest stock
and the Korean War brought to a peak the destruction of Korea's
forests. After the 1950s, Seoul slowly developed the organizational
and technical expertise to save the nation's trees. Despite frequent
setbacks, reforestation had proceeded fairly successfully by the
1970s; the total volume of timber had grown from a low of 30.8
million cubic meters in 1954 to over 164.4 million cubic meters
in 1984. The density of the woodlands expanded from an average
of 4.8 to 17.8 cubic meters per hectare of forest during the same
period.
By 1984 over 20 percent of the nation's 6.5 million hectares of
forest belonged to the government; most was managed by the Office
of Forestry, a branch of the Ministry of Home Affairs. Another
8 percent was owned by local public authorities; 72 percent was
privately owned. In 1985 about two-thirds of South Korea was
covered by forests. Until the 1970s, reforestation had taken place
primarily in national forests; as a result of this situation, the den-
sity of government-owned forests was about three times greater than
that of private forests. Most forest owners were smallholders with
inadequate financial resources to purchase and maintain seedlings.
However, upon the introduction of the Saemaul Movement, an
ambitious rural development program launched by Park in 1971,
the performance of the Village Forestry Associations—similar to
and often overlapping with the agricultural cooperatives—improved
significantly. Between 1972 and 1979, forestry agents and village
associations planted 1 .4 million hectares with 3.4 million seedlings.
Although the fuel needs of most farmers were met by wood from
local forests or coal briquettes, the growing industrial demand for
timber was not adequately supplied by domestic production. In
1977 South Korea imported 88 percent of its timber, mostly from
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Malaysia and Indonesia. In 1985 South Korea imported US$538
million worth of wood, lumber, and cork; imports were US$549
million in 1986.
South Korea's fishing industry contributed both to the welfare
of the consumer and to export earnings. Although the value-added
income from fishing contributed less than 1 percent of GNP and
the fishing population decreased by over 18 percent during the 1970s
(to 745,000 persons), fishery products contributed 5 percent of the
value of commodity exports. Fishery production totaled 470,000
tons in 1962, 1.3 million tons in 1972, 2.6 million tons in 1982,
and 3.3 million tons in 1987. In 1988 South Korean fishing house-
holds earned about US$10,000 on average.
Most of the expansion of production in the 1970s and 1980s was
the result of deep-sea fishing operations. The major fishing ports
were Ulsan and Masan. In the late 1980s, the production of sea-
weed, oyster, and other products of coastal and offshore breeding
farms declined, but the catch of tuna and squid in deep-sea fishing
rose. Fishing trawlers brought in about 250,000 tons of pollock off
the coast of Alaska in 1985, a catch that both contributed to the
South Korean diet and was exported to United States food processors.
In 1985 there were 90,970 fishing vessels harvesting a total catch
of 858,471 tons. Of these vessels, 71,836 were motorized (836,633
tons) and 19,134 (21,838 tons) were nonmotorized. These num-
bers reflected a major change from 1962, when only 6,085 vessels
out of 45,504 were motorized.
The Agricultural Crisis of the Late 1980s
Agricultural labor costs rose as young people left rural areas for
urban jobs, and farm work mainly was done by women and old
men. Farmers' relative earnings improved during the 1970s, but
fell in the 1980s. The gap between incomes of urbanites and peo-
ple in rural areas widened considerably in the late 1980s. In 1988
the average income of people in gun (counties) amounted to 79.1
percent of that of people in cities, as compared with 84.7 percent
in 1985. South Korean farming households earned about
US$12,000 in 1988, up 24.4 percent from 1987. In comparison,
the average income for an urban family in 1989 was about
US$15,000. Nonfarm income in 1989 comprised 39.5 percent of
average farm household earnings, as compared with more than 50
percent in Japan and approximately 70 percent in Taiwan.
Farm families accumulated debts averaging about US$4,620 per
household in 1988 and had average assets of about US$66,057.
The purchase of modern farm machinery as well as of many new
consumer goods contributed to higher debts. The 35 percent rise
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in assets between 1987 and 1988 mainly was because of a 41 percent
increase in the price of land. Budgetary pressures from the govern-
ment on agricultural price supports also reduced farm income.
There was increased rental of farmland in the 1980s. The per-
centage of rented farmland among total farmland rose from 2 1 per-
cent in 1980 to 30.5 percent in 1985. The percentage of farm
households renting some of their land among total farm households
expanded rapidly from 37.1 percent in 1980 to 64.7 percent in 1985.
Nonfarmer ownership of tenant farmland also increased to 63 per-
cent in 1985.
The farmers who rented land were mainly the small-landed farm-
ers adversely affected by Seoul's agricultural open-door policy of
the 1980s. Under this policy, the government sought cheap cereal
prices by increasing cheap imports and promoted large-scale farm-
ing where crops could be produced more cheaply and efficiently.
In the early 1970s, a farm family could meet almost 100 percent
of household expenses by farming 0.5 to 1 hectare, but by 1985
such small plots of land only met 59.8 percent of expenses. Many
farmers had to rent extra land to augment their incomes.
Poor prospects on the farm depleted farm villages as the young
left and the old died. Parents sent their children to the towns and
cities for a better education. Young farmers who could not find
wives also left for the cities.
The government initiated various programs to improve rural con-
ditions. The most extensive of these was the New Community
Movement (Saemaul undong, known as the Saemaul Movement).
Its goal was to mobilize villagers in their own service. At first Sae-
maul projects were aimed at improving household living conditions.
Later, projects were directed more to the village as a whole and
included the construction of roads, bridges, irrigation ditches, and
common compost plots. Next, the program focused on more eco-
nomic concerns
—
group farming, common seed beds, livestock
production, forestation, and even joint marketing and factories.
Better health and sanitation as well as beautification of the environ-
ment also became program goals. The government provided the
materials and small amounts of money to the villagers, who sup-
plied the labor. In the early 1980s, President Chun removed con-
trol over the Saemaul Movement from the Ministry ofHome Affairs
and left most decisionmaking to the Saemaul leaders and bureau-
crats, headed by the president's younger brother, Chon Kyong-
hwan. The Saemaul Movement initially was quite successful but
deteriorated in the early 1980s. Chon Kyong-hwan, arrested on
a variety of corruption charges in 1988, was accused of large-scale
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extortion and embezzlement while he was chairman of the move-
ment between 1981 and 1987.
South Korea, a high-cost agricultural producer, prohibited un-
restricted beef and rice imports and severely limited many other
agricultural imports. Foreign trading partners such as the United
States pressured South Korea to open up the agricultural market,
but Seoul said that its farmers would be hurt badly by the impor-
tation of inexpensive beef, rice, tobacco, and other products. In
April 1989, Seoul released a list of 243 agricultural products sched-
uled for import liberalization by 1991, but the list did not include
beef. In the late 1980s, many farmers, already deeply in debt, were
told by the government that they might have to compete in the
world market and took to the streets to protest against foreign de-
mands and to demand further protection from the government.
In the late 1980s, farmers gained political strength through the
increased activities of various farm associations and the formation
of new organizations, such as the National Association of Farmers
(Chon'guk-nongmin hyophoe) established in 1987. The Korean
Catholic Farmers Association and Protestant Farmers Association
became active in 1987. These and other independent farm groups
applied strong pressure on the government to alleviate their problems.
Rural residents made up less than one quarter of South Korea's
voters, but they elected almost half of the National Assembly; thus,
they exercised virtual veto power over farming legislation.
Prospects
The long-term prospects for agriculture were not encouraging.
Traditionally the peninsula's rice basket, South Korea had not been
self-sufficient agriculturally for many years. In the late 1980s, almost
half the nation's foodstuff needs were imports, mostly wheat and
animal feed corn. Natural disasters compounded the problems of
farmers in the 1980s. As a result of these factors, the share of the
GNP provided by the agriculture, forestry, and fishing sector share
of the GNP shrank 5.2 percent in 1987.
However, the situation was not totally bleak in the early 1990s.
Although the purchasing power of the agricultural sector had been
declining since the early 1960s relative to other sectors of the econ-
omy, the rate of agricultural productivity increased in the 1980s.
Livestock raising and rice cultivation had come to dominate the
agricultural sector over a variety of traditional agricultural pursuits.
Service Industries
Service industries included insurance, restaurants, hotels, laun-
dries, public bath houses, health-related services, and entertainment
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establishments. There were thousands of small shops marketing
specialized items, large traditional marketplaces, and streamlined
buildings housing corporate and professional offices. Game rooms
featuring Ping-Pong tables, or billiards, and tearooms serving a
variety of beverages were located on almost every downtown city
corner.
South Korea's hosting of the 1988 Seoul Olympics from Sep-
tember 18 to October 2, 1988, made 1988 a boom year for tourism.
More than 2 million tourists spent US$3.3 billion, an increase in
the number of tourists and the dollars spent, respectively, of 24.9
percent and 42.2 percent over 1987. Japanese visitors accounted
for 48 percent of the total; tourists from the United States made
up 14.9 percent. The Korean National Tourist Corporation predict-
ed that in 1990 almost 3 million tourists would visit the country.
An improved transportation and communications infrastructure,
increasing incomes, enhanced consumer sophistication, and govern-
ment tax incentives encouraged the development of a modern dis-
tribution network of chain stores, supermarkets, and department
stores (see Transportation and Telecommunications, this ch.).
In the mid-1980s, the largest employer of South Korea's ser-
vice sector was retail trade. A growing number of workers were
employed by the mostly department stores (most of which were
owned by chaebol) that were opening rapidly in the downtown areas
of major urban centers. The vast majority of retailers were small
merchants in cities, towns, and villages, each with a modest store-
front, or stand, limited stock, and poor access to capital, but the
great majority of South Koreans made their purchases from these
small retailers. In 1986 there were approximately 26,054 whole-
sale and 542,548 retail establishments and 233,834 hotels and
restaurants that employed about 1 . 7 million people (these figures
probably do not include family members working in small stores)
.
The distribution system was far from perfect, and managers
recognized the need for better organization and management. Most
of the nation's wholesalers were located in Seoul and accounted
for most of the turnover of goods. Most of the sales outlets were
located in the heart of urban centers. Cargo truck terminals and
warehouse facilities were spread irregularly through city neigh-
borhoods.
Money and Banking
When Park Chung Hee became president in 1961 , he organized
a highly centralized government with the power to direct the econ-
omy. Park quickly nationalized all banks, took control of foreign
borrowing, and merged the agricultural cooperative movement with
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the agricultural bank. The government also took control of all forms
of institutional credit, giving Park great control over the business
community.
The government began to liberalize the banking system in the
mid-1980s by denationalizing several banks, but refused to allow
individual chaebol to acquire controlling shares in these banks. The
government still maintained strong managerial controls over these
banks through the Bank of Korea's Office of Bank Supervision and
Examination, which, under the guidance of the Monetary Board,
supervised and regularly examined banking institutions. Most of
the credit provided by these banks went to the chaebol, but the banks
also were required by law to make at least one-third of their busi-
ness loans to small and medium-sized firms.
South Korea's financial sector in the late 1980s included a diver-
sified commercial banking system, a securities market, and a wide
range of secondary financial institutions. The banks kept pace with
the rest of the economy, particularly after the liberalization and
modernization of financial institutions in the mid-1980s and the
establishment of the capital market system based on the Fifth Five-
Year Economic and Social Development Plan.
The Bank of Korea was established as the central bank on June
12, 1950. Its major functions included the issuance of all currency;
the formulation and execution of monetary and credit policies; the
conduct of the bulk of foreign exchange control business; the
research, collection, and preparation of statistics on many aspects
of South Korea's financial system; and the supervision and regu-
lation of the activities of private banks. The Bank of Korea en-
gaged in loan and deposit transactions for the government;
additionally, the bank transacted various government business
activities. It also made loans to and received deposits from other
banking institutions; all banks maintained their solvency through
balances at the Bank of Korea.
South Korea's five major commercial banks (Chohung, Com-
mercial, First, Hanil, and Seoul) were privately held. Together with
two city bank joint ventures—the Kor-Am Bank and the Shin-Han
(co-owned with the United States and Japan respectively)—there
were 961 commercial bank branches across South Korea at the end
of 1987. Local banks were found in every province.
The Bank of Korea regulated all commercial banking activities
under the provisions of the General Banking Act passed in 1954.
Commercial banks got their money through deposits from the
general public, international loans, and funds borrowed from the
Bank of Korea. The lending activities of commercial banks focused
on short-term loans or discounts because long-term lending was
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still the prerogative of such specialized banks as the Korea Exchange
Bank, Korea Housing Bank, and National Agricultural Coopera-
tives Federation. In the late 1980s, the banking industry operated
according to a "prime" bank system whereby each major South
Korean bank was assigned one domestic commercial bank. Un-
der specific legislation designed to achieve certain functions or to
assist special markets, six special banks received funds from the
government and from the sales of debentures.
Three other financial development institutions supplied credit
for business and government projects. The Export-Import Bank
of Korea extended medium- and long-term credit to both suppli-
ers and buyers to facilitate exports of capital goods and services,
major resources development, and overseas investment. The Korea
Development Bank, which was the government's shareholder in
state-run enterprises, raised funds from the government as well as
from international financial institutions and foreign banks to fund
key industries and infrastructure projects. The Korea Long-Term
Credit Bank financed equipment investment.
Small and Medium-Sized Businesses
Small and medium-sized businesses
—
generally those with less
than 400 employees—accounted for US$1 1 billion, or 32 percent,
of South Korea's exports in 1986. By 1987 these businesses gener-
ated an estimated US$14 billion, but the export percentage dropped
to 30 percent as large automobile and electronics groups led ex-
port growth. Small and medium-sized businesses contributed 38.9
percent to the GNP in 1986 when calculated on a value-added basis.
Many of South Korea's smaller firms manufacture specialized
parts or equipment for the larger chaebol. As is the case with keiretsu
in Japan, many of the chaebol in South Korea assemble and mar-
ket goods under their own brandnames, but rely on smaller sup-
port firms to manufacture most of the individual parts. Wages are
often lower in the smaller firms than at the chaebol, and working
conditions often are worse.
Starting in 1 983 , Seoul selected a number of the more promis-
ing smaller firms to receive special government assistance. These
businesses were eligible for a number of tax breaks, help in secur-
ing financing, and consultations and technical education from the
Ministry of Trade and Industry. Small businesses were central to
the government's policy of producing more sophisticated technol-
ogy locally; additionally, they were critical to the government's
strategy of encouraging regional development away from the over-
crowded area around Seoul. In 1989 the government announced
a plan to spend billions of won to help small and medium-sized
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industries seek structural improvements so that they could move
away from labor-intensive production in favor of technology-
intensive production.
The Labor Force
Despite significant increases in wages in the 1980s, labor unions
in the late 1980s continued their wave of strikes demanding better
working conditions and wages. The ferocity and sheer size of the
labor movement caught management and the government by sur-
prise. During his first year or so in office, President Roh Tae Woo
was confronted with considerable labor unrest; there were more
than 300 strikes in the first three months of 1989 (see Interest
Groups, ch. 4). Emboldened by the political reforms of 1987 and
by reports that the rate of South Korea's economic growth was
greater than the improvements in their own incomes and life-styles,
many workers agitated for a greater share of the nation's prosperity
and sought more freedom and responsibility at the workplace and
an end to the traditional paternalism of management. Lost produc-
tion was estimated to have climbed to US$6 billion in 1989 from
US$4.4 billion in 1988.
Workers were caught in a revolution of rising expectations, as
a wave of rising urban land values and housing costs outpaced aver-
age real wage increases of more than 70 percent during the 1980s.
Moreover, wages for manual workers, who were responsible for
much of the production and export that fueled the economy, were
much lower than the national average. In the late 1980s, working
families still found themselves struggling to meet minimum stan-
dards of living. Employees also were expected to work long and
often erratic hours in exchange for steady employment and were
frustrated over a lack of benefits and individual say. One labor acti-
vist noted in 1989 that the labor movement "is not a class struggle.
We just want better working conditions and better status for work-
ers. We have been looked down on in Korea for a very long time. '
'
Worker complaints were focused on three areas: low wages, long
working hours, and a high number of industrial accidents. In 1986
the average wage of a South Korean worker was US$381 a month
(339,474 won), including overtime and all allowances. The basic
wage was US$287, or 255,408 won, but, according to the govern-
ment, the basic wage necessary to sustain a "decent" way of life
was US$588 (524,1 13 won). Thus, the average worker only earned
two-thirds of what the government thought necessary to sustain
a family of four. In 1987 semiskilled workers typically received
US$1 .50 to US$2.00 per hour and worked fifty-five to sixty hours
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a week; unskilled workers worked twelve-hour days seven days a
week, earning US$125 a month.
There were, however, dramatic increases in wages in 1988 and
1989. Labor stoppages in the manufacturing sector, coupled with
a scarcity of labor, led to 20-percent salary increases for workers
in the manufacturing sector in 1988 and 25-percent salary increases
in that sector in 1989. These raises later spread, increasing wages
across the entire economy 18.7 percent in 1989. By 1989 some South
Korean economists were worrying about the effect that skyrocket-
ing wages would have on the cost of domestic-made goods and the
consequent impact on export prices. The situation was especially
worrisome because the wages paid to workers in South Korea's
major competitors were growing far more slowly.
South Korea was known for having the world's longest working
hours. In 1986 the Korean worker averaged about 54.7 hours a
week. This situation was the natural consequence of the low wage
system that necessitated extended hours and extra work to earn
minimum living expenses.
Wages and Living Conditions
The economic expansion of the 1980s caused rapid improvements
in the living conditions of many South Koreans, which does not
mean, however, that all lived comfortably. Indeed, one had only
to wander the narrow alleys of Seoul, Inch 'on, or other South
Korean cities to see poor living conditions. In 1990 families in slum
areas of Seoul usually had electricity and running water, as well
as a small range for cooking, a television, and a radio or two. But
living space was crowded, furniture was shabby, and buildings were
badly built and gloomy. People in poorer families seemed to be
fairly healthy and had adequate diets. The level of starvation, as
well as the cost of some foodstuffs, seemed low. Beggars and the
homeless who wandered the streets were infrequent. Although there
were some noticeable exceptions, farming families generally lived
in small houses, with few of the basic luxuries of middle-class ur-
ban families.
Living conditions in South Korea's cities, however, were im-
proving in the late 1980s. According to the Economic Planning
Board, in April 1988, the average monthly income in Seoul and
other major cities was 612,400 won (US$868) a rise of 16.1 per-
cent over the previous year.
A composite portrait of average middle-class families in Seoul
would show the following: a husband in his early forties, a wife
about six years younger, and two children, aged thirteen and ten.
The family would live in a fairly small apartment, consisting of
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a hallway, one small bedroom with bunk beds for the children, a
small room with several bureaus and with mats as floor coverings,
a television set and a videocassette recorder, and a hi-fi stereo. This
room would serve as an eating area and family room during the
day and as the parents' sleeping area at night. There also would
be a larger room partitioned off into three sections: a living room
with three elaborate easy chairs, a more formal dining area, and
a small kitchen with an oven-range, sink, washing machine, shelves,
and cabinets. The mother would stay at home; the father would
work from 9:00 A.M. to 10:00 P.M. six days a week. There would
be a fairly new car, probably a Hyundai, which the father would
use to drive to work.
A survey of income distribution in South Korea in 1985 and 1988
showed that average household income had risen on average 14.8
percent per year, from 5,857,000 won (US$8,645 based on the 1989
exchange rate ofUS$1 = 677.5 won) to 8,863,000 won (US$13,081).
The Gini coefficient, a commonly used measure of income distri-
bution, dropped slightiy from 0.3449 in 1985 to 0.3355 in 1988.
The comparable figure stood at 0.285 inJapan in 1985 and at 0.364
in the United States in 1978.
As noted by David I. Steinberg, economic growth translated into
fairly equitable income distribution when compared with other na-
tions experiencing similar development and its attendant problems.
When Park took office, approximately 40 percent of the popula-
tion lived below the poverty line; by the late 1980s, less than 10
percent of the population lived under the poverty line, although
incomes at the top of the scale had increased faster than those at
the bottom. Salary increases had not been constant under Park's
regime because Park did not want high labor costs to detract from
the competitiveness of South Korean goods on the international
market. By the late 1980s, capital-intensive higher technology was
more important. Further, although wages had increased substan-
tially in the late 1980s, this increase was not because of the good
will of the chaebol or the government, but was the result of a great
many strikes and a shortage of skilled workers as industry expanded
and large numbers of workers moved to the Middle East to work
on construction projects.
The purchasing power of the average citizen rose rapidly in the
1980s. Real per capita GNP more than doubled between 1983 and
1988 (from US$1,914 to US$4,040) and was expected to reach
US$5,100 by 1991. South Korea was already transforming itself
into a durable consumer society. By the late 1980s, television sets
and refrigerators had become a standard part of the average house-
hold, and ownership of an automobile was not unusual. Families
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tended to consume more meat, fresh vegetables and fruit, canned
or processed foods, and to eat less rice than in previous decades.
They also dressed in modern fashions made from quality fabrics.
Higher incomes led to significant shifts in consumption patterns.
For example, in 1963 the average family spent 57.4 percent of its
budget on food. Twenty years later, the share going to food had
fallen to 40 percent and was expected to continue to fall (but not
as rapidly as in the past). Despite the decreasing share of food in
the consumer budget, the absolute value of food consumed grew
regularly in the 1970s and 1980s and was expected to continue to
do so in the 1990s. Rising incomes, the increased mobility of the
average person, and a high literacy rate demonstrated evident so-
cioeconomic progress.
Industrial Safety
Of the almost 5 million workers employed in 70,865 South
Korean factories in 1986, some 142,000 (nearly 3 percent) were
so badly injured that they had to be hospitalized for more than four
days. There were 1,660 workers killed in industrial accidents, mean-
ing an average ofjust over four workers died each day. Long work-
ing hours and bad working conditions contributed to high rates
of injury and death.
Transporation and Telecommunications
Roads
Domestic transportation improved greatly during the 1980s, and
growth was evident in all sectors. The rapid improvement and ex-
tension of public roads and the increasing availability of motor ve-
hicles contributed enormously to the mobility of the population.
Approximately 51,000 kilometers of roadways spanned the coun-
try in 1988, 46.3 percent of which were paved. Express highways
facilitated travel between major cities and reached a combined
length of 1,539 kilometers in 1988, as compared to 86.8 kilome-
ters in 1967 (see fig. 11). The 1980s saw the increased paving of
roads and the building of ultramodern highways around Seoul (es-
pecially in the vicinity of the Olympic stadiums) and between Seoul
and such major cities as Pusan and Taegu. In 1989 the govern-
ment announced that it would start construction on nine new ex-
pressways with a combined length of 1,243 kilometers. In 1996,
when the expressways and two additional projects were expected
to be completed, South Korea was expected to have twenty-one
expressways with a combined length of 2,840 kilometers.























By 1987 there were approximately 845,000 passenger cars and
748,000 commercial vehicles, up from a combined total of about
744,000 in 1980. In 1988 South Korean automakers produced
504,000 vehicles for domestic sale and 576,134 vehicles for export.
In the first nine months of 1989, domestic sales reached nearly
800,000 vehicles.
The expansion and rapid improvement of South Korea's long-
distance highway system led to the growth of an excellent intercity
bus system in the 1980s. In 1988 there were ten express bus com-
panies operating a fleet of some 900 buses connecting all of the
major cities of Korea.
Subways and Railroads
In 1990 subways were gradually replacing buses as the main
means of transportation in Seoul. The Seoul subway, the first part
of which opened in 1974, was operated by the Seoul Metropolitan
Rapid Transit Company. In 1985 the system carried approximately
3 million passengers daily. In 1990 the subway had more than 200
kilometers of track, enabling commuters to reach any station within
the 45-kilometer radius of the capital city within an hour. One line
connected Seoul with Inch 'on. Four subway lines served Seoul,
in addition to the lines of the Korean National Railroad.
South Korea has an excellent railroad network. The first rail-
road, which linked Seoul and Inch 'on, was opened in September
1899. Other major lines were laid by the Japanese during the coloni-
al period; these included lines originating in Mokp'o, Masan, and
Pusan. These lines connected to Seoul and to Sinuiju in North
Korea, where they were linked with the Trans-Siberian Railway.
The railroad network was badly damaged during the Korean War,
but it was later rebuilt and improved.
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the Korean National Railroad,
a state-run corporation under the Ministry of Transportation, was
in charge of all rails and continued electrifying heavily used tracks
and laying additional tracks. As of 1987, the combined length of
the country's railroad network was approximately 6,340 kilome-
ters, including approximately 761.8 kilometers of double-track rail-
roads and 1,023 kilometers of electric railroads. Suburban lines
were electrified and connected to the Seoul subway system. Roll-
ing stock included 459 diesel locomotives, 90 electric locomotives,
133 motor coaches, and 370 electric motor cars. In 1989 Seoul
announced that it was studying the possibility of constructing high-
speed railway systems similar to those in Japan and France.
Railroads in the 1980s were useful primarily in the transporta-
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around Seoul and in the heavily-traveled corridor linking the cap-
ital with the southern port of Pusan. Although the railroad system
grew little during the 1980s (there were already 5,600 kilometers
of tracks in 1980), rail improvements—the increased electrifica-
tion of tracks, replacement of older tracks, and the addition of rolling
stock—allowed rail traffic to boom. Some of the busiest lines south
of Seoul linking the capital with Pusan and Mokp'o had three or
four tracks. The 1980s also saw the introduction of high-speed trains
connecting Seoul with Pusan, Chonju, Mokp'o, and Kyongju. The
famous "Blue Train" between Seoul and Pusan (via Taejon and
Taegu) took only four hours and fifty minutes and offered two class-
es of service, first class and special. In 1987 approximately 525 mil-
lion passengers and 59.28 million metric tons were transported by
the railroad system.
Civil Aviation
Although most interurban travel was either by express bus or
by train, air service between major cities was increasingly availa-
ble and popular, especially among business travelers. Korean Air,
founded by the government in 1962 and privately owned since 1969,
was South Korea's sole airline until 1988. Korean Air served nine
major domestic routes in 1988 and also offered international ser-
vice to Japan, the United States, Canada, West Germany, France,
Hong Kong, Iraq, Libya, Malaysia, the Philippines, Saudi Ara-
bia, Singapore, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, and the United
Arab Emirates. A second carrier, Asiana Airlines, was established
in 1988 to serve three domestic cities. Seoul's Kimp'o International
Airport nearly doubled in size by 1989 (largely because of the Seoul
Olympics) to accommodate the rapidly growing number of air
travelers. There also were international airports at Pusan and
Cheju; another was planned for Ch'ongju.
Telecommunications
Communications services improved dramatically in the 1980s
with the assistance of foreign partners and as a result of the de-
velopment of the electronics industry. The number of telephones
in use in 1987 reached 9.2 million, a considerable increase from
1980, when there were 2.8 million subscribers (which, in turn, was
four times the number of subscribers in 1972).
Radio, and in more recent years television, reached virtually ev-
ery resident (see The Media, ch. 4). The Japanese established a
radio station in Seoul in 1927; by 1945 there were about 60,000
radio sets in the country. By 1987 there were approximately 42
million radio receivers in use, and more than 100 radio stations
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were broadcasting. Transistor radios and television sets have made
their way to the most remote rural areas. Television sets, now mass-
produced in South Korea, became far less expensive; most city peo-
ple and a significant number of rural families owned or had access
to a television. Ownership of television sets grew from 25,000 sets
when broadcasting was initiated in 1961 to an estimated 8.6 mil-
lion sets in 1987, and more than 250 television stations were broad-
casting.
Foreign Economic Relations
Exports were the key to South Korea's industrial expansion. Until
1986 the value of imports was greater than exports. This situation
was reversed, however, in 1986 when South Korea registered a
favorable balance of trade of US$4.2 billion. By 1988 the favor-
able balance had grown to US$1 1 .4 billion. Financing this persis-
tent, although not unexpected, gap between domestic and imported
resources was a principal concern for economic planners. In the
1950s and 1960s, much of the trade deficit was financed by for-
eign aid funds, but in the last two decades, borrowing from and
investment in international capital markets have almost completely
substituted for economic aid.
Aid, Loans, and Investment
Foreign economic assistance was essential to the country's recov-
ery from the Korean War in the 1950s and to economic growth
in the 1960s because it saved Seoul from having to devote scarce
foreign exchange to the import of food and other necessary goods,
such as cement. It also freed South Korea from the burden of heavy
international debts during the initial phase of growth and enabled
the government to allocate credit in accordance with planning goals
(see The Post-War Economy, ch. 1). From 1953 to 1974, when
grant assistance dwindled to a negligible amount, the nation
received some US$4 billion of grant aid. About US$3 billion was
received before 1968, forming an average of 60 percent of all in-
vestment in South Korea. As Park's policies took effect, however,
the dependence on foreign grant assistance lessened. During the
1966-74 period, foreign assistance constituted about 4.5 percent
of GNP and less than 20 percent of all investment. Before 1965
the United States was the largest single aid contributor, but there-
afterJapan and other international sponsors played an increasingly
important role.
Apart from grant assistance, other forms of aid were offered;
after 1 963 South Korea received foreign capital mainly in the form
of loans at concessionary rates of interest. According to government
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sources, between 1964 and 1974 such loans averaged about 6.5 per-
cent of all foreign borrowing. Other data suggested a much higher
figure; it seemed that most loans to the government were conces-
sional, at least through the early 1970s. International Monetary
Fund (IMF—see Glossary) data showed that imports financed
through such means as foreign export-import loans with reduced
rates of interest totaled 11.6 percent of all imports from 1975 to
1979. The aid component of these loans was only a fraction of their
total value.
During the mid-1960s, South Korea's economy grew so rapidly
that the United States decided to phase out its aid program to Seoul.
South Korea became increasingly integrated into the international
capital market; from the late 1960s to the mid-1980s, development
was financed with a series of foreign loans, two-thirds of which came
from private banks and suppliers' credits. Total external debt grew
to a high of US$46.7 billion in 1985. Positive trade balances in
the late 1980s led to a rapid decline in foreign debt—from US$35.6
billion in 1987 to an expected US$23 billion by 1991 . Account sur-
pluses in 1990 were expected to enable Seoul to reduce its foreign
debt from its 1987 level of about 28 percent of GNP to about 10
percent by 1991.
United States assistance ended in the early 1970s, from which
time South Korea had to meet its need for capital investment on
the competitive international market and, increasingly, from domes-
tic accounts. The government and private industry received funds
through commercial banks, the World Bank (see Glossary), and
other foreign government agencies. In the mid-1980s, total direct
foreign equity investment in South Korea was well over US$1
billion.
The fact that South Korea was so dependent on foreign trade
made it very vulnerable to international market fluctuations. The
rapid growth of South Korea's domestic market in the late 1980s,
however, began to reduce that dependence. For example, a dra-
matic rise in domestic demand for automobiles in 1 989 more than
compensated for a sharp drop in exports. Furthermore, while
Seoul's huge foreign debt left it vulnerable to changes in the avail-
ability of foreign funds and in international interest rates, Seoul's
economic and debt management strategy was very effective.
South Korea's philosophy concerning direct foreign investment
had undergone several major changes tied to the changing politi-
cal environment. Foreign investment was not allowed through the
1950s. In 1962 the Foreign Capital Inducement Act established
tax holidays, equal treatment with domestic firms, and guaran-
tees of profit remittances and withdrawal of principal. Despite the
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provisions of the act, there was little foreign investment activity
until after the establishment of diplomatic relations between South
Korea and Japan in 1965.
Seoul had to mobilize both external and internal sources when
it launched its First Five-Year Economic Development Plan in 1962.
The Foreign Capital Inducement Act was amended in 1966 to en-
courage a greater inflow of foreign capital to make up for insuffi-
cient domestic savings. A rapid inflow of investment followed until
1973, when the act was changed to restrict the flow of investments.
Beginning in the late 1970s, however, the government gradually
began to remove restrictions as domestic industries began to grow
and needed to be strengthened to cope with international compe-
tition. But until the early 1980s, South Korea relied heavily on bor-
rowing and maintained a somewhat restrictive policy towards
foreign direct investment.
Donald S . Macdonald has pointed out that under the liberaliza-
tion policy, restrictions on foreign direct investment were eased
in 1984 and 1985. Seoul changed its control policy on foreign invest-
ment from a * 'positive list" to a "negative list" basis, which meant
that any activity not specifically restricted or prohibited was open
to investment. An automatic approval system was introduced un-
der which all projects meeting certain requirements were to be im-
mediately and automatically approved by the Ministry of Finance.
Seoul twice revised the negative list system after its initial
introduction—first in September 1985 and again in April 1987—to
open more industrial sectors to foreign investors. In 1984 there were
339 items, or 34 percent of the 999 items on the Korean Standard
Industrial Classification, on the negative list. As ofJuly 1987, there
were 788 industrial sectors open to foreign investment. In the
manufacturing sector, 97.5 percent of all industries (509 out of 522)
were open to foreign investment.
In December 1987, Seoul announced a policy to liberalize the
domestic capital market by 1992. The program called for liberalizing
foreigners' investment funds, offering domestic enterprises rights
on overseas stock markets, and consolidating fair transaction orders.
Seoul planned to allow direct foreign investment in its stock mar-
ket in 1992.
Of the total direct investment in South Korea from 1962 to 1986,
which amounted to US$3,631 billion, Japan accounted for 52.2
percent and the United States for 29.6 percent. In 1987 Japan in-
vested US$494 million, or 44.9 percent of the total foreign invest-
ment of US$1.1 billion. Japan invested mainly in hotels and
tourism, followed by the electric and electronics sector. Direct in-
vestment from the United States showed a remarkable increase since
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the early 1980s, accounting for 54.4 percent of the 1982-86 total
investment. The United States invested a total of about US$255
million, or approximately 24 percent of the 1987 investment. Cumu-
lative United States investment was about US$1 .4 billion by 1988.
There was a dramatic rise in foreign investment in the late 1980s.
Approvals of foreign equity investments reached an all-time high
of US$1,283 billion in 1988, a 16.6 percent increase over 1987.
As in previous years, approvals forJapanese investments were the
dominant factor; they totaled US$696 million (up 41 percent from
1987), followed by United States investors with US$284 million
(up 1 1 percent), and West European sources, US$240 million (up
14 percent). Investment approvals in the service sector doubled in
1988 to US$561 million, which included two large Japanese hotel
projects totaling US$344 million. Investment approvals in the
manufacturing sector, however, declined from US$775 million in
1987 to US$710 million in 1988.
South Koreans began investing abroad in the 1980s. Before 1967
there was virtually no South Korean investment overseas, but there-
after there was a slow growth because of Seoul's need to develop
export markets and procure natural resources abroad. In the 1970s,
South Koreans invested in trading, manufacturing, forestry, and
construction industries. By the early 1980s, a sharp reduction in
development projects in the Middle East led to a decline in South
Korean investment there. Mining and manufacturing investments
continued to grow throughout the decade. In 1987, out of a total
South Korean overseas investment of US$1,195 million (745
projects), US$574 million was invested in developed countries and
the remaining US$621 million was invested in developing countries.
One of the most noticeable economic achievements in the 1980s
was Seoul's reversal of the balance of payments deficit to a sur-
plus. This improvement was largely attributable to strong over-
seas demand for South Korean products and to the reduction in
expenditures for oil imports. In addition, the "invisible" trade ac-
count (monies from tourism and funds sent home by nationals)
had improved considerably in the late 1980s because of temporary
increases in revenue from tourism, receipts from overseas construc-
tion, and structural decreases in interest payments (see table 5, Ap-
pendix).
South Korea's success in achieving a balance of payments sur-
plus, however, was not without some drawbacks. It led to harsh
trade disputes with the United States and other developed nations,
as well as to inflationary pressures. To cope with these problems,
Seoul had to modify its enthusiastic promotion of exports in favor
of a policy restraining trade surpluses within reasonable limits.
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An important measure restraining the growing foreign trade im-
balance between South Korea and the United States was Seoul's
decision to revalue the won against the United States dollar. A
stronger won made American imports cheaper, increased the cost
of South Korean exports to the United States, and slowed, but did
not reverse, the growth in the South Korea-United States trade
deficit as of 1989. The United States pressed for further apprecia-
tion of the won in 1989. In April 1989, the United States Depart-
ment of the Treasury accused South Korea of continued
'
'manipulation" of the South Korean currency to retain an artifi-
cial trade advantage. South Korean officials and businesspeople,
however, complained that the already rapid appreciation of the won
was slowing economic growth and threatening exports. In May
1989, South Korea avoided being called an unfair trader by the
United States and forestalled possible United States trade sanctions,
but the nation paid a high price by promising to open up its agricul-
tural market, ease investment by foreigners, and remove many im-
port restrictions (see table 6, Appendix).
Foreign Trade Policy
Seoul stated in 1987 that its foreign trade policy was structured
for further expansion, liberalization, and diversification. Because
of the paucity of natural resources and traditionally small domes-
tic market, South Korea has had to rely heavily on international
trade as a major source of development. Seoul also sought to diver-
sify trading partners to ease dependence on a few specific markets
and to remedy imbalances in the present tendency to bilateral trade.
Exports and Imports
The rapid growth of South Korea's economy in the late 1980s
led to significant increases in exports and imports (see table 7
,
Ap-
pendix). In the wake of the 1988 Seoul Olympics, South Korea's
trade surplus exceeded US$1 1 billion and foreign exchange revenue
had increased sharply. Seoul's trade with communist countries
surged in 1988. Trade with Eastern Europe was US$215 million,
trade with China almost US$1 .8 billion, and trade with the Soviet
Union US$204 million.
In 1989 total exports grew to US$74.29 billion, and imports to-
taled US$67.21 billion. South Korea's annual trade exceeded
US$100 billion for the first time in 1988, making it the world's
tenth largest trading nation.
During the 1960s and early 1970s, the commodity structure of
Seoul's principal exports changed from the production of primary
goods to the production of light industrial goods. After 1974 there
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was a rapid expansion in the production and export of heavy in-
dustrial and chemical products. By 1986 the share of heavy indus-
trial and chemical products in total exports had expanded to 55.5
percent (as compared to 18.9 percent in 1980) whereas the share
of light industrial products had shrunk to 40.9 percent (as com-
pared to 71.1 percent in 1980).
South Korea had depended greatly on the United States and
Japan as its major trading partners, with 75.6 percent of all ex-
ports going to these markets in 1970. Success at diversifying ex-
port markets led to a reduction in the United States-Japan export
market share to 55.6 percent in 1986. The Middle East accounted
for 12 percent of South Korea's export trade from 1972 to 1977,
but its share declined to 5.2 percent in 1986 because of the col-
lapse of the construction boom in the Middle East and the Iran-
Iraq war (1980-88). Exports to Western Europe declined from 18.8
percent in 1979 to 15 percent in 1986. Exports to developing areas,
such as Latin America (0.8 percent in 1972; 3.6 percent in 1986)
and Oceania (0.9 percent in 1972; 1.4 percent in 1986), grew.
Indirect Seoul-Moscow trade was estimated at about US$20 mil-
lion in 1978, with Moscow importing electronics, textiles, and
machinery and exporting coal and timber. By the late 1980s, South
Korea's global fur trader, Jindo, was expected to produce US$20
million worth of fur garments annually in a joint venture with the
Soviet Ministry of Light Industry. South Korean businesspeople
were offered such Soviet products as instruments for nuclear en-
gineering and technology for processing mineral ores and concen-
trates. In the first ten months of 1989, bilateral trade between Seoul
and Moscow reportedly increased 156 percent from 1988 figures
to US$432 million.
Since the early 1960s, the structural pattern of imports had shown
changes, particularly in the relatively decreasing share of import-
ed consumer goods and the accelerated growth of industrial sup-
plies and capital equipment imports. The share of consumer goods
imported in 1962 was 24.1 percent of total imports; this share
declined to 9.8 percent of total imports in 1986 because of increased
South Korean production of these goods for the domestic market.
The declining share of raw materials as a percentage of imports
during the early 1970s was reversed in 1974 because of the increased
value of oil imports (caused by the 1973 war in the Middle East).
By 1979 crude oil was 25 percent of South Korea's total import
requirements. This figure dropped to 8.4 percent in 1988 because
of the use of other sources of energy and the decline in the price
of petroleum in the late 1980s.
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South Korean exports to the United States in 1988 rose to
US$21.5 billion, a 17-percent increase over 1987; imports rose to
US$12.8 billion, a 46-percent increase over the 1987 level. The per-
centage of total South Korean exports destined for the United States
market decreased to 35.3 percent in 1988 from 38.7 percent in 1987.
At the same time, the United States' share of total South Korean
imports rose to 24.6 percent, up from 21.4 percent in 1987. By 1988
Seoul's favorable balance had grown to more than US$8.7 billion.
In 1989 imports rose to US$57 billion (up 18 percent from 1988)
whereas exports reached US$61 billion, a 2-percent increase from
1988. The trade surplus was reduced from US$11.5 billion to
US$4.3 billion and was projected to decline even more. Invisible
receipts rose 10 percent, but payments, mainly reflecting a big in-
crease in South Korean travel abroad, were up 20 percent. Thus,
the surplus on invisible trade was reduced from US$1.3 billion to
US$400 million.
Korea in the Year 2000
The Setting
South Korea's high GNP growth rate during the 1960s and 1970s
was accompanied by growth in the labor supply and a rising share
of national product going into capital formation—from 15 percent
in the early 1960s to more than 30 percent in the late 1970s. In
1988 South Korean economic planners predicted that in the 1990s
the share of the GNP devoted to capital formation would not con-
tinue to rise and, in fact, might fall slightly. Lower birthrates and
an aging population would result in slow growth of the labor force.
In the late 1980s, South Korean economic planners expected
growth to continue at somewhat reduced rates through 2000, a result
of slower growth in inputs. Large increases in productivity,
however, could be expected to push GNP growth beyond 1988 lev-
els. The rapid growth of exports had enabled the country to special-
ize in the products it made best and to import those it produced
less efficiendy. No change in this balance was foreseen. However,
domestic producers would have to rely more on the domestic mar-
ket for growth than in the past. Protection of domestic producers
might prompt less productivity; but if competition against foreign
products were allowed, a favorable impact on productivity might
be expected.
The government borrowed heavily in the 1960s and 1970s to
finance economic development. By the mid-1980s, South Korea
was one of the world's major debtors. South Korea recorded a
favorable balance of trade for the first time in 1986; there was an
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even more favorable balance in 1987. Funds generated from this
trade surplus allowed South Korea to reduce its total foreign debt
to US$35.6 billion by 1987 and were expected to allow a further
reduction to US$23 billion by 1991. Since 1986 there had been
a drastic change in domestic savings, with savings growing to 36
percent in 1987 as compared to 33 percent in 1986. The twin fac-
tors of increasing debt and low domestic savings that had threat-
ened growth in the past had been mitigated to a considerable
degree.
The Role of Science and Technology
The most important sources of productive growth for South
Korean manufacturers had traditionally been directly or indirect-
ly related to the ability of South Korean companies to acquire new
technology from abroad and to adapt it to domestic conditions,
rather than paying the cost of research and development. However,
as Seoul's industry and exports continued to evolve toward higher
levels of technology, domestic research and development efforts
needed to be increased. Fortunately for South Korea, its high lev-
el of well-educated workers, who constitute a formidable brain trust
for future research and development, are its major asset.
The Seoul government began investing in technology research
institutes soon after the republic was established. The Korean Atom-
ic Energy Commission founded in 1959 was responsible for research
and development, production, dissemination, and management of
technology for peaceful applications of atomic energy. In the
mid-1960s, the government established the Ministry of Science and
Technology to oversee all government research and development
activities and the Korea Institute of Science and Technology to func-
tion as an industrial research laboratory. In the 1970s, in order
to better coordinate research and development, two scientific com-
munities were established—one in Seoul, the other near Taejon.
The Seoul complex included the Korea Institute of Science and
Technology, the Korea Development Institute (affiliated with the
Economic Planning Board), the Korea Advanced Institute of
Science, and the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute. Plans
for the Daeduk Science Town near Taejon were far more ambi-
tious. Modeled after the Tsukuba Science City in Japan, by the
late 1980s the Daeduk Science Town accommodated laboratories
specializing in shipbuilding, nuclear fuel processing, metrology,
chemistry, and energy research. The government founded the
Korea Advanced Institute of Science to develop and offer gradu-
ate science programs, and it also encouraged universities to de-
velop their own undergraduate programs in science.
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The tremendous growth of Samsung since the mid-1980s was
strong evidence of the high productivity in such modern industries
as electronics. The group's total sales nearly doubled (8.4 billion
won to 14.6 billion won) between 1984 and 1986, while the num-
ber of employees only increased from 122,000 to 147,000. The rea-
son for this high degree of productivity was South Korea's move
away from labor-intensive industries to those that were highly au-
tomated.
South Korean planners realized that the country needed to ad-
vance quickly in such areas as high technology if the economy were
to grow while matching foreign competition. POSCO's decisions
to build the Pohang Institute of Science and Technology and the
Research Institute of Industrial Science and Technology were ex-
amples of this trend. POSCO also used a great deal of money to
lure back more than 100 top South Korean scientists and researchers
who had emigrated abroad.
The Pohang Institute of Science and Technology also maintained
a major undergraduate and graduate school. By 1988 the institute
had a faculty of 132 teachers, about 500 undergraduate students,
and approximately 110 graduate students. Only one of every fifteen
applicants was accepted and only those students who scored in the
top 2 percent of the nation's college entrance examinations were
allowed to apply.
POSCO's efforts represented a great change from the past. As
of the late 1980s, many of South Korea's younger scientists, tech-
nocrats, and economic planners in had received their graduate edu-
cation in the United States. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the
government sponsored the scientific and technical education of
many graduate students at prestigious institutions, such as Har-
vard University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
The success of the Pohang Institute of Science and Technology
meant that many of South Korea's future scientific and technical
leaders would be educated at home.
In 1 990 Seoul announced an ambitious plan to promote science
and technology so that high-technology activities would dominate
the economy by the year 2000. The Ministry of Science and Tech-
nology intended to coordinate technology-related projects between
government and industry in a variety of fields including semicon-
ductors, computers, chemistry, and new materials.
The anticipated slowdown in economic growth could well be
counteracted by the continued high rate of capital formation, in-
creased productivity of labor, and expansion of the education sys-
tem. Until South Korea's per capita income reached that of the most





'follower" country benefiting from the experiences of others while
avoiding their mistakes, it was likely that strong growth would
continue.
In 1987 the Korea Development Institute issued a report, Korea
Year 2000, that profiled South Korean economic development in
2000. The Korea Development Institute noted that the industrial
structure would be highly developed and would resemble that of
advanced countries inasmuch as high value-added industries, high-
technology industries, and soft industries grew relatively rapidly.
Further, changes in industrial structure were expected rapidly to
reduce the demand for unskilled workers while simultaneously in-
creasing the demand for professional and technical manpower,
resulting in further change of the employment structure.
The Korea Development Institute also noted that the Ministry
of Science and Technology had prepared a long-range plan of
science and technology for the twenty-first century that took into
account limited available resources. Accordingly, Seoul selected
its comparative advantage areas, including informatics
—
particularly information storage and retrieval and electronic data
processing
—
, fine chemicals, and precision machinery in the short
term; biotechnology, new materials, and public benefit areas, such
as the environment, health, and welfare, in the mid-term; and
oceanography and aeronautics for the mid- and long term.
The Economic Future
The Korea Development Institute also forecasted in 1988 that
South Korea's per capita GNP would exceed US$10,000 early in
the twenty-first century. The institute predicted that Seoul would
enjoy a higher sustained growth rate than average through the
1990s; that the manufacturing industry would play a pivotal role
in the economy in the twenty-first century; and that the service
industry would become knowledge-intensive in order to meet the
needs of a highly diversified industrialized society. The share of
the primary sector (agriculture, forestry, and fisheries) would sink
to nearly 5 percent by the turn of the century, whereas the second-
ary sector (industry) would rise to over 40 percent and the service
sector would be at about 55 percent. Major areas of industrial
growth would include automobiles, electronics, and machinery.
In 1988 Kim Duk-choong of Sogang University listed five main
points that were expected to make the "Korean economic future
look bright." He noted that South Korea had drastically reduced
its foreign debts since 1985, greatiy increased the rate of domestic
savings, improved on the equitable distribution of income through-
out the population, increased the role of small and medium-sized
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corporations in the economy, and made the transition from a labor-
oriented to a technology-oriented economy. He expected that these
positive economic developments would easily outweigh existing
problems and lead to real growth in years to come.
Kim's optimism had merit, but there were other important is-
sues that could inhibit economic growth, for example, rising pro-
tectionist sentiments in the United States, Japan, and elsewhere.
Another problem was the fact that the chaebol tended to restrict sub-
contracting and to keep as much production as possible inhouse,
which meant that the smaller industries and businesses, which bore
the brunt of slowdowns in Japan, would not be able to act as shock
absorbers. Moreover, as South Korea moved up the technological
ladder, it would face stiff competition from advanced nations like
Japan and up-and-coming nations like Thailand. There also was
the intangible problem of the resolve of South Korea's workers,
who labored six days a week with little vacation time. What effect
would a slackening of resolve have on the South Korean worker
by the 2000? In general, the future of South Korea's economy
looked very bright, but there were enough intangibles to make ac-
curate predictions difficult at best.
* * *
There are numerous excellent works on the South Korean econ-
omy that offer a variety of perspectives. Historical studies chart-
ing the nation's colonial and modernization periods include Andrew
C. Nahm's Korea underJapanese Colonial Rule and Ramon H. My-
ers' and Mark R. Peattie's TheJapanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945.
Donald S. Macdonald's The Koreans provides information on the
Korean economy from colonial times through contemporary soci-
ety. Among the general works on the postwar economy are David
I. Steinberg's South Korea's Economy and Chaebol; Han Sung-joo and
Robert Myers's Korea; Edward S. Mason et al.'s The Economic and
Social Modernization of Korea; Jene K. Kwon's, Korean Economic De-
velopment; G. Cameron Hurst Ill's Korea 1988; Alice H. Amsden's
Asia's Next Giant; David S. Bell, Jr., Bun Woong Kim, and Chong
Bun Lee''s Administrative Dynamics and Development; Karl Moskowitz's
From Patron to Partner; and The Rise of the Korean Economy by Byung-
Nak Song.
Opposition groups' views of the South Korean economy are best
expressed in Minjungsa's Lost Victory. The Far Eastern Economic
Review publishes frequent articles on the economy, as does Asian
Survey. For a South Korean perspective on the economy, articles in
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the English-language Korea Newsreview and the various publications
of the Korean Economic Institute in Washington are valuable. (For
further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)
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Chapter 4. Government and Politics
Hwaso Gate, with parapet, Suwon Castle
THE CRISIS OFJUNE 1987 brought public dissatisfaction with
the Chun Doo Hwan government to a head (see The Demise of
the Chun Regime, ch. 1). The next eight months saw the begin-
ning of a compromise between the ruling and opposition camps
that marked a potential watershed in South Korean politics. Poli-
ticians who had been in exile or under house arrest for many years
returned to leadership roles. The media, unleashed from both cen-
sorship and official guidance, began a qualitative and quantitative
explosion. A newly critical press probed previously hidden aspects
of the military, the national security agencies, and the government
more aggressively than ever before.
For the first time since the fall of the Syngman Rhee regime in
1960, the Republic of Korea produced a constitution through
deliberative processes rather than through military intervention or
emergency measures. Moreover, elections for the presidency in De-
cember 1987 and for the National Assembly in April 1988 rede-
fined the political process; a minority president leading a minority
party began a five-year term with full awareness that, at least in
the near term, compromise was necessary for political survival.
The search for the political middle ground was handicapped by
external pressures upon ruling and opposition parties alike. On
President Roh Tae Woo's right, conservative bureaucrats, mili-
tary leaders, and Democratic Justice Party members held over from
the Chun period watched the president carefully. During the first
two years of Roh' s rule, the rightists grew increasingly suspicious
of the process of compromise and upset with the direction taken
by South Korea's emerging left, both within and outside of the
political process. The traditional opposition parties—the Reunifi-
cation Democratic Party and the Party for Peace and Democracy
led by Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung, respectively—felt simi-
lar pressures from younger and more progressive elements within
their parties, as well as from the more radical opposition outside
the political process. By mid- 1989 the Roh government appeared
to have reached its limit of reform and began to return to earlier
patterns of political control, including the broad use of the National
Security Act and national security agencies to limit dissent.
The National Assembly came into its own in the late 1980s and
at least temporarily achieved the balance of powers provided for
in the 1987 Constitution. For the first time in South Korea's his-
tory, the government party, as a minority in the legislature, was
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forced to seek procedural and substantive compromises with three
opposition parties. Partisan conflict was temporarily muted for the
Seoul Olympics in September 1988 but surfaced again at the end
of the year in a series of legislative committee hearings concerning
corruption under Chun. Further debate in 1989 led to a political
compromise late in the year that resolved the question of the "lega-
cies" of the Fifth Republic (1980-87) that had animated politics
in the legislature since the beginning of the Roh administration.
A judicial revolt in mid- 1988 forced the resignation of a chief
justice appointed by the Chun administration, the subsequent ap-
pointment of a more politically independent successor, and the
replacement of several dozen senior judges. An administrative re-
form commission conducted a surprisingly independent investiga-
tion of numerous government agencies, including the national
security bodies that had long interfered in the political process.
The pattern of politics outside the formal institutions of govern-
ment continued to change as the 1990s began. New interest groups,
particularly within the intellectual professions, emerged to challenge
the government-sponsored professional associations in fields such
as journalism, teaching, and the arts. These developments in turn
often provoked heavy-handed responses from the government, long
accustomed to controlling professional organizations through na-
tionwide umbrella groups. Cause-oriented groups of various po-
litical persuasions prepared to launch new parties, stimulated by
the prospect of local council elections to be held in 1990.
Many of the political developments of the late 1980s reflected
important and irreversible social and economic changes that had
occurred during the previous two decades. As the 1990s began,
a key question of South Korean politics remained the degree to
which the development of a better-educated and more affluent
populace—essential to South Korean modernization, yet corrosive
of the older style of political leadership—would contribute to greater
political liberalization.
The Constitutional Framework
Despite centuries of authoritarian and autocratic rule, reform
thinkers in nineteenth-century Korea had debated the subject of
government and advocated the rule of law and eventual constitu-
tional government as early as the 1890s. The notion of a govern-
ment limited by checks and balances under a constitutional order
was not entirely new to the Korean political setting in 1945. Organi-
zations such as the Self-Strengthening Society (Chaganghoe) used
translations to promote the study of numerous European consti-
tutions and legal codes during the years just before Japan annexed
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Korea in 1910. During Japanese rule (1910-45), a self-styled
Korean government in exile in China drafted several charters and
constitutions. Within colonial Korea, a small Protestant commu-
nity conducted self-governing denominational meetings in accor-
dance with rules of parliamentary procedure. Japanese rule in
Korea, however, was itself largely exempt even from Japanese con-
stitutional constraints (see Korea under Japanese Rule, ch. 1).
Despite Korean interest in the idea of constitutionalism, therefore,
the colonial experience provided Koreans with little opportunity
to experience the practice of limited government.
Since the formation of an independent South Korean republic
in 1948, the term constitutionalism—as it is popularly understood
in Western democracies—has become a major focus of political
strife. Although the concept has been interpreted in various ways,
there has been at least a nominal consensus that constitutionalism
would foster, if not guarantee, a general framework for benevo-
lent and effective government. The constitution would help protect
certain individual rights and provide safeguards against the con-
centration of power in the hands of a dictatorial group.
There have been numerous difficulties in adapting constitution-
alism to South Korea, not the least of these being the reluctance
of incumbent leaders to step down peacefully and prepare for a
transfer of power through the constitutional process. The politics
of constitutional manipulation has been deadly serious, calculated
to bolster or prolong the tenure of incumbent presidents or to lend
an aura of legitimization to a regime brought to power by a coup
(see table 8, Appendix). South Korea experienced its first peace-
ful transfer of power since independence only in 1987 (see Politi-
cal Dynamics, this ch.). In most of the leadership changes prior
to 1987, the incumbents used forceful tactics—including martial
law and other surreptitious parliamentary maneuvers—to change
the constitution. The 1990s began with discussions of possible fur-
ther changes in the fundamental law. It appeared that South Korea
had yet to escape a pattern in which both powerholders and their
political rivals perceived a constitution as a tool for holding power
rather than as a framework for long-term governance, and in which
each administration required one or more constitutional revisions.
The constitutional framework of the Sixth Republic, which started
in 1987, was based on a constitutional bill that was passed by the
National Assembly on October 12, 1987, and subsequently approved
by 93 percent of the voters in a national referendum on October
28 (see The Legislature, this ch.). The bill was the product of pains-
taking negotiation and compromise among the major political parties
in the National Assembly, unlike the preceding two constitutions,
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which were essentially unilaterally drafted by the executive branch
and then submitted to referendums under emergency measures or
martial law. The 1987 Constitution became effective on February
25, 1988, when Roh Tae Woo was inaugurated as president. The
new Constitution, which consisted of a preamble, 130 articles, and
supplementary provisions, strengthened the power of the Nation-
al Assembly and considerably reduced the power of the executive.
Its adoption marked only the second time that the government and
opposition parties had produced a constitutional amendment bill
by consensus in South Korea's modern history and the first time
that such cooperation had been successful (the first occasion, in
1980, was cut short by a military coup d'etat). The new fundamental
law, the first since 1960 not intended to extend the rule of the in-
cumbent president, provided for direct election of the president,
an issue the opposition parties had campaigned for since 1985. It
also eliminated or modified a number of provisions that had come
under criticism since theyusin (revitalization) constitutional amend-
ment in 1972.
The 1987 Constitution declares South Korea a democratic repub-
lic, its territory consisting of "the Korean Peninsula and its adja-
cent islands. " Popular sovereignty is the norm of the state; all public
officials are described as servants of the people; and the tenure and
political impartiality of these officials are protected by the provi-
sions of law. In language not found in earlier constitutional amend-
ments, the Constitution states that the "Republic of Korea shall
seek unification and shall formulate and carry out a policy of peace-
ful unification based on the principles of freedom and democra-
cy." In another innovation clearly aimed at the past influence of
the military on politics and political succession, the Constitution
stipulates that "political neutrality shall be maintained" by the
armed forces.
The section on fundamental rights reflects continued evolution
toward the affirmation of civil rights and due process of law (see
Human Rights, this ch.). Individuals may not be punished, placed
under preventive restrictions, or subjected to involuntary labor "ex-
cept as provided by law and through lawful procedures. ' ' The pro-
tection of habeas corpus, restored in the 1980 constitution but rarely
honored in practice in political cases under the Chun government,
is further reinforced. People detained or arrested must be informed
of the reason and of their right to be assisted by counsel. Family
members of those arrested or detained must be informed of the
fact "without delay." Prosecutors' failure to indict a criminal sus-
pect or accused person placed under detention might entitle the







be issued by a judge "through due procedures" rather than at the
mere request of prosecutors, as had often occurred, especially in
political cases, in the past. Other new provisions include the right
of citizens to receive aid from the state if they suffer injury or death
because of the criminal acts of others; the autonomy of institutions
of higher learning; and recognition of extended labor rights.
The articles on rights, like other portions of the Constitution,
originated during a process of political compromise that deferred
a number of complex or controversial issues until a later date. A
number of new social welfare provisions were left to subsequent
legislation. These measures included aspirations to protect work-
ing women from unjust discrimination, state protection for citizens
incapacitated by disease and old age, environmental protection
measures, housing development policies, and "protection for
mothers" (see Public Health and Welfare, ch. 2).
As in earlier constitutions, the formal provision of a right was
often qualified by other constitutional provisions or by related laws.
The most significant of these pre-existing laws was the National
Security Act, which severely truncated rights of due process speci-
fied in the Constitution and the Code of Criminal Procedure (1954)
for persons accused of a variety of political offenses.
The Constitution affirms both the right and the duty to work
and requires legislation for minimum wages and standards of work-
ing conditions to "guarantee human dignity." Special protection
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is provided to working women and working children. Except for
workers in important defense industries, workers have the right
to independent association, collective bargaining, and collective
action—a marked change from the 1980 constitution, which stat-
ed that collective action could be regulated by law. By 1990,
however, not all of the numerous laws that restricted the exercise
of labor rights had been thoroughly subjected to the scrutiny of
the Constitution Court (see The Judiciary, this ch.).
Chapter Nine of the Constitution, which is concerned with the
economy, continues the theme of the previous constitution in com-
mitting the state to fostering economic growth and foreign trade.
As was the case under the 1980 constitution, tenant farming is tech-
nically prohibited, but leasing or proxy management of farmland
is recognized in the interest of increasing agricultural productivity
and rational land utilization. The new Constitution permits regu-
lations designed to "ensure the proper distribution of income" and
prevent "abuse of economic power." In an implicit recognition
of severe disparities in regional development in the past, the state
is also charged with ensuring balanced development of all regions
of the country. The government is responsible for establishing na-
tional standards and for developing technical, scientific, and hu-
man resources.
Separation of powers came from the political process as well as
from the formal structure of government embodied in the Consti-
tution. The Sixth Republic's Constitution provides greater formal
balance than earlier constitutions among the three branches of
government. In important substantive areas, it strengthens the legis-
lature and the judiciary. In other areas, it sets broad policy guide-
lines but leaves legislation to the legislators. The resulting formal
checks and balances were reinforced by the outcome of the April
1988 general elections, in which the president's party—the Demo-
cratic Justice Party—lost a working majority in the legislature for
the first time since the establishment of the Republic of Korea.
The process for amending the Constitution received public atten-
tion in early 1990 when the Democratic Justice Party and two of
the three major opposition parties announced plans to merge and
to amend the Constitution to provide for a cabinet-responsibility
system. Proposed amendments to the Constitution could be intro-
duced by the president or by a simple majority of members of the
National Assembly. A favorable vote of two-thirds of the National
Assembly members is required before amendments can be placed
before a national referendum. To be successful, amendments re-
quire a majority vote by at least one-half of the electorate eligible
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to vote in general elections. An incumbent president may not benefit
from an amendment extending the term of the presidency.
The Government
The Legislature
The unicameral National Assembly consists, according to the
Constitution, of at least 200 members. In 1990 the National Assem-
bly had 299 seats, 224 of which were directly elected from single-
member districts in the general elections of April 1988. Under
applicable laws, the remaining seventy-five representatives were
appointed by the political parties in accordance with a proportional
formula based on the number of seats won in the election. By law,
candidates for election to the National Assembly must be at least
thirty years of age. As part of a political compromise in 1987, an
earlier requirement that candidates have at least five years' con-
tinuous residency in the country was dropped to allow Kim Dae
Jung, who had spent several years in exile in Japan and the Unit-
ed States during the 1980s, to return to political life. The Nation-
al Assembly's term is four years. In a change from the more
authoritarian Fourth Republic and Fifth Republic (1972-80 and
1980-87, respectively), under the Sixth Republic, the National As-
sembly cannot be dissolved by the president.
Legislators are immune from arrest or detention, except in cases
of flagrante delicto, while the National Assembly is in session. If
an arrest occurs before the National Assembly session begins, the
legislator concerned must be released for the duration of the ses-
sion. National Assembly members also enjoy legal immunity for
statements made in that forum. Greater freedom of the media and
independence of the courts, combined with the power of the oppo-
sition parties in the legislature, gave greater substance to this im-
munity during the first two years of the Sixth Republic than under
the preceding government, when prosecutors and the courts did
not honor such immunity.
The position of the National Assembly in the Constitution is
much stronger than it had been under the Fifth Republic (see ta-
ble 9, Appendix). The annual session of the National Assembly
was extended to 100 days. Extraordinary sessions of thirty days
each might be called by as little as one-quarter of the membership
(versus one-third in the 1980 constitution), and there was no limit
on the number of such sessions that could be called each year. The
power to investigate state affairs also was strengthened. The Na-
tional Assembly now held the power to remove the prime minister
or a cabinet minister at any time, rather than having to wait a year
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following appointment, as had been the case before. The consent
of the National Assembly was required for the appointment of all
Supreme Court justices, not just the chief justice. The National
Assembly performed a tie-breaking function in presidential elec-
tions and was required to approve or to disapprove presidential
emergency measures before they took effect, time permitting.
Failure to obtain National Assembly approval would void the emer-
gency measures.
The Executive
The president, according to the Constitution, is head of state,
chief executive of the government, and commander in chief of the
armed forces. The Constitution and the amended Presidential Elec-
tion Law of 1987 provide for election of the president by direct,
secret ballot, ending sixteen years of indirect presidential elections
under the preceding two governments. Presidential succession is
for a single five-year term by direct election, which must be held
at least thirty days before the incumbent president retires. If a pres-
idential vacancy should occur, a successor must be elected within
sixty days, during which time presidential duties are to be performed
by the prime minister or other senior cabinet members in the order
of priority as determined by law. While in office, the chief execu-
tive is exempt from criminal liability except for insurrection or
treason.
The president may, at his own discretion, refer important poli-
cy matters to a national referendum, declare war, conclude peace
and other treaties, appoint senior public officials, and grant am-
nesty (with the concurrence of the National Assembly). In times
of serious internal or external turmoil or threat, or economic or
financial crises, the president may assume emergency powers "for
the maintenance of national security or public peace and order."
Emergency measures may be taken only when the National As-
sembly is not in session and when there is no time for it to con-
vene. The measures are limited to the "minimum necessary."
The 1987 Constitution deleted the 1980 constitution's explicit
powers to temporarily suspend the freedoms and rights of the peo-
ple. However, the president is permitted to take other measures
that could amend or abolish existing laws for the duration of a cri-
sis. It is unclear whether such emergency measures could temporar-
ily suspend portions of the Constitution itself. Emergency measures
must be referred to the National Assembly for concurrence. If not
endorsed by the assembly, the emergency measures can be revoked;
laws overridden by presidential orders regain their original effect.
In this respect, the power of the legislature is more vigorously
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asserted than in cases of ratification of treaties or declarations of
war, in which the Constitution simply states that the National Assem-
bly "has the right to consent" to the president's actions. In a change
from the 1980 constitution, the 1987 Constitution stated that the
president is not permitted to dissolve the National Assembly.
The president works out of an official residence called the Blue
House, so named because of the building's blue roof tiles. He is
assisted by the staff of the Presidential Secretariat, headed by a
cabinet-rank secretary general. Apart from the State Council, or
cabinet, the chief executive relies on several constitutional organs
(see fig. 12).
These constitutional organs include the National Security Coun-
cil, which provides advice concerning the foreign, military, and
domestic policies bearing on national security. Chaired by the presi-
dent, the council in 1990 had as its statutory members the prime
minister, the deputy prime minister, the ministers for foreign af-
fairs, home affairs, finance, and national defense, the director of
the Agency for National Security Planning (ANSP, known as the
Korean Central Intelligence Agency—KCIA—until December
1980), and others designated by the president. Another body was
the Advisory Council for Peaceful Unification Policy, inaugurat-
ed in June 1981 under the chairmanship of the president. From
its inception, this body had no policy role, but rather appeared to
serve as a government sounding board and as a means to disburse
political rewards by providing large numbers of dignitaries and
others with titles and opportunities to meet periodically with the
president and other senior officials.
The president also was assisted in 1990 by the Audit and Inspec-
tion Board. In addition to auditing the accounts of all public insti-
tutions, the board scrutinized the administrative performance of
government agencies and public officials. Its findings were reported
to the president and the National Assembly, which itself had broad
powers to inspect the work of the bureaucracy under the provi-
sions of the Constitution. Board members were appointed by the
president.
One controversial constitutional organ was the Advisory Coun-
cil of Elder Statesmen, which replaced a smaller body in February
1988, just before Roh Tae Woo was sworn in as president. This
body was supposed to be chaired by the immediate former presi-
dent; its expansion to eighty members, broadened functions, and
elevation to cabinet rank made it appear to have been designed,
as one Seoul newspaper said, to "preserve the status and position
of a- certain individual. " The government announced plans to
reduce the size and functions of this body immediately after Roh's
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Figure 12. Structure of the Government, 1989
inauguration. Public suspicions that the council might provide for-
mer President Chun with a power base within the Sixth Republic
were rendered moot when Chun withdrew to an isolated Buddhist
temple in self-imposed exile in November 1988.
The State Council
The top executive body assisting the president in 1990 was the
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State Council, or cabinet, the members of which in 1990 included
the president, the prime minister, and from fifteen to thirty heads
of various ministries and their equivalents. More often a technocrat
than a politician, the prime minister is appointed by the president
with the consent of the National Assembly. Other cabinet mem-
bers, also presidential appointees, are supposed to be recommended
by the prime minister but actually are chosen by the president.
As was also true under the 1980 constitution, no member of the
military may hold a cabinet post unless he is retired from active
service.
The State Council is responsible for the formulation and im-
plementation of basic plans and policies concerning a wide range
of government functions. The results of deliberation by the coun-
cil are conveyed to the Presidential Secretariat and the Office of
the Prime Minister, the two principal units responsible for coordi-
nation and supervision relating to various government agencies.
Given the importance of economic performance to the stability and
security of the nation, the Economic Planning Board plays a sig-
nificant role in the administrative and economic process. The
minister of the board by law doubles as deputy prime minister;
his senior assistants, many of them holding advanced degrees from
foreign universities, have been among the ablest public servants
in the country.
As South Korean observers have noted, the president's power
to appoint persons to senior and deputy ministerial positions not
only has administrative significance but also is an important polit-
ical tool for balancing factional interests within the president's party
and for rewarding loyalty. The South Korean media closely scruti-
nize high-level appointments for clues to politics within the ruling
party. The announcement in early 1990 of plans to merge the rul-
ing party and two of the three major opposition parties and to insti-
tute a cabinet-responsibility form of government produced even
more intensive interest in cabinet appointments.
In 1989 a presidentially appointed Administration Reform Com-
mission concluded a fourteen-month study concerning the struc-
ture of the government. In reporting its findings to the president,
the panel proposed a number of changes, including the merger or
abolition of several State Council ministries and other government
agencies. Faced with strenuous lobbying by officials of the agen-
cies concerned, the ruling party and government administration
tabled most of the recommendations. Several proposals were im-
plemented. The new Ministry of Culture, established in late 1989
from the former Ministry of Culture and Information, was placed
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under the initial direction of Yi O-yong, a prominent essayist and
literary critic. The new ministry continued the cultural and artis-
tic functions of its predecessor and also took over responsibilities
concerning national and public libraries and national language policy
from the Ministry of Education. The establishment of the Minis-
try of Environment, upgraded from the former Office of Environ-
ment within the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, acknowledged
that national development over the preceding three decades had
often neglected environmental concerns. Its establishment redeemed
a pledge made in both the 1980 and 1987 constitutions that the
people of South Korea ''shall have the right to a healthy and
pleasant environment," and that the government would take mea-
sures for environmental protection.
The Presidential Secretariat
The Presidential Secretariat, often referred to in the Western
media as the Blue House staff, in 1 990 included a secretary general
of cabinet rank and six or seven senior secretaries with responsi-
bility for political, economic, and other specialized areas. As in
other political systems, these top aides enjoyed special presiden-
tial confidence. They were widely believed to control access to the
chief executive and to influence personnel appointments and policy
decisions.
The Judiciary
The administration of justice was the function of the courts as
established under the Constitution and the much-amended Court
Organization Law of 1949. A number of provisions of the 1987
Constitution were intended to improve judicial independence, which
was long held, even within the judiciary itself, to be inadequate
(see Events in 1988, this ch.; table 10, Appendix).
At the top of the court system in 1990 was the Supreme Court,
whose justices served six-year terms, giving them a measure of inde-
pendence from the president, whose single term was only five years
(lower-level judges served ten-year terms.) All other judges were
appointed by the Conference of Supreme Court Justices and the
chief justice. This process reverses the more centralized appoint-
ment process that had been in place since theyustn system of 1972,
in which the chief justice (under the direction of the president, in
practice) appointed lower court judges. All but the chiefjustice may
be reappointed. The Supreme Court is the final court of appeal
in all cases, including courts-martial; except for death sentences,




High Courts in Seoul, Kwangju, and Taegu hear appeals against
decisions oflower courts in civil and criminal cases. They also may
assume jurisdiction over litigation brought against government
agencies or civil officials. Courts of first instance for most civil and
criminal matters are the district courts in Seoul and major provincial
cities. The Family Court in Seoul handles matrimonial, juvenile,
and other family law matters; in other cities such issues are adju-
dicated in the district courts.
The Constitution divides responsibility for constitutional review
of laws and administrative regulations between the Supreme Court
and the Constitution Court. The Supreme Court reviews only regu-
lations, decrees, and other enactments issued by the various minis-
tries of other government agencies. The constitutionality or legality
of the regulation to be reviewed must be at issue in an ongoing
trial. The Constitution Court has much broader powers. It decides
on the constitutionality of laws enacted by the National Assembly
when requested by a court to aid in the resolution of a trial, or
in response to a constitutional petition, which may be brought by
any person who has exhausted available legal remedies. The Con-
stitution Court also has exclusive power to rule on the dissolution
of political parties and impeachment of the president, cabinet mem-
bers, and other high officials. All nine members of the Constitu-
tion Court must be qualified to be judges. The president, National
Assembly, and chiefjustice each select three members of the court's
nine-member panel.
The Constitution Court began operation in late 1988. Unlike
its predecessors, which since the early 1960s had made only three
rulings, the new body gave rulings in 400 of the more than 500
cases considered during its first year. Most of the cases heard were
constitutional petitions. In a series of major decisions, the court
declared unconstitutional a law prohibiting creditors from suing
the government, directed the National Assembly to revise a por-
tion of the National Assembly Law requiring independent candi-
dates to pay twice the deposit of party-affiliated candidates, declared
the Act Concerning Protection of Society unconstitutional, and up-
held the constitutionality of a law prohibiting third-party involve-
ment in labor disputes.
The Civil Service
For centuries the most honored profession in Korea was govern-
ment service, which had been more or less preempted by the scholar-
official class (see Traditional Social Structure, ch. 2). In modern
South Korea, however, the civil service has lost some of its earlier
prestige, partly because financially rewarding jobs have been more
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plentiful in private industry and commerce. Nonetheless, the up-
per levels of the civil service, particularly in the economic minis-
tries, generally draw upon some of the best-trained and most
technically competent members of the population.
Civil servants have generally enjoyed reputations as competent
and dedicated, but the proverbial corruption in the bureaucracy
has also unfairly brought disrepute to the profession as a whole.
Efforts to eliminate malfeasance have been continuous, although
they have been perhaps most pronounced (in the fashion of tradi-
tional Chinese and Korean dynastic succession) after the assump-
tion of power by a new regime. The record of reform often has
been mixed. In 1980 Chun Doo Hwan announced a far-reaching
program intended to "purify" the bureaucracy. Many South
Koreans welcomed investigations of former cabinet ministers and
the confiscation of large, unexplained fortunes from other leaders,
such as Kim Chong-p'il, accused of enriching themselves under
the preceding Park Chung Hee regime. Chun also dismissed more
than 200 high officials and 1,000 lower-level functionaries. Politi-
cal motives were clearly evident in the ouster on vague charges of
all opposition politicians of any prominence and in the removal
of public officials and staff members of state-run corporations likely
to remain overly loyal to the late president's political machine.
The anticorruption reforms of Roh Tae Woo, marked by great-
er attention to due process and broad political participation than
those of his predecessor, won considerable public support. In his
presidential campaign, Roh had joined other presidential candi-
dates in promising exposure of financial irregularities under the
Fifth Republic and had pledged broader disclosure of public offi-
cials' assets through the amendment of existing laws. The first
promise was largely honored. The question of Fifth Republic cor-
ruption was dealt with through vigorous prosecution of former high-
level officials and relatives of former President Chun Doo Hwan
charged with abuse of power or other irregularities. The opposi-
tion parties played a major role in the process by participating in
an unprecedented series of National Assembly hearings conduct-
ed in late 1988. These riveting sessions, often televised, attracted
millions of viewers, emptying the streets of Seoul while the hear-
ings were taking place and drawing greater members even than
the broadcast earlier in the year of the Seoul Olympics. By late
1989, the courts had tried and sentenced numerous Chun relatives
and former high officials, including a former ANSP chief, on var-
ious corruption or influence-peddling charges.
Despite these successes, the disclosure of senior officials' assets
remained an elusive goal as the 1980s came to a close, hampered
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by the lack of legal measures to penalize nondisclosure. The Na-
tional Assembly had finally passed a law concerning public owner-
ship of property that would require land owners to register property
in their true names, but still had not ratified a more controversial
bill that would impose stiff penalties for the failure of assembly-
men, ministers, and vice-ministerial level officials to report their
financial dealings.
The civil service is managed by the Ministry of Government Ad-
ministration. Recruitment for the most part occurs through com-
petitive examinations held annually in two categories, "ordinary"
and "higher" examinations. Those passing the higher tests gener-
ally are recognized as bright and able and are loosely known as
members of the so-called higher civil service examinations clique.
They are given preference in appointment and over the years have
become the nucleus of bureaucratic elites scattered in three major
government functions
—
general administration, foreign affairs, and
the administration ofjustice. The foreign service and judiciary are
recruited through separate examination systems that are extremely
selective. Faculty members at state universities, although selected
according to traditional academic criteria rather than solely by ex-
amination, also are part of the civil service system, as are those
who have passed examinations to become public school teachers.
The Constitution provides that "all public officials shall be ser-
vants of the entire people and shall be responsible to the people"
and guarantees the political impartiality of public officials. From
the perspective of the citizen needing to do some business in a street-
level government office, however, the ethos of service sometimes
gives way to the traditional self-regard of the official, a situation
encapsulated in the traditional phrase kwanjon minbi (respect for
the official, contempt for the people). Political neutrality also has
been undercut by the persistence of political and bureaucratic pres-
sures on civil servants, especially during national elections. These
pressures can be especially intense upon low-ranking officials at
the bottom of the bureaucratic chain of command and on those
officials in the upper five of the nine civil service grades who serve
as presidential appointees.
In early 1989, the number of government officials totaled
700,026, most ofwhom worked for the executive branch of govern-
ment. About 7,200 civil servants worked for the judiciary. The new
importance of the National Assembly under the Sixth Republic was
reflected in an increase in staff hired by the legislative branch to
some 2,700 employees—500 more than during the final year of the
preceding administration. In the 1980s, about one-third of civil
service employees worked in local government. The civil service
213
South Korea: A Country Study
still represents a cross section of society. However, graduates of
the so-called big three universities—Seoul National University,
Yonse University, and Koryo University (more commonly called
Korea University in English)—continue to enjoy an advantage.
Graduates of these schools, all of which are located in Seoul, con-
tinue to have an edge in gaining employment in the government
as well as in the private sector and are disproportionately represented
in the higher civil service grades.
Local Administration
South Korea in 1990 was divided into six provincial-level cities
—
the special city (t'ukpyolsi) of Seoul (Soul-t'ukpyolsi to Koreans)
and the five cities directly governed (chikhalsi) by the central
government—Pusan, Taegu, Inch'on, Taejon, and Kwangju
and nine provinces, or to (see Glossary), including Cheju Island
(see fig. 1). Major cities were divided into wards (ku) and precincts
(tong). A province was composed of counties (gun) and cities (si)
with a population of more than 50,000. A county consisted of towns
(up) with a population of 20,000 and more each, townships (myon),
and villages (rc). Both cities and towns had further subdivisions
designed to facilitate communication between government and peo-
ple on local community matters.
The need for local self-government was first recognized in 1948;
a local autonomy law was enacted in 1949. It was not until De-
cember 1960, however, that local elections for the mayors of Seoul
and Pusan, provincial governors, and local councils—the first in
Korean history—were held. Under the system in operation from
the military coup d'etat of May 1961 until late 1969, Seoul, Pusan,
and the provincial governments were under the direct control of
the central government. In view of its special importance, Seoul
was controlled by the central government and made subordinate
to the Office of the Prime Minister. Provincial administrations and
the special cities reported to the Department of Local Affairs of
the Ministry ofHome Affairs. Likewise, administrative departments
of provincial and city governments maintained close contacts with
the regional and central offices of the respective cabinet ministries.
The police apparatus in each locale also was administratively respon-
sible to the National Police Headquarters in Seoul. The mayor of
Seoul was appointed by the president and usually was regarded
as his close confidant. Heads of other administrative divisions were
recommended by the minister ofhome affairs for presidential approv-
al. Mayors of ordinary cities and county chiefs—members of the
civil service—were recommended by the provincial governor for
appointment by the president. Heads of towns and townships were
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named by county chiefs, heads of wards and precincts by mayors,
and village chiefs by heads of townships.
Under the system of proportionality in use in the National As-
sembly in 1985, the majority of the at-large seats—two-thirds
—
was given to the party that came in first. This arrangement dis-
proportionately favored the government party, with its traditional
advantages of incumbency. Thus, in the 1985 general elections,
the government party ended up with a little over 35 percent of the
popular vote—the largest share—but held more than 53 percent
of the seats in the legislature. Conversely, the second-placed party,
with roughly 29 percent of the votes, occupied just over 24 per-
cent of the seats after the at-large seats were distributed. The two-
member district system used in 1985 also helped the government
party, which had litde chance of finishing first in many pro-
opposition urban districts, but could hope to win a second-place
seat (see table 11, Appendix).
In late 1989, the National Assembly passed legislation designed
to increase local autonomy over the following two years. Under
the newly amended Act Concerning Local Autonomy, local auto-
nomy was to be introduced in several phases. Local councils would
be elected by June 1990. The central government was to continue
appointing local administrative heads—including mayors of the six
special cities and nine provinces—until elections for those posts,
scheduled for 1991, could be held. The government would retain
full control over deputy heads of special cities and provinces for
the first four years, after which the central government would merely
ratify the choices of the mayors and provincial governors. In a last-
minute compromise, the National Assembly acceded to the oppo-
sition parties' position, permitting political parties to nominate can-
didates for local elections either individually or in coalition with
other parties. Related laws scheduled for National Assembly consid-
eration in 1990 were expected to address other details of local
government, including the question of financial autonomy.
Political Dynamics
Compromise and Reform: July-December 1987
The period from late June through December 1987 saw rapid
implementation of political reforms in an unusual mood of com-
promise between the ruling and opposition parties. In July the
government paroled 357 political offenders, amnestied more than
2,000 other prisoners, and restored full political rights to promi-
nent opposition figure Kim Dae Jung. In August the National
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Assembly established a committee to study constitutional revision.
Representatives of four parties took one month to negotiate and
propose a draft constitution that incorporated most of the provi-
sions long sought by the opposition parties: greater press freedom
and protection for civil rights, a stronger National Assembly, and
direct presidential elections. After the bill passed the National As-
sembly, more than 93 percent of the voters approved the new draft
in a plebiscite on October 28, 1987.
Anticipating the presidential election of December 1987, the four
major presidential candidates (Roh Tae Woo, Kim Dae Jung, Kim
Young Sam, and Kim Chong-p'il, collectively referred to in the me-
dia as "one Roh and three Kims") began their informal campaign-
ing with a series of public appearances and speeches in October.
In April 1987, Kim Young Sam and Kim DaeJung had led their
respective factions, who together included seventy-two National
Assembly members, out of the New Korea Democratic Party
(NKDP) to form the Reunification Democratic Party (RDP).
Summer-long efforts to produce a single RDP presidential candi-
date failed. By late September, Kim Young Sam was finally left
in control of the party when Kim Dae Jung and his followers depart-
ed to form a new party of their own—the Party for Peace and
Democracy (PPD). Kim Young Sam announced his candidacy on
October 10, and the RDP convention proclaimed Kim the party's
candidate on November 9. Kim Chong-p'il was affiliated with the
New Democratic Republican Party (NDRP).
Hoping to benefit from the inability of Kim Dae Jung and Kim
Young Sam to agree on a unified candidacy, Roh Tae Woo's
Democratic Justice Party (DJP) expected to win the election with
a plurality of 1 million votes and sweep about 45 percent of the
total vote. The party's strategy was based on the substantive ap-
peal of Roh Tae Woo's June 29 declaration in favor of a new
democratic constitution and other reforms, along with a massive
public relations campaign. The public relations campaign—roundly
scored by Roh's political rivals
—
portrayed the former four-star
general and division commander (he had helped Chun depose the
army chief of staff in December 1979) as a simple, "ordinary man"
who would bring about a society in which other ordinary people
could live comfortably and more affluently. The Roh campaign
also avoided the traditionally strident slogans of South Korean
politics, preferring promising phrases such as "Commitment to
a Bright Future."
DJP strategists seeking the youth vote, which accounted for nearly
60 percent of the electorate, acknowledged the party's likely problem
216
Government and Politics
with the more opposition-minded liberal arts college graduates;
instead, they focused on segments of the young population believed
to be more easily won, such as high-school graduates and techni-
cal college graduates. As the campaign continued, Roh increas-
ingly attempted to distance himself from his patron, Chun Doo
Hwan, admitting that the government had committed torture and
"other mistakes' ' and affirming that not even the head of state could
be exempted in eradicating corruption.
The other conservative candidate, viewed by some of the press
as a "spoiler' ' who would take votes from Roh Tae Woo, was Kim
Chong-p'il. Kim's campaign used the "man of experience" theme
and was structured around small meetings (especially outside his
native South Ch'ungch'ong Province), some larger rallies, and care-
fully chosen television spots financed from the coffers of the Frater-
nal Association of National Revitalization and by other affluent
and conservative South Koreans. In his speeches, Kim criticized
Roh's long association with the evils of the Fifth Republic and out-
lined a tentative program of financial relief for farmers, coal miners,
and others.
Like the other major candidates, Kim Young Sam took advan-
tage of the liberalized political climate to begin his presidential cam-
paign with a series of public rallies even before the October 28
national referendum on the new constitution. The failure to agree
with Kim Dae Jung on a unified opposition candidacy required
a two-pronged offensive, designed both to divert blame for poten-
tially splitting the opposition vote in the election and to attack Roh
Tae Woo. The RDP's slogans, "End Military Government with
Kim Young Sam" and "A Man for Peace, Harmony, and
Honesty," reflected the dual objectives of the campaign. On Octo-
ber 17, 1987, Kim told a home-town audience of 1 million in Pu-
san that, unlike Roh, he would lead a corruption-free government
that would end a "long tradition of military-backed governments"
and would make appropriate monetary and symbolic compensa-
tion to those killed and wounded in the 1980 "civilian uprising"
in Kwangju. In a large rally in Taejon on October 24, Kim sug-
gested that a Kim Dae Jung candidacy would "bring about sharp
confrontation among Cholla and Kyongsang people. " In keeping
with the name of his party, Kim also publicized his plan for "Five
Steps to Peaceful Unification" on October 12.
Kim Dae Jung's populist campaign themes were national recon-
ciliation, a just economy, political neutrality of the military, and
pursuit of reunification. The platform struck a balance between
appeals to Kim Dae Jung's hoped-for constituency among work-
ers, farmers, and lower middle-class voters and reassurances to
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voters who feared that a Kim Dae Jung candidacy could inflame
regional loyalties or result in vindictive purges against those who
held power during the Fifth Republic. One of Kim's sons directed
specialized party organs such as the United Democratic Youth As-
sociation to attract younger voters. Like Roh and Kim Young Sam,
Kim Dae Jung was able to assemble 1 million participants in ral-
lies in Seoul and in home-province appearances, while drawing
somewhat smaller crowds in other provinces.
In addition to the four principal candidates, several minor par-
ties also offered candidates. These included relative unknowns, such
as Kim Son-jok of the Ilche Party (Unified Party), Sin Chong-il
of the Hanism Unification Party, and Hong Suk-cha of the Social
Democratic Party. Another candidate, Paek Ki-wan, was promi-
nent in dissident circles. Most of these candidates faded as the cam-
paign progressed, eventually withdrawing their candidacy in
support of one or another major candidate.
The election results closely followed projections based on the
regional origins of the four major candidates, despite protestations
by all that regionalism should not divide the country. Of the major
candidates, Roh took 36.9 percent of the votes, Kim Young Sam
28 percent, Kim DaeJung 26.9 percent, and Kim Chong-p'il only
8 percent.
Losers in the election had been charging the government party
with illegal electioneering activities ever since it became clear in
late September that Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam would
not be able to agree on a unified candidacy. The traditional ad-
vantages of incumbency were evident early; by October the busi-
ness pages of Seoul's daily press were already discussing the
"election inflation" caused by election-related spending, which in-
cluded government disbursements for development projects. Such
spending, common in many countries prior to elections, included
a substantial decrease in the price of heating oil, an increase in
the official purchase price of rice, and a salary increase for civil
servants. Also common, although by no means limited to the rul-
ing party, were customary "transportation costs" given to people
to attend rallies and the wide distribution of small gifts, such as
the cigarette lighters bearing Roh Tae Woo's name, dispensed by
the ruling party. Political cartoonists could easily make light of the
latter practice, probably because it had been many years since the
votes of South Koreans, even in rural areas, had been swayed by
simple gifts such as a bowl of rice wine or a pair of rubber shoes.
One candidate seemed to sum up the prevailing attitude in remarks
at a mid-November rally: "If they give you money, take it. If they
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take you to Mount Sorak for sightseeing, then have a nice jour-
ney. But on 16 December, be sure to give your vote to me."
More serious irregularities reported prior to and during the elec-
tions included acts of violence or intimidation against election ob-
servers, biased television coverage, mobilization of local officials
and neighborhood organization officers to encourage people to vote
for Roh, and fraudulent handling of ballot boxes. In one working
class district in Seoul, for example, election observers seized two
ballot boxes being surreptitiously brought in to a polling station
on the morning of the election. The government, which removed
the observers by force two days later, claimed that the boxes con-
tained absentee ballots, but had no explanation for why they were
delivered in commercial trucks carrying fruit, bread, and other con-
sumer goods.
Conversely, few election observers commented on the intimidat-
ing effect—no less on potential voters than on candidates—of acts
of violence that repeatedly occurred against all major candidates.
Candidates were forced to hire phalanxes of bodyguards with plastic
shields for protection against flying objects and often were made
to cut short public speeches during appearances in regional strong-
holds of other candidates. In spite of local abuses, it was difficult
to estimate what fraction of Roh Tae Woo's plurality of almost
2 million votes, out of 23 million cast, may have been improperly
influenced. Extravagant claims of wholesale manipulation in the
computerized vote tabulation were made difficult to assess by the
failure of those who had made such charges to present convincing
evidence. Claims of election rigging also were undercut at the time
by the continued insistence of both the Kim Dae Jung and Kim
Young Sam camps that their candidate was the one to whom the
election rightfully should have gone.
Within a week after the election, public anger at the outcome
was divided. Protests continued against election irregularities but
were accompanied by increasing criticism of the two major oppo-
sition leaders for their failure to produce a unified candidacy that
could have defeated the government party candidate. The RDP
and PPD, embarrassed by the fact that Kim Dae Jung and Kim
Young Sam together received 54 percent of the vote to Roh's 36
percent, both apologized to the public, while vowing to continue
disputing the results of the election. Both major opposition par-
ties, together with Kim Chong-p'il's party, gradually turned their
attention to the question of upcoming National Assembly elections.
Events in 1988
President-elect Roh Tae Woo outlined his 1988 political goals—both
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old and new—in a New Year's interview. Some of Ron's comments
echoed the authoritarian language of President Chun's 1987 New
Year's speech, which had typically called for ' 'grand national har-
mony" in which transcendent political leadership would see the
country through, if only the people would "rid themselves of all
vestiges of the old habit of confrontation and strife." Roh made
ample reference to traditional themes, speaking of * ' suprapartisan
operation of national affairs," "rooting out corruption," and a
mixture of persuasion and "stern measures," if necessary, to bring
leftist elements back into the fold. Roh also seemed to promise
genuine innovations: to eliminate authoritarian practices, to in-
vestigate and punish people guilty of past financial scandals, to pro-
tect the press from harassment by law enforcement authorities, to
reorganize intelligence agencies, to demilitarize politics, and to
resolve the 1980 Kwangju incident by restoring honor to the vic-
tims and providing remuneration to the bereaved.
Other leaders and other political forces also had their own agendas
for the new year. Under the heading of "Liquidating the Legacy of
the Fifth Republic," the opposition parties of Kim Dae Jung and
Kim Young Sam sought to investigate corruption in the Fifth Repub-
lic, to reexamine the Kwangju incident, and, as well, demanded
the release of all political detainees and the reform of numerous
laws that had been used to control nonviolent political activity and
free expression. Like Roh, Kim Dae Jung's ability to compromise
was limited to a degree by his own desire not to lose influence with
an offstage constituency, in this case the dissident community and
other elements to his left. Kim Chong-p'il's presidential campaign
had also made use of these themes in its attacks on the govern-
ment party's candidate, Roh Tae Woo. Of even greater importance,
however, was restoration of the reputations and professional careers
of numerous individuals from the Park Chung Hee era who, like
Kim himself, had been purged in 1980 during Chun Doo Hwan's
takeover. These individuals included more than 8,800 civil servants
and officers of state corporations as well as several dozen senior
military officers (from the army chief of staff down), who had lost
both ranks and pensions. Successful resolution of these issues greatiy
increased Kim's ability to work with the government party.
Other groups in society had their own expectations. Members
of labor unions at many of South Korea's large corporations, fresh
from a major campaign of strikes in late 1987, hoped for the right
to elect their own leaders and organize outside the framework of
the government-sponsored Federation of Korean Trade Unions
(see Interest Groups, this ch.). Some dissident organizations hoped
that the forthcoming 1988 Seoul Olympics could be held jointly
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in P'yongyang and Seoul (see Foreign Policy, this ch.). Leftist stu-
dents also sought opportunities to meet with North Korean stu-
dents. Some activist students hoped to establish firmer contacts with
farmers and the growing labor movement, while at the violence-
prone fringe of the radical student movement others planned to
continue to dramatize their grievances through arson attacks against
United States and South Korean government facilities (see Politi-
cal Extremism and Political Violence, this ch.). Still other dissidents
planned to continue demonstrating against the Roh government out
of conviction that it was a simple continuation of the previous mili-
tarized regimes.
After his inauguration in February 1988, Roh took steps to honor
some of his campaign promises, appointing a woman to his cabi-
net and approving the rehabilitation of thirty-one generals dismissed
in Chun's coups of 1979 and 1980. Another commitment, to ap-
point members of the opposition parties to cabinet posts, was not
met when the two major parties failed to propose names for con-
sideration. Four of the new cabinet appointees, however, were from
the Cholla provinces.
Negotiations among the major political parties promptly began
over amending the National Assembly Election Law, one of the
major political issues left unresolved in the 1987 Constitution. At
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stake were two variables: the size of the electoral districts and the
degree of proportionality. Each party took a position that it be-
lieved would be to its advantage. Initially, the government party
and Kim Chong-p'il's NDRP favored different mixtures of large
and small districts. Kim Young Sam's party was divided between
its rural members, who also favored multiple-member districts, and
the leadership, which argued for single-member districts. Kim Dae
Jung's party, which in the presidential election had swept all but
two districts in Seoul, hoped to use its heavily concentrated con-
stituency in the Cholla provinces to become the largest opposition
party with a single-member district system.
The ruling party eventually shifted to a single-member district
formula close to that proposed by the PPD, but finally withdrew
from the negotiations, claiming that the other parties could not come
to agreement in time. In a manner reminiscent of the tactics of
the Park Chung Hee era, the ruling party took advantage of its
legislative majority to pass unilaterally its own draft amendment
in a one-minute session held at 2:00 A.M. on March 8, 1988. The
newly amended law reinstated single-member electoral districts,
last used in the general election of 1970. It also diluted the ele-
ment of proportionality somewhat by reducing the number of at-
large seats to 75, or about one-fourth of the total of 299, and by
more evenly distributing them among the participating parties. The
opposition parties strongly protested (Kim Dae Jung's party less
vigorously than the others) and then started to prepare their cam-
paigns.
According to most observers, the results of the general election
of April 26, 1988, set the stage for a new political drama. For the
first time in South Korean history, the government party lost its
working majority in the legislature. The government party had
hoped to emerge victorious, as the two largest opposition parties
again split the antigovernment vote. With 34 percent of the popu-
lar vote, however, the DJP held only 125 seats (87 district seats
and the remainder at-large), well under the 150 needed for a majori-
ty. Kim Chong-p'il's party, the NDRP, ended up with a total of
thirty-five seats, enabling it to form its own bargaining group in
the National Assembly. Kim Young Sam's RDP gained a small
number of seats, but lost in overall ranking in the larger body. Kim
Dae Jung's PPD took the senior opposition party position with more
than 19 percent of the vote and 23 percent of the total number of
seats (see table 12, Appendix).
There were several reasons for the upset. The government party
might have made a stronger showing had not Roh, intent upon con-
solidating his control of a party that still contained many holdovers
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from the Chun period, replaced one-third of incumbent legisla-
tors with political newcomers. Because the new candidates were
not able to build up quickly the personal networks necessary for
success at the district level, the ruling party in effect gave up one
of its strongest campaign assets on the eve of the election. Other
factors included the ruling party's lack of a following among younger
and better-educated voters and its failure to distance itself suffi-
ciently from the Chun government (the former president's brother
was arrested on corruption charges one month before the election).
Increasing regionalism also played a role, especially in the Cholla
provinces, where the government party candidates failed to win
a single district seat.
The impact of the new balance of political forces in the National
Assembly, characterized by the press asydsoyadae (small ruling pow-
er, large opposition power), quickly became evident. Even before
the thirteenth National Assembly convened in late May 1988, the
floor leaders of the government and opposition parties met to agree
upon procedures and to discuss the release of political prisoners.
These four-way talks became common during the next two years,
especially for routine business matters. Four-way talks also were
used to negotiate in advance such political issues as the distribu-
tion of committee chairmanships (nine for opposition parties, seven
for the government party) and the National Assembly's investiga-
tion of dozens of cases of corruption or other irregularities com-
mitted under the preceding Fifth Republic.
The judiciary also moved toward greater political independence
in 1988. In June one-third of the nation's judges demanded that
the chief justice of the Supreme Court, Kim Yong-ch'ol, resign
as a measure to restore public trust in the politicized court system.
Two weeks after the chiefjustice resigned in disgrace, the two major
opposition parties abstained from the National Assembly vote to
confirm Roh's first choice for the vacancy, thereby causing the
nomination to fail. This action resulted in the nomination of Yi
Il-kyu, a more independent-minded figure known for not bending
to political pressure. A Supreme Court justice during the Chun
presidency—until his appointment was not renewed in 1986—Yi
had won wide public respect for overturning lower court rulings
in political cases. Yi's appointment as chiefjustice led to National
Assembly approval of thirteen new Supreme Court justices and
a major reshuffle of the judiciary in July that affected some thirty-
five senior District Court and High Court judges. At a meeting
of chiefs of all court levels in December 1988 when the Supreme
Court was drafting a revision to the Court Organization Law that
would give the judiciary full control over its own budgets, Chief
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Justice Yi Il-kyu called on the judiciary to "take a hard look at
ourselves for the situation in which the public felt distrust for the
judiciary" and pledged that he would "never tolerate any outside
influence in court proceedings."
Under Yi's leadership, the South Korean judiciary became more
independent. This trend continued into 1989, as courts overturned
the parliamentary election victories of two government party can-
didates on charges of illegal campaigning and sentenced numer-
ous former officials and relatives of former President Chun Doo
Hwan to prison terms on corruption and power-abuse charges. In
another unprecedented action in late 1989, a judge acting on his
own initiative granted bail to a student activist charged with violat-
ing the National Security Act.
The Seoul Olympics, scheduled to begin in September 1988, con-
tributed to a tacit political truce where the more contentious and
difficult political questions, such as the revisions of "bad laws"
sought by the two larger opposition parties, were concerned. The
primary focus of partisan politics during 1988 was the settling of
old accounts concerning the Fifth Republic. These issues, in turn,
were divided into two categories: questions related to Chun's sei-
zure of power in late 1979 and early 1980, including the Kwangju
incident, and questions concerning corruption and other irregular-
ities during the period of Chun's rule through 1987. In July 1988,
following the president's veto of two bills that would have expand-
ed the legislature's inspection powers—for example, enabling the
National Assembly to order judicial warrants forcing subpoenaed
witnesses, such as former President Chun, to testify—the govern-
ment party agreed with the three major opposition parties to hold
hearings into numerous irregularities of the Fifth Republic. Other
special committees established inJuly were charged with studying
reunification policy, democratization issues, problems of region-
alism in politics, the conduct of the Seoul Olympics, and irregular-
ities in the recent presidential and general elections.
In twenty meetings held between late September and mid-
December 1988, the committee investigating corruption under the
Chun government interviewed dozens of witnesses, many of them
high-level civilian and military officers. The televised hearings daz-
zled the public with revelations concerning the suppression of me-
dia independence in 1980, the extortion of political funds from large
corporations, and improprieties connected with the Ilhae Institute,
a charitable foundation established by Chun Doo Hwan (see The
Media, this ch).
The hearings had several effects. Pressures against the former
president grew as the hearings continued; in late November 1988,
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Chun appeared on television to apologize to the nation, taking
responsibility for what he termed the "tragic consequences" in
Kwangju in 1980. He also stated that he would surrender US$24
million in cash and property and announced that he would seek
seclusion in a Buddhist monastery in repentance. The hearings led
to subsequent criminal prosecutions of numerous members of
Chun's family, as well as former high officials, including the former
director of the Agency for National Security Planning, Chang Se-
dong. The hearings also gave many South Koreans their first op-
portunity to see their legislators in action and set a precedent for
future broadcasts of National Assembly business.
The drama of the hearings drew attention away from the more
prosaic business of the National Assembly, which during the year
passed dozens of laws and decided on a 1989 budget. Despite often
strong disagreements among parties, these results underscored the
role of four-way talks in the process of political compromise, previ-
ously a rare commodity in South Korean politics. The resulting
de facto coalition foreshadowed the merger of three of the four par-
ties in early 1990.
People dissatisfied with Roh's first year as president overlooked
significant political factors, including the restraining impact of world
attention prior to the 1988 Seoul Olympics on Roh's conduct. Roh
did make effective moves to consolidate his political position dur-
ing the year, including a series of appointments and reshuffles
within the Democratic Justice Party, the cabinet, and the senior
ranks of the military. Changed political circumstances in 1989 made
it possible for Roh to move more decisively to deal with opponents
inside and outside the National Assembly.
Returning to the Politics of National Security, 1989
In his 1989 New Year's address, President Roh promised greater
efforts in reaching out to communist bloc countries and in improving
relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North
Korea). He also emphasized continued democratization, coupled
with stability. The emphasis on stability was shared by the NDRP,
which in its New Year's statement noted the need to correct the
unbalanced distribution of wealth and to eliminate conflicts based
on regionalism but also rejected "any action to undermine political
and social stability." Both the RDP and the PPD viewed 1989 as
the year for the final resolution of Fifth Republic issues and called
for the appointment of a special prosecutor to investigate impar-
tially criminal charges stemming from the National Assembly in-
vestigations.
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The president's willingness to move toward tighter social con-
trols was given further impetus by developments in the first few
months of the year. In February farmers angry over the govern-
ment's liberalization of agricultural trade staged large-scale, some-
times violent, demonstrations in Seoul. During the same month,
the nationwide leftist student organization, the National Associa-
tion of University Student Councils (Chondaehyop) challenged the
government's desire to retain the initiative between the two Koreas
by announcing plans to send members to Pyongyang's World
Youth and Student Festival scheduled for July. In March a sub-
way workers' strike paralyzed commuter transportation in Seoul
for seven days. Nationwide labor unrest continued through April
with a violent strike by Hyundai shipyard workers. Student demon-
strators continued to match police tear gas with Molotov cocktails
through the early months of the year. In May the nation was
shocked when students who had taken police officers hostage in
a building at Tongui University in Pusan set a fire that took the
lives of seven police officers who had stormed the facility.
These events were accompanied by signs of uneasiness among
advisers of President Roh. In March a cabinet minister, known
as a spokesman for those in the military seeking a crackdown on
labor union and student radicalism, resigned. A week later, at
graduation ceremonies of the Korea Military Academy, the acade-
my superintendent twice failed to salute the president and in his
speech complained that "people have such confused perceptions
about which are hostile and which are friendly countries that they
do not know who our enemy is." Pressures on the president to
curb what these and other conservatives in the military and the
government party believed was a trend toward deterioration in-
creased further in late March, when it became known that two
prominent South Korean dissidents had traveled to P'yongyang,
where they met with North Korean leader Kim II Sung and at-
tended a church service. These developments and others, such as
the announcement in June that a former opposition legislator had
made an unauthorized trip to North Korea in 1988, gave the presi-
dent the rationale to reverse another trend—the declining involve-
ment of the national security agencies in domestic political life.
During the political openness of 1988, a report of the govern-
ment's Administration Reform Commission had denigrated the
Agency for National Security Planning, on grounds that the agency
had in the past "violated human rights on many occasions and
interfered in politics, thus incurring the condemnation of the pub-
lic." As ruling and opposition parties studied ways to limit the agen-
cy's role in domestic political surveillance, the ANSP also appeared
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to take a new approach, announcing that it was scaling back domes-
tic operations, sharing classified documents on external security
issues at press conferences, and sending new agency directors to
pay respects to the presidents of the opposition parties. By early
1989, political agreement had been reached on a revised ANSP
law that would require the agency to observe the right of habeas
corpus, remain politically neutral, and end other forms of inter-
ference in domestic political life.
The president's response to the growing political crisis of early
1989 was to grant a renewed mandate to the police and security
agencies. In view of increasing attacks on police boxes, a long-
standing program to provide police with M- 1 6 rifles was stepped
up and new rules of engagement issued, permitting police to fire
in self-defense on Molotov cocktail-throwing demonstrators. In the
aftermath of the Tongui University incident, the National Assem-
bly quickly passed a law providing special penalties for the use of
Molotov cocktails. In early April, the president established a Joint
Security Investigations Headquarters to coordinate the work of
police, intelligence, and national security agencies. This organ,
which was in existence from early April through late June 1989,
investigated student union groups, dissident organizations, and an
antigovernment newspaper, eventually arresting more than 500 per-
sons (including the pair who had traveled to North Korea in March)
on suspicion of "aiding an antistate organization"—North
Korea—under the broad terms of the National Security Act.
The Joint Security Investigations Headquarters was disbanded
inJune under pressure from the National Assembly. Public prose-
cutors and the Agency for National Security Planning, however,
continued making arrests and pursuing investigations into a vari-
ety of political activities on national security grounds. There also
was a resumption of the quasi-legal or illegal practices common
in national security cases before 1988: breaking into the campaign
headquarters of an opposition candidate in a by-election in July;
publishing lists of banned "antistate" books even after a civil court
ruling that such a ban was illegal; arresting people for reading or
possessing books considered to be pro-North Korean; arresting an
antigovernment journalist for planning unauthorized coverage of
North Korea; and ignoring court orders to allow arrested political
detainees to meet with their attorneys. By the end of 1989, all people
who had traveled to North Korea without authorization had been
convicted and sentenced to lengthy prison terms.
The role of the ANSP was further strengthened during the rest
of the year. As part of a cabinet shuffle in July, Roh appointed
a former high-school classmate, with a reputation for a hardline
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approach as a prosecutor under the Fifth Republic, as head of the
ANSP. In the National Assembly, discussion of amendments that
would ease sections of the National Security Act and restrict the
powers of the ANSP were indefinitely postponed. In September
the government introduced an amendment that would enable the
ANSP to bypass the constitutional guarantees of access to a law-
yer in national security cases. In late 1989, the government claimed
that 342 people had been charged under the National Security Act
during the year.
Parties and Leaders
Unlike the two former military leaders who had preceded him,
Roh Tae Woo followed an indirect course to the chairmanship of
the Democratic Justice Party (DJP) and the presidency. A Korea
Military Academy classmate ofChun Doo Hwan and Chong Ho-
yong and a 1959 graduate of the United States Army Special
Warfare School, Roh had passed through a succession of career-
building military commands, including a brigade of the Special
Warfare Command, before moving a regiment of his frontline Ninth
Division into Seoul to support Chun's forcible removal of the army
chief of staff and other senior military leaders on December 12,
1979. As Chun consolidated his political position through the spring
and summer of 1980, he placed Roh in the most politically sensi-
tive military posts, naming him to be commander of the Capital
Garrison Command and, later, the Defense Security Command.
After Chun became president in 1980, however, he retired Roh
from the military and used him to fill a series of government posts,
beginning with a position as second minister of political affairs,
a position that was apparently created especially for Roh. After
a short period as minister of sports in the spring of 1982, Roh served
for fifteen months as the minister of home affairs.
In retrospect it seems clear that Roh's ability simultaneously to
benefit by, yet distance himself politically from, his association with
Chun began in mid- 1983 when he was moved from the post of
minister of home affairs to take the chairmanship of South Korea's
Olympic Committee, which he held through 1986. With the Olym-
pic Committee portfolio, Roh was able to avoid entanglement in
increasingly tough police handling of the student movement while
remaining in the public eye as the person who had successfully
managed the campaign to have Seoul selected as the site of the 1988
Games of the XXIV Olympiad. After his election to the National
Assembly in April 1985, Roh emerged as a significant figure in
the DJP when Chun appointed him to the party presidency.
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At the end of the first two years of the Roh presidency, the DJP
was a different party from that bequeathed by Chun in 1981 . Roh
had surprised political observers when he dismissed one-third of
the party's local chapter chairmen and denied the party's nomi-
nation in the April 1988 National Assembly election to 126 incum-
bent party members in favor of relatively unknown and new party
members. These decisions undoubtedly cost the party heavily in
the number of seats won, but they also enabled Roh to begin to
reshape the party in his own image. By December 1988, Roh was
ready to consolidate his control of the DJP. Within four days, Roh
replaced twenty of twenty-three cabinet ministers, eliminating vir-
tually all those carried over from the Chun administration. He also
reshuffled the senior DJP leadership, removing Park Chun-kyu,
a former adviser to Park Chung Hee's Democratic Republican
Party, from the chairmanship.
The numerically dominant membership, or mainstream, of the
DJP was made up of figures from the city of Taegu and North
Kyongsang Province, a group sometimes characterized by the press
as the TK Mafia, or TK Division (TK for Taegu and Kyongsang).
This trend had become evident during the Fifth Republic under
Chun and within the Democratic Republican Party under Park
Chung Hee before him. Roh also attempted, however, to replace
Chun loyalists within the party with individuals who were more
likely to owe him their primary loyalty. Roh supporters included
some members of an influential subset of the TK group made up
of individuals who had graduated from Kyongbuk High School,
Roh's alma mater. In December 1988, for example, all of the presi-
dent's senior staff were Roh's fellow high-school alumni. Taegu
-
Kyongsang ties also extended to numerous civil and military posts,
most notably all army chiefs of staff after 1980, one-quarter of
director-level officers in the Korean National Police, and 120 of
662 prosecutors in 1989.
A second group that supported the president comprised a num-
ber of older politicians whom the Seoul press termed the New Elders
Group. Members of this group fled from North Korea in the 1940s
or during the Korean War, held senior positions in various walks
of life, especially journalism, and played an important role in rally-
ing the votes of other former North Koreans in Kyonggi and Kang-
won provinces in the 1987 presidential election. For this service,
they were allowed to return to political life, in many cases for the
first time since persons of North Korean origin lost political in-
fluence following the fall of Syngman Rhee in 1960 and the 1961
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coup d'etat of Park Chung Hee. As a group, they were strongly
anticommunist and favored the restoration of * 'law and order" in
the face of rising dissent in South Korean society.
Political alignments within the ruling party tended to form around
personalities rather than ideas because of the importance of per-
sonal networks in South Korean society and the fact that under
the Constitution Roh could not succeed himself. In August 1989,
President Roh removed Yi Chong-ch'an from a senior party post.
Yi, the leader of a group of DJP members hailing from the Seoul
area, was known to favor greater democracy within the party and
to oppose revision of the Constitution to create a cabinet-responsible
system. After the announcement in early 1990 that the parties of
Kim Young Sam and Kim Chong-p'il would merge with that of
Roh Tae Woo, observers expected the roles both of ideas and of
personal alignments or factions to be even more significant in the
new, enlarged Democratic Liberal Party.
New Democratic Republican Party (NDRP) leader Kim Chong-
p'il had been nominated as the presidential candidate of the
Democratic Republican Party following Park's assassination in late
1979, but Kim was arrested by Chun on corruption charges dur-
ing the latter' s takeover in 1980. Kim was accused of corruption
and stripped of most of his personal assets in South Korea. He spent
six years in the United States. In March 1986, he returned to South
Korea to attempt to reconstruct Park's old party and restore his
own political fortunes. In a series of speeches in 1986 and 1987,
Kim spoke of the need to continue the "revitalizing" tasks of the
yusin phase of Park Chung Hee (see South Korea under Park Chung
Hee, 1961-79, ch. 1). His appeal initially was to former officials,
cashiered military leaders, and others who had lost their positions
in 1980. As Kim's message changed to emphasize his association
with the beginnings of South Korea's modern economic develop-
ment in the 1960s, he began to attract some younger, conserva-
tive South Koreans, and many from his native Ch'ungch'ong
Province. By October 30, 1987, when Kim's NDRP was formally
established, people under the age of forty made up more than half
of the party's 3,000 charter members. Others included the twenty-
one National Assembly members of the now defunct Korea
Nationalist Party, which during the 1980s had provided a home
for political survivors of Park Chung Hee's party.
Kim Young Sam was a veteran politician with a strong consti-
tuency in Pusan and in South Kyongsang Province. As a Nation-
al Assembly member for the opposition New Democratic Party
(NDP) in the 1960s, he fought a series of losing battles against Park
Chung Hee on such issues as normalization of relations withJapan
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in 1965. By 1970 he had risen to the top policy-making committee
of the NDP. He lost the party's nomination to political rival Kim
Dae Jung in the presidential election of 1971 but continued to hold
top party posts through 1979, when the government-dominated
National Assembly expelled him after he called for the resignation
of Park and the abandonment of the yusin system. This incident
contributed to large-scale unrest in Pusan and nearby Masan and
may have indirectly contributed to Park's assassination.
Kim Young Sam, like other well-known political figures, such
as Kim Chong-p'il and Kim Dae Jung, was banned from politics
in 1980 by Chun Doo Hwan; he spent the early 1980s under house
arrest. A Presbyterian elder, Kim used the enforced leisure in well-
publicized self-improvement along traditional cultural lines common
to exiled South Korean politicians. He was occasionally photo-
graphed while practicing calligraphy in his book-lined study, or
while on permitted outings with his Democratic Alpine Club.
Government censorship prevented detailed press coverage of his
twenty-three-day hunger strike against the Chun government in
May and June 1983. Although Kim's house arrest was lifted after
the hunger strike, his political rights were not restored until after
the February 1985 National Assembly elections. Kim subsequent-
ly joined his faction members in the newly formed New Korea
Democratic Party as an official party adviser; his long-time rival,
Kim Dae Jung, directed his own faction in the party from outside
it as a member of the Council for Promotion of Democracy.
In the late 1980s, South Korean political observers, increasing-
ly interested in the question of leadership succession within the op-
position parties, focused their attention more on generational
groupings than on factions. Seen this way, the RDP was broadly
divided into old-line Kim Young Sam loyalists and some additional
experienced opposition politicians in their fifties and an emergent
group of younger politicians, mostly in their forties. Many of the
latter group began their first terms in the National Assembly in
1988. They typically brought to their political careers progressive
political credentials earned in human rights law, labor relations,
or other fields. Several members of this group received nationwide
attention for their cogent interrogation techniques during the Na-
tional Assembly hearings in late 1988.
At the time of the presidential elections in December 1987, sixty-
two-year-old opposition leader Kim Dae Jung from the Cholla
region was in many ways the South Korean political candidate best
known outside of South Korea. A one-time newspaper publisher,
a Roman Catholic of eclectic views, and a charismatic popular
speaker elected to the National Assembly four times in the 1960s,
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Kim had an international reputation that stemmed largely from
the continuous efforts of the South Korean government to keep
him out of the country, in prison, or under house arrest following
his near-victory over Park in the 1971 presidential election. He
had built active support organizations among South Koreans in
Japan and the United States by the time the Korean Central In-
telligence Agency kidnapped him at a Tokyo hotel in 1973. Fol-
lowing United States intervention to save his life during the
abduction, he was brought back to South Korea to stand trial for
alleged violation of the election law and Park's Emergency Meas-
ure Number Nine. He served several years of imprisonment and
house arrest, then was released and had his civil rights restored
in 1980 on the heels of the October 1979 assassination of Park.
Again arrested under martial law in May 1980, Kim Dae Jung
was accused of fomenting the Kwangju incident and sentenced to
death by a military court on sedition charges that the United States
Department of State described at the time as "far-fetched" (see
The Kwangju Uprising, ch. 1). Under pressure from the United
States government, his death sentence was subsequendy reduced
to life and then to twenty years' imprisonment. This term was sus-
pended in late 1982 when Kim went to the United States to seek
medical treatment. In the United States, Kim divided his time
among a research appointment at Harvard University, the Korean
Institute for Human Rights in Alexandria, Virginia (informally
known as the Kim Dae Jung Embassy), and wide-ranging travels
to speak before Korean-American groups and United States civic,
academic, and human rights organizations. Kim returned to South
Korea in February 1985 on the eve of the National Assembly elec-
tions. In March 1985, he was released from the 1980 general ban
on political activity, although the suspended criminal charges still
in effect meant that he could neither belong to a party nor run for
office. He immediately joined with Kim Young Sam, who had also
had his ban lifted, to establish the Council for Promotion of
Democracy. Although Kim Dae Jung spent most of the next two
years under house arrest, he telephonically provided informal
guidance to his faction within the New Korea Democratic Party
and, after April 1985, within the Reunification Democratic Party
(RDP). As part of the political understanding reached in late June
1987, the government dropped all outstanding charges against him
and he reemerged to participate fully in politics. After negotiations
with the Kim Young Sam faction of the RDP failed to reach agree-
ment concerning a unified candidacy, the Kim Dae Jung faction
and its supporters left in October 1987 to form the Party for Peace
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and Democracy (PPD). The December 16 election was fast ap-
proaching when Kim received his party's presidential nomination
on November 12.
As the 1990s began, the PPD was made up of at least three dis-
cernible groups. The first group comprised old-line Kim DaeJung
followers who occupied the senior positions in the party hierarchy
and gave unquestioning loyalty to the party leader. A second group,
making up more than one-half of the party's seventy-one Nation-
al Assembly seats after the April 1988 election, consisted of first-
termers obliged by custom to play a low-key role in party affairs
until they acquired more political experience. Within this group,
however, was a subgroup of activists with long experience in cause-
oriented groups and human rights law. Many of these activists had
worked for the party in the National Assembly elections in 1985;
a few had run as independents in 1988 before formally joining the
party. Many of this group, organized as the Study Group for Peace-
ful and Democratic Reunification (P'yongminyon) within the party,
participated conspicuously in National Assembly hearings in 1988.
Collectively, they constituted the party's left wing and its link with
the broader dissident movement outside of the National Assem-
bly. Political speculation in late 1989 centered on whether this group
would continue to exert a leftward pull, seeking to bring the posi-
tion of the PPD closer to that of South Korea's emergent left. Ob-
servers noted that several PPD members of this group also were
members of the Coalition for a National Democratic Movement
(Chomminyon) formed in January 1989 and were likely to be in-
volved with that organization's plans to form a progressive politi-
cal party to participate in the first local council elections scheduled
to take place in 1990.
Chomminyon was one of a variety of groups that considered plans
to form cause-oriented political parties in anticipation oflocal council
elections. These bodies included a group of some fifty former cabinet
members and retired generals who believed that the government
party was not conservative enough and at least two groups of en-
vironmentalists who planned to establish parties dedicated to that
issue. A proposed Green Party, like its European counterparts,
planned to emphasize antiwar and antinuclear issues as well as the
cause of the environment, but also supported a concept of "Oriental
humanity" that would promote respect for the elderly and other
traditional virtues.
Interest Groups
Despite its Constitution and formal structure, the South Korean
government has never fully conformed to the liberal democratic
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model that sees the state as a simple summation of diverse and com-
peting interests within society. In politics, as in economic life, South
Korea has more closely fit the "strong state" model, in which the
government has tended to outweigh particular social or group in-
terests. Nonetheless, the balance between the government and var-
ious interest groups showed some dramatic changes in the late
1980s; as the 1990s began, observers found it likely that such
changes would continue, despite efforts by the government to re-
tain its traditionally strong position.
During most of the postwar period, the South Korean gov-
ernment had encouraged organizations for the communication of
economic interests, but had not encouraged professional or occupa-
tional interest groups to voice political demands. Independent or
unsanctioned interest groups had come into existence from time
to time to challenge fundamental policies of the government. In
the late 1980s, such challenges accounted for a sizable proportion
of extragovernmental political activity.
The relationship between government and business associations
in South Korea had its roots in the period ofJapanese colonial rule,
when the governor general established the Seoul Chamber ofCom-
merce and Industry and other industrial associations as a means
of communicating economic policies to the business community.
Since 1952 all businesses have been required by South Korean law
to belong to the Korean Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the
bylaws and initial membership of which closely paralled those of
the Seoul Chamber ofCommerce and Industry of the colonial peri-
od. Since 1961 , when the Park government began its economic de-
velopment plans, the Federation of Korean Industry has represented
the major conglomerates. A larger organization, the Federation
of Small and Medium Industries, has had much less influence. The
Korea Traders' Association and the Korean Federation of Textile
Industries round out the four major industrial associations. In 1989
there were some 200 additional business associations licensed by
the state (see The Government and Public and Private Corpora-
tions, ch. 3).
In most cases, the government recognizes only a single associa-
tion as the representative of that industry. Major business leaders
may have individual access to administrators through personal ties
and might be able to influence the government in minor ways, such
as obtaining exemptions from specific taxes. For the most part,
however, business associations through the 1980s were dominated
by the government. As noted by one specialist, "It is through in-
dustry associations that the Korean government implements its poli-
cies, enforces routine compliance, gathers information, and
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monitors performance." In the 1980s, this process was sometimes
facilitated by the placement of retiring senior military or national
security officials in industry association positions.
Institutional changes and pressures toward open markets began
to change the traditional government-business relationship in the
mid-and late 1980s. Larger corporations became interested in hav-
ing a role in policy formulation more commensurate with their con-
tribution to more than two decades of economic growth. This
interest took several forms, including substantial corporate con-
tributions to all major political parties during elections. As eco-
nomic ministries grew in influence within a more decentralized
economic planning structure in the 1980s, the related industry as-
sociations gained a greater voice, just as was true in Japan and
the United States. Growing liberalization of the domestic market
under foreign pressure also led to greater friction between the in-
terests of specific economic sectors and the need of the government
to satisfy its foreign critics or risk a loss of access to vital foreign
markets. As the 1990s began, these frictions seemed likely to con-
tinue and to lead eventually to further readjustments.
In general, the higher-paid professions establish and administer
their own associations and cooperate closely with the appropriate
government ministries but receive no government support. These
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associations are chiefly concerned with maintaining standards and
the economic status of the professions concerned and have been
traditionally regarded by the government as politically safe. The
major exception has been the Korean Bar Association, which be-
came increasingly outspoken on human rights and related legal is-
sues in the 1970s and 1980s.
The government has attempted to keep tight controls on the in-
tellectual professions, sponsoring the formation of the Korean Fed-
eration of Education Associations and the Federation of Artistic
and Cultural Organizations of Korea. Membership in the Korean
Federation of Education Associations was compulsory for all
teachers through high-school level. Members of these umbrella
groups received significant medical benefits, and they tended to
avoid political controversy. The Korean Newspaper Association
and Korean Newspaper Editors' Association were politically cau-
tious during the early 1980s, but became much less constrained
during the early years of Roh's rule.
Dissident associations have frequently grown from the intellec-
tual sector of society. The Minjung Culture Movement Associa-
tion (mtnjung means populist) was formed in 1985 by dissident artists
and writers who did not want to belong to the state-controlled Fed-
eration of Artistic and Cultural Organizations of Korea. Similar
organizations of dissident journalists, such as the Association of
Journalists Dismissed in 1980, or the Democratic Press Movement
Association, often were dealt with harshly under the Fifth Repub-
lic. The Association of Korean Journalists, although more broad-
ly based and less ideological, was quick to resist censorship and,
after a change in the law in 1988, supported the formation ofjour-
nalists' unions.
The government has been especially sensitive about unautho-
rized professional associations among teachers. Many teachers, and
some opposition political leaders, have been determined to reduce
the state's control over the political views of teachers and the con-
tent of education. In early 1989, President Roh vetoed an
opposition-sponsored amendment to the Education Law that would
have allowed teachers to form independent unions. In spite of the
president's veto, activist leftist teachers—numbering about 10 per-
cent of the nation's primary through high-school faculties
—
announced their intention to form such a union. The National
Teachers Union (Chon'gyojo), inaugurated in late May 1989, criti-
cized the Korean Federation of Education Associations as
progovernment and weak in protecting teachers' rights (see Primary
and Secondary Schools, ch. 2). The Ministry of Education respond-
ed by dismissing more than 1,000 members of the new union in
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the spring and summer of 1989, resulting in the eventual with-
drawal of more than 10,000 additional teachers. The Agency for
National Security Planning conducted a well-publicized investiga-
tion into the union's ideology, with the implication that members
could be charged with aiding an antistate organization under the
National Security Act. Police broke up pro-National Teachers
Union rallies; members participating in a signature-gathering cam-
paign to support the union were charged with traffic violations.
Eventually, several teachers' union leaders received prison terms
on various charges. The Ministry of Education produced new guide-
lines that permitted teachers' colleges to deny admission to stu-
dents with activist records and that allowed district education boards
to screen out "security risks" when testing candidates for employ-
ment. These measures effectively halted the activities of the National
Teachers Union.
The modern Korean labor movement, including unions of skilled
and unskilled workers, dates to the first decade ofJapanese colonial
rule. South Korean law and constitutions since 1948 have recog-
nized the "three rights" of labor: the right to organize, the right
to bargain collectively, and the right to take collective action. In
practice, however, the government has consistently attempted to
control labor and mitigate the effects of unionism through the use
of a variety of legal and customary devices, including company-
supported unions, prohibitions against political activities by unions,
binding arbitration of disputes in public interest industries, which
include 70 percent of all organized labor, and the requirement that
all unions be affiliated with one of the seventeen government-
sponsored industrial unions and with a general coordinating body,
the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU). In the 1980s,
large companies, often supported by the police and intelligence
agencies of the government, also exerted pressure on unions to pre-
vent strikes, to undermine the development of white-collar unions,
to retain control of union leaders, and to prevent persons with some
college education from attempting to organize workers by taking
positions as industrial laborers.
Despite such measures, the government has never exercised
total control of the labor movement. Even the FKTU occasionally
has been able to file administrative suits against government rul-
ings or to lobby—sometimes successfully—against laws that would
have a negative impact on working conditions or rights of unions.
Through most of its existence, however, the federation has been
able to do little beyond submit proposals for legal reform to the
government. Throughout the postwar period, dissenting labor or-
ganizations either have attempted to function apart from the
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government-sanctioned structure under the FKTU, or have formed
rival umbrella organizations, such as the National Council of Trade
Unions, established in 1958.
South Korea experienced an explosion of labor disputes from
1987 through 1989 under the more open political conditions fol-
lowing the crisis of late June 1987 and the pressures created by
long-deferred improvements in wages and working conditions (see
table 13, Appendix; Social Classes in Contemporary South Korea,
ch. 2). More than 3,500 labor disputes occurred from August
through November 1987. Most were quickly resolved by negotiated
wage increases and by the prospect that another common
demand—freer scope for union activities—would be met in forth-
coming legislation. In 1988 labor-related laws were amended to
make it easier to establish labor unions and to reduce government
intervention in labor disputes. Unions were still prohibited,
however, from articulating any demands that the government in-
terpreted as political in nature.
In 1988 the number of unions increased from 4,000 to more than
5,700. This figure included numerous new white-collar unions
formed at research institutes, in the media, and within the larger
corporations.
There was a general privatization of labor-management conflict
during 1988 and 1989 as the government adopted a more neutral,
hands-off stance. Companies experimented widely with tactics such
as lockouts (5 in 1987; 224 in 1988), and labor unions achieved
new levels of joint action by workers in different regions and in-
dustries. The government's ability to manage organized labor
through the traditional means of controlling the FKTU declined.
The FKTU, under criticism for the many years it had represent-
ed the government more than labor, also began to take a more in-
dependent posture as the 1980s came to a close. In 1989 the
once-docile umbrella organization prepared to sponsor union can-
didates in anticipated local elections (an illegal activity under ex-
isting law) and held education seminars and rallies to press for
"economic democracy" through revision of labor laws and other
reforms. Notwithstanding the increasing ability of labor to organize
and to present economic demands, however, the government con-
tinued to suppress leftist labor groups that appeared to have broad
political goals or that questioned the legitimacy of the government,
such as the National Council of Labor Unions (Chonnohyop), which
was formally established in early 1990.
In early 1990, the government announced new measures to sup-
port its return to more restrictive policies governing strikes. The
number of intelligence agents at key industries was more than
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doubled (from 163 to 337) and a special riot police task force
—
sixty-three companies in strength—was deployed against "illegal"
strikes.
During the postwar period, articulation of workers' interests had
been weakest for South Korea's farming population. In 1946 the
government used the Korea Federation of Peasants to mobilize the
rural population against leftist peasant unions. The Federation of
Agricultural Cooperatives, established in 1957, was also largely
funded and administered by the state. Its purpose was not to
represent farmers' interests but to facilitate government control over
the purchase and sale of grain and farmers' purchases of fertilizer.
Although most South Korean farmers continued to belong to
cooperatives, two pressures converged in the late 1980s to change
the way in which farmers' interests were represented. First, as rural-
urban income disparities grew in the late 1970s and 1980s, farmer
dissatisfaction with the government cooperatives' role in setting
crop prices and the costs of agricultural supplies also increased (see
Agriculture, ch. 3). Some farmers turned to independent organi-
zations, such as the Korean Catholic Farmers Association or the
Christian Farmers Association. These groups, which were viewed
as dissident organizations by the government, performed a varie-
ty of services for farmers and also took public positions on govern-
ment agricultural and price policies, sometimes using mass rallies.
The second change, which affected larger numbers of farmers, was
the result of South Korea's growing trade surpluses in the late 1980s
(see Foreign Trade Policy, ch. 3). As the government responded
to pressure from major trading partners, such as the United States,
to open South Korea's domestic markets, farmers became increas-
ingly active in large-scale protest rallies against both the government
and the major political parties. As the 1990s began, it was clear
that the traditional harmony of political interests between a conser-
vative rural population and conservative governments had ended.
Political Extremism and Political Violence
The deliberate use of violence, including occasional assassina-
tion, to express or advance political goals was common among both
the right and the left in South Korea after liberation in 1945 and
up to the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. Subsequent
political violence up to the 1980s, apart from exchanges between
police and participants in political demonstrations or rallies, was
largely limited to the illegal government use of violence or the threat
of violence to suppress dissent and intimidate political opponents.
During the presidency of Syngman Rhee (1948-60), for example,
the government mobilized the Anticommunist Youth League and
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members of street gangs to smash facilities of critical newspapers
and intimidate opposition candidates for election (see The Syngman
Rhee Era, 1948-60, ch. 1). The Park government continued ille-
gal police practices, including torture of some dissidents, intellec-
tuals, and even members of the National Assembly, and was often
indirectly involved in violence. The Korean Central Intelligence
Agency (KCIA) also used various means, including physical threats,
to intimidate South Korean journalists in the United States. Such
methods continued under Chun, occasionally resulting in the deaths
of political defendants under police torture. Police were passively
present while hired thugs broke up dissident religious services or
union meetings. Under Roh Tae Woo, police handling of politi-
cal suspects retained some of the illegal violence of earlier times,
although improved media freedom also meant greater scrutiny of
police misconduct. In contrast with earlier regimes, however, the
Roh government permitted prosecution and conviction of police
officers and even of military personnel in several cases involving
violence during its first year in office.
Under a special "afforestation program" administered by the
Defense Security Command, more than 400 student activists were
punitively induced into the army during the Chun years. Accord-
ing to a Ministry of National Defense report, at least five commit-
ted suicide or were killed, and many were forced to become
informants (see The Defense Security Command, ch. 5). At least
50 people died (of some 10,000 incarcerated) in the government's
"triple purity" (samch'ong) reeducation camps in the early 1980s.
Ten years after the May 1980 Kwangju incident, many South
Koreans continued to believe that the initial violence committed by
armed Special Forces troops against civilian demonstrators on that
occasion was deliberate. The former martial law commander for the
region told a National Assembly committee in 1988 that civilian pro-
tests were not violent enough at the beginning to justify the use
of elite forces and that army brutality aggravated the situation.
Public violence against government institutions was rare from
the 1950s through the early 1980s. When students overthrew the
Syngman Rhee government in April 1960, mobs destroyed the
headquarters of Rhee' s Anticommunist Youth League. More spon-
taneous forms of violence often occurred during student protest
rallies in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, when small numbers of rock-
throwing students at the edges of large rallies clashed with club-
wielding riot police, or security forces dispatched martial arts
experts and plainclothes officers to beat or arrest demonstrators.
Students also occasionally beat up police informants or plainclothes
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officers. This pattern changed following the killings of students and
other demonstrators in Kwangju in May 1980.
The Kwangju incident permanently stained the legitimacy of the
Chun government for subsequent generations of student activists,
many of whom also blamed the United States for what they be-
lieved to be its supportive role. The use of Molotov cocktails by
some elements among student demonstrators, both as a counter
to increasingly effective police use of tear gas and as a reflection
of increased militancy, became a feature of student demonstrations
during the 1980s.
Another threshold was crossed in March 1982, when several stu-
dents deliberately set a fire in the American Cultural Center in
Pusan, causing severe damage and, inadvertently, the death of
another South Korean student studying in the building at the time.
In a related statement, the students said they were beginning an
anti-United States struggle to eliminate United States power from
South Korea. The students blamed the United States for causing
"the permanent national division of Korea" and for "supporting
the military regime that refuses democratization, social revolution,
and development."
In April 1985, radical students, together with veteran activists
released from prison the year before, formed the Struggle Com-
mittee for the Liberation of the Masses, the Attainment of Democra-
cy, and the Unification of the Nation, or Sammint'u. The ideology
of this organization borrowed from dependency theory in blam-
ing a "dependent industrialization process" dominated by the Unit-
ed States for South Korea's social and political problems.
Sammint'u supported various forms of direct action, including in-
filtration of labor unions and forcible occupations of United States
and South Korean government facilities. Sammint'u activists con-
ducted a number of such actions, including a three-day seizure of
the United States Information Service (USIS) building in Seoul
in May 1985 and the occupation of two regional offices of the Minis-
try of Labor in November of the same year. Although Sammint'u
was suppressed in 1986 under the National Security Act as an "anti-
state" organization, its emphasis on well-organized occupations
and other actions (rather than the more spontaneous forms of tradi-
tional student protest) and its ability to mobilize students across
campus lines marked a permanent change in student protest tac-
tics (see College Student Activism, ch. 2).
By the late 1980s, violence-prone student radicals, although a
small minority even among politically active students, demonstrated
increasing effectiveness in organizing occupations and arson as-
saults against facilities. In 1988, under the general guidance of the
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National Association of University Student Councils (Chondae-
hyop) and the Seoul Area Federation of Student Councils
(Soch'ongnyon), small groups of students armed with Molotov cock-
tails, metal pipes, and occasionally tear gas grenades or improvised
incendiary or explosive devices and staged more than two dozen
raids on United States diplomatic and military facilities. Students
also conducted a similar number of attacks against offices of the
government and ruling party and the suburban Seoul residence
of former President Chun (see table 13, Appendix).
Anti-United States attacks in 1989 began in February with a sei-
zure of the USIS library in Seoul and attempted arson at the Ameri-
can Cultural Center in Kwangju. Additional incidents continued
through the year at about the same level as in 1988, culminating
in the violent occupation of the United States ambassador's resi-
dence by six students in December. In the spring of 1989, there
were numerous incidents of arson and vandalism against Hyun-
dai automobile showrooms in many cities, as Chondaehyop mobi-
lized member organizations nationwide to support a strike by
Hyundai shipyard workers. Other attacks occurred throughout the
year against Democratic Justice Party (DJP) offices and South
Korean government facilities.
As the 1980s ended, however, violence-prone radical groups also
suffered setbacks and found themselves under increased pressure
from the courts, police, and public and student opinion. The deaths
of seven police officers in a fire set by student demonstrators in
Pusan in May 1989, the arrest of Chondaehyop leaders on Na-
tional Security Act charges stemming from the unauthorized trav-
el of a member of the organization to P'yongyang over the summer,
and the beating to death of a student informer by activists at one
university in Seoul in October contributed to this pressure. In stu-
dent council elections throughout the country in late 1989, students
at many campuses defeated student council officers associated with
the Chondaehyop's "national liberation" strategy, often replac-
ing them with other leaders who favored a "people's democracy"
approach, emphasizing organizational work among farmers and
the labor movement over violent assaults on symbolic targets, at
least for the near term.
Many South Korean commentators interpreted the outcome of
the 1989 campus elections as a renunciation of violent methods or
as a turn away from radical student activism. Other observers noted,
however, the ideological and organizational complexity of "peo-
ple's democracy" elements, some of which had in the past equaled
or exceeded Chondaehyop's commitment to violent activism. As
the 1990s began, it seemed likely that at least some radical elements,
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although perhaps increasingly driven underground like their coun-
terparts in Japan, would remain committed to the use of violence
as a political tool.
Human Rights
Traditional Korean political thought, rooted in neo-Confucianism,
placed some emphasis on benevolent rule and on the government's
paternalistic responsibility to redress grievances of the population.
These ideas were carried further in the nineteenth century by the
Tonghak Movement (tonghak means Eastern Learning), which es-
poused equality of the sexes and of social classes. Interest among
Koreans in modern human rights, however, and especially in civil
and political rights protected by law began late in the Choson Dy-
nasty (1392-1910) with the natural rights ideas of enlightenment
movement (kaehwa) reformers, such as Kim Ok-kyun, So Chae-
p'il, and Pak Yong-hyo (see The Choson Dynasty, ch. 1).
The Japanese colonial period (1910-45) saw further diffusion
of such ideas. In 1919 Koreans who had fledJapanese colonial rule
established a government-in-exile in Shanghai that affirmed wide-
ranging civil and political rights—freedoms of the ballot, religion,
press, movement, property, and social and sexual equality. Within
Korea in the 1920s, labor and tenant farmers unions spread the
idea of rights and provided experience in organizational and pro-
test techniques. As colonial rule continued, many Korean nation-
alists came to assume the desirability of a modern legal order and
due process of law, especially while experiencing dual legal stan-
dards and abuses such as torture and fabrication of evidence in
political cases. Meanwhile, Koreans serving in the colonial police
and receiving training in the Japanese Imperial Army often ab-
sorbed the increasingly stringent and authoritarian perspective of
Japanese militarism.
Human rights performance did not immediately improve fol-
lowing the liberation of Korea from Japanese rule in 1945. Many
factors—national division, ideological conflict, and violent confron-
tation even before the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950
—
contributed to this problem. Japanese-style practices held over from
the colonial days also were to blame. The United States Army Mili-
tary Government in Korea (1945-48), confronted with serious
problems of public order, found itself retaining the old colonial
police apparatus and its Korean personnel (see South Korea un-
der United States Occupation, 1945-48, ch. 1). United States-
sponsored legal reforms, such as an effort to institute habeas corpus
in 1946, often failed; attempts by United States advisers to prevent
South Korean police from using torture, especially in political cases,
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also were unsuccessful. Under Syngman Rhee, South Korea con-
tinued the prewar pattern of using law and the police for political
purposes—intimidating the judiciary, arresting journalists, and ap-
plying extralegal pressures against the teaching profession and mem-
bers of the new National Assembly.
Under the presidencies of Park and Chun such problems wors-
ened, and there were increasing signs of tension between the govern-
ment and its supporters, who sought to ignore or minimize such
rights, and many South Koreans, including some even within
the government, who believed that civil, legal, and political rights
should be honored. This tension was evident in the affirmations
of rights found in most of South Korea's postwar constitutions and
especially in the government's need for increasingly stringent mea-
sures to control a restive judiciary under theyusin constitution. The
forced resignations of judges and the resort to military tribunals
in some political trials were rationalized on national security
grounds, but only served to show that by the mid-1970s the gov-
ernment was, on such matters, no longer able to command the
respect and cooperation of a significant part of the country's legal
profession.
The Chun government modified some of the worst features of
the yusin constitution by removing the admissibility of confessions
as evidence, for example, but continued most of the abusive police
and judicial practices of the Park period with little change. Penal
sentences for people found guilty of offenses under certain politi-
cally relevant laws—the National Security Act and the Act Con-
cerning Assembly and Demonstration, for example—actually were
harsher under Chun than under the preceding yusin system.
In addition to the growing disaffection of the legal profession
in the 1970s and 1980s, South Korea's modernization had gener-
ated two social trends—rapid urbanization and dramatic increases
in literacy and education levels—that were essential to industriali-
zation, irreversible, and highly corrosive of traditional authoritar-
ian practices. Public outrage against the police torture and killing
of a student during an interrogation in early 1987 helped to fuel
the growing political crisis that culminated in the tulmultuous events
in June.
The agreement in late 1989 between opposition and government
parties concerning the legacy of the Fifth Republic left unresolved
the question of what the press and many politicians referred to as
revision of akpop (evil laws). These were laws long used in South
Korea to restrict and punish nonviolent political activity. The abo-
lition in 1988 of one such law, the Basic Press Act of December
1980, had important and immediate effects on freedom of the press.
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Other laws remained on the statute books and were increasingly
used in 1989 as the Roh administration reached the apparent limits
of its willingness to tolerate dissent. Despite Roh's initial reputa-
tion for moderation, police records reported in the press show that
by late 1989 the Roh government had more than doubled the Chun
administration's rate of arrests for political offenses.
As measured in numbers of persons under investigation, stand-
ing trial, or serving sentences, the Act Concerning Assembly and
Demonstration continued under Roh, as under the Fifth Repub-
lic, to be the law most frequently used to restrict and control non-
violent political expression. The law gave police chiefs, of whom
there were twenty-four in Seoul alone, the authority to deny per-
mission, without appeal, for any proposed demonstration. Police
also had wide discretion over treatment of participants in illegal
demonstrations, determining whether a given participant was to
be charged with sponsoring an illegal demonstration, which car-
ried the threat of a seven-year prison term, or with varying degrees
of participation, which could be punished as a misdemeanor or even
with a simple warning. Police had on occasion taken actions un-
der the law to prevent persons from attending meetings that the
police believed were "likely to breed social unrest."
The National Security Act, as amended in 1980, restricted "anti-
state activities" that endangered "the state or the lives and free-
dom of the citizenry. ' ' However, Seoul used the law not only against
espionage or sabotage, but also to control and punish domestic dis-
sent, such as the publication of unorthodox political commentary,
art, or literature, on the grounds that such expressions benefited
an "antistate organization." In divided Korea, almost any act of
opposition to the South Korean government could be and has been
characterized as benefiting North Korea. Arrests under the law have
been made for a wide variety of actions, including the sale of cas-
sette tapes containing antigovernment songs; the sale, possession,
or reading of books and other publications on the government's
banned list; or chanting anti-American slogans at a student rally.
Ordinary procedural protections of the Code of Criminal Proce-
dure were not provided for defendants for offenses under this law.
Any liaison with antistate organizations was also punishable un-
der the law, although in the late 1980s there was considerable de-
bate concerning the government's selectivity in allowing some
politicians and businessmen to travel to North Korea or meet with
North Korean officials while severely punishing critics of the govern-
ment who did the same thing. There was a surge in prosecutions
for various offenses under the National Security Act in 1989, despite
continuing talk of amending the law to facilitate broader contacts
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with the north. In early 1990, as the third year of Roh's adminis-
tration began and as the government mulled over plans to sign
several international agreements concerning human rights, it was
still unclear whether or when the promise of Roh's 1988 inaugural
speech, that "the day when freedoms and human rights could be
slighted in the name of economic growth and national security has
ended," would be redeemed.
The Media
Modern Korean journalism began after the opening of Korea
in 1876. The Korean press had a strong reformist and nationalis-
tic flavor from the beginning but faced efforts at political control
or outright censorship during most of the twentieth century. Many
Korean journalists established a tradition of remaining indepen-
dent. They were often critical of the government, zealously pro-
testing any attempts at press censorship. At annexation in 1910,
the Japanese governor general assumed direct control of the press
along with other public institutions. Following the March First
Movement in 1919, Japanese authorities loosened their overt con-
trol over cultural activities and permitted several Korean
newspapers to function while maintaining some behind-the-scenes
direction over politically sensitive topics. During the 1920s, Korean
vernacular newspapers, such as Tonga ilbo (East Asia Daily), and
intellectual journals, such as Kaebyok (Creation), conducted run-
ning skirmishes with Japanese censors. Japanese authorities pro-
hibited sales of individual issues on hundreds of occasions between
1926 and 1932. Japan's war mobilization in the ensuing years ended
any semblance of autonomy for the Korean press; all Korean-
language publications were outiawed in 1941.
Following the period of the United States Army Military Govern-
ment in Korea (1945-48), which saw a burgeoning of newspapers
and periodicals of every description as well as occasional censor-
ship of the media, almost all subsequent South Korean govern-
ments have at times attempted to control the media. Syngman
Rhee's government continued the military government's Ordinance
Number Eighty-Eight, which outlawed leftist newspapers. Rhee
also closed moderate newspapers and arrested reporters and pub-
lishers on numerous occasions between 1948 and 1960. On taking
power in 1961, Park Chung Hee's Supreme Council for National
Reconstruction closed all but fifteen of Seoul's sixty-four daily
newspapers and refused to register a comparable percentage of the
country's news services, weeklies, and monthly publications while
using its own radio and news agencies to promote its official line.
The Park government also used the Press Ethics Commission Law
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of 1964 and, after 1972, emergency decrees that penalized criti-
cism of the government to keep the media in line. In 1974 the
government ordered a number of journalists fired and used the
KCIA to force Tonga ilbo to stop its reporting on popular opposi-
tion to the Park government by intimidating the paper's advertisers.
During the Park and Chun years, the government exercised
considerable control and surveillance over the media through the
comprehensive National Security Act. In late 1980, the Chun gov-
ernment established more thorough control of the news media than
had existed in South Korea since the Korean War. Independent
news agencies were absorbed into a single state-run agency, numer-
ous provincial newspapers were closed, central newspapers were
forbidden to station correspondents in provincial cities, the Chris-
tian Broadcasting System network was forbidden to provide news
coverage, and two independent broadcasting companies were ab-
sorbed into the state-run Korean Broadcasting System (KBS). In
addition, the Defense Security Command, then commanded by
Roh Tae Woo, and the Ministry of Culture and Information or-
dered hundreds of South Korean journalists fired and banned from
newspaper writing or editing.
The Basic Press Act of December 1980 was the legal capstone
of Chun's system of media control and provided for censorship and
control of newspapers, periodicals, and broadcast media. It also
set the professional qualifications for journalists. Media censorship
was coordinated with intelligence officials, representatives of vari-
ous government agencies, and the presidential staff by the Office
of Public Information Policy within the Ministry of Culture and
Information using daily "reporting guidelines" (podo chich'im) sent
to newspaper editors. The guidelines dealt exhaustively with ques-
tions of emphasis, topics to be covered or avoided, the use of govern-
ment press releases, and even the size of headlines. Enforcement
methods ranged from telephone calls to editors to more serious forms
of intimidation, including interrogations and beatings by police.
One former Ministry of Culture and Information official told a
National Assembly hearing in 1988 that compliance during his ten-
ure from 1980 to 1982 reached about 70 percent.
By the mid-1980s, censorship of print and broadcast media had
become one of the most widely and publicly criticized practices of
the Chun government. Even the government-controlled Yonhap
News Agency noted in 1989 that "TV companies, scarcely worse
than other media, were the main target of bitter public criticism
for their distorted reporting for the government in the early 1980s.
"
Editorials called for abolition of the Basic Press Act and related
practices, a bill was unsuccessfully introduced in the National
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Assembly to the same end, and a public campaign to withhold com-
pulsory viewers' fees in protest against censorship by the KBS net-
work received widespread press attention. By the summer of 1986,
even the ruling party was responding to public opinion.
The political liberalization of the late 1980s brought a loosening
of press restraints and a new generation of journalists more will-
ing to investigate sensitive subjects, such as the May 1980 Kwangju
incident. Roh's eight-point declaration ofJune 29, 1987, provid-
ed for "a free press, including allowing newspapers to base cor-
respondents in provincial cities and withdrawing security officials
from newspaper offices." The South Korean media began a rapid
expansion. Seoul papers expanded their coverage and resumed the
practice of stationing correspondents in provincial cities. Although
temporarily still under the management of a former Blue House
press spokesman, the MBC television network, a commercial net-
work that had been under control of the state-managed KBS since
1980, resumed independent broadcasting. The number of radio
broadcast stations grew from 74 in 1985 to 1 1 1 (including both AM
and FM stations) by late 1988 and to 125 by late 1989. The num-
ber of periodicals rose as the government removed restrictions on
the publishing industry (see Transportation and Telecommunica-
tions, ch. 3; table 15, Appendix).
There also were qualitative changes in the South Korean me-
dia. The Christian Broadcasting System, a radio network, again
began to broadcast news as well as religious programming in 1987.
In the same year, the government partially lifted a long-standing
ban on the works of North Korean artists and musicians, many
ofwhom were of South Korean origin. A newspaper run by dissi-
dent journalists began publication in 1988. A number of other new
dailies also appeared in 1988. Many of the new weekly and monthly
periodicals bypassed the higher profits of the traditional general
circulation magazines to provide careful analyses of political, eco-
nomic, and national security affairs to smaller, specialized au-
diences. Observers noted a dramatic increase in press coverage of
previously taboo subjects such as political-military relations, fac-
tions within the military, the role of security agencies in politics,
and the activities of dissident organizations. Opinion polls dealing
with these and other sensitive issues also began to appear with in-
creasing regularity. Journalists at several of the Seoul dailies organ-
ized trade unions in late 1987 and early 1988 and began to press
for editorial autonomy and a greater role in newspaper manage-
ment.
In 1989 South Korea's four largest dailies, Hanguk ilbo, Chun-
gang ilbo, Choson ilbo, and Tonga ilbo, had a combined circulation of
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more than 6.5 million readers. The antiestablishment Hangydre sim-
mun (One Nation News) had 450,000 readers—less than the major
dailies or smaller papers like Kyonghyang simmun or Soul simmun but
larger than four more specialized economic dailies. All the major
dailies were privately owned, except for the government-controlled
Hanguk ilbo. Several other daily publications had specialized reader-
ships among sport fans and youth. Two English-language news-
papers, the government-subsidized Korea Herald and the Korea Times,
which was affiliated with the independent Soul simmun, were widely
read by foreign embassies and businesses. A Chinese-language daily
served South Korea's small Chinese population (see Population,
ch. 2).
The Yonhap News Agency provided domestic and foreign news
to government agencies, newspapers, and broadcasters. Yonhap
also provided news on South Korean developments in English by
computerized transmission via the Asia-Pacific News Network. Ad-
ditional links with world media were facilitated by four satellite
link stations. The International Broadcast Center established in
June 1988 served some 10,000 broadcasters for the 1988 Seoul
Olympics. The government's KBS radio network broadcast over-
seas in twelve languages. Two private radio networks, the Asia
Broadcasting Company and Far East Broadcasting Company,
served a wide regional audience that included the Soviet Far East,
China, and Japan.
The South Korean government also supported Naewoe Press,
which dealt solely with North Korean affairs. Originally a propagan-
da vehicle that followed the government line on unification policy
issues, Naewoe Press became increasingly objective and moderate
in tone in the mid-1980s in interpreting political, social, and eco-
nomic developments in North Korea. Vantage Point, an English-
language publication of Naewoe Press, provided in-depth studies
of North Korean social, economic, and political developments.
Except for two newspapers (one in Korean and one in English)
that the government owned or controlled and the state television
network, ownership of the media was for the most part distinct from
political or economic power. One exception was the conservative
daily, Chungang ilbo. Under the close oversight of its owner, the
late Samsung Group founder and multimillionaire Yi Pyong-ch'ol,
the paper and its affiliated TBC television network generally sup-
ported the Park government during the 1970s. Its relations with
the government became strained after 1980, however, when Chun
Doo Hwan forced TBC to merge with KBS. A journalists' strike
at Chungang ilbo in 1989, in one of many similar incidents at the
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major South Korean newspapers, won even greater management
and editorial independence.
Most of South Korea's major newspapers derived their financial
support from advertising and from their affiliation with major pub-
lishing houses. The Tonga Press, for example, published not only
the prestigious daily Tonga ilbo, but also a variety of other periodi-
cals, including a newspaper for children, the general circulation
monthly Sin tonga (New East Asia), a women's magazine, and spe-
cialized reference books and magazines for students. Throughout the
postwar period, Tonga ilbo has been noted for its opposition sympathies.
South Korea's principal antiestablishment newspaper, Hangyore
simmun, began publication in May 1988. It was founded by dissident
journalists who were purged by the government in the early 1970s
or in 1980; many of the paper's reporters and editorial staff left posi-
tions on mainstream newspapers to join the new venture. The struc-
ture and approach of the paper reflected the founders' view that in
the past the South Korean news media had been too easily co-opted
by the government. The paper had a human rights department as
well as a mass media department to keep an eye on the government's
press policy and to critique the ideological and political biases of
other newspapers. The paper's nationalism and interest in national
reunification were symbolically represented in the logo, which depict-
ed Lake Ch'onji at the peak of Mount Paektu in North Korea; in
the exclusive use of the Korean alphabet; and by the type font in
which the paper's name was printed—the font dated from a famous
Korean publication of the eighteenth century. The paper was printed
horizontally, rather than vertically like other Seoul dailies. In other
innovations, the Hangyore simmun relied on sales revenues, private
contributions, and the sale of stock, rather than on advertising from
major corporations, in line with its claim to be "the first newspaper
in the world truly independent of political power and large capi-
tal. " The newspaper came under increasing government pressure
in 1989 (see Political Dynamics, this ch.).
South Korea also had extensive and well-developed visual me-
dia. The first Korean film was produced in 1919, and cinemas sub-
sequently were built in the larger cities. The result of the spread
of television sets and radios was the dissemination of a homogenized




The Constitution of the Sixth Republic vests the conduct of foreign
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affairs in the presidency and the State Council, subject to the ap-
proval of the National Assembly. The president and the State Coun-
cil, through the prime minister and the minister of foreign affairs,
make periodic reports on foreign relations to the legislature. The
president receives or dispatches envoys without legislative confir-
mation; treaties, however, must receive legislative consent. Decla-
rations of war, the dispatch of troops overseas, and the stationing
of foreign troops within the national borders also are subject to legis-
lative approval (Article 60 of the Constitution). The National As-
sembly has a standing Foreign Affairs Committee that reports its
deliberations to plenary sessions of the assembly. The assembly may
also establish ad hoc committees to consider questions of special
importance to the state.
Constitutionally, major foreign policy objectives are established
by the president. The chief foreign policy advisers in the State Coun-
cil are the prime minister, who heads the cabinet, and the minister
of foreign affairs. From time to time, these officials may be ques-
tioned by the National Assembly; the Assembly may pass a recom-
mendation for the removal from office of the prime minister or a
State Council member (Article 63). The president is assisted by
the National Security Council in the formulation and execution
of foreign, military, and domestic policies related to national security
prior to their deliberation by the State Council (Article 91). The
Agency for National Security Planning, its mission akin to that
of a combined United States Central Intelligence Agency and Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation, has direct access to the president and
operates at his personal direction in the overall conduct of foreign
policy (see The Agency for National Security Planning, ch. 5).
Diplomatic missions abroad conduct foreign policy. The Ministry
of Foreign Affairs was established with functional and area divi-
sions. The foreign ministry staff consists of civil service members
and a highly professionalized career foreign service corps, select-
ed on the basis of at least a college education and performance in
a highly competitive examination supervised by the Ministry of
Government Administration. Regarded as prestigious social posi-
tions, diplomatic posts attract ambitious and bright individuals who
undergo an intensive training program conducted by the Foreign
Affairs Research Institute. The institute in the late 1980s had a
very rigorous curriculum in international diplomacy, specialized
area training, and intensive language training.
Basic Goals and Accomplishments
The external posture of South Korea in general, and toward
North Korea in particular, began a new chapter in the 1980s. While
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retaining its previous goal—enhancing political legitimacy, mili-
tary security, and economic development by maintaining close ties
with the West—South Korea greatly expanded its diplomatic
horizons by launching its ambitious pukpang chongch 'aek (see Glos-
sary), northern policy, or Nordpolitik. Nordpolitik was Seoul's ver-
sion of the Federal Republic of Germany's (West Germany)
Ostpolitik of the early 1970s. Although the policy's origins can be
traced back to 1973 under Park, it was greatly invigorated by Roh.
Seoul's Nordpolitik was designed for a number of rather ambi-
tious but initially ill-defined objectives. Seoul's basic dilemma in
its Nordpolitik appeared to be how to reconcile its traditional ties
with the West with its new opportunities in the East. First,
policymakers felt that their economic and military reliance on the
West was excessive, mendicant, and too lengthy. Seoul sought to
correct this situation by establishing its own self-reliant global
posture. This desire to be less dependent became particularly acute
as Seoul's Western allies greatly improved relations with Eastern
Europe, the Soviet Union, and China.
Second, Nordpolitik was designed to expand and diversify trade
relations on a global scale to cope with increasing trade protec-
tionism from the United States. Intentionally or not, the policy
aroused anti-Americanism. Ironically enough, the rising anti-
United States feeling was accompanied by increasing demands for
economic and political democracy, culminating in the Kwangju
incident in May 1980.
Finally, Nordpolitik involved the pursuit of wide-ranging rela-
tions with socialist countries and contacts and dialogue with North
Korea. It had often been observed that political leaders in Pyong-
yang and Seoul utilized their confrontational postures to sustain
their political legitimacy. Claiming that Pyongyang's response had
been far from satisfactory, Seoul's policymakers solicited assistance
and cooperation from Pyongyang's socialist allies to induce and
persuade P'yongyang to become more accommodating. Yet Seoul's
success in improving relations with P'yongyang' s socialist allies had
not resulted in substantially improved relations with P'yongyang
by 1990. In fact, for the short term, Seoul even might have less-
ened its chances for improved relations with P'yongyang by hav-
ing improved its relations with North Korea's socialist allies and
by raising the question of whether Nordpolitik was primarily
designed to confront and compete with P'yongyang. Thus far,
Nordpolitik clearly demonstrated the limited power of P'yongyang'
s
socialist allies, particularly Moscow and Beijing, vis-a-vis the ex-
tremely self-reliant North Korea. In reality, Seoul may have grossly
underestimated Pyongyang's firmly established independence.
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On the whole, however, Nordpolitik was successful, and Seoul's
accomplishments could be readily observed in sports, trade, and
diplomacy. The 1988 Seoul Olympics was a major catalyst for Nord-
politik. It was the first Olympic Games in twelve years not marred
by a bloc-level boycott and had the highest participation ever— 1 59
nations and more than 9,000 athletes. Seoul gained new global
recognition and visibility as more than 3 billion people around the
world watched the games being televised live.
Had it not been for the North Korean bombing ofKAL 858 over
the Andaman Sea in November 1987, Seoul might have been more
willing to reach out to P'yongyang. While the much-feared and
predicted North Korean misbehavior over South Korea's staging
of the Olympics did not materialize, Seoul probably was relieVed
by Pyongyang's absence from the games.
Seoul's international trade record has been impressive (see For-
eign Economic Relations, ch. 3). While encountering, along with
other newly industrialized nations, mounting trade friction with
the United States and other major markets, Seoul emerged in the
late 1980s as the world's tenth-largest trading nation. Economic
reforms and the open-door policies of socialist countries, coupled
with their recognition of Seoul's economic growth, pushed economic
trade and cooperation between South Korea and socialist coun-
tries into full swing.
Perhaps Seoul's most impressive success was in diplomacy. Liter-
ally implementing the 1988 Olympics slogan, "From Seoul to the
World, and from the World to Seoul," by the beginning of 1990
South Korea had established diplomatic relations with 133 coun-
tries and had 138 diplomatic missions, including representative
offices and a consulate department in Moscow. Conversely, North
Korea had diplomatic relations with 102 countries and 85 overseas
missions. An impressive number of young South Korean diplo-
mats were trained in the West and actively implemented Nord-
politik. These diplomats were also supported by the aggressive
worldwide market diversification programs of South Korea's big
business establishments, the chaebol, and by an increasingly large
number of overseas South Koreans, many of whom become
salespersons of South Korean products (see The Origins and De-
velopment of Chaebol, ch. 3).
After Roh's inauguration in February 1988, Nordpolitik was par-
ticularly invigorated. In aJuly 7, 1988, statement primarily aimed
at insuring the success of the Olympics, Roh unveiled a six-point
plan to ease forty years of bitter confrontation between Seoul and
P'yongyang and to clear the way for peaceful unification of the
divided peninsula. In the afterglow of the Olympics, Roh made
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his diplomatic debut as the first South Korean president to address
the United Nations (UN) General Assembly, on October 18, 1988.
Roh's speech called for a six-nation consultative conference to dis-
cuss a broad range of issues concerning peace, stability, progress,
and prosperity in Northeast Asia. Pledging unilaterally never to
use force first against North Korea, Roh proposed to replace the
existing 1953 armistice agreement with a peace treaty.
Relations with the United States
South Korea's relations with the United States have been most
extensive and intense since 1948. This relation was perhaps inevita-
ble because South Korea was primarily established by the United
States and was saved from a total collapse in the course of the
Korean War (1950-53) by the United States-initiated, United
Nations-sponsored rescue operation. During the subsequent four
decades, however, Seoul came of age economically, politically, and
even militarily and was no longer as economically or militarily de-
pendent on the United States. Instead, by the 1990s it was seeking
to establish a partnership for progress. The Seoul-Washington rela-
tionship in this transition was increasingly subject to severe strains.
Trade had become a serious source of friction between the two
countries. In 1989 the United States was South Korea's largest and
most important trading partner, and South Korea was the seventh-
largest market for United States goods and the second-largest market
for its agricultural products. Friction, however, had been caused
in the late 1980s by South Korea's trade surplus. Correcting and
eliminating this trade imbalance became the center of economic
controversy between Seoul and Washington. Although Seoul gave
in to Washington's demands to avoid being designated as a "pri-
ority foreign country" (PFC) under the United States "Super 301
"
provisions of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988,
economic policymakers in Seoul greatiy resented this unilateral eco-
nomic threat. They also feared that the PFC designation would
fuel anti-Americanism throughout South Korea.
Security was another source of strain. Some policymakers in
Seoul and Washington maintained that United States forces should
remain in South Korea as long as Seoul wanted and needed them.
Not only did 94 percent of South Koreans support the presence
of United States forces, but even the vocal opposition parties fa-
vored a continued United States military presence in South Korea.
Stability in the peninsula, they argued, had been maintained be-
cause strong Seoul-Washington military cooperation had deterred
further aggression.
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Other policymakers, however, felt that United States troops
should gradually be leaving South Korea. They argued that South
Korea in the late 1980s was more economically, militarily, and po-
litically capable of coping with North Korea. Moreover, they doubt-
ed that P'yongyang could contemplate another military action,
given its acrimonious relationships with Moscow and Beijing. In
Washington, meanwhile, an increasing number of United States
policymakers advocated gradual troop withdrawal for budgetary
reasons. The consultations on restructuring the Washington-Seoul
security relationship held during Secretary of Defense Richard B
.
Cheney's February 1990 visit to South Korea marked the begin-
ning of the change in status of United States forces—from a lead-
ing to a supporting role in South Korea's defense. In addition, Seoul
was asked to increase substantially its contribution to defense costs.
Although the precise amount of savings would be difficult to mea-
sure, the United States would likely save at least US$2 billion to
US$3 billion annually if defense costs were restructured as the United
States wished. Furthermore, disengagement would avoid the potential
for American entanglement in complicated internal South Korean
politics. In short, it was suggested that it was time for Seoul to be
treated as an independent entity responsible for its own security.
Politics also strained relations between Seoul and Washington.
An increasingly sensitive South Korean nationalism was faced with
what Seoul viewed as a hardened Washington. The United States
role in the May 1980 Kwangju uprising was the single most press-
ing South Korean political issue of the 1980s. Even after a decade,
Kwangju citizens and other Koreans still blamed the United States
for its perceived involvement in the bloody uprising.
Washington's policymakers applauded Nordpolitik as a neces-
sary adjustment of the relationship between Seoul and Moscow.
However, the South Korean press contributed to a distorted zero-
sum notion of the situation, suggesting that improving ties with
the Soviet Union would cause strains in the relationship with the
United States. In his February 1989 speech to the South Korean
National Assembly, President George Bush defined continuity and
change as the guideposts in Seoul-Washington relations.
Relations with the Soviet Union
Seoul-Moscow relations entered a new era in the 1980s. In many
ways, Roh's Nordpolitik and Mikhail Gorbachev's "New Think-
ing" had something in common—they were attempts to reverse
their nations' recent histories. Their efforts, while supported by
popular longings, still confronted serious resistance from conser-
vative and powerful bureaucracies. In a fundamental sense, the
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Soviet economic crisis appeared responsible for Moscow's improved
relations with Seoul. Politically, Gorbachev had signaled Soviet
interest in improving relations with all countries in the Asia-Pacific
region irrespective of sociopolitical system, including South Korea,
as was clearly spelled out in his July 1986 Vladivostok and August
1988 Krasnoyarsk speeches.
Improved Seoul-Moscow relations appear to have been careful-
ly and systematically planned in three related stages: sports, trade,
and political relations. The Seoul Olympics was a major catalyst.
The Soviets were eager to participate in the games, if only for the
sake of the athletic competition. Seoul's most honored guests were
from the Soviet Union. Moscow sent more than 6,000 Soviets to
South Korea. Soviet tourist ships came to Pusan and Inch'on, and
Aeroflot planes landed in Seoul. And when the Soviet team head-
ed for home, it also took along thirty-six South Korean television
sets, seven minibuses, four large buses, four cars, and one copy
machine— all gifts from Daewoo.
Economically, Seoul and Moscow were natural partners. South
Korea had been seeking to trade with the Soviet Union even be-
fore Gorbachev came to power. Gorbachev desired foreign capital
and high technology, as well as Seoul's help in alleviating the Soviet
economic crisis through direct investment, joint ventures, and trade.
Moreover, with the advantage of geographic proximity, South
Korea was an ideal source of badly needed consumer goods and
managerial skills. As early as May 1979, during a visit to Helsinki,
then South Korean minister of foreign affairs Pak Tong-jin signed
an agreement obtaining Finnish assistance in exporting South
Korean products to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Seoul
has welcomed trade opportunities with Moscow and considers the
Soviet Union a significant part of the global market. Moreover,
the natural resources Seoul increasingly needs—oil, metals, tim-
ber, and fish—are abundant in the Soviet Far East. Trade with
the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and China would also allevi-
ate South Korea's apprehension over the United States' increas-
ing trade protectionism. Moreover, South Korea's expanding trade
with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union initially was encouraged
by the United States, although Washington later became increas-
ingly concerned over possible high-technology transfers.
Because of the lack of diplomatic relations, most South Korean-
Soviet trade initially was indirect; Eastern Europe, Hong Kong,
Japan, and Singapore served as intermediaries. With an increas-
ing volume of trade, Seoul and Moscow began trading direcdy, using
facilities near Vladivostok and Pusan. Several major South Korean
257
South Korea: A Country Study
businesses, including Daewoo, Sunkyong, and Lucky-Goldstar,
traded directly with the Soviet Union in 1990.
Based on mutual economic interests, the Korean Trade Promo-
tion Corporation (KOTRA) and the Soviet Chamber ofCommerce
and Industry exchanged a trade memorandum in 1988 pledging
mutual assistance in establishing trade offices in 1989. During a
six-day visit to Seoul in October 1988, Vladimir Golanov, deputy
chairman of the Soviet Chamber of Commerce and Industry, was
received by officials of South Korea's major multinationals.
KOTRA president Yi Sun-gi signed the trade memorandum in
Moscow in December 1988. Seoul's trade office in Moscow opened
in July 1989; Moscow's trade office in Seoul opened in April 1989.
In December 1989, Seoul invited Soviet officials to attend a trade
exhibition where members of the Soviet state-run Tekhsnabeksport
displayed impressive high-technology items.
Political relations were developing gradually. South Korea's new-
found wealth and technological prowess had been attracting the
interest of a growing number of socialist nations. In initiating Nord-
politik, its chief architect Pak Ch'6r-6n—Roh's confidential for-
eign policy adviser—was rumored to have visited Moscow to consult
with Soviet policymakers. Kim Young Sam visited Moscow from
June 2 to June 10, 1989, with the apparent approval of the Roh
administration. Selected from among several other South Korean
politicians (including Kim Dae Jung, who had reportedly been in-
vited to Moscow) to make certain that the newly emerging Seoul-
Moscow relationship would proceed steadily, Kim Young Sam was
received as a guest of the Soviet Institute of World Economy and
International Relations (IMEMO). He participated in talks with
various Soviet officials, including the newly elected chairman of
the Supreme Soviet, academician Yevgeni Primakov. In a joint state-
ment, the Reunification Democratic Party (RDP) and IMEMO
pledged to promote closer trade and cultural ties between the two
nations. While Kim Young Sam was in Moscow, the Kremlin
announced that it would allow some 300,000 Soviet-Koreans who
had been on the Soviet island of Sahkalin since the end of World
War II to return permanently to South Korea—clearly a reflec-
tion of the continuing improvement in Seoul-Moscow relations.
Moscow even arranged a Seoul-P'yongyang meeting. During
the meeting, which was planned by IMEMO, Kim Young Sam,
with Roh's prior approval, met with the North Korean ambassador
to the Soviet Union, Kwon Hui-gyong, who reportedly proposed
a regular exchange between the RDP and the Korean Workers'
Party (KWP), as well as a North-South summit meeting. Kim
also met with Ho Tarn, chairman of the Committee for Peaceful
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Reunification of the Fatherland (CPRF), who came to Moscow
from P'yongyang.
The progress in Seoul-Moscow relations was extraordinary.
Given the complementary and parallel interests between Seoul and
Moscow, their relations were likely to proceed even if there were
temporary setbacks. A highly experienced South Korean diplomat,
Kong No-myong, was assigned to the Moscow consulate; an equally
experienced Soviet diplomat was posted to Seoul. In June 1990,
Roh held his first summit with President Mikhail S. Gorbachev
in San Francisco. Moscow's "Seoul Rush" may be regarded as
an effort to reconcile (and possibly to terminate) its past political-
military obligations to P'yongyang with the new economic and stra-
tegic opportunities in Seoul. Seoul's "Moscow Rush" had been
conceived primarily as a way to utilize its growing economic power
for political purposes, particularly in its relations with P'yong-
yang. On the other hand, if indeed the final destination of Nord-
politik was P'yongyang, Seoul had thus far proved to be less
successful than Moscow.
Relations with Japan
Korea is geographically close, yet emotionally distant from Japan.
Given the historical relationship between the two countries, the
paradoxical nature of their relation is readily understandable. Since
normalizing relations in 1965 at the urging of the United States,
Seoul and Tokyo have held annual foreign ministerial conferences.
The usual issues discussed have been trade, the status of the Korean
minority population inJapan, the content of textbooks dealing with
the relationship, Tokyo's equidistant policy between P'yongyang
and Seoul, and the occasional problems (see Foreign Policy, ch. 1).
At the first of three ministerial conferences held in 1987 (in Seoul,
New York, and Geneva, respectively), the two countries' foreign
ministers discussed pending issues, including Seoul's trade deficit
with Tokyo. The Japanese minister of foreign affairs pledged to as-
sist Seoul in its role as host of the Olympics. Seoul and Tokyo signed
a bilateral agreement on sea rescue and emergency cooperation.
The 1988 foreign ministerial conference was held in Tokyo. There
the two countries agreed to expand exchanges of youths, students,
and teachers and to establish the twenty-first century committee
between the two nations, as well as a joint security consultative
committee for the Seoul Olympics.
Roh's Nordpolitik somewhat relaxed Seoul's vehement opposi-
tion to Tokyo's approach to P'yongyang. TheJapan Socialist Party,
in particular, has become active in improving relations not only
between P'yongyang and Tokyo, but also between itself and Seoul.
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As the Japan Socialist Party has abandoned its posture favoring
P'yongyang, Seoul has welcomed the new equidistant policy, in-
viting a former secretary general of the Japan Socialist Party,
Ishibashi Masashi, to Seoul in October 1988. Ishibashi's visit was
unusually productive, not only in improving his party's image in
Seoul, but also in his reported willingness to mediate between Seoul
and P'yongyang. Although Tokyo appeared willing to assist Seoul
in improving relations not only with P'yongyang but also with Bei-
jing, it did not seem to welcome the much-improved Seoul-Moscow
relationship. Further, Seoul-Tokyo relations became somewhat
strained when in 1989 Tokyo began steps to improve relations with
P'yongyang.
Relations with China
Nordpolitik has been viewed as less attractive in Beijing than
in Moscow. Beijing's needs for Seoul in the 1980s were hardly
matched with those of Moscow, particularly in economic terms.
Still, because of complementary economic needs and geographic
proximity, South Korea and China began to trade actively. The
absence of any official relations, however, made it difficult to ex-
pand trade between Seoul and Beijing because South Korea could
not legally protect its citizens and business interests in China.
Beijing, in comparison with Moscow, has been politically closer
to P'yongyang, a situation that has slowed political improvements
between Beijing and Seoul despite the increasing volume of trade
between the two countries. Furthermore, China has attempted to
mediate between North Korea and the United States and North
Korea and Japan and also has initiated and promoted tripartite
talks among P'yongyang, Seoul, and Washington.
Active South Korean-Chinese people-to-people contacts have
been encouraged. Academics, journalists, and particularly fami-
lies divided between South Korea and China were able to exchange
visits freely in the late 1980s. Nearly 2 million ethnic Koreans, es-
pecially in the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture in China's
Jilin Province, have interacted with South Koreans.
It has been difficult to determine what effect the political tur-
moil in China will have on Sino-Korean relations. After the mili-
tary crackdown on demonstrators in Beijing in June 1989,
P'yongyang predictably came out in support of Beijing's repres-
sive actions. Seoul, on the other hand, produced a more muted
response that did not condone the actions in Tiananmen Square
but did not condemn them either. Trade between the two coun-
tries continued to increase.
260
Government and Politics
Relations with North Korea
Nordpolitik's final destination—P'yongyang—has proved difficult
to reach. After nearly two decades, inter-Korean relations had not
improved measurably. In fact, it may be argued that political leaders
in Seoul and P'yongyang have skillfully used the perceived mutual
threat to maintain and justify their political legitimacy. Their pos-
tures may seem reasonable, given that until the precarious 1953
armistice agreement is replaced by a permanent peace treaty, the
Korean War cannot be considered completely over. Nevertheless,
Seoul and P'yongyang have been increasing their contacts across
and around the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in a gradual and un-
even fashion. These expanding contacts appear quite natural be-
cause there are an estimated 10 million separated family members.
Moreover, South Korean business leaders have been keenly aware
of potential economic benefits in improved relations with North
Korea. Inasmuch as inter-Korean contacts are gradually becom-
ing a "growth industry," their prospects appear promising.
Inter-Korean relations may be divided into four periods. The
first stage covered the period between 1972 and 1973; the second
stage was initiated by Pyongyang's delivery of relief goods to South
Korea after a typhoon caused devastating floods in 1984; and the
third stage began with the exchange of home visits and perform-
ing artists in 1985. The fourth stage, activated by Nordpolitik un-
der Roh, was represented by expanding public and private contacts
between the two Koreas. These working-level contacts have included
Red Cross talks aimed at exchanging home visits by divided fami-
lies and performing artists; sports talks aimed at establishing a uni-
fied team for the 1990 Beijing Asian Games; economic trade at
the level of premiers; preliminary talks for joint parliamentary meet-
ings; and expanded academic and religious exchanges.
The Nordpolitik blueprint—Roh's declaration ofJuly 7, 1988
—
opened a new chapter in inter-Korean dialogue. Calling for the
building of a single "national commonwealth," Roh solicited the
assistance of Washington and Tokyo to improve Seoul's relations
with Moscow and Beijing. At the same time, he encouraged Wash-
ington and Tokyo to improve relations with P'yongyang and to ex-
pand inter-Korean exchanges. Roh urged a positive response from
P'yongyang; North Korea's reaction, however, was not positive.
P'yongyang issued an immediate and detailed statement on July
11, 1988. The CPRF dismissed Roh's proposal as old wine in a
new bottle, claiming that only the 1972 three basic principles for
Korean reunification—reunification by peaceful means, by tran-
scending ideological differences (nationalism), and without external
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interference (self-determination)—could be the basis to improve
inter-Korean dialogue. Seen from Pyongyang's perspective, Roh's
July 7 proposal was nothing more than a political ploy to cope with
increasing radical student agitation that opposed Seoul's hosting
of the Olympics without Pyongyang's participation. Consequendy,
Roh's statement angered rather than mollified Pyongyang's
posture, which was based on Kim II Sung's proposal to establish
a Democratic Confederal Republic of Korea.
Meanwhile, Seoul began to speak more openly about the rising
level of direct and indirect inter-Korean trade, much to the dis-
pleasure of P'yongyang. P'yongyang claimed that Seoul had fabri-
cated these trade stories. By 1988, however, Seoul began to reduce
tariffs and other duties to liberalize trade with P'yongyang. Trade
statistics provided by Seoul and P'yongyang on north-south trade
were largely unreliable inasmuch as each government had its own
reasons for reporting high or low figures. Much of the trade was
conducted through third parties.
Pyongyang's response to Seoul consisted of three points: ask-
ing for the repeal of the National Security Act, which designated
P'yongyang an enemy; making a declaration of nonaggression; and
establishing a "Peaceful Reunification Committee." Over the next
few months, Roh's government attempted to make progress toward
satisfying each of these requirements. In his October 18, 1988, Unit-
ed Nations speech, Roh advocated convening a six-nation consul-
tative conference to achieve a permanent peace setdement in Korea
and called for establishing a partnership with P'yongyang. In his
1989 New Year's address, Kim II Sung extended an invitation to
the presidents of the major South Korean political parties and re-
ligious leaders, including Cardinal Kim Soo Hwan, Reverend Mun
Ik-hwan, and Reverend Paek Ki-wan, for a leadership-level inter-
Korean reunification meeting to be held in P'yongyang. However,
any meaningful inter-Korean dialogue bogged down at Pyong-
yang's objections to the annual United States-South Korean Team
Spirit military exercises.
Economic relations have demonstrated more promise. An autho-
rized public visit to North Korea by Chong Chu-yong, honorary
chairman of the Hyundai Group, in early 1989 (in technical viola-
tion of South Korea's National Security Act) was a remarkable
breakthrough. After years of behind-the-scene efforts, Chong,
through a South Korean intermediary in Japan, was invited by
P'yongyang and fulfilled his long-cherished dream of seeing his
relatives at his native village, near scenic Kumgang-san. Chong
was received in P'yongyang by Ho Tarn, Chairman of the Com-
mittee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland, and by
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business leaders eager to discuss large-scale economic cooperation,
such as joint ventures and development of the tourist industry.
Chong's visit caused euphoric expectations and also engendered other
visits.
Many of Chong's expected business dealings, however, suffered
temporary setbacks after his return to South Korea. These setbacks
were primarily caused by the unauthorized visits to North Korea
of Reverend Mun Ik-hwan (March-April 1989), South Korean law-
maker So Kyong-won (who had secretly visited P'yongyang in Au-
gust 1988, had been accused of the visit in June 28, 1989, and had
been sentenced in December 1989 to fifteen years in prison), and
dissident South Korean student representative, Im Su-kyong (who
had attended the thirteenth World Youth and Student Festival, July
1-8, 1989, in P'yongyang and later had been sentenced to a prison
term). The government's harsh handling of these visits clearly
showed that it intended to keep the initiative in dealings with North
Korea, but the action also appeared to some Koreans to contradict
Roh' s July 7 statement encouraging free inter-Korean contacts at
various levels. That Roh's statement itself seemed to disregard the
National Security Act added momentum to dissident calls for the
law's abrogation or revision.
Relations with International Organizations and the Third World
South Korea has been very active in the United Nations (UN)
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even though, as of 1990, it was not a member. Seoul has taken
a vigorous part in the activities of various subsidiary and special-
ized UN agencies, as well as other international organizations, and
has had active permanent missions to the UN, the UN Economic
and Social Council and its Economic and Social Commission for
Asia and the Pacific, and the European Community. An increas-
ing number ofUN Security Council members, including the Soviet
Union, tended to consider seriously Seoul's bid for separate entry
into the UN. This move was vehemently opposed by North Korea,
which claimed that such a recognition would make the division of
Korea permanent.
Seoul's activities in the Pacific Economic Cooperation Confer-
ence (PECC) were particularly noteworthy. As a founding mem-
ber of the PECC, South Korea played a key role in liberalizing trade
networks throughout the entire Pacific region. The South Korean
national committee of the PECC represented academic, business,
and government interests. The national committee was extremely
useful not only in formulating Seoul's trade policies, but also in com-
municating these policies to other members' national committees and
in successfully negotiating mutually advantageous trade agreements.
Equally impressive has been Seoul's diplomacy toward the de-
veloping world. Being a developing nation itself, South Korea has
identified with other developing nations. For this reason, and in ap-
parent competition with P'yongyang, Seoul has been actively seek-
ing to improve relations, particularly with nonaligned nations, based
on the principles of good neighborliness, reciprocity, and equality.
As ofJanuary 1990, Seoul had full diplomatic relations with seventy-
eight members of the Nonaligned Movement, including Yugosla-
via and Algeria. To promote economic assistance and expand trade,
Seoul established the Economic Development Cooperation Fund in
1987. South Korea signed three loan agreements: US$13 million
for a road construction project in Indonesia, US$10 million for
modernization of fishing vessels in Peru, and US$10 million for rail-
way projects in Nigeria. To promote better relations with develop-
ing countries on the basis of south-south cooperation, Roh made
state visits to Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei in November 1988.
Future Prospects
Seoul became more globally conscious in the 1980s. South Korean
contacts with foreigners have been largely a post-Korean War
phenomenon. Indeed, Seoul's expanding foreign business contacts
have been greatiy stimulated by the fierce rivalry with North Korea.
Seoul's basic goals are still to enhance political legitimacy, military
security, and economic development vis-a-vis P'yongyang. After the
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1988 Seoul Olympics, however, South Korea's diplomatic horizon
was greatly expanded because of Roh's Nordpolitik, which had suc-
cessfully transformed South Korea's sports industry, economic re-
lations, and diplomacy (although its success with P'yongyang was
limited)
.
Lacking a reconciliation with North Korea—the final destina-
tion of Nordpolitik—Roh's remarkable accomplishments will re-
main incomplete. In his 1990 New Year policy statement, Roh
observed that "the East European wave of reform toward freedom
and prosperity is bound to teach North Korea before long. ' ' He
added that he hoped that "similar change will take place in the
North in an orderly and peaceful fashion." Roh pledged "[a]ll-
out efforts ... to convince North Korea . . . that it should join
the trend of world history and open up."
* * *
A number of introductory books on South Korean domestic pol-
itics and foreign relations are available in English. Ki-baik Lee's
A New History ofKorea is a Korean scholar's perspective on Korean
political history, valuable chiefly for its examination of the period
before 1945. Ramon H. Myers and Mark Peattie's The Japanese
Colonial Empire, 1895-1945 sheds light on the colonial roots of sub-
sequent South Korean political cultural and behavior. Young Whan
Kihl's Politics and Policies in Divided Korea compares political leader-
ship and styles in the two Koreas, while Ralph N. Clough's Em-
battled Korea is a thorough and cogent treatment of diplomacy and
extradiplomatic foreign policies as seen through the prism of rivalry
between the two Koreas. Dae-Kyu Yoon's Law and Political Authority
in Korea is an excellent and detailed study of the interaction be-
tween law and politics in the Republic of Korea.
A number of useful articles on South Korean foreign relations
and the United States-Korean relationship are contained in Robert
A. Scalapino's and Hongkoo Lee's Korea-U.S. Relations. Donald
Stone Macdonald's The Koreans, although not limited to politics,
is a useful survey. David I. Steinberg's The Republic of Korea con-
tains many insightful observations on South Korean politics. Kim
Dae Jung is the only major political figure to have his views pub-
lished extensively in English. Mass Participatory Economy gives his
views on South Korean political economy as of the mid-1980s; Prison
Writings presents his thoughts on South Korean political culture
and other subjects. Human Rights in Korea, edited by William Shaw,
contains several chapters on postwar South Korean political and
human rights issues. The United States Department of State's June
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1989 "United States Government Statement on the Events in
Kwangju, Republic of Korea, in May 1980" also is a valuable
document.
Following the abolition of the Basic Press Act in 1988, the South
Korean media became a rich source of both factual and interpre-
tive material on politics and government. Korea Newsreview, based
on coverage of the government-owned Korea Herald newspaper,
presents weekly articles concerning politics and foreign affairs,
generally from a progovernment point of view; beginning in 1987,
the publication has also printed the writings of dissenting guest
columnists. The full spectrum of Seoul's Korean-language news
media coverage on political topics is sampled and translated in the
Foreign Broadcast Information Service's Daily Report: East Asia.
The United States Embassy in Seoul publishes its Press Transla-
tions: Korea six days each week.
Outside political analysis may be found in monthly periodicals,
including Asian Survey and TheJournal ofNortheast Asian Studies. The
monthly Korea Update contains news and commentary on politics
and human rights issues. Perceptive accounts of the political scene
are found in Far Eastern Economic Review and Asian Wall StreetJour-
nal, as well in major United States dailies such as the Washington
Post, New York Times, and Christian Science Monitor.
Among annual publications are Korea Annual, published by the
state-sponsored Yonhap News Agency, and the Asia Yearbook, pub-
lished by the Far Eastern Economic Review. Amnesty International's
Report on Human Rights contains a chapter on South Korea in each
annual edition, as does the Department of State's Country Reports
on Human Rights Practices. (For further information and complete
citations, see Bibliography.)
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Signal Fire Tower, Suwon Castle, sited with a view of the royal villa. The
tower offered an important means of communication.
DURING SOUTH KOREA'S Fifth Republic (1981-87), the
modernization of the armed forces was one of the highest priori-
ties of Chun Doo Hwan's administration. As a result, when Chun's
term in office ended, he left behind one of the best-equipped mili-
tary forces in Asia. Army units had been reorganized and equipped
with indigenously produced weapons. The improvement of defense
fortifications and supply systems along the southern side of the
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) ensured that ground forces were bet-
ter prepared to defend South Korea than at any time since the end
of the Korean War (1950-53). An automated air defense system,
jointly managed by the army and air force, reduced the possibility
that South Korea would be caught unprepared in the event of a
surprise attack. As a by-product of rapid industrialization and
coproduction agreements with United States and West European
firms, South Korean aircraft producers and shipbuilders were able
to supply most of the country's needs for modern fighter aircraft,
helicopters, coastal patrol vessels, and other equipment required
by the air force and navy.
A tenuous peace held throughout the 1980s on the Korean
Peninsula—tenuous because the government of the Democratic Peo-
ple 's Republic of Korea (North Korea) in P'yongyang continued
to expand its armed forces and to deploy two-thirds of all military
units—army, navy, and air force—in a combat-ready status close
to the DMZ. Moreover, North Korean-directed terrorist activity
against South Korea threatened to provoke a renewal of hostili-
ties. In 1980 P'yongyang and Seoul each had about 600,000 mili-
tary personnel on active duty. From 1980 to 1985, the North Korean
armed forces increased by 150,000 people, whereas the South
Korean armed forces expanded modestly by about 5,000 people.
In 1990 North Korea's armed forces had 1.4 million military per-
sonnel on active duty. South Korea's armed forces had 650,000
persons on active duty and another 1,240,000 persons in the
reserves.
Under Chun's leadership, Seoul cautiously promoted a peace-
ful dialogue with North Korea and encouraged the expansion of
north-south contacts in the early 1980s; P'yongyang remained unin-
terested in these overtures and on at least two occasions perpetrat-
ed terrorist attacks that increased tension on the Korean Peninsula.
The primary purpose of South Korean peace proposals in 1981
and 1982 was to realize a summit meeting between Chun and North
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Korean president Kim II Sung. South Korean leaders hoped that
the establishment of a government-to-government dialogue would
lead to agreements reducing the size of the armed forces of both
countries and establishing the framework for a peace plan to replace
the 1953 armistice.
In October 1983, a P'yongyang-directed terrorist attack result-
ed in the cessation of the peace process. A bomb that exploded in
Rangoon, Burma, killed twenty-one people, including seventeen
high-ranking officials of the South Korean government then visit-
ing Burma. The bombing was planned and executed by personnel
drawn from North Korean army units. Chun's decision not to retali-
ate with force set a precedent that won him praise from abroad
and sympathy for his unpopular regime at home. Seoul's reliance
on diplomatic and economic measures to counter terrorism rather
than a small-scale attack on a North Korean target, which could
be used as an excuse for beginning an all-out war, effectively mobi-
lized international public opinion to limit trade and other contacts
with North Korea.
Another terrorist attack occurred in September 1987 when two
North Korean saboteurs placed a bomb on a Seoul-bound Korean
Air Boeing 707 aircraft carrying ninety-five passengers and twenty
crew members. The plane exploded over the Andaman Sea (south
of Burma), killing all aboard. Chun, following the precedent set
in 1983 after the Rangoon bombing, ruled out military retaliation
and asked the international community to condemn North Korea
for its continued belligerence.
South Korea also experienced an increase in politically motivated
domestic violence during the 1980s. For the first time, a small, vocal
segment of the population persistently challenged former and cur-
rent military leaders, including Chun, to stay out of politics. The
1980 Kwangju rebellion was used by disenfranchised politicians
and disillusioned radical students as a rallying cry. Moderates were
encouraged to pressure Chun to change the constitution and pub-
lic security laws to guarantee that soldiers, police, and the intelli-
gence services would never again be turned against the people.
Seoul's claims that the radical student organizations were fronts
for North Korea gradually lost credibility, particularly in 1985,
when student participation in the political process contributed to
the high proportion of votes cast for the New Korea Democratic
Party in that year's parliamentary elections. Public indignation con-
cerning increasingly brutal attacks on dissidents by police became
a major political issue in January 1987 when Pak Chong-ch'ol, a
Seoul National University student, was tortured and subsequent-
ly died while in police custody. From March through June 1987,
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combat police units of the Korean National Police responsible for
crowd control were constantly on the move as antigovernment
demonstrations, sometimes including tens of thousands of ordinary
citizens, became everyday occurrences in Seoul, Pusan, Kwangju,
and other cities.
After the inauguration of Roh Tae Woo as president in Febru-
ary 1988, attention once again reverted to North Korea as the fore-
most threat to security. Roh made good his promise to ensure the
safety of athletes and spectators from around the world who came
to Seoul for the 1988 Seoul Olympics. Japan and the United States
provided direct security assistance during this period, the former
by closely monitoring the thousands of airline flights and visitors
passing through Tokyo and other Japanese cities en route to the
event, the latter by deploying additional air, naval, and security
units in and around South Korea before and during the Olym-
pics. Following the Olympics, Roh relaxed restrictions on South
Korean contacts with North Koreans, gave in to increasing demands
for social spending, and acknowledged growing skepticism about
the threat from P'yongyang, all of which resulted in reducing the
percentage of the budget spent on defense. These policies were
designed to encourage reciprocal moves by North Korea and to
reduce tension between the two Koreas.
In 1989 Roh publicized plans to restructure the South Korean
armed forces to enhance their defensive capabilities. Seoul also
planned to acquire new types of technologically sophisticated
weapons to prepare the armed forces for warfare and defense in
the twenty-first century.
Development of the Armed Forces
KoguryO, Si I la, and KoryO Kingdoms
Historical records suggest that the Koguryo Kingdom was the first
Korean state to emphasize the military arts. From the first through
the fourth centuries A.D., the Koguryo tribes frequently fought
with Chinese and other groups for control of the region from the
Liao River south to the Yalu River, the latter forming today's in-
ternational boundary between North Korea and China. Modern
South Korean textbooks emphasize an unbroken history of foreign
incursions. Like the early warrior kings of Paekche and Silla,
however, King Kwanggaet'o, who ruled Koguryo from 391 to 412,
significantly added to his state's territory by military conquest, absorb-
ing neighboring tribes and fortified towns throughout present-day
northeastern China and down into the Korean Peninsula (see Silla;
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Koryo, ch. 1). The Koguryo established military units in each of
their five tribes. Each tribal army had about 10,000 men. An elected
leader in charge of all military forces in the kingdom headed the
chain of command. It was considered an honor for a man to be
selected to be a soldier by the council of elders.
In the seventh century, the Silla Kingdom united Korea south
of the Taedong River and successfully resisted repeated campaigns
by the rulers of Sui (581-617) and Tang (618-907) China to con-
quer all of Korea. Under Silla rule, the king placed military com-
manders in charge of civil and military affairs in all of the country's
local districts. A military academy was established in the capital
city of Kyongju and was open to young men of aristocratic birth.
Upon completion of their training, these young men were given
the title hwarang, meaning Flower Knight. Most of the great mili-
tary leaders of Silla trained at this academy and dedicated their
lives to military service.
During the Koryo Dynasty (918-1392), Korea remained in-
dependent until the kingdom was invaded by the Mongols in 1231
.
King Taejo (918-39) was a merchant and military leader who re-
unified the peninsula after the political fragmentation that followed
the decline of the Silla Dynasty in the late ninth century. During
the reign of King Munjong (1046-83), Korea's northern bound-
aries once again reached the Yalu and Tumen rivers. King Mun-
jong established two military districts along the northern border
and based army units there to defend the kingdom. Following a
military coup led by socially and economically disgruntled gener-
als in 1170, Koryo kings (most notably those of the Ch'oe family)
became virtual puppets of military leaders from 1196 to 1258. In
1259, at the end of several years of warfare with the Mongols, Koryo
capitulated, becoming a vassal of the Mongol Yuan Dynasty
(1279-1364) based in Dadu, which is modern Beijing (see The Evo-
lution of Korean Society, ch. 1). King Kongmin (1351-74),
however, increasingly resisted Yuan-imposed institutions and sided
with the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) against the Mongols. Yi Song-
gye, one of Kongmin's commanders, rebelled against the effort of
Kongmin' s son to reverse Korea's pro-Ming orientation and in
1392 established the Choson Dynasty.
The Choson Dynasty and the Japanese Colonial Period
In 1592 Japan dispatched a force of approximately 170,000 men
in 700 ships to conquer Korea. The Japanese army landed at Pu-
san in March and controlled most of the Korean Peninsula by July.
The small Korean navy under Admiral Yi Sun-sin used ironclad
battleships known—because of their appearance—as turtle boats
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to make frequent attacks on the Japanese fleet attempting to resup-
ply Japanese forces in Korea. King Sonjo requested military assis-
tance from Beijing and, as the Chinese and Korean armies gradually
pushed the Japanese south, the Korean navy frustrated Japanese
efforts to initiate new attacks on the Korean Peninsula. Although
Japan's first attempts to subjugate Korea were unsuccessful, many
of the central organizations of the Korean imperial military sys-
tem were weakened by the impact of the invasion.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Korean rulers gener-
ally devoted little attention to the military, although King Injo
(1623-49) did reorganize the army and establish five permanent
military bases in the country. Military service became unpopular
after the Japanese invasion. The yangban (see Glossary) class no
longer provided a large source of strong military leaders, and the
lower classes generally preferred to pay a tax that exempted them
from conscription. Because Korean rulers had little contact with
the outside world, the Korean military establishment remained
uninformed about developments of new weapons and modern bat-
tlefield tactics until the middle of the nineteenth century.
In the late 1860s, the advisers of King Kojong (1864-1907),
alarmed by the interest of the United States, France, Russia, and
other Western countries in opening Korea to foreign trade, con-
vinced him to modernize the Korean army. During the next two
decades, Korean military missions travelled to China and Japan
to study modern warfare. King Kojong had neither the money nor
the will to establish a large army, and he continued to rely primarily
on the Chinese for military protection. In the 1880s, Chinese ad-
visers trained 2,000 Korean troops and organized them into four
elite units that were intended to be King Kojong' s palace guard.
The Tonghak Rebellion in Cholla Province in 1894 providedJapan
with an excuse to dispatch troops to Korea, and Japanese forces
were sent in July with the dual mission of eliminating Chinese in-
fluence on the Korean Peninsula and laying the foundation for the
eventual colonization of the country.
Japanese victories in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) and
the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05)—both partially fought in
Korea—left Korea without any foreign powers willing to oppose
the Japanese annexation of Korea. Soon after the Treaty of Ports-
mouth was signed in July 1905, formally ending the Russo-Japanese
War, Japan stationed large contingents of police and army units
in Korea and disbanded the Korean army. Korea became a
Japanese colony in August 1910.
In the 1920s and 1930s, the main staging areas for Korean mili-
tary groups whose aim was to end Japanese rule in Korea were
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in Nanjing, China; along the Korean border in Jilin and Liao-
ning provinces; and in Irkutsk in the Soviet Union. The Nanjing-
based groups received military training from and supported Chiang
Kai-shek's Guomindang (Kuomintang orKMT—the National Peo-
ple's Party, or Nationalist Party). Until 1939 there were several
small Nationalist and communist military groups that used guer-
rilla tactics to harass the Japanese in Korea and Manchuria (as
northeast China was then known). By the end of 1940, the Japanese
Imperial Army had destroyed most organized resistance along the
Korean border with China; many Korean communists who had
belonged to these groups joined the Northeast People's Revolu-
tionary Army of the Chinese Communist Party (see Korea under
Japanese Rule, ch. 1). A small number of Soviet-controlled Korean
military units were organized in Irkutsk as early as 1921.
The South Korean Army after World War II
In November 1945, the United States Army Military Govern-
ment in Korea (1945-48) began the task of organizing Korean mili-
tary and police forces. In December a school for training military
officers was established; the South Korean National Constabulary
was organized in January 1946. The United States originally had
planned to assist South Korea in developing only those police and
military organizations necessary to maintain law and order dur-
ing the period Korea was to be under the five-year Soviet-American
trusteeship. By 1948, however, it was apparent that South Korea
would need to expand the National Constabulary into a larger and
more conventionally organized army to adequately defend itself
from a possible invasion by North Korea. For this reason, the Unit-
ed States provided funds and training to expand the eight provin-
cial units and one capital city unit of the National Constabulary
from regiments to brigades (see South Korea under United States
Occupation, 1945-48, ch. 1).
In November 1948, the Republic of Korea National Assembly
passed the Armed Forces Organization Act. Under the provisions
of this act, the National Constabulary was reorganized into an army
comprising seven divisions. In June 1949, when the last United
States Army units deployed in Korea as part of the post-World War
II occupation forces withdrew, leaving behind a 500-person mili-
tary advisory group, the leaders of the South Korean army con-
trolled an organization that had been internally weakened by
subversion and political factionalism and that lacked enough trained
personnel and modern weapons to prepare adequately for war.
North Korea's effort to win control of the south using guerrilla
warfare forced South Korea's military leaders to concentrate on
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counterinsurgency operations. In the fall of 1949, North Korean
guerrilla units attempted to gain control of remote areas and small
towns in the mountainous areas of eastern and southern South
Korea. It was estimated that as many as 5,000 guerrillas trained
in North Korea were infiltrated into these areas by the winter of
1949. Two South Korean army divisions and one army brigade
were quickly deployed to conduct sweep and destroy missions to
eliminate the guerrillas. Counterinsurgency operations were initiat-
ed in South Cholla Province in October 1949. In some areas, South
Korean villages were evacuated both to protect civilians and to as-
sist counterinsurgency units in locating guerrilla bases. By April
1950, less than 500 North Korean guerrillas remained in South
Korea. Although the counterinsurgency program succeeded in end-
ing the threat posed by the guerrillas, it had a deleterious effect
on the army, necessitating reorganization and retraining for con-
ventional war preparedness.
War on the Korean Peninsula
When North Korea invaded South Korea inJune 1950, the poor
quality of the South Korean armed forces immediately became ap-
parent. Although South Korea had 94,000 troops when North
Korea began its all-out surprise attack, one week later only 20,000
troops could be accounted for. By early September 1950, the
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invading forces held all of South Korea except for the Pusan-Taegu
corridor in the southeast.
The United Nations (UN) Security Council, upon the request
of the United States, condemned North Korea's invasion of South
Korea and asked members of the UN to assist South Korea. Fifteen
nations besides the United States and South Korea eventually
provided troops; all forces fought under the UN flag and under
the unified command of General Douglas A. MacArthur, com-
mander in chief ofUN forces. These combined forces successfully
broke North Korea's extended supply lines by landing at Inch'on
in September 1950. The invading forces were pushed back to near
the Chinese border. Only the massive intervention of the Chinese
People's Volunteers (CPV) in October averted the defeat of the
North Korean forces. United Nations and communist forces fought
to a standstill.
In July 1953, an armistice was signed that in 1990 remained the
only agreement preventing the renewal of hostilities on the penin-
sula. The armistice fixed the boundaries of the 241 -kilometer DMZ
as the border between North Korea and South Korea. It also
established a Military Armistice Commission, comprising China,
North Korea, the United States, and South Korea, to resolve ar-
mistice violations and prevent the resumption of hostilities. As of
1990, the Chinese representative still was posted to the Military
Armistice Commission, attended its plenary sessions, participat-
ed in secretarial meetings, officers of the day meetings, language
officers meetings, and observed Neutral Nations Supervisory Com-
mission meetings, but deferred to North Korea's representative.
South Korea's Response to the North Korean Military Buildup
In the 1960s, P'yongyang began a sustained expansion of its
armed forces that continued without interruption through the 1980s
(see fig. 13). Under presidents Syngman Rhee and Park Chung
Hee, the South Korean military remained largely dependent on
the United States to deter a second North Korean invasion and
to provide much of the training and equipment needed by the armed
forces. When the First Republic (1948-60) fell, South Korea's mili-
tary institutions were stronger relatively than most of its other
government agencies. Each service had a well-established school
system and adequate supplies of weapons, ships, and aircraft from
World War II and the Korean War.
Because of internal politics and Syngman Rhee's policy of con-
trolling the promotion and assignment of all general rank officers,
the military leadership was already at the edge of involvement in the
nation's politics. Park Chung Hee and the other military leaders
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who participated in the May 1961 coup d'etat that brought down
the Second Republic (1960-61) were motivated largely by dissatis-
faction with their corrupt and ineffective military and civilian su-
periors (see The Democratic Interlude, ch. 1). They believed that
South Korea's survival as a nation depended on the reestablish-
ment of social and economic stability. They viewed the strength
of the armed forces and the reinstitution of the National Security
Act of 1960 and other laws intended to reduce civil disturbances
as necessary means to restore order and promote sound economic
development. By 1963 when Park won election to the presidency
of the Third Republic (1963-72) as a civilian, he already had placed
other former military leaders, mostly members of the eighth class
of the Officer Candidate School who had graduated in 1949, in
key government positions.
Two of Park's major objectives during the Third Republic were
to improve defense cooperation with the United States and to
modernize the armed forces (see South Korea under Park Chung
Hee, 1961-79, ch. 1). In pursuit of these goals, Park devoted one-
third of all government spending to defense in 1965. As a sign of
support for United States policies in Southeast Asia and in exchange
for the substantial financial and material contributions for modern-
izing the army, Park deployed units of the South Korean army
and marine corps to the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam).
In the early 1970s, the Park administration, with United States
assistance through its Foreign Military Sales program, promoted
the establishment of an indigenous defense industry. Park's mili-
tary advisers were concerned that Kim II Sung already had built
a North Korean arms industry. The Nixon administration was call-
ing for Washington's allies to assume more responsibility for their
own defense. Nixon's national security advisors also feared that
Seoul might be too weak to deter a North Korean invasion unless
it began to manufacture some of its own weapons.
A Defense Industry Bureau was established in the Ministry of
National Defense, and planning for a defense industry was incor-
porated into South Korea's first Force Improvement Plan
(1971-76). Some of the weapons were assembled in government-
owned plants. Licensed production of the United States-designed
Colt M-16 rifle was initiated in 1971, with select South Korean
companies supplying the government assembly plant with most of
the parts for the weapon. In other cases, coproduction responsibility
was entirely delegated to civilian-managed companies, many of
which already had produced nonmilitary items with technical assis-
tance from various United States firms. The Tacoma Boatbuilding
Company, for example, assisted a South Korean shipbuilding
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Figure 13. Comparative Growth of the Armed Forces of South Korea and
North Korea, 1950-90
company based in Chinhae in constructing several classes of patrol
boats, including the Paegu-class derived from the Asheville-class,
which was equipped with Harpoon antiship missiles.
Park's assassination in 1979 did not obscure his regime's con-
tributions to improving the armed forces during the eighteen years
he was in power. He reorganized the Ministry of National Defense
and each of the armed services to enhance the government's capa-
bility to manage any military contingency, including an all-out
attack by North Korea across the DMZ, small-scale infiltrations
along South Korea's extensive 8,640-kilometer coastiine, and var-
ious types of low-intensity conflict, such as commando raids that
targeted industrial, power, and communications facilities, or at-
tempts by terrorists to assassinate key government officials.
President Chun Doo Hwan perpetuated the military's dominance
over politics from December 1979 until Roh's inauguration in
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February 1988 and protected Park's legacy of simultaneously im-
proving the country's economic and military capabilities. Chun
continued Park's policy of devoting one-third of all government
spending to the military, outstripping estimated North Korean mili-
tary expenditures during most of the 1980s. Chun also continued
Park's policy of promoting defense-related research and develop-
ment and commercial agreements with the United States, Japan,
and Western Europe—a policy that provided Seoul with access to
more advanced defense technologies. Particular emphasis was
placed on expanding the air force and establishing a modern air
defense network.
Korean Air, then South Korea's only civil airline, began
coproduction of Northrop F5-E/F fighter aircraft in 1982. At the
end of Chun's term in office, Seoul was considering coproducing
either the General Dynamics F-16 or the McDonnell Douglas
FA- 18. During Chun's administration, South Korean shipbuilders
increased production of various types of frigates, missile-equipped
fast attack craft, and other, smaller naval vessels. Civilian indus-
tries also became more involved in coproduction of defense ord-
nance, including armored personnel carriers, self-propelled artillery,
tanks, and communications equipment.
The Military's Role in Society
As the 1990s began, the armed forces remained the largest and
most influential government organization in South Korea. Over
75 percent of South Korean males over the age of twenty had served
in the regular army, the reserves, or the Homeland Reserve Force,
or had been assigned duties supporting the armed forces under the
Conscription Law of 1949. The National Technicians Law gave
the Ministry of National Defense the authority to order civilian
industrial plants to produce military items and to draft technicians
with special skills into military service during wartime. The Act
Concerning Protection of Military Secrets limited the freedom of
the press to report on military affairs. The Military Installation
Protection Law restricted civilian access to areas around military
installations.
The Defense White Paper, 1988, a report on the armed forces and
military preparedness and the first comprehensive document ever
prepared by the Ministry of National Defense for the public, not-
ed several initiatives the Roh administration had undertaken to
address these concerns. During both the Park and Chun administra-
tions, students who demonstrated against the government had been
expelled frequently from school and drafted into the army, where
they were treated harshly unless they demonstrated a willingness
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to accept government doctrine on opposing communism, promot-
ing the common good of society, and showing respect for military
and political power figures. In the Defense White Paper, 1988, the
Roh administration announced that new conscription policies had
been formulated that would standardize selection procedures and
end past abuses. Officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs)
were under orders to follow a new military protocol that respected
the rights of soldiers as citizens. Another measure announced in
1988 was the abolition of the Student Defense Corps, a military
training organization established at South Korean colleges in 1969
to provide mandatory lectures on the government's national secu-
rity policies and mobilization plans and instruction in handling
weapons and military tactics.
Changes in the living and working environment on military bases
were to include the gradual elimination of barracks and office build-
ings constructed in the 1950s, expansion of education programs
to prepare soldiers for selected jobs in the civilian sector before their
discharge, and small increases in pay. Additionally, in order to al-
leviate civil-military discord, the Roh administration planned to
relocate many of the bases in urban areas to suburban or rural areas
as soon as possible. Urban growth around military installations in
large cities, including Seoul, Pusan, Taejon, Inch'on, Ch'unch'on,
Masan, YVonju, Uijongbu, and Chinhae, had compromised the
security of these bases and day-to-day military activities; in turn,
the bases had disturbed the normal commercial and social activi-
ties of civilians.
In the 1980s, in addition to their regular military duties, mili-
tary units continued the traditional practice of aiding farmers in
planting and harvesting rice, assisting civil authorities in prevent-
ing loss of life and property during and following natural disasters,
delivering medical services in rural areas, and providing other so-
cial services. In 1987 a total of 561,000 military personnel helped
local farmers plant their rice, and 392,000 military personnel were
made available for harvesting the crop. The army and the
Homeland Reserve Force—more than 1 million troops—were mobi-
lized in July 1987 to perform rescue operations and repair wind
and flood damage caused by a typhoon. Stranded civilians were
evacuated to safety, temporary dikes were constructed to prevent
flood damage, debris was cleared from roads, and temporary
shelters were constructed for the homeless.
Government policies on emergency preparedness were designed
to quickly mobilize civilian personnel and resources to support the
military during wartime. The Military Manpower Law delegated
responsibility to the Office of Military Manpower Administration
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of the Ministry of National Defense for maintaining computerized
records on all civilians who were eligible to serve in the Homeland
Reserve Force. Men and women between the ages of twenty and
sixty who had not been assigned duties in the military reserves but
had technical skills needed by the military could also be assigned
to support the military during wartime or a national emergency
declared by the president and approved by the National Assembly
under Article 77 of the 1987 Constitution. As the 1990s began,
an estimated 5 million men and women were available for war-
time duties in the Homeland Reserve Force and designated civilian
industries that would produce, repair, and deliver defense goods
to the military in wartime. Another important element of emer-
gency preparedness was a plan to mobilize civilian ships, aircraft,
heavy construction equipment, and other types of vehicles and
equipment useful to the military in wartime.
Under provisions of the Emergency Prepared Resources Manage-
ment Law, provincial and local government authorities were respon-
sible for registering civilian assets that were to be included in the
plan. Periodic exercises of the plan were conducted to test mobili-
zation procedures. Local governments were required to provide
the Ministry of National Defense and other appropriate ministries,
including the Ministry of Home Affairs and Ministry of Trans-
portation, with their mobilization plans.
Organization and Equipment of the Armed Forces
The National Security Council and the Ministry of National
Defense were the primary executive bodies responsible for mili-
tary affairs. The former, comprising the prime minister, the director
of the Agency for National Security Planning (ANSP), and the
ministers of national defense, foreign affairs, home affairs, and
finance, was responsible for advising the president on security is-
sues and was convened at the pleasure of the president. The Minis-
try of National Defense was organized into bureaus responsible
for force development, budget, personnel, reserve forces, logistics,
military installations, medical affairs, the defense industry, and the
military education system.
Army
The ground forces were organized into three armies and sever-
al independent operational and functional commands (see fig. 14).
The First Army and the Third Army occupied well-fortified posi-
tions stretching southward from the DMZ about fifty kilometers.
The First Army's mission was to defend the eastern section of the
DMZ. The Third Army, South Korea's largest and most diversified
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Figure 14. Deployment of South Korean and United States Forces in South
Korea, 1990
combat organization, was responsible for guarding the most likely
potential attack routes from North Korea to Seoul^—the Munsan,
Ch'orwon, and Tongduch'on corridors. The Second Army had
operational command over all army reserve units, the Homeland
Reserve Force, logistics, and training bases located in the six
southernmost provinces. Select army troops were assigned to the
Capital Defense Command (formerly the Capital Garrison Com-
mand), whose active duty component, really more a countercoup
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force than a defensive force, was a little less than a division in 1990,
organized into three separate security groups or regiments. They
were assigned to defend the Blue House (the presidential residence),
major government and Ministry of National Defense buildings,
and Kimp'o International Airport. The wartime strength of the
Capital Defense Command comes from multiple division reserves,
which would be mobilized during a conflict. The Capital Defense
Command also was responsible for peacetime training of all Seoul
area reserves. Functional commands included the Counterespionage
Operations Command, subordinate to the chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and responsible for interdicting North Korean
saboteurs and espionage agents; the Defense Security Command,
the army's internal security organization; and the Logistics Base
Command, which was established to manage the movement of sup-
plies to the frontlines.
Active-duty infantry units were organized as combined armed
forces with armor and artillery forces subordinate to the division
or brigade commander. The Third Army and First Army controlled
nineteen infantry divisions and two mechanized infantry divisions.
In 1987 each infantry division had about 14,716 soldiers but in
terms of transportation and communications and other equipment
was considered "light" by United States standards. Each infantry
division had four battalions per regiment, three infantry regiments
and one artillery regiment, a reconnaissance/ranger battalion and
an armor battalion (some only had armor companies), and a
reasonable facsimile of combat support and combat service sup-
port units in comparison to United States counterparts. The two
mechanized infantry divisions each had three mechanized/
maneuver brigade headquarters, a cavalry battalion, and a mix
of nine armor and mechanized infantry battalions.
The army was responsible for the ground component of South
Korea's air defense network and had two surface-to-surface mis-
sile battalions and several antiaircraft gun battalions. The surface-
to-surface missile battalions were equipped with United States-
produced HAWK and Nike Hercules missiles, the former having
a range of 42 kilometers, the latter a range of 140 kilometers. The
field armies had small quantities of three types of man-portable,
shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles. These included the
British-produced Javelin and the United States-produced Redeye
missile. Additionally, there were three types of antiaircraft guns
in use: the Swedish-produced Bofors L/70 40mm; the Swiss-
produced Oerlikon GDF-002 35mm; and the domestically produced
Vulcan 20mm.
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The Special Warfare Command had seven brigades trained for
wartime missions behind enemy lines. Although information on
the organization of these units was unavailable in 1990, they prob-
ably were among the best-trained and most combat-ready forces
in the army.
A single aviation brigade operated several types of attack and
transport helicopters that could be strategically deployed to sup-
port combat operations of the infantry divisions and special forces.
Some 200 McDonnell Douglas 500-MD helicopters were produced
under license by Korean Air between 1976 and 1984. At least fifty
of these helicopters were equipped with TOW antitank weapons.
The remainder were used as transports and for other support mis-
sions. In 1990 South Korea also had about 50 McDonnell Doug-
las AH- IS attack helicopters and 144 McDonnell Douglas
UH-1B/H transport helicopters.
The role of women in the army has changed in the late twen-
tieth century. A small, all-volunteer Women's Army Corps (WAC)
was made a separate unit of the army in 1971. Women were re-
quired to be high-school graduates, they were enlisted for a two-
year tour of duty, and their military occupational specialties were
limited to nursing and a few other noncombat positions.
In September 1989, the National Assembly revised the military
personnel law which governed the WAC , and the WAC was offi-
cially deactivated on December 30, 1989. Female soldiers were for-
mally reassigned to seven branches within the army: infantry,
administration, intelligence, finance, education and information,
logistics, and medical service. A separate WAC school and per-
sonnel center remained.
Between 1980 and 1990, the army increased in size by only a
small margin. During this same period, however, new units were
formed; the procurement of new tanks, armored personnel carri-
ers, field artillery, antitank guns, air defense missiles, helicopters,
and other types of military equipment significantly improved the
defensive capabilities of the ground forces (see table 16, Appen-
dix). In 1980 the army had approximately 1,200 United States-
produced M-47 and M-48 tanks and 500 mostly United States-
produced M-l 13 armored personnel carriers (also some Fiat 6614
wheeled armored personnel carriers). By 1990 South Korea had
manufactured 200 of the domestically produced T-88 tank and had
upgraded most of its M-48s to M-48A3s or M-48A5s. During the
period from 1980 to 1990, the number of field artillery pieces more
than doubled, going from 2,000 to 4,200 pieces, and South Korea
began to introduce larger guns to extend the effective range of fire.
In 1980 the army was equipped with 57mm, 75mm, 90mm, and
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106mm recoilless rifles for antitank use and TOWs. In 1990 the
TOW and LAW still were the primary antitank weapons. The
106mm/90mm recoilless rifles increased in numbers and were the
basic antitank system for the infantry, although lower caliber
weapons still existed. The TOWs were relatively scarce and were
organized into independent units separate from the infantry divi-
sions' main organization and equipment. The national air defense
network comprised only 100 Vulcan antiaircraft guns and a small
number of Nike-Hercules and HAWK surface-to-air missiles in
1980; by 1990 there were 600 antiaircraft guns, and the Nike-
Hercules and HAWKs had both increased in number and under-
gone significant upgrades.
Air Force
The air force was organized into three commands operating ap-
proximately 700 aircraft from eight major airbases: the Combat
Air Command controlled the bulk of the roughly 500 jet combat
aircraft; a small Air Transportation Command had 37 transport
aircraft; and the Air Training Command used 7 types of trainers
(see table 17, Appendix). In 1990 the air force had 40,000 person-
nel on active duty. Most of these personnel were stationed at large,
well-defended air bases located at Suwon, Osan, Ch'ongju, Kang-
nung, Taegu, Kunsan, Kwangju, and Sunch'on. The air force also
operated an unknown number of smaller airbases. Civilian airfields,
including three international airfields at Seoul, Pusan, and Cheju,
would be utilized in wartime, as would specially designed sections
of major highways.
The Combat Air Command, headquartered at Osan, controlled
aircraft that included twenty-two squadrons of ground attack fight-
ers/interceptors, twenty-three counterinsurgency aircraft in one
squadron, twenty reconnaissance aircraft in one squadron, and
fifteen search-and-rescue helicopters in one squadron. All of these
aircraft were produced in the United States, with the exception of
sixty-eight Northrop F-5E/Fs that were coproduced with Korean
Air. The 294 Northrop F-5s and 36 General Dynamics F-16C/Ds
were the primary ground attack aircraft. Approximately 130
McDonnell Douglas F-4s were deployed for air defense but were
equally useful in ground attack. All three types of aircraft were capa-
ble of being used in either role, depending on their armament. The
air force supported army counterinsurgency programs with twenty-
three Cessna A-37 aircraft, used as forward air controllers, but
which could also be used in ground attack. Eight Northrop F-5s
and twelve McDonnell Douglas F-4s were equipped solely for
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reconnaissance. A total of fifteen Bell UH-1B and UH-1H helicop-
ters were available for search-and-rescue operations.
During the 1980s, the air force modernization program focused
primarily on the formation and deployment of twelve new fighter
aircraft squadrons and the establishment of an automated air defense
network. The F-16 provided South Korea with an aircraft believed
to be technologically superior to similarly designed communist air-
craft, including the Soviet-produced MiG-29, the most sophisti-
cated aircraft employed by the North Korean air force. South
Korea-United States coproduction of F-5 aircraft demonstrated the
resolve of South Korean military planners to promote a defense
industry that simultaneously utilized advanced United States tech-
nology while enhancing indigenous efforts both at establishing an
aviation industry and increasing access to Western technology.
The Tactical Air Control Center at Osan became operational
in 1983. Reconnaissance aircraft and air defense radar sites in-
formed the center about potentially hostile aircraft before they en-
tered South Korean airspace. In wartime this capability was
expected to allow South Korean air controllers more time to as-
sess threat and the ability quickly to communicate orders to inter-
ceptor aircraft and surface-to-air missile sites.
Navy and Marine Corps
In 1990 the navy and marine corps remained small forces primar-
ily dedicated to protecting the nation's territorial waters and islands.
There was one large naval base at Chinhae, and seven small naval
stations located at Cheju, Inch'on, Mokp'o, Mukho, Pukp'yong-ni,
P'ohang, and Pusan. Both the navy and marine corps were subor-
dinate to the chief of naval operations, who was a member of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. The navy, with 35,000 personnel, was organi-
zed into three fleet commands and separate commands for aviation,
amphibious operations, mine warfare, training, and logistics— all
subordinate to the first vice chief of naval operations. The marine
corps, with 25,000 personnel, was organized into two divisions and
one brigade under the Marine Corps Command. Although part
of the navy, marine units often operated under army control.
During the 1980s, the navy's modernization program focused
on antisubmarine warfare and the deployment of new types of in-
digenously produced submarines, frigates, missile-equipped fast
attack craft, and patrol boats. Naval vessels deployed with the
Eastern, Western, and Southern fleets were equipped with modern
sonar equipment, depth charges, and torpedoes to counter more
effectively North Korea's growing submarine force (see table 18,
Appendix). Two types of United States-produced and one type of
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French-produced shipborne surface-to-surface and surface-to-air
missiles were used by the navy on its destroyers, frigates, and fast
attack craft. United States-produced Harpoon surface-to-surface
missiles, with a ninety-kilometer range, were deployed on Gearing-
class destroyers, Ulsan-class frigates, and Paegu-class fast attack
craft derived from the Ashville-class. French-produced Exocet
surface-to-surface missiles, with a seventy-kilometer range, were
employed on Donghae frigates and Kirogi-class fast attack craft.
Paegu fast attack craft were equipped with United States-produced
Standard surface-to-air missiles.
The Naval Aviation Command and the Naval Amphibious Com-
mand operated small fleets of aircraft and landing craft, respec-
tively, to support naval fleet and marine corps operations.
Twenty-five Grumman S-2 aircraft, twenty-five Hughes 500-MD
helicopters, and ten Bell SA-316 helicopters were shore based. They
were deployed for surveillance of surface ships and for antisubma-
rine warfare.
The marine corps was assigned the defense of the Han River
estuary and five northwestern islands located close to North Korea.
The Naval Amphibious Command operated fifty-two amphibious
craft in support of the marine corps.
Reserve and Civil Defense Forces
The reserve forces included mobilization reserve forces for each
of the armed services and the Homeland Reserve Force, a paramili-
tary organization responsible for community and regional defense.
Between 1968 and 1988, males between the ages of eighteen and
forty were eligible for defense call-up duty; there was no clear policy
on the age at which a recruit was eligible for retirement. In Janu-
ary 1988, a new policy was instituted that reduced the age-group
of the male population subject to service in the reserves: only males
who had been drafted for service between the ages of nineteen and
thirty-four were required to serve in the reserves. The period of
service was limited to between six and eight years, depending on
the individual's age at conscription.
The mission of the mobilization reserves was to provide each
of the services with well-trained personnel prepared to enter com-
bat as soon as possible in wartime. In 1990 there were 1,240,000
men in the reserves: 1,100,000 in the army; 60,000 in the marines;
55,000 in the air force; and 25,000 in the navy. Most recruits had
served on active duty in their respective services and were assigned
to a reserve unit upon completion of their term of enlistment. Units
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in the reserves probably closely resembled active-duty organiza-
tions. Mobilization reserve personnel attended regularly scheduled
training about one day a month and also participated in an annu-
al field exercise that lasted about one week. Active-duty officers
and NCOs were assigned to command and staff positions in the
reserves at battalion and higher levels.
The Homeland Reserve Force was established in April 1968 as
part of a nationwide program to increase defense preparedness in
the wake of North Korean provocations. InJanuary 1968, a North
Korean commando unit infiltrated Seoul and attacked the Blue
House in an attempt to assassinate President Park Chung Hee.
That same month, two additional North Korean commando units
launched attacks on towns on the east coast in attempts to encourage
the South Korean populace to overthrow the government.
Homeland Reserve Force personnel were given basic training in
physical fitness, weapons familiarization, and defense tactics against
various types of attacks by enemy forces. In wartime these units
would remain close to or in their own cities, villages, or towns,
where they would guard roads, power plants, factories, and other
potential military targets.
In 1975 the National Assembly passed the Civil Defense Law,
which was promulgated to establish organizations in every com-
munity to protect lives and property during wartime and natural
disasters. Males between the ages of nineteen and fifty who were
not drafted for service in the military were recruited for service
in civil defense units. In 1980 there were over 90,000 civil defense
personnel in the country. By 1990 their numbers were more than
3.5 million. Their missions included air raid defense, search and
rescue, and building and road repair.
Recruitment, Training, and Conditions of Service
All males, except for a small percentage of individuals considered
physically or socially undesirable for military service, could be draft-
ed into the army. In 1990 there were 407,000 males nineteen years
of age who were required to register for military service. Approxi-
mately 9.2 percent of these young men were rejected for conscrip-
tion for one of the following reasons: having a physical or mental
disability; possessing a criminal record; being an orphan; and be-
ing born out of wedlock or having one parent who was not a South
Korean citizen. Conscripts were required to have at least an elemen-
tary school education; 77 percent of those drafted had at least a
high school education.
The Military Manpower Agency was responsible for assigning
recruits to the army, navy, marines, the Korean Augmentation
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of the United States Army (KATUSA), and the combat police units
of the Korean National Police. Recruits could request assignment
to a particular service and were assigned based on their education,
technical skills, and physical condition. About 85 percent of eligi-
ble recruits were drafted for periods of between thirty and thirty-
six months. Candidates for the KATUSA program were required
to be high school graduates with some English-language training.
In 1990 approximately 5,000 men in KATUSA served with the
United States Army units in South Korea. In 1990 the air force
was an all-volunteer force.
The conscription system was flexible and allowed most young
men to plan their service in a way that would promote their in-
dividual career goals. High school graduates who had been accepted
into a college or technical school or who were attending such schools
were granted deferments. Conscripts with good education records
and aptitudes suited to particular military specialties were select-
ed to be trained as specialists in combat support branches such as
signals, ordnance, and engineers. Even conscripts assigned to com-
bat, however, were encouraged to take classes during their terms
of duty to prepare for employment when they left the service.
The army, navy, and air force each had a full range of recruit
training centers, schools for technical military occupational specialties,
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and officer training courses. Army recruits were transported from
provincial induction centers to one of the Second Army's recruit
training centers for basic training. Each branch of the army had
one or more schools that offered curricula for enlisted personnel,
NCOs, and officers. The large number of schools and the diversi-
fied training programs available to servicemen supported the ar-
my's need for skilled personnel to use, maintain, repair, and
resupply combat forces during wartime. The air force had schools
for pilots, air technicians, communication and electronics specialists,
aircraft maintenance specialists, and air traffic controllers. The navy
had its own schools oriented to the needs of the three fleets and
the marine corps.
All officers and enlisted personnel were closely supervised and
had to obey strict security regulations that limited their contacts
with civilians, including their own families. All military personnel
were provided with food, clothing, housing, and medical services.
A variety of entertainment and recreational programs were or-
ganized on military installations to reduce boredom and promote
the physical health and morale of service personnel.
Officers and Noncommissioned Officers
Officers were graduates of army, navy, or air force service acade-
mies, reserve officer training cadet programs offered at civilian col-
leges, or were recruited from enlisted personnel for selected
short-term service in noncombat occupational billets. More than
90 percent of the field-grade officers chosen to command combat
units at battalion and higher levels were graduates of the Korea
Military Academy (in the case of the army), the Air Force Acade-
my, or the Naval Academy. Applicants were chosen on the basis
of their academic records, performance in competitive examina-
tions, physical condition, and dedication to the mission of the armed
forces. Each academy offered a four-year curriculum to provide
the cadet with a bachelor's degree and practical military skills.
Graduates of the military academies were required to serve ten years
in the military and made up 5 percent of the newly commissioned
officers each year. Approximately 40 percent of the new second
lieutenants were commissioned from the Reserve Officer Train-
ing Corps (ROTC) after two years' training and a two-year, three-
month obligation. Another 40 percent of the new second lieutenants
were from the Third Military Academy, which had a twenty- to
thirty-six week training course. The remaining 15 percent were
direcdy commissioned specialists, including personnel in the medical
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corps, judge advocates, and chaplains. Most of the recruits of the
Third Military Academy were newly graduated from junior col-
leges or regular colleges. At one time the Third Military Academy
was itself a two-year college. Historically, most of the ROTC officers
left after completing their obligation, but the graduates of the Third
Military Academy often stayed on to field-grade rank and were
the dominant source of commission at that rank.
Advanced individual training for officers was provided at the
Army's Command and General Staff College, the National Defense
College, and military training institutes in other countries. The
Command and General Staff College prepared selected field-grade
officers for command and staff duties at division, corps, and army
levels. The National Defense College trained a limited number of
selected senior officers of the three services and some civilian govern-
ment officials for the highest command and staff positions.
Each army branch, as well as the air force, navy, and marine
corps, was responsible for selecting NCOs for training in their oc-
cupational specialty. Those selected were required to reenlist for
two to seven years, depending on the availability of replacements
in their branch. Army staff sergeants were selected from civilian
applicants and eligible enlisted personnel who had completed the
required courses of studies in branch schools. The navy recruited
petty officers through examination at the time of conscription. Af-
ter finishing basic training, candidates were trained for their duties
in a branch school. The air force followed a procedure similar to
the navy's. Combat marines were sent to army schools for NCO
training, whereas marines in service branches usually attended navy
schools.
Enlisted Personnel
Recruit training in each of the services lasted about sixteen weeks
and focused on physical conditioning, basic military skills, and the
functions of combat and combat support units. Conscripts select-
ed to serve in the army and marine corps were sent to Second Army
recruit training centers for basic training. The navy and air force
operated their own recruit training centers.
Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia
The rank and grade structure of the three services correspond-
ed, with minor exceptions, to that of the United States forces, as
did the correlation between rank and responsibility (see fig. 15).
In peacetime, the army and air force were each commanded by
a four-star general; a lieutenant general commanded the marines,
and an admiral commanded the navy.
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Service uniforms also resembled those of the United States forces
in color and style. Service personnel wore a summer uniform of
denim and a winter uniform of wool. Troops in forward areas wore
a more expensive padded winter uniform. Noncommissioned
officers of the army and air force wore a tunic buttoned to the top;
navy noncommissioned officers wore the United States-type sea-
man's blouse. Officers' uniforms were similar to those worn by
officers of the United States.
Defense Spending and Military Production
From the end of the Korean War to 1990, South Korea had
evolved from a country dependent on other nations for its nation-
al security to a strong and growing nation, increasingly capable
of meeting its own defense needs. Civilian industries maintained
military assembly lines as a separate, and generally small, part of
their corporate activities.
Defense Spending
Seoul's defense budget increased in proportion to the growth of
the national economy throughout the 1970s and 1980s, demonstrat-
ing how strongly national leaders felt about improving the armed
forces (see fig. 16). Between 1971 and 1975, defense spending in-
creased from US$411 million to US$719 million. Defense expen-
ditures averaged about 4.5 percent of the country's gross national
product (GNP—see Glossary). In 1976, the first year that the
government included proceeds from the defense tax in published
figures for military expenditures, the budget for the armed forces
and defense industries increased 100 percent over the 1975 figure
to US$1 .5 billion. The costs involved in initiating weapons produc-
tion and the loss of military grant aid from the United States were
the major reasons for the gradual increase of defense spending from
5.2 percent of GNP in 1979 to 6.2 percent of GNP in 1982. By
1990 defense spending had increased to almost US$10 billion a year,
but because of the dramatic growth in the country's economy, this
figure was below 30 percent of the government's budget and less
than 5 percent of GNP for the first time since 1975.
Annual defense budgets were proposed by the Ministry of Na-
tional Defense and approved by the president following consulta-
tions with the National Assembly. Beginning in fiscal year (FY—see
Glossary) 1979, the Ministry of National Defense adopted a budget
management system based on the United States Department of
Defense project planning budget system. The South Korean system
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Figure 16. Comparison of Defense Expenditures, South Korea and North
Korea, 1978-88
focused on force modernization and the maintenance of military
organizations in peacetime at 70 percent of their wartime strength.
The government's mobilization and resource management plans
for support of the military were designed to bring the armed forces
up to full strength quickly and to maintain the country's capabili-
ty to supply the military during wartime. Under the 1987 Consti-
tution, the National Assembly was accorded more responsibility
to review the defense budget and to recommend appropriate lev-
els of spending. In 1990, however, the president continued to have
the final say on budget matters.
Approximately 40 percent of the defense budget was devoted
to weapons and equipment modernization in 1990. Defense plan-
ners established a number of long-range goals: to establish an
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independent reconnaissance system with intelligence satellites and
early warning aircraft; to improve the quality of firepower and the
accuracy of domestically produced weapons; to deploy indigenously
produced surface-to-air and tactical surface-to-surface missiles; and
to replace outdated fighter aircraft and naval vessels with techno-
logically advanced models that would neutralize the threat of North
Korea's modern weapon systems.
The operational costs of the three armed services constituted ap-
proximately 35 percent of the defense budget. Improvements in
training, logistical support to combat units, and pay and benefits
provided to military personnel were a part of the increased cost
of supporting the armed forces. The acquisition of sophisticated
new types of weapons, although contributing to national security,
also increased operational costs.
The remaining 25 percent of the defense budget was mostly al-
located among the armed forces reserves; South Korea's share of
the United States-Republic of Korea combined defense improve-
ment program; research into new defense technologies; and con-
struction and maintenance of military installations.
Military Production
The Defense Industry Bureau of the Ministry of National Defense
was the government agency responsible for managing the quanti-
ty and quality of domestically produced weapons and equipment.
In 1990 South Korean industries provided about 70 percent of the
weapons, ammunition, communications and other types of equip-
ment, vehicles, clothing, and other supplies needed by the military.
Weapons production for the army began in 1971 when the Minis-
try of National Defense constructed a plant to assemble United States-
designed Colt M-16 rifles. The memorandum of agreement between
the United States and the Republic of Korea authorized produc-
tion of enough rifles to supply South Korean army units. However,
the agreement prohibited the production of additional M-16s
without the permission of Colt Industries and the United States
government. In the mid-1970s, South Korea signed agreements
to begin licensed production of many types of United States-
designed weapons, including grenades, mortars, mines, and recoil-
less rifles, with the same stipulations as those for the M-16 rifle.
South Korea also began to manufacture ammunition for the
weapons it produced for the army.
By 1990 South Korean companies had army contracts to produce
tanks, self-propelled and towed field guns, two types of armored
vehicles, and two types of helicopters. A division of Hyundai
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produced the 88 Tank (formerly called the K-l tank) at Ch'ang-
won. The K-l was the result of ajoint United States-South Korean
design. The 88 Tank's 105mm gun was an improved version of
the same caliber gun that was standard on South Korea's M-48A5
tanks. Although a few components of the tanks' fire control and
transmission systems were imported, Hyundai and South Korean
subcontractors manufactured most of the systems. One of the Sam-
sung Group's businesses produced 155mm M-109 self-propelled
howitzers. Kia Machine Tool was the manufacturer for the KH-178
105mm and the KH-179 155mm towed field guns. The KH-178
and KH-179 guns were derived from United States-designed ar-
tillery but were considered indigenously designed. Daewoo Indus-
tries and Asia Motors had a coproduction agreement for an
Italian-designed wheeled, armored personnel vehicle. Bell Helicop-
ters Textron of the United States and Samsung coproduced UH-1
helicopters. Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation, also of the United States,
had a contract with Daewoo to coproduce H-76 helicopters.
In December 1989, the Ministry of National Defense selected
the McDonnell Douglas FA- 18 to be the second United States-
designed fighter aircraft to be coproduced in South Korea. Sam-
sung's aerospace division was awarded a contract to manufacture
the airframe and engine; Lucky-Goldstar became the subcontrac-
tor for the aircraft's avionics. McDonnell Douglas agreed to deliver
twelve FA- 18s to the South Korean air force in 1993 and to assist
Samsung with the later assembly of 108 aircraft in South Korea.
As of 1990, the entire FA- 18 program was under review because
of increased costs. Korean Air used its depot maintenance facili-
ties at Kimhae to overhaul most types of aircraft in service with
the South Korean air force. Additionally, the United States Air
Force contracted with Korean Air for the maintenance of its F-4,
F-15, A-10, and C-130 aircraft stationed in South Korea, Japan,
and the Philippines.
In 1990 South Korean shipbuilders were building two indigenous-
ly designed naval vessels, and they had coproduction agreements
with United States, Italian, and German companies for several other
types of ships. Four shipbuilders—Hyundai, Daewoo, Korea Ta-
coma, and Korean Shipbuilding and Engineering—constructed
South Korean-designed Ulsan-class frigates and Tonghae-class cor-
vettes for the navy. During the 1980s, Korea Tacoma, a South
Korean-owned subsidiary of the United States Tacoma Boatbuild-
ing Company, produced one class of patrol gunboat and one class
of landing ship for the navy. The Kirogi-class patrol boat was a
larger model of the Tacoma-designed Schoolboy-class patrol boat
manufactured in South Korea during the 1970s. The Kirogi-class
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patrol boat, a 170-ton vessel, required a thirty-one-person crew
and was equipped with five guns: one 40mm single-barreled Bofors
on the bow, two 30mm twin-barreled Emerson Electrics in the stern,
and two 20mm Oerlikon twin-barreled guns behind the bridge. The
Kirogi-class patrol boat, with a range of 700 kilometers and a max-
imum speed of 38 knots, was well suited for its inshore patrol
mission.
The Mulgae-class landing ship, another naval vessel designed
and produced in the United States by Tacoma Boatbuilding Com-
pany, was ordered by the navy to augment a small amphibious
fleet that comprised several models of obsolescent transport craft
produced in the United States during World War II and trans-
ferred to the South Korean navy in the 1960s and 1970s. The
Mulgae-class landing ship was designed to carry an infantry com-
pany with its weapons, mechanized and wheeled vehicles, and other
supplies. It had a range of 560 kilometers and a maximum speed
of 13 knots. In 1986 South Korea's Kangnam Shipbuilding Cor-
poration began construction of the Swallow/Chebi class minehunter,
which was based on the Italian-designed Lerici-class. At that time,
the South Korean navy had only eight United States-produced
Kunsan-class minesweepers in service with the three fleets. The
Swallow-class minehunter had new types of sonar and mine coun-
termeasure equipment that was expected to improve the navy's
capability to locate and to eliminate minefields in international ship-
ping lanes during wartime.
In the late 1980s, production of submarines designed by the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany (West Germany) was initiated. Three
150-ton submarines designed by the Howaldswerke Shipbuilding
Corporation were in service with the navy in 1990. Howaldswerke
also had plans to provide technical assistance for the construction
of three Type 209 submarines, about 1 ,400 tons each. South Korean
military planners were interested in using submarines to protect
critical shipping lanes from North Korean submarines in wartime.
Strategic Planning for War
Under the terms of the 1954 Republic of Korea-United States
of America Mutual Defense Treaty, the United States and South
Korea agreed to cooperate in defending the security and strategic
interests of both countries. South Korea's deployment of army and
marine units to South Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s demon-
strated its commitment to meeting its obligations under the treaty.
By 1990 the United States had stationed 44,500 military person-
nel in South Korea—a signal to North Korea and other countries
297
South Korea: A Country Study
in the region that Washington would meet its security commitments
to Seoul under the Mutual Defense Treaty.
United States Forces in Korea
In the confusion of the early days of the Korean War, Seoul
placed its armed forces under the command of General Douglas
A. MacArthur as United Nations (UN) commander. This arrange-
ment continued after the armistice. For some twenty-five years,
the United Nations Command headquarters, which had no South
Korean officers in it, was responsible for the defense of South Korea,
with operational control over a majority of the units in the South
Korean military. The command was the primary peacetime plan-
ning organization for allied response to a North Korean invasion
of South Korea and the principal wartime command organization
for all South Korean and United States forces involved in defend-
ing South Korea. In 1978 a binational headquarters, the South
Korea-United States Combined Forces Command (CFC), was
created, and the South Korean military units with front-line mis-
sions were transferred from the United Nations Command to the
CFC's operational control. The commander in chief of the CFC,
a United States military officer, answered ultimately to the national
command authorities of the United States and the Republic of
Korea (see fig. 17).
Historically, operational control of South Korea's tactical armed
forces has made the United States commander vulnerable to the
politics of association. United States commanders have rigidly
avoided commentary on South Korean party politics, confining
public statements to purely military matters on such issues as arms
buildups and threats from North Korea. However, in the complex
politics of the Korean Peninsula, the United States commander's
military opinions often have been publicly manipulated as support
for Seoul's authoritarianism.
In May 1961 and December 1979, the command structure was
breached by South Korean troops participating in military coups.
A more complex set of circumstances occurred in May 1980, when
troops were withdrawn from the CFC under existing procedures
and dispatched to Kwangju to respond to the student uprising. Con-
fusion in the South Korean public over the particular circumstances
of the incident, the United States position, and the limits of the
CFC's control led many South Koreans to believe that the United
States fully supported the violent suppression of the uprising. The
lack of an accurate historical record for nearly ten years gener-
ated widespread misunderstanding, and it has been credited with
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the rise of anti-Americanism in South Korea, a movement which
continues.
Only after President Chun stepped down at the end of 1987,
and the opposition in the National Assembly grew stronger, did
the United States begin answering the questions concerning Unit-
ed States involvement in Kwangju. On June 19, 1989, Washing-
ton issued the "United States Government Statement on Events
in Kwangju, Republic of Korea, in May 1980," in response to
formal requests from the National Assembly. The statement ad-
dressed a series of questions related to the rise to power of then
Lieutenant General Chun Doo Hwan. The statement noted no prior
knowledge of the assassination of President Park Chung Hee, nor
warning of the December 12, 1979, incident, in which a group of
South Korean army officers led by Major General Chun seized
control of the military. It was revealed that Washington repeated-
ly protested to the government and the military leadership about
the misuse of forces under the Combined Forces Command. The
report also stated that South Korean authorities gave the United
States two hours advanced warning of the extension of martial law
on May 18, 1980, and no prior warning of the military's intention
to arrest political leaders or to close both the National Assembly
and the universities.
The statement clearly noted that none of the South Korean forces
deployed at Kwangju were, during that time, under either the oper-
ational control of the CFC or the control of any United States
authorities. Additionally, the United States had neither prior
knowledge of the deployment of special forces to Kwangju nor
responsibility for their actions there. The report addressed the use
of the Twentieth Division, CFC, and clarified that the CFC agree-
ment allowed both the United States and South Korea to assert
control over its forces at any time without the consent of the other.
According to the statement, the United States was informed in ad-
vance of intentions to use elements of the Twentieth Division to
reenter Kwangju, that United States officials, after cautioning
against the use of military force to solve a political crisis, accepted
that it would be preferable to use the Twentieth Division rather
than Special Forces units (but the latter were also involved) . The
report further documented that the United States repeatedly pro-
tested public distortions of Washington's actions and policy by Seoul
and the South Korean press, namely allegations that the United
States knew either of the December 12 incident in advance or of
the extension of martial law, or that Washington approved of the
Special Forces actions in Kwangju.
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While the report rebutted most of the myths of American cul-
pability for events in 1979 and 1980, the ten-year delay in issuing
the report did little to resolve the misgivings held by many South
Koreans, who still persisted in believing that the United States was
in some way a party to the military takeover in May 1980, and
the harsh suppression of the Kwangju demonstrations that followed.
In 1990 a few hundred United States military personnel were
assigned to the United Nations Command headquarters in P'an-
munjom, in the DMZ, and were responsible for representing the
United States at meetings of the Military Armistice Commission.
Because the Seoul and P'yongyang governments had never negotiat-
ed a peace agreement after the Korean War, the sometimes shaky
1953 armistice concluded between the United Nations Command,
North Korea, and China remained the only formal channel for han-
dling complaints about violations of the truce.
There were 32,000 United States Army personnel in South Korea
in 1990; most were assigned to the Eighth Army, which included
the Second Infantry Division, the Seventeenth Aviation Brigade,
and other detachments deployed north of Seoul as part of the joint
South Korean-United States forward defense strategy. If a con-
flict were to occur, the Second Infantry Division would be expect-
ed to serve as a reserve force for the South Korean army on one
of the main invasion routes between the DMZ and Seoul. United
States Army personnel with command or planning responsibilities
for combat units also were assigned to the headquarters of the CFC
and to the headquarters of the Republic of Korea-United States
Combined Field Army, of which the Second Infantry Division was
the main American component. The remaining United States Army
personnel were assigned to support the missions of selected Unit-
ed States and South Korean combat units, serving primarily in com-
munications, logistics, and training positions.
There were 12,000 United States Air Force personnel in South
Korea in 1990. They were assigned to units responsible for early
warning, air interception, close air support of United States and
South Korean ground forces, combat support, aircraft maintenance,
and the transportation of personnel and supplies from the United
States, Japan, and other United States military installations in the
Pacific. The Seventh Air Force, headquartered at Osan Air Base,
was the command element for all United States Air Force organi-
zations in South Korea. United States Lockheed U-2 high-altitude
reconnaissance and South Korean Grumman E-2C early warn-
ing aircraft patrolled the North Korean border and monitored the
Soviet Union's air and naval activities in the Sea ofJapan area.
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Advanced F-16 fighter aircraft were used by tactical fighter squad-
rons based at Osan and Kunsan. These squadrons operated
alongside South Korean air force tactical squadrons in both air in-
terception and close air support roles. South Korea and the United
States jointly managed the South Korean tactical air control sys-
tem, which had wartime responsibility for Korean airspace and the
entire South Korean coastline. The United States Military Airlift
Command was responsible for transporting United States military
personnel, weapons, and supplies from the United States and lo-
cations in the Pacific to South Korea.
United States Navy and United States Marine Corps personnel
in South Korea consisted of about 500 officers and enlisted per-
sonnel who occupied critical staff and liaison positions in the CFC.
The United States Pacific Command in Hawaii frequently deployed
units of the United States Pacific Fleet, based in Japan, and units
of the marine corps, based in Okinawa and other locations in the
Pacific, to South Korea for joint training exercises, particularly
Team Spirit, held every spring to promote South Korean-United
States military cooperation and readiness. During the 1988 Seoul
Olympics, the United States Seventh Fleet operated in the Sea of
Japan and was assigned specific missions to assist units of the CFC
in discouraging P'yongyang from attempting to disrupt the Olympic
Games.
South Korean and United States Cooperation
In 1968 the United States and South Korea held their first an-
nual Security Consultative Meeting. This meeting provided high-
level defense experts from the two countries with an official forum
for reassessing the nature of the North Korean threat to South
Korea, for agreeing on an overall defense strategy for South Korea,
and for outlining the roles of both countries in deterring a North
Korean invasion.
During the 1989 Security Consultative Meeting in Washington
(the meetings were held in alternate years in Seoul and Washing-
ton), the two nations agreed that the Moscow-assisted moderniza-
tion of Pyongyang's air force and army indicated that the military
situation in Northeast Asia remained tense and unpredictable.
Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev's Korean policy, focused on
promoting unofficial contacts with Seoul though Moscow, continued
to bolster Pyongyang's military establishment.
South Korean and United States leaders who attended the 1 989
Security Consultative Meeting considered it unlikely that the Soviet
Union would initiate a military conflict targeting South Korea. They
believed, however, that increasing Soviet military support for North
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Korea made it highly probable that the Soviet Union would con-
tinue to assist North Korea if war broke out. For this reason, United
States secretary of defense Richard B. Cheney and South Korean
minister of national defense Yi Sang-hun agreed to strengthen stra-
tegic planning through existing organizations, such as the CFC.
Internal Security
From the founding of the Republic of Korea, its leaders, while
professing liberal democratic ideals, consistentiy held that the secu-
rity threat posed by an aggressive, communist North Korea re-
quired some modification of Western democracy to fit Korean
realities. Confronted with a heavily armed enemy determined to
reunify the peninsula on its own terms—by force, if necessary
—
successive South Korean governments gave top priority to exter-
nal and internal security, guaranteed by large and well-organized
security services. The need for social order and discipline in the
face of this threat remained central to the government's approach.
Faced with a divided country, even "loyal" opposition often was
suppressed as dangerously disruptive. On more than one occasion,
political opposition was confused with communist subversion. The
communist threat at times provided political justification for
authoritarian regimes to maintain power and to suppress public
criticism or demands for democracy. In both 1961 and 1980, the
military cited these concerns to justify its interventions in South
Korean politics.
The Threat from the North
After the division of the peninsula, North Korea used subver-
sion and sabotage against South Korea as part of its effort to achieve
reunification. North Korea was unsuccessful at developing a covert
political infrastructure in South Korea or forging links with dissi-
dents resident in South Korea, and after the early 1960s Pyong-
yang's efforts were unproductive. Based on available evidence, in
1990 it appeared that P'yongyang placed or recruited only a limit-
ed number of political agents and sympathizers in the southern part
of the peninsula. Pyongyang's agents acted individually for the
most part, did not maintain regular contact with one another, and
received only intermittent support and guidance.
Peacetime infiltration by North Korean agents was a fact of life
in South Korea after the armistice in 1953. There were, however,
clear shifts both in the number and method of infiltrations over
the years and in their goals. Through the mid-1960s, P'yongyang
sent agents primarily to gather intelligence and to try to build a
covert political apparatus. This tactic was followed by a dramatic
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shift to violent attempts to destabilize South Korea, including com-
mando raids along the DMZ that occasionally escalated into fire-
fights involving artillery. These raids peaked in 1968, when more
than 600 infiltrations were reported, including an unsuccessful at-
tempt at a commando attack on the Blue House in Seoul and the
infiltration of over 120 commandos on the east coast. In 1969 more
than 150 infiltrations were attempted, involving almost 400 agents.
In 1970 and 1974, agents attempted unsuccessfully to assassinate
President Park. In the 1974 attempt, during an August 15 ceremony
marking National Liberation Day at the National Theater in Seoul,
the assassin's shots missed President Park but killed Mrs. Park.
Subsequently, Pyongyang's infiltration efforts abated somewhat,
and the emphasis shifted back to intelligence gathering and covert
networks.
From the mid-1970s to the early 1980s, most North Korean in-
filtration was done by heavily armed reconnaissance teams, which
increasingly were intercepted and neutralized by South Korean
security forces. After shifting to infiltration by sea for a brief peri-
od in the 1980s, P'yongyang apparently discarded military recon-
naissance in favor of inserting agents from third countries. North
Korea did not abandon violence, however, as was shown by the
abortive 1982 attempt to recruit Canadian criminals to assassinate
President Chun Doo Hwan, the 1983 Rangoon assassination at-
tempt that killed seventeen South Korean government officials and
four Burmese dignitaries, and the 1987 destruction of a Korean
Air airliner with 115 people on board. In the airliner bombing,
North Korea broke from its pattern of targeting South Korean
government officials, in particular the president, and targeted or-
dinary citizens.
North Korean propaganda concentrated on weakening the so-
cial fabric and sowing discord between the South Korean govern-
ment and the population. Indirectly, North Korea sought to turn
dissident elements within South Korean society into propagandists
and agitators who would undermine the government. P'yongyang
achieved some limited indirect success in this effort, as indicated
by the repetition of some of its themes by student dissidents. North
Korean coverage of dissident activity in the south was on occasion
so timely and accurate as to lead some members of the South Korean
government to believe that dissent in the south was directed from
the north. However, despite similarities between North Korean
propaganda and dissident statements, South Korean security agen-
cies never convincingly established a direct connection between
the dissidents and the north, although in the late 1980s some ele-
ments among dissident groups increasingly used Marxist-Leninist
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language and North Korean political themes (see Political Extre-
mism and Political Violence, ch. 4).
Seoul's Response
The pre-Korean War period was marked by political turmoil
and widespread demands for sweeping political, economic, and so-
cial change. As the communists entrenched themselves in the north
and right-of-center politicians emerged in control in the south, the
possibility for peaceful unification of the peninsula disappeared.
In the autumn of 1946, a series of unorchestrated leftist-led labor
strikes and rural peasant rebellions were suppressed by the fledg-
ling Korean National Police after some 1,000 deaths and 30,000
arrests. The communist South Korean Workers' Party led a part-
ly indigenous guerrilla movement in the south after a major rebel-
lion on Cheju Island in April 1948 that claimed tens of thousands
of lives. South Korea's military and paramilitary forces were be-
set by mutinies and defections but eventually gained the upper hand.
In reaction to the communist-based Yosu-Sunch'on rebellion of Oc-
tober 1948, a harsh national security law was passed in December
1949 that made communism a crime. However, the law was so com-
prehensive and vague that it could be used against any opposition
group. Under the law, members of the South Korean Workers'
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Party were arrested and some 150,000 persons were barred from
political activity. Guerrilla warfare continued until the end of 1949,
coupled with skirmishing along the thirty-eighth parallel. North
Korea's conventional attack followed when it became clear that the
insurgents would not triumph easily.
Recollection of this chaotic period and the invasion from North
Korea colored subsequent South Korean government attitudes
toward internal security. Domestic opposition, especially from the
left, was suspect. President Syngman Rhee's call for national uni-
ty provided political justification for limiting the activities of the
opposition during the 1950s. Although the regime did not suppress
all opposition or independent sources of information, it suppressed
some organized opposition and criticism (see The Media, ch. 4).
In the late 1950s, as Rhee became more authoritarian, the gov-
ernment increasingly resorted to using the police force and, to a
lesser extent, the military security forces, for political purposes.
The Ministry of Home Affairs, whose charter ranged from intelli-
gence and investigative operations to supervision of local and
provincial affairs, emerged as a powerful political force. The police,
with a strong core of veterans from the Japanese colonial police
(approximately 70 percent of the highest ranking officers, 40 per-
cent of the inspectors, and 15 percent of the lieutenants), was both
effective and feared. The police used strong-arm tactics to coerce
support for the ruling party during elections and harassed the po-
litical opposition. The prerogative of the police to call in anyone
for questioning was a powerful tool of intimidation. These circum-
stances inevitably led to police corruption, politicized law enforce-
ment, and exploitation of the populace in the name of internal
security. Rhee's political survival became more and more depen-
dent on the police. When police control wavered at the time of the
April 19 student revolution in April 1960, his regime fell.
The short-lived Chang Myon government (July 1960 to May
1961) did not survive long enough to articulate an internal security
policy but was committed to a more open political system. However,
because of internal conflict within the ruling party and the obstruc-
tions of the conservative opposition, society was in a state of polit-
ical and social turmoil.
Following the May 16, 1961, military coup, the Korean Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency (KCIA) was formed on June 19. Directly
under the control of the Supreme Council for National Reconstruc-
tion, the KCIA, with nearly unlimited power, emerged as the or-
ganization most feared during the Park Chung Hee era. Under
Kim Chong-p'il's direction, the organization weeded out anti-Park
elements and became the prime tool keeping the regime in power.
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Under Park, the lack of advancement in civil liberties continued
to be justified by referring to the threat from North Korea. The
political influence of the Ministry of Home Affairs and the police
declined in the face of the KCIA's power. The relationship between
the police and general public, however, was not significantly al-
tered. As Se-Jin Kim wrote in 1971: "The former still act with
arbitrary arrogance; the latter respond with fear but not respect. '
'
The government often used martial law or garrison decree in
response to political unrest. From 1961 to 1979, martial law or a
variant was evoked eight times. The October 15, 1971, garrison
decree, for example, was triggered by student protests and result-
ed in the arrest of almost 2,000 students. A year later, on October
17, 1972, Park proclaimed martial law, disbanded the National
Assembly, and placed many opposition leaders under arrest (see
Constitution; Human Rights, ch. 4). In November theyusin con-
stitution (yusin means revitalization), which greatly increased
presidential power, was ratified by referendum under martial law.
The government grew even more authoritarian, governing by
presidential emergency decrees in the immediate aftermath of the
establishment of theyusin constitution; nine emergency decrees were
declared between January 1974 and May 1975. The Park regime
strengthened the originally draconian National Security Act of 1960
and added an even more prohibitive Anticommunism Law. Un-
der those two laws and Emergency Measure Number Nine, any
kind of antigovernment activity, including critical speeches and writ-
ings, was open to interpretation as a criminal act of "sympathiz-
ing with communism or communists" or "aiding antigovernment
organizations." Political intimidation, arbitrary arrests, preven-
tive detention, and brutal treatment of prisoners were not un-
common.
Opposition to the government and its harsh measures increased
as the economy worsened in 1979. Scattered labor unrest and the
government's repressive reactions sparked widespread public dis-
sent: mass resignation of the opposition membership in the Na-
tional Assembly and student and labor riots in Pusan, Masan, and
Ch'angwon. The government declared martial law in the cities.
In this charged atmosphere, under circumstances that appeared
related to dissatisfaction with Park's handling of the unrest, on Oc-
tober 26, 1979, KCIA chief Kim Chae-gyu killed Park and the
chief of the Presidential Security Force, Ch'a Chi-ch'ol, and then
was himself arrested. Emergency martial law was immediately
declared to deal with the crisis, placing the head of the Defense
Security Command, Major General Chun Doo Hwan, in a posi-
tion of considerable military and political power.
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Popular demand for the restoration of civil liberties after Park's
death was immediate and widespread. Acting President Ch'oe Kyu-
ha revoked Emergency Measure Number Nine, which had forbid-
den criticism of the government and the yusin constitution. Civil
rights were restored to almost 700 people convicted under the emer-
gency decrees. The illegitimacy of the yusin constitution was ac-
knowledged, and the process of constitutional revision begun.
The slow pace of reform led to growing popular unrest. In early
May 1980, student demonstrators protested a variety of political
and social issues, including the government's failure to lift emer-
gency martial law imposed following Park's assassination. The stu-
dent protests spilled into the streets, reaching their peak during
May 13 to 16, at which time the student leaders obtained a promise
that the government would attempt to speed up reform. The mili-
tary's response, however, was political intervention led by Lieu-
tenant General Chun Doo Hwan, then KCIA chief and army chief
of staff. Chun, who had forced the resignation of Ch'oe' s cabinet,
banned political activities, assemblies, and rallies, and arrested
many ruling and opposition politicians.
In Kwangju, demonstrations to protest the extension of martial
law and the arrest ofKim DaeJung turned into rebellion as demon-
strators reacted to the brutal tactics of the Special Forces sent to
the city. The government did not regain control of the city for nine
days, after some 200 deaths.
General Chun Doo Hwan, as chairman of the standing com-
mittee of the Special Committee for National Security Measures
(SCNSM), assumed de facto leadership of the country. The
pronouncement of martial law announced as a result of Park's as-
sassination remained in effect until January 24, 1981. Under the
Special Committee for National Security Measures and the Legis-
lative Council for National Security that replaced it, sweeping po-
litical controls were instituted. Established political parties were
disbanded and over 800 people banned from politics; the media
were restructured, many journals were abolished, and hundreds
ofjournalists were purged; some 8,000 employees were purged from
government or government-controlled companies and some 37,000
people were arrested and "re-educated" in military training camps
under the Social Purification Campaign; and military court juris-
diction was extended to such civilian offenses as corruption and
participation in antigovernment demonstrations. The new National
Assembly Law and the amended National Security Act (which was
rewritten to incorporate elements of the 1961 Anticommunist Law)
also were passed. On January 10, 1981, the Martial Law Command
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allowed people to resume limited political activities in preparation
for the presidential election.
The Fifth Republic's constitution marked significant progress
from the yusin constitution. As implemented by the newly elected
Chun government, however, it fell far short of popular expecta-
tions of democraticization that had been raised after Park's death.
The constitution was attacked by students and dissidents as Park's
yusin system under new trappings. The government attempted to
defuse discontent by "decompression" as well as repression, gradu-
ally returning civil rights to those banned in 1980. Addition-
ally, the government opened up the political system slightly in 1983
and to a greater degree in 1985, although the dissident movement
continued.
Discontent was kept under control until 1987 by the regime's
extensive security services
—
particularly the Agency for National
Security Planning (ANSP, the renamed KCIA), the Defense Secu-
rity Command (DSC), and the Combat Police of the Korean Na-
tional Police (KNP). Both the civilian ANSP and the military DSC
not only collected domestic intelligence but also continued "intel-
ligence politics."
The Act Concerning Assembly and Demonstration was used to
limit the expression of political opposition by prohibiting assem-
blies likely to "undermine" public order. Advanced police notifi-
cation of all demonstrations was required. Violation carried a
maximum sentence of seven years' imprisonment or a fine. Most
peaceful nonpolitical assemblies took place without government in-
terference. However, the act was the most frequently used tool to
control political activity in the Fifth Republic, and the Chun re-
gime was responsible for over 84 percent of the 6,701 investiga-
tions pursued under the act.
The security presence in city centers, near university campuses,
government and party offices, and media centers was heavy.
Citizens, particularly students and young people, were subject to
being stopped, questioned, and searched without due process. The
typical response to demonstrations was disruption by large num-
bers of Combat Police, short-term mass detention of demonstra-
tors, and selective prosecution of the organizers. Arrest warrants
—
required by law—were not always produced at the time of arrest
in political cases.
The National Security Act increasingly was used after 1985 to
suppress domestic dissent. Intended to restrict "antistate activi-
ties endangering the safety of the state and the lives and freedom
of the citizenry," the act also was used to control and punish non-
violent domestic dissent. Its broad definition of offenses allowed
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enforcement over the widest range, wider than that of any other
politically relevant law in South Korea. Along with other politically
relevant laws such as the Social Safety Act and the Act Concern-
ing Crimes Against the State, it weakened or removed procedural
protection available to defendants in nonpolitical cases.
Questioning by the security services often involved not only psy-
chological or physical abuse, but also outright torture. The 1987
torture and death of Pak Chong-ch'ol, a student at Seoul Nation-
al University being questioned as to the whereabouts of a class-
mate, played a decisive role in galvanizing public opposition to the
government's repressive tactics.
The security services not only detained those accused of violat-
ing laws governing political dissent, but also put under various lesser
forms of detention—including house arrest—those people, including
opposition politicians, who they thought intended to violate the laws.
Many political, religious, and other dissidents were subjected to
surveillance by government agents. Opposition assembly members
later charged in the National Assembly that telephone tapping and
the interception of correspondence were prevalent. Ruling party
assembly members, government officials, and senior military offi-
cials probably also were subjected to this interference although they
did not openly complain.
Listening to North Korean radio stations remained illegal in 1990
if it were judged to be for the purpose of "benefiting the antistate
organization" (North Korea). Similarly, books or other literature
considered subversive, procommunist, or pro-North Korean were
illegal; authors, publishers, printers, and distributors of such materi-
al were subject to arrest.
Use of tear gas by the police (over 260,000 tear gas shells were
used in 1987 to quell demonstrations) increasingly was criticized;
the criticism eventually resulted in legal restrictions on tear gas use
in 1989. The government continued, however, to block many "ille-
gal" gatherings organized by dissidents that were judged to incite
"social unrest." In 1988 government statistics noted 6,552 rallies
involving 1.7 million people. There were 2.2 million people who
had participated in 6,791 demonstrations in 1989.
Intelligence Agencies
The Agency for National Security Planning
The Agency for National Security Planning (ANSP) was origi-
nally established on June 19, 1961 as the Korean Central Intelli-
gence Agency (KCIA) directly under the Supreme Council for
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National Reconstruction in the immediate aftermath of the May
16, 1961, military coup. Its duties were to "supervise and coor-
dinate both international and domestic intelligence activities and
criminal investigation by all government intelligence agencies, in-
cluding that of the military. ' ' Its mission was akin to that of a com-
bined United States Central Intelligence Agency and Federal
Bureau of Investigation.
The first head of the KCIA was Kim Chong-p'il. Kim, utiliz-
ing the existing Army Counterintelligence Corps, built a 3,000-
member organization—the most powerful intelligence and inves-
tigatory agency in the republic. The KCIA maintained a com-
plex set of interlocking institutional links with almost all of the
government's key decision-making bodies. The KCIA had a near-
monopoly over crucial information concerning national security
under the charter of the Act Concerning Protection of Military
Secrets and, more importantly, possessed considerable veto pow-
er over other agencies through its supervisory and coordination
functions.
The KCIA's practically unlimited power to investigate and to
detain any person accused of antistate behavior severely restricted
the right to dissent or to criticize the regime. The frequent ques-
tioning, detention, or even prosecution of dissidents, opposition
figures, and reporters seriously jeopardized basic freedoms and
created an atmosphere of political repression.
After the 1979 assassination of President Park Chung Hee by
the KCIA director, the KCIA was purged and temporarily lost
much of its power. Chun Doo Hwan used his tenure as acting direc-
tor of the KCIA from April to July 1980 to expand his power base
beyond the military. The organization was renamed the Agency
for National Security Planning, and its powers were redefined in
presidential orders and legislation. The ANSP, like its predeces-
sor, was a cabinet-level agency directly accountable to the presi-
dent. The director of the ANSP continued to have direct presidential
access. In March 1981, the ANSP was redesignated as the prin-
cipal agency for collecting and processing all intelligence. The re-
quirement for all other agencies with intelligence-gathering and
analysis functions in their charters to coordinate their activities with
the ANSP was reaffirmed.
Legislation passed at the end of 1981 further redefined the
ANSP's legally mandated functions to include the collection, com-
pilation, and distribution of foreign and domestic information
regarding public safety against communists and plots to overthrow
the government. The maintenance of public safety with regard to
documents, materials, facilities, and districts designated as secrets
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of the state was the purview of the ANSP, as was the investigation
of crimes of insurrection and foreign aggression, crimes of rebel-
lion, aiding and abetting the enemy, disclosure of military secrets,
and crimes provided for in the Act Concerning Protection of Mili-
tary Secrets and the National Security Act. The investigation of
crimes related to duties of intelligence personnel, the supervision
of information collection, and the compilation and distribution of
information on other agencies' activities designed to maintain public
safety also were undertaken by the ANSP. By 1983 the ANSP had
rebounded and again was the preeminent foreign and domestic in-
telligence organization.
As of 1990, the organizational structure of the ANSP was con-
sidered classified by Seoul, although earlier organizational infor-
mation was public knowledge. Despite the social and political
changes that came with the Sixth Republic (1987- ), the ANSP
apparendy still considered the support and maintenance of the presi-
dent in power to be one of its most important roles. In April 1990,
for example, ruling Democratic Liberal Party (DLP) coleader Kim
Young Sam complained that he and members of his faction wi-
thin the DLP had been subjected to "intelligence maneuvering in
politics" that included wiretapping, surveillance, and financial in-
vestigations.
Nevertheless, the ANSP's domestic powers were indeed curtailed
under the Sixth Republic. Prior to the change, the ANSP had had
free access to all government offices and files. The ANSP, Defense
Security Command, Office of the Prosecutor General, Korean Na-
tional Police, and the Ministry ofJustice had stationed their agents
in the National Assembly to collect information on the activities
of politicians. In May 1988, however, overt ANSP agents, along
with agents of other intelligence agencies, were withdrawn from
the National Assembly building. The ANSP's budget was not made
public, nor apparently was it made available in any useful man-
ner to the National Assembly in closed sessions. In July 1989, pres-
sured by opposition parties and public opinion, the ANSP was
subjected to inspection and audit by the National Assembly for the
first time in eighteen years. The ANSP removed its agents from
the chambers of the Seoul Criminal Court and the Supreme Court
in 1988.
As of 1990, however, the ANSP remained deeply involved in
domestic politics and was not prepared to relinquish the power to
prevent radical South Korean ideas—much less North Korean
ideas—from circulating in South Korean society. Despite an agree-
ment in September 1989 by the chief policymakers of the ruling
and opposition parties to strip the ANSP of its power to investigate
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pro-North Korean activity (a crime under the National Security
Act), the ANSP continued enforcing this aspect of the law rather
than limiting itself to countering internal and external attempts to
overthrow the government. The ANSP continued to pick up radi-
cal student and dissident leaders for questioning without expla-
nation.
In another move to limit the potential for the ANSP to engage
in "intelligence politics," the ANSP Information Coordination
Committee was disbanded because of its history of unduly influenc-
ing other investigating authorities, such as the Office of the Prose-
cutor General. Additionally, the ANSP, responding to widespread
criticism of its alleged human rights violations, set up a "watch-
dog' ' office to supervise its domestic investigations and to prevent
agents from abusing their powers while interrogating suspects.
Aside from its controversial internal security mission, the ANSP
also was known for its foreign intelligence gathering and analysis
and for its investigation of offenses involving external subversion
and military secrets. The National Unification Board and the ANSP
(and the KCIA before it) were the primary sources of government
analysis and policy direction for South Korea's reunification strategy
and contacts with North Korea. The intelligence service's reputa-
tion in pursuing counterespionage cases also was excellent.
The ANSP monitored visitors, particularly from communist and
East European countries, to prevent industrial and military espi-
onage. Following the diplomatic successes of the late 1980s—the
establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and
the countries of Eastern Europe, and the increased informal con-
tacts with China, Mongolia, and Vietnam—this mission grew in
importance. The security watch list contained 162 out of 3,808
visitors from communist nations in 1988 and 226 out of 6,444
visitors in 1989.
The Defense Security Command
It was Syngman Rhee, not the military, who initiated the polit-
ical involvement of the military in intelligence activities. The turning
point came in 1952 when Rhee proclaimed martial law—and the
presence of military police in the chamber of the National Assem-
bly guaranteed passage of the constitutional amendment he sought
over the objections of a recalcitrant legislative branch and still-
independent judicial branch. Throughout Rhee's administration,
two military units—the Joint Military Provost Marshal and the
army Counterintelligence Corps (CIC)—engaged in extralegal and
violent political tactics, apparently not excluding the outright mur-
der of politically undesirable people. Although the details never
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were disclosed fully, more than a few minor political figures' dis-
appearances were connected to the two units.
Under Park, the provost marshal's political role declined, while
the CIC and its successor, the Army Security Command (ASC),
concentrated on internal military security. The CIC/ASC, which
was under Park's direct control, maintained strict surveillance over
all high-ranking officers. It acted as a deterrent to would-be coup
leaders. It tried, less successfully, to prevent the rise of disruptive
factions within the military.
The Defense Security Command was formally activated in Oc-
tober 1977. This merger of the Army Security Command, the Navy
Security Unit, and the Air Force Office of Special Investigations
produced a single, integrated unit under the direct command and
operational control of the minister of national defense. Although
technically subordinate to the minister, the DSC commander oper-
ated semiautonomously and typically had personal, direct access
to the president. Given the disparity in service size, the old ASC
predominated within the DSC. The strength of the DSC varied
over time within a probable range of 5,000 to 7,000 people during
the 1980s.
The DSC (and its predecessors) was created to deal with the real
question of loyalty within a military on a divided peninsula. It was
315
South Korea: A Country Study
inspired by the Guomindang model, in which political officers moni-
tored the military services for subversion or disloyalty. The DSC
was responsible for monitoring the military for loyalty; for
safeguarding military information; for monitoring domestic polit-
ical, economic, and social activities that might jeopardize military
capabilities and national unity; for maintaining defense industrial
security—both physically and in terms of counterespionage; for
countering North Korean infiltration; for detecting espionage and
anticommunist law violations; and for conducting special investi-
gations at the direction of the president.
The DSC assigned small elements to all major military units to
monitor security and loyalty. These elements operated outside the
unit's chain ofcommand and performed a highly effective indepen-
dent audit function. The DSC representatives never rivaled unit
commanders as political officers occasionally had in communist mili-
tary units. Their input into officer evaluations, however, often
played a decisive role in career progression, giving DSC members
influence far beyond their rank and producing friction between them
and the "regular" military. Corruption within the DSC was difficult
to verify, but political manipulations, misappropriation of operat-
ing funds, and undue influencing of promotions certainly occurred
and were particularly rampant in the mid- to late 1970s.
For most of the Park regime, the ASC/DSC remained concerned
primarily with internal military matters and was involved in the
Yun P'il-yong incident in 1972 and removing the army chief of
staff, General Yi Se-ho, in 1979 for corruption. Yun P'il-yong,
head of the Capital Garrison Command, was court martialed, along
with several close followers, on charges of bribery and corruption.
His "real" offense, however, was creating a faction among the class-
es of the four-year graduates of the Korea Military Academy. Yun's
faction did not disappear when he was purged. The group of young
officers, who called themselves the "Hanahoe" (One Mind Soci-
ety), had its origins in an alumni group, the Taegu Seven Stars,
of seven young officers, including Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae
Woo, from the first graduating class of the Academy (Class 11).
The Hanahoe evolved into a group of some 200 members through
ten graduating classes. In 1979 and 1980, Chun drew on the Hana-
hoe in his ascent to power. The irony of Park's death at the hands
of his KCIA chief in 1979, however, was compounded by the rise
to power of the commander of the DSC, then Major General Chun
Doo Hwan, who used the military's anticoup apparatus to ensure
the success of his own coup (see The Chun Regime, ch. 1).
During and following Chun's rise to power, the DSC greatly
expanded its charter into domestic politics and during the early
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1980s was, perhaps, the dominant domestic intelligence service.
The DSC was "credited" with masterminding the media reorgani-
zation of 1980 and with being the midwife for the first political par-
ties of the Fifth Republic. Many former DSC members played
prominent roles in Chun's administration and in the ruling
Democratic Justice Party.
The end of the Fifth Republic brought the DSC under even more
pressure than had been brought against the ANSP to cut back on
its domestic political activities. Both the DSC and the ANSP with-
drew from the National Assembly at the same time in 1988. In
October 1988, Minister of National Defense O Cha-bok reported
to the National Assembly that the DSC would concentrate on coun-
terespionage activities, preventing the spread of communism, con-
ducting "relevant research," major restructuring, and would
discontinue the investigation of civilians. Subsequently, the DSC
eliminated the Office of Information that had been charged with
collecting information on civilians, whose members had been ac-
tive in local government offices. As a result of this move, 116 small
detachments were disbanded, and the DSC announced plans to
cut 860 personnel, or 14 percent of its 1990 strength. Additional-
ly, the DSC curtailed its involvement in security screening of non-
military government personnel. An official of the DSC claimed that
surveillance of politicians was turned over to "another agency."
Given the historically broad interpretation of national security
threats espoused by DSC personnel, however, many analysts doubt-
ed that the DSC had totally disengaged from domestic political sur-
veillance. Despite the democratic trends of the late 1980s,
intelligence and security agencies still were populated by individuals
who were both institutionally and personally loyal to the president
and ready to use any means at their disposal to support him.
Korean National Police
Organized by the United States Army Military Government in
1945, the Korean National Police (KNP) force was formally acti-
vated in 1948 by the new Korean government and placed under
the Ministry of Home Affairs. Even after the establishment of a
separate military service in 1948, the police force retained a
paramilitary role and was employed in military operations during
the Korean War.
Attacked in its early years as a remnant ofJapanese colonial rule
(1910-45), beset by low professionalism, factionalism, endemic cor-
ruption, and political manipulation, the Korean National Police
nonetheless still evolved into a relatively modern and effective force.
Although the police force was used by the Rhee regime in such
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a flagrantly political way that it was held in low esteem by the
citizenry, reforms made after the 1961 military coup began the
police force's slow evolution into a professional force. Reorgani-
zation, recruitment by examination, merit promotion, and modern
concepts ofmanagement and training were instituted. Further im-
provements came during the 1970s when modern communication,
data processing, and crime detection practices were introduced.
In 1975 the director general of the KNP was elevated to vice-
ministerial rank directly under the minister of home affairs. The
KNP reported through its own channels to its headquarters in Seoul.
Provincial governors and local officials had no authority over the
police.
In addition to the regular police functions of law enforcement,
criminal investigation, and public safety, the KNP was responsi-
ble for riot control, countering student demonstrations, and other
public disorders. Coastal security, including patrolling coastal
waters, antismuggling operations, and coordinating counterespi-
onage operations with the navy and the air force, were also its pur-
view. "Combat operations" against small-scale North Korean
infiltration attempts; the monitoring of foreign residents in South
Korea; anticommunist operations, including counterintelligence
activities and monitoring of "security risks" (historically expand-
ed to including monitoring political, labor, economic, academic,
religious, and cultural figures); and counterterrorist operations were
all part of the mission of the KNP. There sometimes was competi-
tive overlap between the KNP, ANSP, and the DSC.
In 1989 the KNP was a 130,000-person organization that con-
sisted of a headquarters, thirteen metropolitan/provincial police
bureaus, the Combat Police, the National Maritime Police, an an-
titerrorist unit, the Central Police Academy, and other support ser-
vices, such as a forensics laboratory, a hospital, and other police
schools. As of January 1989, there were 201 police stations and
3,220 police substations and detachments throughout the country.
The National Police Headquarters exercised authority over all
police components. Metropolitan and provincial police bureaus were
responsible for maintaining public order by directing and super-
vising their own police stations (see fig. 18).
The police station was responsible for maintaining public peace
within its own precinct. The police station had seven functioning
sections: an administration and public safety section, responsible
for operation and supervision of police substations and boxes, liti-
gation of minor offenses, traffic control, and crime prevention; a
security section, responsible for maintaining public order; an in-
vestigation section, responsible for investigating criminal incidents,
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lawsuits, booking criminals, custody of suspects, detention-cell
management, and transference of cases and suspects involved in
criminal cases to prosecution authorities; a criminal section, respon-
sible for crime prevention; a counterespionage section; and an in-
telligence section, responsible for collection of intelligence and
information. The police substation or police box took preliminary
actions in all criminal incidents, civic services, and accidents.
Police boxes were the South Korean equivalent of the cop on
the beat. They provided direct contact between the people and the
police. Police box personnel were supposed to know their areas and
the people who lived and worked in them. Police boxes were com-
manded by lieutenants or sergeants and had reaction vehicles avail-
able on a twenty-four-hour basis.
Weighed down by a wide range of administrative duties, KNP
personnel spent only 1 5 percent of their time on routine enforce-
ment duties in 1989. Among other things, the KNP collected fines,
approved death certificates, and processed security checks for pass-
port applicants. The personnel shortage was acute; official statis-
tics showed that there was only one police officer (excluding the
Combat Police, who accounted for nearly half the strength of the
KNP) for every 680 South Koreans, as compared with one police
officer for every 390 people in the United States, one for every 318
people in West Germany, and one for every 551 people in Japan
(the lowest ratio for any major industrialized noncommunist coun-
try). This shortage was compounded by a tight budget and the con-
tinued preoccupation with riot control, which left the force ill
equipped to deal with the demands of an increasingly affluent and
sophisticated society.
Recruitment and training were done through the Central Police
Academy, the National Police College, and the Police Consolidat-
ed Training School. The Central Police Academy was established
in 1987. It had a maximum capacity of 35,000 recruits and was
capable of simultaneously offering a six-week training course for
police recruits, a two-week training course for draftees of the Com-
bat Police, and a variety of basic specialized training courses for
junior police. Officials planned to recruit about 10,000 new police
officers a year from 1989 to 1991 to alleviate the personnel short-
age, although their ability to maintain the quality of the force, given
the low starting pay, was questioned. Only 12 percent of police
applicants were university graduates in 1989. Screening unsuita-
ble recruits was problematic because neither psychiatric nor poly-
graph assessments were administered. (In 1982, for example, an
unstable police officer killed fifty-four people in one night follow-
ing a domestic dispute.)
319
















































By 1989 the National Police College had graduated some 500
officers since its first class graduated in 1985. Each college class
had about 120 police cadets, divided between law and public ad-
ministration specializations. The National Police College began ad-
mitting women in 1989; five women were admitted each year. The
cadets shared a collective life for four years at the college. The goal
was to establish a career officers corps similar to those created by
the military academies.
The Police Consolidated Training School provided advanced
studies, basic training for junior police staff, and special practical
training courses for security and investigative officers from the coun-
terespionage echelons of police agencies. It also trained Maritime
Police instructors, key command personnel for the Combat Police
force, and foreign-language staff members.
Revolvers and carbines were the customary weapons; billy clubs
were carried by patrol officers. The gradual replacement of car-
bines by rifles began in 1981. In 1989 the KNP reemphasized the
planned replacement of carbines with M-16 rifles. Approximate-
ly 4,300 M-16s were to be supplied to police boxes and stations
in 1989; by 1999 a total of 110,000 M-16s was scheduled to be
distributed. Transportation was by motorcycle, bicycle, jeep, truck,
and squad car.
The KNP's special weapons and tactics squad was known as
Force 868. Organized in 1982, its members were trained in martial
arts and counterterrorist tactics. It received significant support and
advice from United States and West European counterterrorist task
forces preceding the 1988 Seoul Olympics and was well supplied
with the more specialized equipment needed for combating ter-
rorism.
The Combat Police force was technically subordinate to the
Ministry of National Defense, but the Ministry of Home Affairs
and the Korean National Police were responsible for its operational
management and budget. During hostilities, the Combat Police
reverted to the Ministry of National Defense. The members of the
Combat Police were conscripted at age twenty or older and served
for approximately two-and-a-half years. Divided into companies,
the Combat Police force was assigned to the metropolitan police
bureaus. Except for supervisory personnel who were regular KNP
officers, members of the Combat Police were paramilitary; their
primary responsibilities were riot control and counterinfiltration.
Under normal conditions, they did not have law enforcement pow-
ers as did regular KNP officers. In 1967 the Combat Police force
was organized to handle counterinfiltration and antiriot duties.
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Approximately half of the total strength of the KNP was formed
into 350 Combat Police/riot control companies. The percentage
of Combat Police in the total force increased during the 1980s. In
1982 there were 39,706 Combat Police, about 40 percent of the
police total. By 1987 Combat Police represented 45.8 percent of
the total force with 54,100 members. Since service in the Combat
Police was regarded as fulfilling a military obligation, young men
who did not wish to serve the compulsory minimum thirty-month
service in the military could choose instead a thirty-five-month stint
with the Korean National Police as combat police. Draftees into
military service also could be assigned to the Combat Police force
after completion of basic training.
Although the police were relatively well trained and disciplined,
illegal police behavior in the conduct of investigations or handling
of suspects was occasionally a serious problem. In 1985, for exam-
ple, as a result of some form of official misconduct, one-fourth of
Seoul's detectives were transferred, demoted, or otherwise dis-
ciplined. Rough treatment of suspects before a warrant was ob-
tained was a continuing problem. Redress in cases of official
misconduct normally was handled internally and rarely resulted
in criminal charges against police officials.
Historically, the use of excessive force by the police was perva-
sive. In violent confrontations with student demonstrators, police
units generally remained well disciplined, but rioters were beaten
on apprehension, often by plainclothes police. Charges of police
beatings in nonpolitical cases were made fairly frequently and some-
times were reported in the press. Antigovernment youth activists
were subjected to repeated and severe physical torture, which at
times resulted in death during interrogations. Various degrees of
physical maltreatment, including sleep and food deprivation, electric
shocks, beating, and forced water intake were common during police
interrogations under the Rhee, Park, and Chun regimes. With the
founding of the Sixth Republic, such reports declined. However,
according to the United States Department of State's reports on
human rights, some credible allegations of torture were made during
the last half of 1989 by persons arrested under the National Secu-
rity Act. Credible allegations of cruel treatment also continued in
1990. Although political cases received the most publicity, mistreat-
ment of people detained or arrested for nonpolitical crimes is al-
leged to be widespread.
Criminal Justice
Throughout Korea's history, the assimilation of foreign laws has
taken place in waves. Korea assimilated the codes of the Chinese
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Qin, Wei, and Tang dynasties in the early Three Kingdoms peri-
od, the codes of the Tang, Song, and Yuan dynasties in the Koryo
period (918-1392), the Ming Code in the Choson Dynasty
(1392-1910) period, Western civil law at the close of the Choson
Dynasty and during theJapanese occupation, and both Continental
Law and Anglo-American law after liberation in 1945. The Cho-
son Dynasty also produced numerous codifications of Korean law
and created new laws as necessary to deal with economic, social,
and other public policy issues. Confucian values exerted strong in-
fluence on Korea's traditional law.
With the end of the Choson Dynasty in 1910, decisive changes
occurred in Korean law. Traditional Korean institutions were sud-
denly replaced. Reform measures, characterized by the introduc-
tion of Western institutions, began with the Kabo Reforms
(1894-95) forced on Korea byJapan and modeled on the Japanese
reforms of the Meiji Restoration (1868). These hasty reforms
produced many laws translated from Japanese codes, which in turn
had their origins in Roman and Germanic laws. The imposition
of institutions by the Japanese and their post- 19 10 use for repres-
sive colonial control constituted a sharp break with the Korean past.
The Westernized legal system's key features included its origin
in the European civil law tradition; prominent roles for legal scholars,
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university professors, and legislators, rather than judges; codified
law rather than precedent as the major source of law; and an in-
quisitorial rather than adversarial court procedure. In other respects,
however, Japanese colonial rule continued several features of the
traditional Korean legal order. Under Japanese colonial rule, for
example, there was no constitutional law, no guarantee of rights,
and no judicial review of the exercise of political power. The legal
system of Korea under Japanese rule was composed essentially of
rules, duties, and obligations. Further, there was little institution-
al or procedural separation of powers. The Japanese governor
general had even greater executive and legislative power than tradi-
tional Korean kings and ruled through a large, efficient, and modern
bureaucracy.
After independence, revulsion over theJapanese occupation moti-
vated Korean officials to devise a new codification designed to
replace all Japanese laws, decrees, and orders, as well as the regu-
lations and decrees of the United States Army Military Govern-
ment in Korea (1945-48) with Korean codes. The process took ten
years. Eventually, the Criminal Code (1953), the Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure (1954), the Civil Code (1958), the Civil Procedure
Law (1960), and the Commercial Code (1962), as well as other
codes—deliberately distinguished from previous Japanese codes
—
were adopted. In most substantive areas, however, South Korean
law retained the most fundamental principles and procedures of
continental jurisprudence as originally received through Japan.
The Code of Criminal Procedure (1954) governed most aspects
of the enforcement of criminal justice. The code retained the basic
characteristics of the European continental legal system and had
some features of Anglo-American law. Among the features adapt-
ed from the United States legal system were a requirement for
judicial warrants; modification of preliminary examination;
strengthening of the system of state-appointed counsel; rejection
of hearsay evidence as a matter of rule; and a requirement for cor-
roborating evidence obtained in confessions.
The first exclusionary ruling on a confession in a South Korean
court based on the constitutional guarantee of the right to legal
counsel occurred in late 1989. Law enforcement and security agency
officials, however, did not consider themselves compelled to ad-
here to legal precedents or court rulings when subsequently inves-
tigating other cases. Police and prosecutors, especially in political
or espionage cases, still limited the frequency and length of defen-
dants' meetings with counsel, except when taking written state-
ments. Legislative action was needed for the South Korean system
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to proceed beyond court redress of specific violations in specific
cases to the establishment of general guidelines.
Crime
During the late 1980s, South Korea experienced a jump in its
traditionally low rates of violent crime. A growing number of vio-
lent crimes were directed against women, a fact that drew special
public concern.
The Korean National Police authorities denied that there was
any "organized crime" in South Korea, although police boxes in
Seoul in 1990 posted signs encouraging citizens to report any in-
formation concerning p'ongnyokpae, violent bands ofmen armed with
knives and improvised weapons who contributed to the rise in vio-
lent assaults throughout the city. Although there were some ties
between Japan's underworld—the yakuza (Japanese gangsters)
—
and South Korean criminal groups through ethnic Koreans resid-
ing in Japan, yakuza "bosses" did not direct the extension ofyakuza
activities into South Korea. Nevertheless, the disturbing increase
in violent crime and apparent disputes between criminal groups
suggested that if organized crime did not yet exist in South Korea
in 1989, its precursors were evident.
Historically, narcotics abuse in South Korea had been very low;
it was confined primarily to marginal urban low-income groups
and did not include either heroin or cocaine abuse (see Health Con-
ditions, ch. 2). In the late 1980s, narcotics abuse remained low
but had steadily increased, becoming a social and political issue.
In reaction to this increase, enforcement responsibility was trans-
ferred from the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs to the Nar-
cotics Division of the Supreme Prosecution Administration under
the Ministry ofJustice. This action gave narcotics enforcement a
higher priority, more staffing, and more funding. (Drug-related
arrests had increased from 810 in 1985 to 1,227 in 1987 and to
1,606 in 1988.) Most drug-related criminal activity involved the
manufacture or abuse of methamphetamine and South Korea's
emergence as a major Asian producer of hirropon, an illicit metham-
phetamine. A related problem was transshipment of Asian heroin
destined for the United States and other world markets.
Criminal Procedure
In the absence of martial law or emergency decrees, both of which
historically had been exercised by the government and provisions
for which remained in the 1987 Constitution, criminal procedure
in other than political cases followed a set format. Both public prose-
cutors and the police were authorized to conduct investigations of
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criminal acts. Public prosecutors were under the direction and su-
pervision of the Office of the Supreme Prosecutor General; the
supreme prosecutor general was appointed by the president. In 1990
there were four branches of the Office of the High Prosecutor Gener-
al and fourteen district offices. Theoretically, police authority to
investigate criminal acts was subordinate to the direction and review
of the prosecutors. Also, the arrest of a suspect required a judicial
warrant except in cases of flagrante delicto or when it was believed
that the suspect would flee or commit the act again. The request
for a warrant could be made only by the prosecutor.
After an arrest, the suspect had to be transferred to the public
prosecutor within ten days and indicted within ten days of the prose-
cutor' s gaining custody. The judge was permitted to extend de-
tention another ten days; the suspect could request court review
of the legality of detention.
The public prosecutor initiated legal action. The name of the
accused, the alleged crime, the alleged facts of the case, and the
applicable laws were stated in the indictment. The prosecutor had
significant discretionary power to decide whether or not to bring
the case to court based on his interpretation of the law and evi-
dence, or in consideration of a suspect's age, character, motive,
or other circumstances, even though a crime had been committed.
Prosecutors normally indicted only when they accumulated what
they considered overwhelming evidence of a suspect's guilt. The
courts, historically, were predisposed to accept the allegations of
fact in an indictment. This predisposition was reflected in both the
low acquittal rate—less than 0.5 percent—in criminal cases and
in the frequent verbatim repetition of the indictment as the judg-
ment. The principle of " innocent until proven guilty" applied in
practice much more to the pre-indictment investigation than to the
actual trial.
During the 1980s, there was a dispute within the legal system
over the judiciary's power to check prosecution. The prosecution
and judiciary differed over whether or not the law gave the judiciary
grounds to arraign suspects before issuing warrants. The judiciary
tried repeatedly in the 1980s to institutionalize this right and in
1989 asserted it in a proceeding. The judiciary was riot able to com-
pel the prosecution to accept this view, however.
At the prosecutor's discretion, a case could be brought before the
court by summary indictment if the offense were punishable by
fines. In such a case, the judge gave a summary judgment without
holding a public hearing. The accused could request an ordinary trial.
Once indicted, the accused had the right to be released on bail.
Exceptions could be made if the offense were punishable by death,
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life imprisonment, or imprisonment over ten years; if the defen-
dant were a recidivist; if there were suspicion that the defendant
would destroy evidence; or if there were reasonable grounds to sus-
pect that the defendant would flee; or if the residence of the defen-
dant were unknown. In 1989 bail was granted in a National Security
Act case for the first time.
The constitutional right to representation by an attorney was
not interpreted as applying to the investigation and interrogation
phases. In National Security Act cases, access to counsel was regu-
larly denied during the investigation phase. In 1989 lawyers sought
court orders granting access, but neither the ANSP nor the Prose-
cutor General's Office felt compelled to comply when the Nation-
al Security Act was involved.
There was no jury system. Cases that involved offenses punish-
able by the death penalty, life imprisonment, or imprisonment for
not less than one year were tried by three judges of a district or
branch court. The remaining cases were heard by a single judge.
Political and criminal cases were tried by the same courts; mili-
tary courts did not try civilians except under martial law.
At least five days before trial, the defendant was served a copy
of the indictment. The defendant had to be represented by coun-
sel if the offenses were punishable by death or imprisonment for
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more than three years. The court appointed defense counsel if the
defendant was unable to do so because of age, mental capacity,
poverty, or other handicaps that might impair choice or commu-
nication.
Hearings generally were open to the public. If danger to national
security or prejudice to public peace or good morals were involved,
the judge could close the proceedings. Charges against defendants
in the courts were declared publicly. Trial documents, however,
were not part of the public record. In lengthy and complex indict-
ments, the relationship between specific alleged actions and viola-
tions of specific sections of the penal code could become unclear.
In cases involving a mixture of political and criminal charges, this
situation at times led to charges of unfair proceedings. A defen-
dant had the right to remain silent and free from physical restraint
in the courtroom. Judges generally allowed considerable scope for
the examination of witnesses.
Either the defendant or the prosecutor could appeal a judgment
on the basis of law or fact. Appeals could result in reduced or in-
creased sentences. A Constitution Court was established in 1988
to relieve the burden on the Supreme Court (see The Judiciary,
ch. 4). When the constitutionality of a law was at issue in a trial,
the Supreme Court requested a decision of the Constitution Court.
The president, chiefjustice, and the National Assembly each named
three members of the nine-member Constitution Court.
The Supreme Court retained the power to make final review
of the constitutionality or legality of administrative decrees, regu-
lations, or actions when at issue in a trial. Grounds for an appeal
to the Supreme Court were limited by the Code of Criminal Proce-
dure to violation of the Constitution, law, or regulation material
to the judgment; abolition, alteration, or pardon of penalty; a grave
mistake in factfinding; or extreme impropriety in sentencing. An
interpretation of law in an appeal had binding effect on the inferi-
or court only when the case was remanded. In other cases, however,
a decision of the Supreme Court only had persuasive effect.
Judges were trained professionally and were among the best
products of one of the toughest education systems in the world.
The qualifications for a judge were the completion of two years
of courses at the Judicial Research and Training Institute after pass-
ing the national judicial examination, or the possession of qualifi-
cations as a prosecutor or an attorney. Judges were members of
a tiny elite; the institute had only 3,692 graduates from 1949 to
1988. In 1988 there were only 940 judges, 668 prosecutors, and
1,593 practicing attorneys. There were additional requirements for
higher positions: fifteen years of legal experience for the chiefjustice
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and justices of the Supreme Court; ten years of experience for the
chiefjudge of an appellate court, the chiefjudge of a district court,
the chiefjudge of a family court, and the senior judge of an appel-
late court; and five years of experience for the judge of an appel-
late court, the senior judge of a district court, and the senior judge
of a family court. South Korea's president, with the consent of the
National Assembly, appointed both the chiefjustice and, upon the
recommendation of the chief justice, the other justices of the
Supreme Court. Under the 1987 Constitution and the Court Or-
ganization Law, lower justices were appointed by the chiefjustice
with the consent of the Conference of Supreme Court Justices.
Historically, the executive branch exercised great influence on
judicial decisions. However, there were some indications of in-
creased judicial independence in 1989. In a number of cases, the
Constitution Court found that the government had violated the
constitutional rights of individuals. Moreover, the Supreme Court
invalidated the results of the elections for two National Assembly
seats, citing election law violations by victorious ruling party can-
didates.
Penal administration was controlled and supervised by the Minis-
try ofJustice. There were four detention facilities (for unconvict-
ed detainees), twenty-seven correctional institutions, ten juvenile
training institutes, and four juvenile classification homes. Condi-
tions in correctional institutions were austere and particularly harsh
in winter. Discipline was strict. Prisoners who broke rules or pro-
tested conditions sometimes were physically abused. Under nor-
mal circumstances, however, convicts were not physically punished.
Most accusations of mistreatment involved persons detained or
awaiting trial in detention facilities, rather than those who were
already convicted and serving their sentences in prison. Visitation
was strictly limited to legal counsel and immediate families. Mail
was subject to monitoring and occasional censorship. There was
no significant difference in the treatment of prisoners on the basis
of wealth, social class, race, or sex. The treatment of political
prisoners could be better or worse than that of regular prisoners.
On some occasions, special provisions were allowed for political
prisoners, and as late as 1989 it also was alleged by human rights
activists that political prisoners sometimes were subjected to sleep
deprivation and psychological pressure.
There were a number of probationary devices that permitted
police to supervise suspected or convicted criminals, including defer-
ral of prosecution and suspension of sentence. These measures in-
creased judicial flexibility and were often used to show clemency.
Probationary devices also had frequently been used to ensure that
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released political offenders behaved in a manner acceptable to the
government. Criminals who showed repentance regularly were freed
in amnesties, often linked to holidays. Amnesty often was declared
to showcase the beneficence of the state in forgiving criminals.
* * *
Three excellent sources on the South Korean armed forces are
Edward A. Olsen's "The Societal Role of the Republic of Korea
Armed Forces" in The Armed Forces in Contemporary Asian Societies;
Eugene Kim's "The South Korean Military and Its Political Role"
in Political Changes in South Korea; and Young Woo Lee's insightful
article "Birth of the Korean Army, 1945-50" in Korea and World
Affairs. The Asian Defence Journal often has comparative analyses
of the military capabilities of the North Korean and South Korean
armed forces. Larry A. Niksch's "The Military Balance on the
Korean Peninsula" in Korea and World Affairs and Richard L. Snei-
der's The Political and Social Capabilities of North and South Korea for
the Long- Term Military Competition provide useful information on the
Korean arms race. Dae-Kyu Yoon's Law and Political Authority in
Korea is an excellent and detailed study of the interaction of law
and politics in South Korea. Two books by South Korean army
officers, Colonel Lee Suk Bok's The Impact of United States Forces
in Korea and Brigadier General Taek-Hyung Rhee's U.S.-ROK
Combined Operations provide the South Korean perspective on United
States-South Korean military relations. English-language sources
on national security issues are published regularly by the Seoul
government, South Korean universities, and two daily newspapers,
Korea Herald and Korea Times. The Ministry of National Defense
publishes an annual White Paper that provides a comprehensive ex-
amination of military organization, defense spending, and train-
ing in the South Korean armed forces. The National Police
Headquarters annually publishes Korean National Police, a pictorial
and textual description of that organization. Manwoo Lee, Ronald
D. McLaurin, and Chung-in Moon's (eds.), Alliance under Tension:
The Evolution ofSouth Korean- U.S. Relations is another useful source.
The subversive activities of North Korea in South Korea and
abroad and the causes for increased domestic violence in South
Korea in the 1980s are discussed in official reports published by
the United States Department of State and the Committee on For-
eign Affairs of the United States House of Representatives. The
Bombing of Korean Airlines Flight KAL-858, by the United States
House Committee on Foreign Relations, provides a comprehen-
sive examination of North Korea's past use of and capabilities for
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future acts of terrorism targeting South Koreans. Donald N. Clark's
The Kwangju Uprising examines aspects of the Kwangju incident
following Chun Doo Hwan's December 1979 coup. Selig S. Har-
rison's The South Korean Political Crisis and American Policy Options
discusses the goals of radical organizations in South Korea in the
mid-1980s. For information concerning the history of the Korean
legal system, Chun Bong Duck, William Shaw, and Choi Kai-
Kwon's Traditional Korean Legal Attitudes should be consulted. Arti-
cles in the Far Eastern Economic Review and Asian Survey should also
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Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors





Hectares (10,000 m2) 2.47 acres
Square kilometers 0.39 square miles
Cubic meters 35.3 cubic feet
Liters 0.26 gallons
Kilograms 2.2 pounds
Metric tons 0.98 long tons
1.1 short tons
2,204 pounds
Degrees Celsius 9 degrees Fahrenheit
(Centigrade) divide by 5
and add 32
Table 2. Major Economic Indicators, 1986-89
Indicator 1986 1987 1988 1989
Gross National Product 1 102.7 128.4 169.2 204.0
Economic growth 2 12.9 12.8 12.2 6.5
Per capita income 3 2,503.0 3,098.0 4,040.0 4,830.0
Consumer prices 4 1.4 6.1 7.2 5.2
Gross savings 5 33.1 36.3 37.7 35.8
Trade account 6 4.2 7.7 11.4 4.6
Current account 6 4.6 9.9 14.2 5.0
Total foreign debt 1 44.5 35.6 31.2 30.3
Gross investment share 4 29.3 29.4 29.9 33.4
1 In billions of United States dollars.
2 In percentage change.
3 In United States dollars.
4 Annual percentage change.
5 As percentage of gross national product.
6 In billions of United States dollars, balance of payments basis.
Source: Based on information from Korea Economic Institute of America, Korea's Econ-
omy, Washington, 1990.
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Table 3. Central Government Expenditures, 1984, 1986, and 1987
(in billions of won) *
1984 1986 1987
Expenditure Amount Percentage Amount Percentage Amount Percentage
National defense 3,539.9 28.2 4,335.5 28.3 4,793.5 26.1
General 6,822.1 54.4 8,577.0 56.0 10,009.0 54.5
Fixed capital
formation 949.6 7.6 1,284.4 8.4 1,391.5 7.6
Net lending -2.4 — 9.5 — 0.5 —
Other 1,225.1 9.8 1,113.7 7.3 2,170.7 11.8
TOTAL 12,534.3 100.0 15,320.1 100.0 18,365.2 100.0
—means negligible.
* For value of the w6n—see Glossary.
Source: Based on information from Bank of Korea, Annual Report, 1987, Seoul, 1987, 68;
and The Europa World Year Book, 1989, 2, London, 1989, 1574.
Table 4. Central Government Revenues, 1984, 1986, and 1988
(in billions of won) *
Source 1984 1986 1988
. . . 6,697.4 8,464.0 12,545.1
1,593.7 1,942.5 2,573.3
, 1,511.3 1,878.9 2,978.4
284.8 372.4 512.3
866.0 984.0 874.0
Government enterprise receipts (net) . . . 232.3 238.3 340.8
Other ... 2,012.0 2,398.5 4,185.4
TOTAL . . . 13,197.5 16,278.6 24,009.3
* For value of the w6n—see Glossary.
Source: Based on information from Bank of Korea, Annual Report 1987, Seoul, 1987, 68;
and The Europa World Year Book, 1989, 2, London, 1989, 1574.
Table 5. Balance of Payments, Selected Years, 1965-88















-623 -922 1986 . . 4,617 4,206
1975 . 1,887 -1,671 1987 . . 9,854 7,659
1980 . . -5,321 -4,384 1988 . 14,266 11,561
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Table 6. Trade with the United States, 1982-89
(in billions of United States dollars)
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
6.28 8.26 10.52 10.78 13.92 18.38 21.47 20.64
5.95 6.27 6.87 6.55 6.54 8.76 12.75 15.91
0.32 1.98 3.65 4.23 7.37 9.62 8.71 4.73
* Figures may not add because of rounding.
Source: Based on information from United States Department of Commerce, International
Trade Administration, Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implications for the United
States: Korea, Washington, June 1989; United States, Department of Commerce,
International Trade Administration, Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implications
for the United States: Korea, Washington, April 1990; and Korea Economic Institute
of America, Korea Economic Update, 1, No. 2, Summer 1990, 4.
Table 7. Principal Trading Partners, 1986 and 1988
(in millions of United States dollars)
1986 Exports
























Country by Rank Volume
1988 Imports





















Source: Based on information from Korea Trade Promotion Corporation, How to Trade
with Korea: 1987—A Practical Guide to Trade and Investment, Seoul, 1987, 20-26; and
The Europa World Year Book, 1989, 2, London, 1989, 1574.
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Table 8. Constitutional Amendments, 1948-90
Date Description
July 4, 1954 To amend 1948 constitution to allow direct popular elec-
(First Republic) tion of president rather than election by National As-
sembly, in which President Syngman Rhee's Liberal
Party lacked a stable majority. Passed in late-night Na-
tional Assembly session under martial law with some
opposition members under arrest and others forcibly
assembled to form quorum.
November 27, 1954 To eliminate limits on presidential terms in office to per-
mit incumbent president (Rhee) indefinite tenure. Bill
carried (after two earlier failures) by fraudulent round-
ing of fractional number required for two-thirds
majority.
June 15, 1960 To replace presidential system with parliamentary form
(Second Republic) of government following overthrow of President Rhee.
Provided extensive civil rights and established Cen-
tral Election Management Committee.
November 23, 1960 To allow ex post facto legislation for punishment of rig-
ging of March 1960 presidential elections and other
actions by officials under former Rhee government.
December 17, 1962 To reestablish presidential form of government in civilian
(Third Republic) form for military leaders under Park Chung Hee, who
staged coup d'etat in May 1961.
October 17, 1969 To remove two-term restriction to permit President Park
indefinite tenure.
November 21, 1972 To increase executive power by permitting broad use of
(Fourth Republic—yusin presidential emergency measures, to undercut power
constitution) of National Assembly, and to restrict many civil rights.
Ratified by referendum under martial law.
October 22, 1980 To end^ui-m political order and provide new constitu-
(Fifth Republic) tional framework for military leaders under Chun Doo
Hwan, who staged coup d'etat in May 1980. Restored
some civil rights, which were qualified by accompany-
ing legislation. Ratified by referendum under martial
law; coupled with measures barring all major civilian
politicians from political participation.
October 28, 1987 To void Fifth Republic constitution and provide for direct
(Sixth Republic) popular election of president; coupled with measures
restoring rights of political participation to all politi-
cians barred in 1980. Drafted by joint committee of
ruling and opposition party representatives following
public pledges by ruling party presidential candidate
Roh Tae Woo in June 1987. Restored stronger civil
rights provisions of 1960 and 1962 constitutions.
Source: Based on information from Korea Annual, 1988, Seoul, 1989, 91-94; John Kie-Chiang
Oh, Korea: Democracy on Trial, Ithaca, 1968, 43, 48; and Constitution of the Republic
of Korea, Seoul, 1987.
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Table 9. Status of the National Assembly under
the 1987 Constitution
Area of Power Provision
Symbolic Text concerning National Assembly precedes text con-
cerning executive.
National Assembly National Assembly member apprehended or detained
and State Council prior to opening of session must be released during
session on request of National Assembly (except in
cases of flagrante delicto).
Requires one-quarter of membership to convene extra-
ordinary session (versus one-third in 1980 consti-
tution).
Deletes provision limiting business in presidentially called
extraordinary session to bills introduced by president.
Deletes 150-day limit on assembly sessions.
Deletes reference to dissolution of assembly.
Extends power of inspection or investigation of specific
matters of state affairs to include matters under crimi-
nal investigation or trial.
Deletes provision disallowing motion for removal of
prime minister or State Council member(s) within first
year after appointment.
Deletes provision for removal of entire State Council if
prime minister is removed.
Judicial appointments Requires consent of National Assembly for all appoint-
ments to Supreme Court (not just chief justice).
Presidency Vote by majority of National Assembly breaks tie in
presidential elections.
Requires convocation of National Assembly if there is
time, prior to emergency measures or presidential
orders having legal effect. Failure to obtain National
Assembly approval voids emergency measures and re-
stores effect of previous laws.
Source: Based on information from Republic of Korea, Ministry of Culture and Informa-
tion, Korean Overseas Information Service, Constitution ofthe Republic ofKorea, Seoul,
1980; and Republic of Korea, Ministry of Culture and Information, Korean Over-
seas Information Service, Constitution of the Republic of Korea, Seoul, 1987.
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Table 10. Executive Domination of the Judiciary, 1972-86
Year Developments
1972 President Park Chung Hee dismisses nine Supreme Court
justices who had overturned a law denying relatives of war
veterans right to claim compensation from state. Park's 1972
yusin constitution rescinds Supreme Court's power to review
constitutionality of laws.
1980 . Six Supreme Court justices are interrogated by security agency
and subsequendy forced to step down for their minority views
that Kim Chae-gyu, President Park's assassin, had not con-
spired to overthrow government.
Early 1980s A number of law students are blacklisted from enrolling in Ju-
dicial Training and Research Institute after demonstrating
against 1980 Chun Doo Hwan coup d'etat.
1985 Two Seoul District Court judges are punitively reassigned to
provincial posts after acquitting accused student demonstra-
tors. A third judge is transferred after protesting the reas-
signment.
Supreme Court reverses its earlier decision in appeal case of
Kang Chong-gon, a National Security Act offender under con-
tinued detention after his original sentence had expired.
1986 Justice Yi Il-kyu is denied reappointment to Supreme Court.
Among his independent decisions are a 1963 determination
that voided coerced confession made by suspect on spying
charges and questioning jurisdiction of 1980 military court
in 1985 appeal by lawyer linked with opposition figure Kim
Dae Jung.
Table 11. National Assembly Election Returns, February 1985
Number of Seats Percentage Percentage
Party Direct Proportional of Vote of Seats
Democratic
Justice Party 87 61 35.3 53.6
New Korea
Democratic Party 50 17 29.2 24.3
Democratic
Korea Party 26 9 19.5 12.7
Korea
Nationalist Party 15 5 9.2 7.2
Other and
independents * 6 6.8 2.2
Total 184 92 100.0 100.0
* Most independents subsequendy joined one of the four major parties.
Source: Based on information from Byung Chul Koh, "The 1985 Parliamentary Election
in South Korea," Asian Survey, 25, No. 9, September 1985, 883-97.
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Table 12. National Assembly Election Returns, April 1988
Number of Seats Percentage Percentage
Party Direct Proportional of Vote of Seats
Democratic
Justice Party 87 38 34.0 41.8
Party for Peace
and Democracy 54 16 19.3 23.4
Reunification
Democratic Party 46 13 23.8 19.7
New Democratic
Republican Party 27 8 15.6 11.7
Other and
independents 1 10 7.2 3.3
Total 2 224 75 100.0 100.0
1 Most independents subsequently joined one of the four major parties.
2 Figures may not add to totals because of rounding.
Source: Based on information from Chan Wook Park, "The 1988 National Assembly Elec-
tion in South Korea: The Ruling Party's Loss of Legislative Majority," Journal
of Northeast Asian Studies, 7, No. 3, Fall 1988, 65.
Table 13. Strikes and Labor Disputes, 1987-90
Number of
Year Events Comments
1987 3,749 70.1 percent over pay.
1988 1 ,873 Average duration 10 days; 51.6 percent over pay,
16.9 percent over the right to bargain
collectively, 7.1 percent over working
conditions, 5.9 percent over dismissal,
3 percent over employers' unfair acts.
1989 * 1,678 Average duration 17.8 days, 47.6 percent over
pay, 25.5 percent over collective bar-
gaining; 69 percent of events ruled ille-
gal under Labor Dispute Adjustment
Law.
* January through October.
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Table 14. Principal Radical Organizations, 1985-89
Date Established Organization
April 17, 1985 National Federation of Student Associations (Chonhangnyon).
Action wing is Struggle Committee for the Liberation of the
Masses, the Attainment of Democracy, and the Unification
of the Nation (Sammint'u). Both outlawed as "anti-state or-
ganizations" under National Security Act and suppressed in
1986.
March 21, 1986 Struggle Committee Against Imperialism, the Military, and Fas-
cism, and for the Nation and Democracy (Mimmint'u) in-
augurated at thirty-eight universities. Mimmint'u ideology
emphasizes political linkages and cooperation among students,
workers, and farmers.
April 11, 1986 Committee for the Anti-U.S. Struggle for Independence and the
Anti-Fascist Struggle for Democracy (Chamint'u) formed at
Seoul National University and Korea University. Chamint'u
ideology emphasizes struggle and direct action against the
government and the United States presence in South Korea.
May 1987 Seoul Area Council of University Student Representatives
(Sodaehyop). Combines Chamint'u and Mimmint'u
elements.
August 19, 1987 National Association of University Student Councils (Chondae-
hyop) established in Taejon. Replaced and enlarged Sodaehyop.
May 1988 Seoul Area Federation of Student Councils (Soch'ongnyon).
Source: Based on information from Wonmo Dong, "University Students in South Korean
Politics: Patterns of Radicalization in the 1980s," Journal of International Affairs [Seoul],
40, No. 2, Winter-Spring 1987, 233-55; and "Monthly Views Two Dissident
Groups' Interactions," Sin tonga [Seoul], March 1, 1989, 268-85, in Foreign Broad-
cast Information Service, Daily Report: East Asia, April 7, 1989, 26-38.
Table 15. Media Statistics, 1986, 1988, and 1989
Media 1986 1988 1989
8 9 18
Local newspapers 1 10 10 24
News agencies 2 2 2








1 Newspapers are Korean-language dailies, excluding sports newspapers.




Table 16. Orders of Battle and Major Equipment for Ground
Forces of South Korea and North Korea, 1990





3 army headquarters 16 corps headquarters
10 31 infantry divisions 2
headquarters 2
2 mechanized 15 armored
infantry divisions 2 brigades 2
21 infantry divisions 2 24 infantry brigades 2







2 ^i i rfarp-tn- «n i rf*a rp surface-to-surface
missile battalions missile battalions 3
1,560 tanks 3,500 tanks
1,550 armored personnel 1,960 armored personnel
carriers carriers
4,200 field artillery 7,800 field artillery
pieces pieces
140 multiple rocket 2,500 multiple rocker
launchers launchers
5,300 mortars 11,000 mortars
12 surface-to-surface 70 surface-to-surface
missiles missiles
—means negligible.
1 Includes 25,000 marines.
2 Includes subordinate armor and artillery units.
3 Number of units unknown.
Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1989-1990, London, 1989, 165-66;
and Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Paper, 1989,
Seoul, 138-40.
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Table 17. Order of Battle and Major Equipment for Air Forces
of South Korea and North Korea, 1990
Category South Korea North Korea
Personnel 40,000 1 70,000
Military units 1 22 ground attack/ 3 bomber regiments
interceptor
squadrons
1 reconnaissance 18 ground attack
squadron regiments
l search-and-rescue surface-to-surface
squadron missile battalions 2











Fighter aircraft . . . 90 F-5A/B 40 J-7
36 F-16C/D 160 J-6
204 F-5E/F 100 J"5
130 F-4 40 Q-5
20 RF-4/5 10 Su-25







Helicopters 400 3 142
1 Data on transportation, helicopter, and training units not available.
2 Number of units unknown.
3 In army and naval aviation units. The army, navy, and air force have an additional 263 support aircraft,
including helicopters, trainers, and transports.
Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1989-1990, London, 1989, 165-66;
and Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Paper, 1989,
Seoul, 1990, 138, 141.
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Table 18. Orders of Battle and Major Equipment for Naval Forces
of South Korea and North Korea, 1990
Category South Korea North Korea
oO,UUU
fleet commands East Coast Fleet
1








3 minisubmarines 24 submarines
11 destroyers 2 frigates
17 frigates 4 corvettes
11 missile-attack craft 29 missile-attack craft
68 patrol boats 330 patrol boats
9 minesweepers 40 minesweepers





Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1989-1990, 1989, London, 165-66;
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chaebol—Korean translation of the Japanese word zaibatsu, or busi-
ness conglomerate. A group of specialized companies with
interrelated management servicing each other.
chip (jip)—The household, i.e., family members under one roof;
the term k'unjip (big house) refers to the main family of the
eldest son, while the term chagunjip (little house) refers to the
branch family households of the younger sons.
Ch'ondogyo—Teachings of the Heavenly Way, an indigenous
monotheistic religion stressing the equality ofman and the unity
ofman and the universe. Formerly Tonghak (q. v. ), Ch'ondogyo
had approximately 27,000 followers and 66 churches in South
Korea in 1988.
chuch 'e (juche)—The political ideology promulgated by Kim II Sung.
The application of Marxism-Leninism to the North Korean
experience based on autonomy and self-reliance.
chungin—The "middle people," a small group of technicians and
administrators in traditional Korea, subordinate to the yang-
ban (q.v.), that included astronomers, physicians, interpreters,
legal specialists, and artists.
Demarcation Line—Established under the Korean armistice agree-
ment of 1953; marks the actual cease-fire line between South
Korea and North Korea.
DMZ (Demilitarized Zone)—The 4-kilometer-wide buffer zone
along the approximately 241 -kilometer-long Demarcation Line
(q.v.).
fiscal year—calendar year.
Five Relationships—The Confucian concept of ideal social rela-
tionships, formulated by classical Chinese philosophers such
as Mencius (372-289 B.C.), which states that there should be
affection between father and son, righteousness between ruler
and minister, attention to their separate functions between hus-




gross domestic product. The total value of all final (con-
sumption and investment) goods and services produced by an
economy in a given period, usually a year.
GNP
—
gross national product. GDP (q. v.) plus income from over-
seas investments minus the earnings of foreign investors in the
home economy.
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han'gul—The Korean phonetic writing system, developed by schol-
ars in the court of King Sejong in the fifteenth century, which
is used either by itself or in conjunction with Chinese characters.
International Monetary Fund (IMF)—Established along with the
World Bank (q.v.) in 1945, the IMF is a specialized agency
affiliated with the United Nations and is responsible for stabiliz-
ing international exchange rates and payments. The main busi-
ness of the IMF is the provision of loans to its members
(including industrialized and developing countries) when they
experience balance of payments difficulties. These loans
frequently carry conditions that require substantial internal
economic adjustments by the recipients, most of which are
developing countries.
p'a—The lineage, a kinship unit consisting of all descendants of
a common male ancestor who, in many cases, was the found-
er of a village. Some p'a contain thousands of households
—
chip (q.v.)—and members conduct ceremonies at the common
ancestral gravesite. In some villages or hamlets in traditional
Korea, many or most of the people were members of the same
p'a -
pukpang chdngch'aek—Also seen as Nordpolitik, or northern policy.
Reconciling traditional ties with the West with new opportu-
nities in the East; establishing self-reliant global posture; ex-
panding and diversifying trade relations on global scale to cope
with trade protectionism from the United States; improving
relations with P'yongyang.
to (do)—Province, used in combined form, as Kangwon-do for
Kangwon Province, or Chungch'ong-pukto for North Ch'ung-
ch'ong Province. There are eight mainland provinces and one
island province in the Republic of Korea. Do, or to, also means
island, as in Cheju-do.
Tonghak—Literally, Eastern learning, an indigenous religious
movement founded by Ch'oe Che-u in the early 1860s, which
spearheaded a popular, anti-foreign rebellion in 1894-95. Later
renamed Ch'ondogyo (q.v.).
won—The monetary unit. In January 1989, the exchange rate was
W682.4 per US$1.
World Bank—Informal name used to designate a group of three
affiliated international institutions: the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International
Development Association (IDA), and the International Finance
Corporation (IFC). The IBRD, established in 1945, has the
primary purpose of providing loans to developing countries for
productive projects. The IDA, a legally separate loan fund but
378
Glossary
administered by the staff of the IBRD, was set up in 1960 to
furnish credits to the poorest developing countries on much eas-
ier terms than those of conventional IBRD loans. The IFC,
founded in 1956, supplements the activities of the IBRD
through loans and assistance specifically designed to encourage
the growth of productive private enterprises in the less devel-
oped countries. The president and certain senior officers of the
IBRD hold the same positions in the IFC . The three institu-
tions are owned by the governments of the countries that sub-
scribe their capital. To participate in the World Bank group,




yangban—The scholar-official ruling class of traditional Korea, dis-
tinguished for its knowledge of neo-Confucianism and its mo-
nopoly of high government positions; more broadly, families
with lineages descended from scholar-officials and scholars who
had passed the civil service examinations even though they had





account surpluses, 153, 184
acquired immune deficiency syndrome
(AIDS), 129-30
Act Concerning Assembly and Demon-
stration, 244, 245, 310
Act Concerning Crimes Against the State,
311
Act Concerning Local Autonomy, 215
Act Concerning Protection of Military
Secrets, 279, 312, 313
Act Concerning Protection of Society, 211
Administration Reform Commission,
209, 226
Advisory Council of Elder Statesmen,
207-8
Advisory Council for Peaceful Unification
Policy, 207
Agency for National Security Planning
(ANSP) (see also Korean Central Intel-
ligence Agency), 207, 225, 281, 310,
311-14; activities of, 227, 237, 314;
conduct of foreign policy by, 251 ; func-
tions of, 312-13; Information Coordi-
nation Committee of, 314; limitations
on powers of, 226-27, 228, 313, 314;
organizational structure of, 3 1 3 ; origin
of, 312; reluctance of, to limit power,
313-14, 327; role of, strengthened,
227-28
Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggres-
sion, Exchange and Cooperation, xxxvi
agricultural: bank, 171-72; development,
44; subsidies, 47; technology, 47; trade,
226; workforce, 45, 163
agricultural cooperative movement, 141,
167; merged with agricultural bank,
171-72
agricultural economy: government's em-
phasis on, 142; under Park, 46; pre-
twentieth century, 139
agricultural productivity, 165, 167, 170;
growth of, 165; under Saemaul Move-
ment, 47
agricultural products, 165, 167, 255;
barley, 165, 167; imports of, xxix, 170;
livestock, 167; price supports for, 169;
rice, 165
agricultural sector (see also farmers): con-
tribution of, to gross domestic product,
165; decline in, xxix, 46; problems in,
163-65; prospects for, 170; share of, in
gross national product, 193
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, Min-
istry of, xxix
AIDS. See acquired immune deficiency
syndrome
air defense system, 269; army's respon-
sibility for, 283, 285
air force, 285-86, 289; aircraft, 285-86;
base locations, 285; commands in, 285;
materiel, xxxix; modernization pro-
gram, 286; organization of, 285; per-
sonnel, 285; role of, xxxix
Air Force Academy, 290
Air Force Office of Special Investigations,
315
airports, 182
Air Training Command, 285
Air Transportation Command, 285
akpop (evil laws), 244
Algeria, 264
Allen, Richard V., 60
American Cultural Center, 241, 242
ancestor worship, 11; function of, 100; in
kinship system, 100; in urban families,
104
ANSP. See Agency for National Security
Planning
anti-American sentiment, 55, 62, 221,
241, 255; aroused by Nordpolitik, 252;
aroused by Kwangju uprising, 241,
299; fueled by Reagan's support of
Chun, 60; violence in, 241, 242
Anticommunism Law, 307
Anticommunist Youth League, 239, 240
April 19 Student Revolution, 34, 306
armed forces. See military; see also under in-
dividual branches
Armed Forces Organization Act, xxxix-
xl, 274
army, 281-85; aircraft of, 284; air defense
network, 283, 285; Capital Defense
Command, xxxix, 282-83; Counter-
espionage Operations Command, 283;
Defense Security Command, 283, 307,
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310, 313, 314-17; disbanded by Japa-
nese, 273; dissident students drafted
into, 279-80; First Army, xxxviii-
xxxix, 281, 283; infantry units in, 283,
285; Logistics Base Command, 283;
materiel, 284-85; organization of, 281;
responsibilities of, 283; Second Army,
xxxix, 282; Special Warfare Command,
284; Third Army, xxxviii-xxxix, 281-
82, 283; weapons, 283, 284-85; women
in, 284
Army Counterintelligence Corps (CIC),
312, 314
Army Security Command, 315
art: Buddhist influence on, 15; calligra-
phy, 16; Chinese influence on, 16; gold
objects, 15; Indian influence on, 15;
under Japanese rule, 22; painting, 16;





Asia-Pacific News Network, 249
Association for Korean Residents in
Japan. See Mindan
Association of Journalists Dismissed in
1980, 236
Association of Korean Journalists, 236
associations, xxxii-xxxiii, 170, 200, 234-
236, 243
Audit and Inspection Board, 207
automobiles, 156; domestic demand for,
138, 158; parts for, 160
automotive industry, xxviii, 156, 158,
160; government emphasis on, 142,
158, 160
balance of payments: effects of, 186; in
1970s, 138; in 1986, 138; surplus, 186
balance of trade, 183, 190-91
Bank of Korea, 142, 172; Office of Bank
Supervision and Examination of, 172
Bank of Seoul and Trust Company, 154
banks, 149, 172, 174; decline in, 154-55;
money-deposit, 154; nationalized, 141,
171; under Chun, 58; under Park, 141;
trust services of, 154
Basic Press Act (1980), 244, 247; public
criticism of, 247-48
Bell Helicopters Textron, 296
birth control. See family planning
birth rate, 29, 79; projected, 190; urban,
84
Blue House, 207, 283, 288, 304
borders, 3, 7, 70
Bright Society Rallies, 58
Britain, 157; treaty with, 12
Brunei, 264
Buddhism, xxvii, 123, 128; decline of,
124; dominance of, 7; effect of land re-
form on, 9-10; influence of, 10, 15, 70;
number of adherents to, 127; opposi-
tion to, 10; Won (Wonbulgyo), 126
Bush, George, 256
business associations, 234; history of, 234;
relationship of, with government, 234,
235
business conglomerates. See chaebol
businesses: contribution of, to gross na-
tional product, 174; financing of, 155;
government assistance to, 174-75; gov-
ernment discrimination among, 97;
under Park, 43; relationship of, with
government, 235; small and medium-
sized, 174-75; wages in, 174; working
conditions in, 174
bus system, 181
cabinet. See State Council
Cairo Conference, 24
Capital Defense Command, xxxix, 282-
83; responsibilities of, 283
capital equipment, 189




Central People's Committee, 27, 28
Central Police Academy, 318, 319
CFC. See United States-Republic of Korea
Combined Forces Command
Ch'aChi-ch'61, 41, 42; assassinated, 42,
307
chaebol (business conglomerates), xxxiii,
148, 194; access of, to foreign tech-
nology, 149; characteristics of, 148; co-
operation of, with government, 148;
department stores owned by, 171; de-
velopment and origins of, 43, 146-49;
diversification programs of, 254; ex-
ports by, 148-49; government favorit-
ism toward, 97, 141; growth of, 148-
49; largest, 147; precursors of, 95, 140;
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revenues of, 147; under Rhee, 147; role
of, in economic development, 141, 147;
working conditions in, 147
Ch'ae Man-sik, 22
chaeya seryok (opposing political forces), 53
chagunjip. See household
Ch'a Kyu-h6n, 56
Changanghoe. See Self-Strengthening So-
ciety




Cheju Island, 71, 75, 305; administration
of, 214; airport, 182; dialect of, 113;
land area of, 71; shamanism on, 106;
women on, 77, 106
chemical industry, 139, 141, 161-62; areas
for investment, 162; expansion of, 44,
189; exports by, 144, 162, 189; fertiliz-
ers in, 161-62; government emphasis
on, 142, 144; growth in, 144; imports
by, 162; role of chaebol in, 149
Cheney, Richard B., 256, 303
Chiang Kai-shek, 27, 274
China: borders with, 3; contacts of, with
South Korean people, 260; cooperation
with, xxxiv; diplomatic relations with,
xxxiv; ethnic Koreans in, 260; influence
of, xxiv, 4, 5, 12, 16, 18, 33, 89, 123;
invasion of Kory6 by, 8; as mediator,
260; military trained in, 273; Nordpoli-
tik viewed by, 260; relations with, 8;
role of, in Korean War, 32; ties with,
xxxiii, 61, 252, 260; trade with, xxxii,
xxxiii, xxxiv, 7, 188, 257; in trustee-
ship, 27; war with, 271, 272; Western
influence in, 11
Chinese Communist Party, 274
Chinese Eastern Railway, 14









Cholla region, xxxii, 273; development
in, 77; discrimination against people of,
97; rebelliousness in, 77; rivalry of,
with KySngsang region, 56, 76-77
ch'ommin class, 91, 93, 94; shamans in,
122
ChomminySn. See Coalition for a Na-
tional Democratic Movement
Chdndaehyop. See National Association of
University Student Councils
Chondogwan (Evangelical Church), 126
Ch'ondogyo (Teachings of the Heavenly









Chongsin Girls' School, 107
ChSng Yag-yong, 1
1




ChSnnohyop. See National Council of Labor
Unions
Cho Pyong-ok, 37
Chosen soren (General Association of
Korean Residents in Japan), 6
Choson Dynasty, 9-15, 323; art in, 15;
Chinese influence in, 16; deforestation
in, 167; education during, 114; founded
by Yi Song-gye, 8-9, 272; genealogy
in, 19, 92; Japanese attacks on, 10;
Manchu attacks on, 10; medicine in,
130; natural disasters in, 11; neo-
Confucianism in, 88, 123; problems in,
10; reforms in, 9; revolts in, 11;
secularism in, 10; shamanism in, 106;
ties of, with United States, 25; urban
population in, 81; yangban in, 20, 91
Choson ilbo, 248
Choson Kingdom, 4; isolationism in, xxiv
Christian Broadcasting System, 247, 248
Christian Farmers Association, 239
Christianity, xxvii, 11, 123-24; growth of,
124; influence of, 90; prohibition of,
124; Protestantism, 124; Roman Ca-
tholicism, 123
Christians: concept of minjung promoted
by, 99; missionaries, 123, 124; num-
ber of, 124, 127; persecution of, 124;
as political radicals, 53; resistance by,
to Japanese occupiers, 110, 124; role
of, in modernization, 124
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Chun Doo Hwan, xxix, 77, 228, 316; at-
tempt to assassinate, 304; coup d'etat
of, xxxvii, 53, 54, 307, 308; elected
president, 56; government of. See Fifth
Republic; investigation of Park by, 52;
public apology by, 225; purges under,
57-58, 220; reaction of, to Kwangju
uprising, 56; self-exile of, 208, 225
Chungang ilbo, 248, 249; strike against,
249-50
Ch'ungch'ong provinces: stereotype of,
77
Chun government (Fifth Republic), xxix-
xxx, 249, 310, 317; banks under, 58;
censorship under, 247; compromise
and reform under, 215-19; control of
news by, 247; crackdown on journalists
under, 236; crackdown on protesters
by, 54-55; demise of, 61-63, 199; econ-
omy under, 59; effect of Kwangju
uprising on, 241
;
emphasis of, on edu-
cation, xxv-xxvi; human rights viola-
tions under, 244; junta committee, 56;
military under, 278-79; military spend-
ing under, 279; modernization of armed
forces under, 269; purge of bureaucracy
by, 212, 230; purge of Korean Central
Intelligence Agency in, 312; reeduca-
tion program of, 58, 240; Saemaul
Movement under, 169; ties of, with
Reagan administration, 59-60; vio-
lence used by, 240
Chun government corruption: committee
investigating, 224; convictions of offi-
cials in, 224; effects of hearings into,
224-25; hearings investigating, 200,
212-13, 225, 233
chungin class, 16, 91, 93
Chungsanggyo, 126
Ch'usok (Autumn Harvest Festival), 104
CIC. See Army Counterintelligence Corps





Civil Defense Law, 288
civil service {see alsoyangban), 211-14; cor-
ruption hearings on and prosecution of
officials in, 212-13; examinations for,
213; management of, 213; number of
employees in, 213; prestige of, 211-12;
qualifications for, 91; recruitment for,




Coalition for a National Democratic Move-
ment (Chomminyon), 233
Code of Criminal Procedure (1954), 203,
324, 328
Cold War, xxiv; effect of Korean War on,
33; revisionist view of, 62-63
Combat Air Command, 285
Combat Police, 310, 318, 321; conscrip-
tion of, 321; as military obligation, 322;
personnel, 322; responsibilities of, 321
Command and General Staff College, 291
Commercial Bank, 172
Commercial Code, 324
Committee for Peaceful Reunification of
the Fatherland (CPRF), 259, 262
commodity: structure, 188-89; trade vol-
ume, 137
Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS), xxxiv
Conference of Supreme Court Justices,
210
Confucianism {see also neo-Confucianism):
dominance of, xxvii, 7, 123; hierarchy
in, 89; influence of, on art, 16, 69-70;
influence of, on education, 114; num-
ber of adherents to, 127; as a political
theory, 89, 124; revival of, xxvii; as so-
cial ethic, 128
Confucius (Kong Zi), 88, 89
conscription, xxxviii, 279, 279, 280, 288,
289; rejection for, 288; role of, in de-
velopment, 96
Conscription Law of 1949, 279
conscripts: assignment of, 288-89; basic
training of, 290; rights of, xxxviii
constitution (see also under individual consti-
tutions): drafting of, 201-2; perception
of, 201
constitution of 1948, 31; amended, 33; re-
vised in 1960, 37
constitution of 1962, 39; amended, 39;
presidential power under, 39
constitution of 1972 (yusin constitution),
40, 42, 244, 307; presidential power
under, xxx; revised in 1987, xxx
constitution of 1980, 53, 57, 202, 204,
206, 207, 310; presidential power
under, 57
Constitution of 1987, 202-5, 325; amend-
ment process, 204-5; drafting of, 216;
384
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due process under, 202-3; elections
under, 221; foreign policy under,
250-51; National Assembly in, 202,
221-22; neutrality clause in, 202; out-
line of, 202-3; people's duties and
rights in, 202-4; presidential power un-
der, 202, 207; separation of powers in,
204; unification policy in, 202
constitutional framework, 200-205; his-
tory of, 200-201; of Sixth Republic,
201-2
constitutionalism: difficulties in adapting
to South Korea, 201 ; as focus of politi-
cal strife, 201; idea of, 201
constitutional review, 211
Constitution Court, 211, 328, 329
construction industry, xxviii, 142, 160-
61; domestic, 160; in Middle East, 160,
177; overseas, 160
consumer goods: imports of, 189; low
production of, 45
consumption patterns, 177-78





Court Organization Law (1949), 210, 223
courts. judiciary; see also under individual
courts
CPRF. See Committee for Peaceful Re-
unification of the Fatherland
CPV. See Chinese People's Volunteers
credit policies, 172, 173
credit associations. See kye
crime, 325
Criminal Code, 324
criminal justice system, 322-30; acquit-
tal rate, 326; amnesty in, 329; appeal,
328; arrest, 326; bail, 326-27; Chinese
influence on, 323; Confucian values in,
323; detention, 326; hearings, 328; key
features of, 323-24; political prisoners
in, 329; probation in, 329-30; public
prosecutors, 325; rights of accused,
202, 324-25, 327; right to legal coun-
sel under, 324-25, 327-28; sentences,
244; summary indictment, 326; West-
ern influence on, 323
criminal procedure, 325-30
culture: Chinese influence on, xxiv, 18;
as element in ethnic identity, 75; re-
pression of, under Japanese rule, 23;
role of hut in, 123; under Three King-
doms, 15-18; United States influence
on, xxiii; Western influence on, xxiv
Cumings, Bruce, 140
curb market, 155
currency: devaluation of, 43; revaluation
of, 188
current account balance: in 1988, 149; in
1989, 149
Curzon, George (Lord), 71
Daeduk Science Town, 191
Daewoo, 147, 157, 160, 257, 258; defense
production by, 296
death: causes of, 129; rate, 128
defense industry, 160, 295-97; aircraft
produced by, 285; coproduction ar-
rangements in, 160, 269, 277-78, 279,
285, 286; domestic, 277, 295-96; li-
censed production in, 277; research and
design in, 279; role of chaebol in, 149;
technical assistance in, 211-1$
Defense Industry Bureau, 277
Defense Security Command (DSC),
xxxix, 54, 61, 228, 240, 247, 283, 307,
310, 313, 314-17; corruption in, 316;
political activities of, 316-17; reform of,
xxxviii
defense spending, 146, 271, 293-95; an-
nual budgets for, 293; under Chun,
279; National Assembly review of, 294;
in 1965, 277; in 1970s, 293; as opera-
tional costs, 295; as percentage of gross
national product, 293; on weapons, 295
Defense White Paper, 1988, 279-80
Demarcation Line, 70
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), 70, 269; es-
tablished, 276
Democratic Alpine Club, 231
Democratic Confederal Republic of Korea,
xxxvi, 262
Democratic Declaration, 40
Democratic Justice Party (DJP), xxx,
199, 204, 228, 317; loss of majority by,
222-23; political alignments in, 230;
Roh's restructuring of, 229; student ac-
tivity against, 242
Democratic Liberal Party (DLP), 230,
313; coalition, xxxii; creation of, xxxi
Democratic Party (DP), 34, 37; creation
of, xxxii
Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
See North Korea
385
South Korea: A Country Study
Democratic Press Movement Association,
236
Democratic Republican Party (DRP), 41,
230; established, 39; revival of, 53
demonstrations (see also student demon-
strations), 245; by farmers, 226, 305;
against martial law, 55; police response
to, 310; against Roh government, 221;
of spring 1987, 271; statistics on, 311;
against United States, 30
Department of Local Affairs, 214
dissidents (see also student dissidents), 226;
arrested, 227, 311, 314; associations of,
236; detained, 311, 312; police attacks
on, 270; prosecution of, 312
divorce, 105
DJP. See Democratic Justice Party
DLP. See Democratic Liberal Party
DMZ. See Demilitarized Zone
domestic capital market: liberalization of,
185
domestic market, 138-39, 184; liberaliza-
tion of, 235, 239
domestic savings, 185
Dong Ah Construction Company, 161
DP. See Democratic Party
DPRK. See North Korea
droughts, 75
DRP. See Democratic Republican Party
drug abuse, 130, 325
DSC. See Defense Security Command
due process of law, 243
Eastern Europe: exports to, 257; revolu-
tions of 1989 in, xxxiii; ties with, xxxiii,
252; trade with, xxxii, 188, 257
Eastern Learning Movement. See Tonghak
Movement
economic depression, 10
economic development: under constitu-
tion, 204; effect of industrial growth on,
155; financing of, 153-55; government
role in, 140-46; under Japanese rule,
22, 139-40; under Park, 43-45, 141,
143, 234; population density as a fac-
tor in, 81; problems caused by, 59; role
of chaebol in, 141, 147
Economic Development Cooperation
Fund, 264
economic development plans (see also five-
year plans), 43, 143, 149; emphases of,
142
economic growth, xxviii; under Chun, 59;
class structure altered by, 96; under
constitution, 204; under Fifth Five-
Year Economic and Social Develop-
ment Plan, 59, 137; influence of edu-
cation on, 1 15; Japanese influence on,
140; under Park, 41, 44, 45, 137
economic modernization, 96
Economic Planning Board, xxvii, xxviii,
45, 79, 81, 144; established, 43, 141-
42; role of, 142, 209
economic policies: influence of, on urbani-
zation, 35; of Park, 38, 43-45
economic recession, 41, 145
economic restructuring, 139; role of chae-
bol'in, 141; role of public enterprises in,
141
economic services, 146
economic stabilization measures, 45; under
Chun, 59; for prices, 44
economic structure: transformation of,
under Park, 137; transition of, to tech-
nology-oriented, 194
economy: under constitution, 204; decline
in, 155-56; future of, 193-94; indus-
trial, 142; inflation, 29, 145; under
Chang, 37; under Chun, 59; under
Japanese rule, 21-22, 29; postwar, 36;
problems in, 29; purchasing power in,
177; under Roh, 177; under United
States occupation, 29-30
education, 114-22; centralized control of,
115; during Choson Dynasty, 114;
Christian influence on, 90; under
Chun, 120; Confucian influence on,
69-70; government expenditure on,
115-16, 146; influence of, on economic
growth, 115; influence of, on job op-
portunities, 46; influence of, on politi-
cal awareness, 35; influence of, on
population growth, 78; influence of, on
social system, 35, 116; influence of
modernization on, 96; underJapanese
occupation, 114, 140; as key to social
mobility, 98; management of, by
women, 107; as reason for urban
migration, 85; reforms of, 120; under
Rhee, 114-15, 35; social importance of,
46, 98-99; United States influence on,
xxiii, 114; of women, 107
education, higher, 118-21; attendance,
46, 115, 118-19, 120; changes in, xxvi;
emphasis on, xxv-xxvi; entrance ex-
aminations for, 118; faculty in, 213;
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hierarchy of universities in, 98; in-
fluence of, on political patterns, xxvi,
244; necessity of, for social mobility,
116; overseas, 98; required failure
quotas in, 121; science and technology
programs in, 191, 192; for women, 107
Education Law, 236
Ehwa Woman's University, 98, 107, 118
Eighth Army, 301
elections, National Assembly: of 1960, 37;
of 1967, 39; of 1971, 39; of 1978, 41;
of 1985, xxx; of 1988, xxxi, 199, 222;
of 1992, xxxii
elections, presidential, 206; of 1956, 34;
of 1960, 34; of 1967, 39; of 1971, 39;
of 1987, xxx-xxxi, 199, 216, 218-19
electric generation, 149, 152-53; energy
used in, 163; under Japanese occupa-
tion, 139; nuclear, 153; for rural areas,
47; under United States occupation, 29
electronics industry, xxviii, 156, 157; de-
pendence of, onJapanese components,
157; exports, 157, 189; government em-
phasis on, 142, 144; growth of, 157;
overseas production in, 157; production,
157; role of chaebol in, 149; value of, 157
elite (see also yangban), 91-92, 97
Emergency Measure Number Nine, 40,
42, 232, 307; revoked, 52, 308
emergency measures, 40, 206-7, 307
emergency preparedness, 280-81
Emergency Prepared Resources Manage-
ment Law, 281
emigration: to Africa, 88; to Canada, 88;
to China, 86; to Europe, 88; to Hawaii,
86; to Japan, 86; to Latin America, 88;
to Manchuria, 86; to Middle East, 88;
reasons for, 86, 88; to Soviet Union,
86; to United States, xxiii, 86, 88
emigres, 86, 88, 95, 258
energy, 162-63; in electric generation, 163;





ethnic identity (see also culture; Korean
people), xxv, 18, 108-14; under Chi-
nese rule, 18; elements in, 75; influence
of geography and history on, 3, 5;
underJapanese rule, 21; search for, 70;
sense of, 70
European Community, 264
examination hell, 118, 119-21
examinations: objectivity of, 120; for
secondary school, 117; for higher edu-
cation, 118; for yangban, 20, 91
examinations, civil service, 213; Confu-
cian, 94
exogamy, law of, 100, 102
Export-Import Bank of Korea, 174
export markets, 189
exports, 188-90; of armaments, 160; of
automobile industry, 158; by chaebol,
148-49; of chemicals and pharmaceu-
ticals, 162; under Chun, 59; decrease
in, 155-56; to Eastern Europe, 257; ef-
fect of, on economic development, 155;
effect of growth in, 45; of electronics,
157; encouraged under Park, 43, 44,
144; expansion of, 44, 147; under Fifth
Five-Year Economic and Social De-
velopment Plan, 59; of footwear, 161;
growth of, 188; incentives for, 142; in-
creased level of, 142, 143; under Park,
148; of textiles, 161; to Soviet Union,
257; to United States, 190
export targets, 141
external debt, 184
factories: 156; under United States occu-
pation, 29
family: economic relations in, 103-4;
gender status in, 103; importance of,
19, 100, 104; nuclear, 69, 103, 104
Family Court, 211
Family Law (1977), 105
family life, traditional, 99-102; decline of,
102-3; filial piety in, 99; role of first son
in, 100
family life, urban, 102-3, 104
family planning: abortion, 79; activities,
78; agencies, 78; cultural attitudes
toward, 79; impact of, xxvii; incentives
for, xxvii, 79; under Rhee, 78; sterili-
zation for, 78-79; success of, 78
farmers: demonstrations by, 226, 305; in-
come of, xxix, 46, 47, 168; indebted-
ness of, xxix, 168; under Japanese
occupation, 94; lifestyle of, xxix, 47;
political strength of, 170, 239; protests
by, 239; and Saemaul Movement, 47,
97; tenant, 97, 169, 204, 243; timber
as fuel for, 167
farmers' associations, xxxii-xxxiii, 170,
243
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Federal Republic of Germany (West Ger-
many), 44, 157, 295
Federation of Agricultural Cooperatives,
239
Federation of Artistic and Cultural Or-
ganizations of Korea, 236
Federation of Korean Industry, 234
Federation of Korean Trade Unions
(FKTU), 220, 237, 238
Federation of Small and Medium Indus-
tries, 234
Federation of Textile Industries, 234
fertility rates, 79
Fifth Republic. See Chun government
filial piety (hyo or xiao), 99
films, 250
financial sector: changes in, 154, 155;
components of, 172
First Army, 281, 283
First Bank, 172
fishing, 168; exports, 168; labor force in,
45; population, 168; products, 168;
share of, in gross national product, 193
Five-Province Administrative Bureau, 31
Five Relationships (o ryun or wu lun), prin-
ciple of, 19-20, 89, 99
Five Steps to Peaceful Unification, 217
five-year plans: First Five-Year Economic
Development Plan (1962-66), 137, 144,
185; Second Five-Year Economic De-
velopment Plan (1967-7), 144; Third
Five-Year Economic Development Plan
(1972-76), 144; Fourth Five-Year Eco-
nomic Development Plan, (1977-81),
144-45; Fifth Five-Year Economic and
Social Development Plan (1982-86), 59,
145, 172; Sixth Five-Year Economic
and Social Development Plan (1987-
91), 145, 153; Seventh Five-Year Eco-
nomic and Social Development Plan
(1992-96), 145







Force 868 (special weapons and tactics
squad), 321
Force Improvement Plan, 277
Foreign Affairs Research Institute, 251
foreign aid, 36, 183-86, 188; from Japan,
60; as percentage of budget, 36; as per-
centage of gross national product, 183;
from United States, 36, 43, 141
Foreign Capital Inducement Act, 184-85
foreign credit, 153
foreign debt, 60; build-up of, 143; for eco-
nomic development, 153; reduction in,
138, 191
foreign economic relations, 183-86, 188-
90
foreign exchange earnings, 44, 45, 188
foreign investment, 137, 143, 154, 183-
86, 188; concessionary loans, 183-84;
control policy, 185; equity, 184; in-
crease in, 186; by Japan, 185-86; lib-
eralization policy, 185; prohibition
against, 184-85; in stock market, 185;
by United States, 185-86
foreign loans, 183-86, 188
Foreign Military Sales program, 277
foreign policy, 250-52, 254-65; accom-
plishments of, 252, 254-55; goals of,
251-52, 254-55; organization and
operation of, 250-51; prospects for,
264-65
foreign service: examinations for, 213;
missions abroad, 251; recruitment for,
213
forestry: share of, in gross national pro-
duct, 193
forests, 167-68; deforestation of, 167;
ownership of, 167; reforestation of, 72,
167; used for fuel, 167
Four Eastern Districts, 4
Fraternal Association of National Revi-
talization, 217




genealogy: counterfeit, 93; destruction of,
93; importance of, 19, 92, 93; foryang-
ban, 92
General Association of Korean Residents
in Japan. See Chosen soren
General Banking Act (1954), 172
geography: coastlines, 70-72; influence
of, on ethnic identity, 3, 5
GNP. See gross national product
Golanov, Vladimir, 258
Gorbachev, Mikhail S., 256, 302; Kras-
noyarsk speech of, 257; New Thinking
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of, 256-57; summit of, with Roh, 259;
Vladivostok speech of, 257
government (see also under individual
branches; individual presidents): budget,
145-46; civil service, 211-14; control
of business, 141; control of media, xxx;
cooperation of chaebol with, 148; dis-
satisfaction with, xxx; executive, 206-8;
executive agencies, 207-8; judiciary,
210-11; legislature, 205-6; misconduct,
xxxi; pensions, 133; Presidential Sec-
retariat, 210; prime minister, 209;
revenues, 145-46; spending, 145-46;




Great Collection of Korean Prescriptions
(Hyangyak chipsongbang), 130
Great Collection of Medicines and Pre-
scriptions (Uibang yuch'wi), 130
Great Man-Made River Project (Libya),
161
Green Party, 233
gross domestic product, 155; agriculture
as percentage of, 165
gross national product (GNP): agricul-
tural as percentage of, 193; business as
percentage of, 174; contribution of bus-
iness to, 174; defense spending as per-
centage of, 293 ; under Fifth Five-Year
Economic and Social Development
Plan, 59; fishing as percentage of, 193;
foreign aid as percentage of, 183; for-
estry as percentage of, 193; government
budget as percentage of, 146; growth
in, 143, 190; in 1950s, 36; in 1980s,
177; in 1990s, 177, 190; projected, 193;
ratio of domestic savings to, 137; share
of industry in, 193; share of primary
sector in, 193; share of service indus-
try in, 193
Guomindang (Nationalist Party), 27, 274
Haeinsa Temple, 128
Hamgyong Province, 77
Hanahoe (One Mind Society), 316
hancha (Chinese ideograms), 112
Han Dynasty, 4, 5-6
Hanguk ilbo, 248
han'gul (Korean script), 12, 112-13; de-
velopment of, 10, 17, 112
Hangyore simmun (One Nation News), 249,
250
Hanil Bank, 172
Hanism Unification Party, 218
Han River, xxxix, 4, 72
Hansik (Cold Food Day), 104
Han Yong-un, 23
Heartless, The (Yi Kwang-su), 22
heavy industry, 141; developed under
Japanese occupation, 139; expansion of,
44, 189; exports by, 144, 189; govern-
ment emphasis on, 142, 144; growth in,
144, 149
High Court, 211
high-technology industry, xxviii, 145,
192; growth in, 149; shift toward, 156
high-technology transfers, 257
hirropon (methamphetamine), 130, 325
Ho Chong, 36-37; transitional govern-
ment, 37
Hodge, John R., 27, 28
Ho Kyun, 17
holidays, 104
Holy Spirit Association for the Unifica-
tion of the World Christianity. See Uni-
fication Church
Home (Yi Ki-yong), 23
Homeland Reserve Force, xxxviii, 279,
280, 287; established, 288; mission of,





Ho Tarn, 258, 262
household (chip orjip), 100-101
;
big house









hwarang (Flower Knight), 272
Hyangyak chipsongbang (Great Collection of
Korean Prescriptions), 130
hyo. See filial piety
Hyundai, 147, 157, 150; defense produc-
tion by, 296; strike against, 226, 242;
student activity against, 242
Hyundai Heavy Industries, 149
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Ilche Party (Unified Party), 218
IMEMO. See Soviet Institute of World
Economy and International Relations
Imjin River, 72
imports: of agricultural products, xxix,
170; under Chun, 59; of coal, 162, 189;
of consumer goods, 189; for energy,
162; of food, 165, 189, 257; liberalized,
145; of oil, 162, 189, 257; under Park,
43, 145; structural pattern of, 189; of
timber, 189; from United States, 190;
value of, 188
Im Su-kyong, 263
Inch'on, 32, 81; administration of, 214;
landing at, 276; population of, 84; pub-
lic transportation in, 181
income {see also wages): disparity, 137, 239;
distribution, 99, 177, 225; of farmers,
xxix, 46, 47
,
168; growth in per capita,
137; of manual workers, 175-76; in
rural sector, 168, 239; from Seoul Olym-
pics, 171, 188; in urban sector, 168, 176
independence: campaign for, 12, 30;
choice for, over unification, 30; of
judiciary, 210, 223-24, 329; United





industrialization: class structure altered
by, 96; effect of, on society, 45, 244;
industrial policies, 143-44
Industrial Manpower Supply Program,
xxviii
industrial sector: government emphasis
on, 137, 142; growth of, 36, 143, 155;
share of, in gross national product, 193;
structure, 138; under Park, 144
industry (see also under individual industries),
xxviii, 155-62; associations, xxxiii,
234-35; corruption in, 147; develop-
ment of, 95; intelligence agents in, 238;
location of, 156; secondary, 45; under
United States occupation, 29
infant mortality rate, 128
inflation: under Fifth Five-Year Economic
and Social Development Plan, 59, 138;
under Fourth Five-Year Plan, 145;
after Korean War, 36; in 1980s, 138;
under Park, 41, 45; resulting from
balance of payments surplus, 186;
under United States occupation, 29
infrastructure: development of, with for-
eign aid, 141; development of, under
Japanese occupation, 94, 139; govern-
ment's emphasis on, 138, 142, 146; in-
vestment in, 138
Injo (King), 273
intellectuals: campaigns by, to amend
1972 constitution, 40; concept of min-
jung promoted by, 99; as followers of
Kim Dae Jung, 53; opposition of, to
normalized relations with Japan, 51;
opposition of, to Park government, 46;
restrictions on, 40
interest groups, 233-39
International Atomic Energy Agency, xli
International Broadcast Center, 249
International Monetary Fund, 184
intelligence agencies (see also Agency for
National Security Planning; Defense
Security Command), 311-17
investment, 59; foreign, 137, 143, 154,
183-86, 188; in industry, 158, 162;
overseas, 186; savings for, 154; trust
corporations, 155
invisible receipts, 190






Japan: aid from, 183; attacks by, on
Choson Dynasty, 10; contrast with,
110-11; dependence of South Korean
industry on, 157; financial diplomacy
with, 43-44; influence of, xxiv, 70; in-
fluence on, 71; interest in Korea by,
110; invasions by, 15-16, 272-73; in-
vestment by, 143, 150; Koreans living
in, 86-88; Mongol-Koryo invasion of,
8; penetration by, 11-12; as rival, 109-
111; Soviet declaration of war against,
24; surrender by, in World War II, 24;
textbook controversy, 110; trade with,
7, 189; "unequal treaty" imposed by,
xxiv; Western influence in, 11
Japanese gangsters. See yakuza
Japanese Imperial Army, 243, 274
Japanese occupation, xxiv, 14-15, 20-24,
323; art under, 22; assimilation policy
under, 23-24, 110; business associa-
tions under, 234; cultural repression
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under, 23; development of infrastruc-
ture under, 94, 139; diet under, 22;
economy under, 21-22; education
under, 114; government in exile dur-
ing, 201, 243; human rights ideas in,
243; industrial development under, 95;
Korean identity under, 21 ; land survey
under, 94; legacy of, 95; literature
under, 22; media under, 246; reforesta-
tion efforts under, 167; reforms under,
14; resistance to, 24, 273-74; Russian
influence on, 14; social transformation
under, 94; treatment of Koreans under,
20, 95; urban population during, 81;
United States endorsement of, 14
Japanese-South Korean relations, 50-51,
60, 259-60; and abduction of Kim Dae
Jung, 40, 51; financial, 50, 51, 60; and
fishing rights, 50; foreign ministerial
conferences, 259; normalized, 39, 50,
150; and reparations paid by Japan, 50;
role of Nordpolitik in, 259; in Seoul
Olympics, 259, 271; trade deficit and,
259
Japan Export-Import Bank, 150
Japan Socialist Party, 259-60
Jilin Province, 260, 274
Jindo, 189
jip. See household
Joint Chiefs of Staff, xxxix, 283
Joint Chiefs of Staff Defense Intelligence
Command, xl
Joint Military Provost Marshal, 314;
under Park, 315
Joint Security Investigations Headquar-
ters, 227
journalists, 244, 247; crackdowns on, 236;
detained, 312; prosecuted, 312; purged,
250, 308
judges: appointment of, 210, 326; num-
ber of, 328; qualifications of, 328; re-
quirements for promotion, 328-29;
training of, 328
Judicial Research and Training Institute,
328
judiciary, 210-11; appointments to, 210;
courts, 210-11; examinations for, 213;
independence of, 210, 223-24, 329; in-
telligence agents stationed in, 313;
recruitment for, 213; reshuffle of, 223;
revolt by, 200; used for political pur-
poses, 244
Jurchen tribes, 18
justices, Supreme Court: appointments
of, 210, 329; chief, 328; term for, 210
Kabo Reforms (1894-95), 94, 323
Kaebyok (Creation), 126, 246




Kangnam Shipbuilding Corporation, 297
Kangwon Province: population density
of, 81; stereotype of, 77
KATUSA. See Korean Augmentation of
the United States Army
KBS. See Korean Broadcasting System
Kaya, 5
KCIA. See Korean Central Intelligence
Agency
KECO. See Korea Electric Company
KEPCO. See Korea Electric Power Cor-
poration
Khubilai Khan, 8
Kia Machine Tool, 296
Kia Motors, 160
Kim Chae-gyu, 42, 307
Kim Chi-ha, 108-9
Kim Chin-wu, 111-12
Kim Chong-p'il, xxxi, 42, 53, 222; ar-
rested by Chun, 55, 230; campaign of,
216, 217; as director of Korean Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency, 38, 306, 312;
political agenda of, 220; purged by
Chun, 58
Kim Dae Jung, xxx, xxxi, xxxii, 55, 60,
128, 199, 215, 219, 222, 231; abduc-
tion of, 40, 51
,
232; arrested by Chun,
55; campaign of, 216, 217-18; career
of, 231-32; death sentence of, 232; fol-
lowers of, 53-54; formation ofPPD by,
232-33; placed under house arrest, 232;





Kim II Sung, 31, 41, 86, 226, 277
Kim Ku, 27, 30
Kim Kyong-Dong, 96
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Kimp'o International Airport, 182, 283
Kim, Se-Jin, 307
Kim Son-jok, 218
Kim Soo Hwan, 262
Kim So-wol, 23
Kim Yong-ch'61, 223
Kim Young Sam, xxx, xxxi, xxxii, 53,
199, 219, 222, 232; campaign of, 216,
217; career of, 230-31; challenge to
government, 41-42; desire of, for re-
unification, 41-42; as leader of New
Democratic Party, 53; ousted from Na-
tional Assembly, 42; placed under
house arrest, 231; political agenda of,
220; surveillance of, 313; visit of, to
Moscow, 258
kindergarten, 116-17
kinship system {see also family; genealogy;
lineage): ancestor worship in, 100; clan
{tongjok or pongwan), 102; decline of,
102-3; household {chip orjip), 100-101;
lineage (p'a) in, 101; line of descent in,
101; mourning group {tangnae) in, 101
kisaeng (female entertainers), 93, 106
Kitan Liao tribe, 7-8, 18
Koguryo Kingdom, xxiii, 5; conflict of,
with Sui Chinese, 7; destruction of, by
Tang Chinese, 7; expansion of, 6-7;
military in, 271-72; ruled by Han
Chinese, 6; tomb painting in, 15, 123
Kqje Island, 158
Kojong (King), 20, 273
Kongmin (King), 272
Kong No-myong, 259
Kong Zi. See Confucius
Kor-Am Bank, 172
Korea {see also North Korea; South Korea):
division of, 24-25; factions in, 12; in-
fluence of, on Japan, 71; provisional
government in, 25; Soviet invasion of,
24; trusteeship in, 25, 27, 28, 274;
unification by Silla of, 7; Western in-
fluence in, 12
Korea Advanced Institute of Science, 191
Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute,
191
Korea Development Bank, 174
Korea Development Institute, 98, 142,
191, 193
Korea Electric Company (KECO), 152,
163
Korea Electric Power Corporation
(KEPCO), 150, 152-53
Korea Exchange Bank, 174
Korea Federation of Peasants, 239
Koreagate, 51, 59
Korea Herald, 249
Korea Housing Bank, 174
Korea Institute of Family Planning, 78
Korea Institute of Science and Technol-
ogy, 191
Korea Long-Term Credit Bank, 174
Korea Military Academy, 98, 226, 290;
alumni of, 228
Korean Air, 182, 279; defense production
by, 296




Korean Augmentation of the United
States Army (KATUSA), 288-89
Korean Atomic Energy Commission, 191
Korean Bar Association, 236
Korean Broadcasting System (KBS), 247,
249
Korean Catholic Farmers Association,
170, 239
Korean Central Intelligence Agency
(KCIA) {see also Agency for National
Security Planning), 38, 42, 58, 311-12;
abduction ofKim Dae Jung by, 40, 50,
232; censorship enforced by, 247; led
by Chun Doo Hwan, 54, 58, 312; led
by Kim Chong-p'il, 306, 312; scandals
in, 38, 58; violence used by, 240
Korean Chamber of Commerce and In-
dustry, 234
Korean Communist Party, 27-28
Korean Democratic Party, 28, 30
Korean Federation of Education Associ-
ations, 236
Korean Fighters Program, 160
Korean Institute for Human Rights
(United States), 232
Korean-Japanese Parliamentary Confer-
ence on Security Affairs, 51
Korean language, 12, 18, 111-14; Chi-
nese loanwords in, 113; dialects, 113-
14; as element in ethnic identity, 75;
and English vocabulary, 113; govern-
ment policy on, 210; hierarchy reflected
in, 112; history of, 111-12; similarities
of, with Japanese, 111-12; standard,
113; suppressed under Japanese occu-
pation, 110, 246; United States influ-
ence on, xxiii; written, 112-13




Korean National Police, 289, 305, 313,
317-19, 321-22; Combat Police of,
310, 318, 321; duties of, 319; illegal be-
havior of, 322; improvements in, 318;
investigations by, 325-26; organization
of, 318; personnel, 318-19; quality of,
319; recruitment of, 319; responsibili-
ties of, 318; special weapons and tac-
tics squad (Force 868), 321; stations
and substations of, 318-19; training of,
319, 321; transportation for, 321;
weapons of, 321; women in, 321
Korean National Railroad, 181
Korean National Tourist Corporation,
171
Korean Newspaper Association, 236
Korean Newspaper Editors' Association,
236
Korean Peninsula (see also Korea): borders
of, 70; Chinese influence on, 4; as cul-
tural bridge, 71; land area of, 71;
topography of, 71-72
Korean people (see also ethnic identity):
diversity of character in, 89-90;
homogeneity of, 70, 75; identity of, 18;
origins of, 4; regional differences
among, 76; stereotypes of, 77
Korean People's Republic, 27, 28
Korean Provisional Government: organi-
zation of, 27; recognition of, 27
Korean script (see also han 'gut)
,
12, 112-13;
development of, 10, 17, 112
Korean Shipbuilding and Engineering,
296
Koreans living overseas, 254; population
of, 86, 88
Korean Standard Industrial Classifica-
tion, 185
Korean Stock Exchange, 155; foreign in-
vestment in, 185
Korean Trade Promotion Corporation
(KOTRA), 258
Korean Volunteer Army in China, 32
Korean War, xxiv, 31-33; armistice of,
276, 301; cease-fire in, 32; deforesta-
tion caused by, 167; dislocation caused
by, 84; effects of, 32-33, 35; legacy of,
for role of military, xxxviii-xxxix; role




Korea Traders' Association, 234
Korea University. See Koryo University
Korea Year 2000, 193
Koryo Dynasty, 7-9, 323; art in, 15;
Buddhism in, 10, 123; land reform
under, 9; 2nd Mongol Empire, 8, 272;
neo-Confucianism in, 88; yangban in, 91
Koryo University (Korea University), 98,
118, 214
KOTRA. See Korean Trade Promotion
Corporation
Kumgang-san Dam (North Korea), 72
Kum River, 72
Kum River basin, 72
k'unjip (big house). See household
Kuomintang. See Guomindang
kut (shaman services). See shamanism
Kuznets, Paul W., 140
Kwanggaet'o (King), 6, 271
Kwangju, 77; administration of, 214;
demonstrations in, 271; population of,
84, 85
Kwangju uprising, 55-56, 61, 77, 217,
232, 252, 270, 308; anti-American sen-
timent resulting from, 241, 299;
crushed by army, 55, 240; effect of, on
Fifth Republic, 241; investigation of,
224; resolution of, 220; role of United
States forces in, xxxvii, 56, 60, 241,
256, 298-99, 301; United States report
on, 299, 301
Kwon Hui-gyong, 258
kye (credit associations), 107
Kyongbuk High School, 229
Kyonggi Province: employment in, 156;
population density in, 81; stereotype of,
77
Kyonghyang simmun, 249
Kyongsang region: development in, 77;
rivalry of, with Cholla region, 56, 76-77
labor disputes, 238
labor force, 46, 175-78; in agriculture,
45, 163; in fishing, 45
labor unions, 98, 237-38, 243, 248; con-
cept of minjung promoted by, 99;
government hostility toward, 97-98,
237; history of, 237; infiltration of, 241;
political agenda of, 220; rights of, 237;
strikes by, 175, 226
land reform: effect of, on Buddhism,
9-10; under Japanese occupation, 94;
in Koryo Dynasty, 9; repercussions of,
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9-10; under Rhee, 35, 165; after World
War II, 95
land survey, Japanese, 94
language. See Korean language
Latin America, 189
Ledyard, Gari K., 112
Lee, Ki-baik (Yi Ki-baek), 11, 110




Liao River, 6, 271
Liberal Party, 33, 36
Libya, 161
life expectancy, 120
light industry: exports by, 189; govern-
ment emphasis on, 142
lineage (p'a), 101-2; continuity of, 100;
descent of, 101; importance of, 19, 100;
male heir in, 100
literacy, 244; underJapanese occupation,
140; rate, 115
literature: folk tales, 17-18; under
Japanese rule, 22; p'ansori, 17; poetry,
16-17; social and political themes in,
22; socialist influence on, 22-23; ver-
nacular, 17
living conditions, 176
living standard: population density as a
factor in, 81
Logistics Base Command, 382
Lolang (Nangnang), 4, 5
lower class, 273; rural, 97; urban, 97;
women, 108
Lucky-Goldstar, 147, 157, 258; defense
production by, 296
Lyuh Woon Hyung (Yo Un-hyong), 28,
30
MacArthur, Douglas, 32, 276, 298
McCormick, Gavan, 140
Macdonald, Donald S., 139, 154, 185
McDonnell Douglas, 160, 296
Mahan confederation, 4, 5
Malaysia, 264
Manchuria, xxiv; Soviet invasion of, 24
Manchus, 10, 18
Mandate of Heaven, doctrine of, 90
manufacturing sector {see also industriali-
zation; industrial sector; industry), 149;
growth in, 44, 137
March First Movement, 20, 246
marine corps, xxxix, 286-87
Marine Corps Command, 286
marriage: arranged, 103; interviews (son
pogi) for, 103; love-match (yonae), 103;
traditional purpose of, 100; women's
rights in, 105, 107; women's role in,
104-5
martial law, 307; declared by Park, 40,
307; declared in Pusan, 42; declared by
Rhee, 33, 314; demonstrations against,
55
Martial Law Command, 55, 56, 58, 308,
310
Masan: as fishing port, 168; population
growth in, 85; student demonstrations
in, 42
materiel: air force, xxxix; army, 284-85;
coproduction of, 269, 277-78, 279, 285,
286, 295; domestic production of,
295-96
Maternal and Child Health Law (1973),
79
media, 246-50; censorship of, 40, 246,
247, 31 1 ; criticism by, of government,
199, 244; government control of, xxx,
xxxvii, 39, 246; increased coverage by,
248; opinion polls in, 248; ownership
of, 249; purged by Chun, 58; reformist
tendencies of, 246
medical: facilities, 131; insurance pro-
gram, 131-33; personnel, 131
medicine: modern, 130; shamanism as,
122; traditional, 130-31
Mencius, 89; philosophy of, 89, 90, 99,
100
mental health, 129
middle class, 46, 96, 97; average family
in, 176-77; necessity of higher educa-
tion for entering, 116
Middle East: construction projects in,
160, 177, 189
migration, urban, xxv, 81; attempts to
stem, 84; effect of, on urban popula-
tion, 84; under Park, 46, 47; to Seoul,
29; of women, 108; after World War
II, 29, 96; of young people, 169
military: academies, 290, 291; academy,
in Silla Kingdom, 272; basic training
in, 290; under Chun, 278-79; duties,
280; effect of, on social system, 35; elite,
96; equipment, xxxviii; headquarters
moved to Taejon, xxxix, 85; increase in,
269; insignia, 292; mobilization plans,
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294; modernization of, xxxviii, 273,
277; under Park, 276; personnel, 290-
91; in politics, 39-43, 276-77, 314;
population, xxxviii; preparedness,
280-81; purges in, 37; ranks, 291; re-
forms, xxxviii; reorganized, 278;
resource management plans, 294;
under Rhee, 276; role of, xxxvii, 202,
279-81; schools, 274, 289-90; security
regulations, 290; spending, xxxviii; sta-
tus of, 20, 96, 272, 273; surveillance in,
xxxviii; in Three Kingdoms period,
271-72; troops, 32, 269; uniforms, 293;
weapons, xxxviii
Military Armistice Commission, xl, 276,
301
Military Installation Protection Law, 279
military installations: living conditions on,
280, 290; relocation of, 280
Military Manpower Agency, 288-89
Military Manpower Law, 280
Mindan (Association for Korean Resi-
dents in Japan), 86
Ming Dynasty, 8, 272, 323
minhwa painting, 16
mining, 29, 162
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries,
xxix
Ministry of Culture, 209-10
Ministry of Culture and Information,
209, 247; Office of Public Information
Policy, 247
Ministry of Education, 115, 117, 118,
120, 210, 236-37
Ministry of Environment {see also Office
of Environment), 210
Ministry of Finance, 142, 185
Ministry of Government Administration,
213, 351
Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, 78,
129, 131, 210, 325
Ministry of Home Affairs, 78, 167, 169,
281j 306, 317, 321; Department of
Local Affairs in, 214; political influence
of, 307
Ministry ofJustice, 313; Supreme Prose-
cution Administration, 325
Ministry of Labor, 142, 241
Ministry of National Defense, 240, 279,
281, 283, 321; budget management sys-
tem of, 293-94; Defense Industry
Bureau in, 277, 295; Office of Military
Manpower Administration in, 280; re-
organized, 278; responsibilities of, 281
Ministry of Science and Technology, 191
,
192, 193
Ministry ofTrade and Industry, 142, 155,
174
Ministry of Transportation, 181, 281
minjok (race). See ethnic identity
minjung (the masses), 99, 121
Minjung Culture Movement Association,
236
minorities, 75
Molotov cocktails, 226, 241, 242; penal-
ties for using, 227
monarchy: weakness of, 19
Monetary Board, 172
Mongol Empire, 8, 272
Mongols; invasion of Koryo by, 8, 272
Moon, Sun Myong (Rev.), 126-27
motor vehicles, 178, 181
mountains, 71
Mount Halla, 71
Movement for the Eradication of Nuclear
Power Plants, 163
mudang. See shamans
Mun Ik-hwan, 262, 263
Munjong (King), 272




Naktong River, 5, 72
Naktong River basin, 72
Nangnang (Lolang), 4, 5
Nanjing, 274
National Agricultural Cooperatives Fed-
eration, 174
National Assembly, 205-6, 228, 244, 274,
294, 311, 317; business leaders in, 149;
conduct of foreign policy by, 251; dis-
solved by Park, 40, 307; distribution of
seats in, 215; electoral districts for, 222;
Foreign Affairs Committee of, 251; in-
telligence agents stationed in, 313; legal
immunity of members of, 205; mass
resignation in, 307; representation in,
222; rights of, xxx
National Assembly Election Law, 221-22
National Assembly elections, xxx, xxxi,
xxxii; of 1948, 31
National Assembly hearings on Fifth
Republic, 223
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National Assembly Law, 308
National Association of Farmers, 170
National Association of University Stu-
dent Councils (ChondaehySp), 226,
242
National Conference for Unification, 40,
52, 56
National Constabulary, 274
National Council of Labor Unions (Chon-
nohyop), 238
National Council of Trade Unions, 238
National Defense College, 291
Nationalist Party. See Guomindang
National Maritime Police, 318, 321
National Police College, 321
National Police Headquarters, 214, 318
National Security Act, xxxvi, 199, 203,
244, 245, 262, 277, 305, 307, 308,
310-11, 313, 314, 327; arrests under,
227, 237; attempts to amend, 228; cen-
sorship enforced under, 247; student
organizations suppressed by, 241; surge
in prosecutions under, 245
National Security Council, 207; conduct
of foreign policy by, 251; responsibili-
ties of, 281
National Teachers Union (NTU) (Chon'g-
yojo), 117, 236, 237
National Technicians Law, 279
National Unification Board, 314
Naval Academy, 290
Naval Amphibious Command, 287
Naval Aviation Command, 287
navy, xxxix, 286-87
Navy Security Unit, 315
neo-Confucianism, 11, 88; filial piety in,
99; Five Relationships in, 89, 99; in-
fluence of, on political system, 243; in-
fluence of, on social system, 69-70, 88;
in mid-1500s, 89; revival of, 114; self-
control in, 89; social relations in, 88-89
Neutral Nations Supervisory Commis-
sion, 276
New Democratic Party (Simmindang), 41,
53-54, 230; creation of, xxxii, 37; and
Kim Dae Jung, 53; and Kim Young
Sam, 41-42, 53, 230-31
New Democratic Republican Party, 222,
225, 230; members of, 230; merger of,
with Reunification Democratic Party,
xxxi
New Elders Group, 229-30
New Korea Democratic Party (NKDP),
216, 231, 232, 270
newspapers, 250; censorship of, 246, 247;
circulation of, 248-49; closed, 246;
under Sixth Republic, 248
New Year's, 104
Nigeria, 264
Nine Cloud Dream, The (Kim Man-jung),
17
Nippon Steel, 150
Nixon, Richard M., 160, 277
NKDP. See New Korea Democratic Party
Nonaligned Movement, 264
Nordpolitik (northern policy) (pukpang
chongch'aek), xxxiii, 61, 256; accom-
plishments of, 254; Chinese view of,
260; objectives of, 252; prospects for,
265; under Roh, 254-55; trade rela-
tions under, 252; United States reac-
tion to, 256
Northeast People's Revolutionary Army,
274
northern policy. See Nordpolitik
North Korea: creation of, 3, 31; family
meetings in, 261; humanitarian aid to
South Korea by, 75, 261; insurgency,
274-75; invasion of South Korea by,
32, 275-76; joint projects with, xxxv;
military buildup in, 31-32; nuclear
weapons development by, xli; political
organization in, 31; prime ministerial
talks with, xxxvi; propaganda by, 304;
refugees from, 95; relations with,
xxxiv-xxxvi; Soviet influence in, 27;
talks with, xxxv, xxxvi; terrorism by,
against South Korea, xxxv, xxxvi, 269,
270, 288; trade with, 262; visits to, 226,
227, 262, 263, 271
North Korean intelligence system, 303-4
North Korean military: buildup of, 269;
equipment, 32; number of troops, 32,
269
North Korean Provisional People's Com-
mittee, 31
North Korean-South Korean relations,
50, 261-63; attempts to mprove, 225;
dialogue in, 262, 269-70; increased
contacts in, 261; Nordpolitik, 251-52;
overtures in, 261-63; proposals for
unification, 50
North Korean threat, 302, 303-5; as
justification for authoritarian govern-
ment, 303, 307





NTU. See National Teachers Union
nuclear facilities, xli, 163
nuclear weapons: North Korean, xli;
withdrawal of United States from
Korean Peninsula of, xli
Oceania, 189
O Cha-bok, 317
Office of Environment (see also Ministry
of Environment), 210
Office of Forestry, 167
Office of the High Prosecutor General,
326
Office of Information, 317
Office of Military Manpower Administra-
tion, 280
Office of Public Information Policy, 247
Office of the President, 142
Office of the Prime Minister, 209, 214
Office of the Prosecutor General, 313, 327
Office of the Supreme Prosecutor Gen-
eral, 326
Officer Candidate School, 277
officers: commissioned, 290-91; noncom-
missioned, 291
oil: exploration, 162; imports of, 162,




Olympics, 1988 Seoul, xxv, 228, 249; as
catalyst for Nordpolitik, 254; effect of,
on political conflict, 224; income from,
171, 188; participation in, xxxiii; pro-
posal to cohost with North Korea,
xxxvi, 220-21; security for, 271, 302
Opium War, 11
opposing political forces. See chaeya seryok
Ordinance Number Eighty-Eight, 246
o ryun. See Five Relationships
overseas investment, 186
Pacific Economic Cooperation Confer-
ence (PECC), 264
Paehwa Girls' School, 107
Paekche Kingdom, xxiii, 5; art in, 15;
military in, 271; rivalry of, with Silla
Kingdom, 77
paekchong class, 93
Paek Ki-wan, 218, 262
Pak Chi-W6n, 17, 92







Park Chung Hee, 77, 96, 229; assassina-
tion of, 42, 278, 299, 307; assassina-
tion of, effect of, 52; attempted
assassination of, 40, 288, 304; coup
d'etat of, xxxvii, 38, 96, 140, 277, 312;
election of, 39, 277; martial law
declared by, 40, 307; national emer-
gency declared by, 39-40; obsession of,
for development, 42-43
Park Chung Hee government: agricul-
tural economy under, 46; banks under,
141; business under, 43; censorship
under, 246-47; economic development
under, 43-45, 137, 141, 234; economy
under, 38, 41, 143, 171; emergency
measures of, 40; family planning pro-
gram under, 78; human rights vio-
lations under, 244, 306; industry
restructured under, 144; military
under, 276, 277; objectives of, 277; op-
position to, 46; provost marshal under,
315; purge of bureaucracy by, 212;
revival of Confucianism under, xxvii;
Saemaul Movement launched by, 84;
society under, 45-47; student opposi-
tion to, 54; violence used by, 240
Park Chun-kyu, 229
Park Tong Sun, 51
Park Yung-chul, 154
Party for Peace and Democracy (PPD),
xxxi, 199, 219, 222, 225; formed, 232-
33; groups in, 233
Peace Dam (South Korea), 72
PECC. See Pacific Economic Cooperation
Conference
people's committees, 27
periodicals: censorship of, 246, 247; under
Sixth Republic, 248
Perry, Matthew C, 11
Persian Gulf conflict, xxiii
Peru, 264
petrochemical industry, 144, 162
Philippines, 14
physicians: population per physician ratio,
131; women as, 106
Planned Parenthood Federation of Korea,
78
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poetry. See sijo
P'ohang, 85, 152
Pohang Institute of Science and Technol-
ogy, 192
Pohang Iron and Steel Company
(POSCO), 150, 152, 156, 192
police {see also Korean National Police):
attacks by, on dissidents, 270; purges
in, 37; strong-arm tactics of, 306, 311;
used for political purposes, 244, 307;
weapons, 227
police boxes, 318-19; attacks on, 227
Police Consolidated Training School, 321
political compromise, xxxi
political institutions, 19-20
political protest; tradition of, 90
political unrest, 41; xxx; under Chang,
37; in June 1987, under United States
occupation, 29-30
political values: Christian influence on, 90
politics: military in, 39-43
pollution, 86, 129
p'ongnyokpae (gangs), 325
population, 77-81; age distribution of, 84;
density, 79-81; elderly, proportion of,
xxvii, 190; factors affecting growth rate,
78; under fifteen years, 78; homogen-
eity of, 70, 75; of Koreans living over-
seas, 86, 88, 254; male-female ratio in,
xxvii; median age of, 78; minorities in,
75; policies, xxvii; projected, 79, 81;
rural, 84
population, urban (see also population of
Seoul), 84; in Choson Dynasty, 81 ; de-
fined, 84; density, 81; effect of migra-
tion on, 84, 85; growth rate, 85;
increase in, 35-36, 45-46, 85; under
Japanese occupation, 81; effect of
migration on, 84, 85; in 1940, 81; in
1945, 81; in 1985, 81; projected, 84
population growth rate, xxvii, 29, 77-78,
79, 85
population of Seoul, 84, 85; in eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, 81; growth
rate, 85; in 1985, 85; in 1990, xxv
population of South Korea: in 1949, 77;
in 1985, 77, 84; in 1989, 78; in 1990,
xxv
POSCO. See Pohang Iron and Steel
Company
poverty, 143, 177
PPD. See Party for Peace and Democracy
practical learning. See Sirhak Movement
precipitation, 75, 165
president, 206-8; conduct of foreign pol-
icy by, 251; elections for, xxx-xxxi, 39,
206; legal immunity of, 206; power of,
xxx, 39, 206-7, 209; succession of, 206;
transfer of power between, 201
Presidential Election Law (1987), 206
Presidential Secretariat, 207, 209, 210
Presidential Security Force, 41
press. See media




Proclamation of Independence, 20
professional associations, xxxii, xxxiii,
200, 235-36
Proletarian Artists' Federation, 22-23
Protestant Farmers Association, 170
public enterprises: areas of, 149; cate-
gories of, 150; employment in, 150;
privatization of, 150; purged by Chun,
58; role of, 149-50; role of, in economic
restructuring, 141
public health, 128-31, 133
public safety, 312-13
Pukhan River, 72
pukpang chongch 'aek. See Nordpolitik
Pulguksa Temple, 15, 128
purges: under Chun, 57-58, 212, 220,
312; ofjournalists, 250, 308; of Korean
Central Intelligence Agency, 312;
under Park, 212, 316; under Roh, 212
Pusan: administration of, 214; demon-
strations in, 271; martial law declared
in, 42; population of, 84; population
density of, 81; population growth in,
85; religious believers in, 127; student
demonstrations in, 42
P'yongan Province, 77
P'yongminyon. See Study Group for Peace-
ful and Democratic Reunification
P'yongt'aek coastal plain, 72
P'yongyang, 6
Pyonhan confederation, 4, 5
Qin Dynasty, 4, 323
Qing Dynasty, 11, 14
Qin Shi Huangdi, 4
race (minjok). See ethnic identity
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radio, 182-83, 250; censorship of, 246;
under Sixth Republic, 248
railroads, 181-82; Blue Train, 182; under
United States occupation, 29
Rangoon bombing, 270, 304
RDP. See Reunification Democratic Party
Ready Made Life (Ch'ae Man-sik), 22
Reagan, Ronald, 52; support by, for
Chun, 56
Red Banner Bandits, 8
reeducation programs, 58, 240, 308
reform movement (1898), 12
refugees, 84; number of, 95; after World
War II, 95
religion (see also under individual religions),
122-28; ancestor worship, 11; commit-
ment to, xxvi-xxvii; new religions,
124-27, 128; role of, 128; shamanism,
122-23
repatriation, 86, 88, 95, 258
Republic of Korea. See South Korea
Republic of Korea-United States of
America Mutual Defense Treaty,
297-98
research and development, 191; in
defense industry, 279; government em-
phasis on, 146; in science and technol-
ogy, 191
Research Institute of Industrial Science
and Technology, 192
reserve forces, 287
Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC),
290
retail trade, 171
reunification (t'ongil), 250; basic princi-
ples of, 261-62; choice for, over in-
dependence, 30; desire for, 109; ethnic
identity as element in desire for, 75; of
families, xxxv; Kim Young Sam's
views concerning, 41-42; policy, in
constitution, 202; Roh's proposal for,
xxxvi; strategy for, 314
Reunification Democratic Party (RDP),
199, 216, 219, 222, 225, 258; merger
of, with New Democratic Republican
Party, xxxi; young politicians in, 231
Rhee, Syngman, xxxvii, 12, 25; cam-
paign by, for independence, 30; elected
president, 31, 33-34; exiled, 37; fam-
ily planning program under, 78; as
head of provisional government, 27;
and military involvement in intelli-
gence, 314; society under, 35-36
Rhee government: businesses under, 147;
corruption in, 147; difficulties in, 33;
education under, 114-15; human rights
violations under, 244; internal security
policy of, 306; legacy of, for economic
development, 141; martial law declared
by, 33; media censorship by, 246; mili-
tary under, 276; overthrow of, 240;
political environment under, 33-34; re-




Roh government (Sixth Republic), 225;
Agency for National Security Planning
under, 313; arrests for political offenses
under, 245; constitutional framework
of, 201; demonstrations against, 221;
four-way talks in National Assembly
during, 223, 225; labor unrest under,
175; political appointments in, 221;
press freedom under, 248; purge of
bureaucracy by, 212; reform under,
199; rehabilitation of those purged by
Chun, 221; violence used by, 240
Roh Tae Woo, xxx, 63, 199, 247, 316;
campaign of, 216; career of, 228; as
member of Chun junta committee, 56;
political goals, 219-20; public relations
campaign of, 216-17; speech of, to
United Nations, 255; summit of, with
Gorbachev, 259
ROK. See South Korea
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 24
ROTC. See Reserve Officer Training
Corps
rural sector: age distribution in, 84; de-
velopment in, 137, 138; income in, 168,
239; living conditions in, 176; women
in, 106
Russia: influence of, 14; treaty with, 12
Russo-Japanese War, 14, 273
Saemaul Movement (Saemaul undong)
(New Community Movement): agricul-
tural productivity under, 47; under
Chun, 57, 58, 169; deterioration of,
169; established, 44, 47; focus of, 47;
impact of, on class structure, 97; im-
pact of, on farmers, 47, 97; under Park,
84; projects of, 169; reforestation in,
167, 169
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Saemaul undong. See Saemaul Movement
Sammint'u. See Struggle Committee for
the Liberation of the Masses, the At-
tainment of Democracy, and the Unifi-
cation of the Nation
Samsung Group, 147, 157, 192, 249;
defense production by, 296
sangmin class, 91, 93
Ssangyong Motors, 160
sanitation, 129
savings, domestic: growth, 44; for invest-
ment, 154; in 1960-62, 153; in 1970-
72, 153; in 1975, 153; in 1979, 153; in
1980, 153; in 1987, 153; in 1989, 154;
ratio of, to gross national product, 137
school, middle, 46, 47, 115
school, primary, 115, 116; teachers, 116
school, private (sdwdri), 114
school, secondary, 46, 47, 115, 116, 117
science and technology: access to, 279; de-
velopment of, 145; programs in higher
education, 191, 192; promotion of, 192;
research and development in, 191
SCNR. See Supreme Council for National
Reconstruction
SCNSM. See Special Committee for Na-
tional Security Measures
Sea of Japan, 5
seasons, 75
Second Army, xxxix, 282
Securities and Exchange Commission,
155
securities market, 172
security, internal, 303-8, 310-11
Security Consultative Meeting, in 1989,
302-3; in 1990, xl
Segye ilbo, 127





Seoul: administration of, 214-15; air ser-
vice in, 182; core zones in, 85; demon-
strations in, 271; employment in, 156;
migration to, 81, 85; population of, in
1990, xxv, 85; population density of,
81; public transportation in, 181; reli-
gious believers in, 127; student demon-
strations in, 42; temperature in, 75
Seoul Area Federation of Student Coun-
cils (Soch'ongnyon), 242
Seoul Bank, 172
Seoul Chamber of Commerce and Indus-
try, 234
Seoul Criminal Court, 313
Seoul Imperial University, 118
Seoul Metropolitan Rapid Transit Com-
pany, 181
Seoul National University, 98, 118, 214
service industry, 145, 170-72, 174-75;
elements of, xxviii; growth in, xxviii;
share of, in gross national product, 193
Seven-Year Economic Development Plan,
36
shamanism, 90, 122-23; on Cheju Island,
106; in Choson Dynasty, 106; influence
of, on social system, 70; kut (services)
in, 122, 123; revival of, xxvi
shamans (mudang), 93, 106, 122
Shin-Han Bank, 172
shipbuilding industry, 156, 157-58;
coproduction in, 277-78; decline in,
158; defense production by, 296;
government emphasis on, 142, 144;
new orders for, 158; projected expan-
sion of, 158
sijo (poetry), 16-17
Silla Dynasty, 7, 123
Silla Kingdom, xxiii, 5, 7; art in, 15; mili-
tary in, 271, 272; rivalry of, with
Paekche Kingdom, 77
Simmindang. See New Democratic Party
Sin Chong-il, 218
Sin Hyon-hwak, 54
Sin Ik-hui, 34, 37
Sino-Japanese War, First, 14, 273
Sino-Japanese War, Second, 21, 23
Sino-Russian treaty (1896), 14
Sin tonga (New East Asia) magazine, 250




Sobaek Range, 5, 71
So Chae-p'il, 12, 243
Soch'ongnyon. See Seoul Area Federation
of Student Councils
social class, 96-99; influence of education
on, 116
Social Democratic Party, 218
social institutions, 19-20
socialism: influence of, on literature, 22-
23
socialist countries: ties with, 252; trade
with, 254
Social Purification Campaign, 308
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Social Safety Act, 311
social security insurance programs, 133
social services: government spending on,
146
social structure, 88-96; Confucian in-
fluence on, 69-70; inequality in, 97; in-
fluence of urbanization on, 69
social values, 88-91; population density
as a factor in, 81
society: military in, 279-81; under Park,
45-47; under United States occupation,
29-30
SOFA. See Status of Forces Agreement
Sogang University, 193-94
Sokkuram Grotto, 15, 128
So Kyong-won, 263
Somjin River, 72
Song Dynasty, 8, 323
Songgyungwan, 114
Songui Girls' School, 107
Sonjo (King), 273
Soul simmun, 249
South Korea: establishment of, xxiv, 3,
30-31
South Korea-Japan Ministerial Meeting
(1969), 160
South Korean Interim Legislative Assem-
bly, 28
South Korean Workers' Party, 28, 305-6
Soviet-American trusteeship, 25, 27, 28,
274
Soviet Chamber of Commerce and Indus-
try, 258
Soviet Institute of World Economy and
International Relations (IMEMO), 258
Soviet Ministry of Light Industry, 189
Soviet Union (see also Commonwealth of
Independent States; Russia), 30; as
agent in diplomatic affairs, 258; decla-
ration ofwar against Japan by, 24; in-
vasion of Korea and Manchuria by, 24;
joint venture with, 189; Koreans living
in, 86; occupation by, xxiv, 27; role of,
in Korean War, 32; support of, for
North Korea, 302; ties with, xxxiii-
xxxiv, 61
,
252; trade office of, in Seoul,
258; trade with, xxxii, 188, 189, 257
Soviet Union-South Korean relations,
256-59
sowon. See school, private
Special Committee for National Security
Measures (SCNSM), 56, 308
Special Forces, 240, 308
Special Warfare Command, 228
Stalin, Josef V., 24
State Council (cabinet), 207, 208-10; con-
duct of foreign policy by, 251; Roh's
appointments to, 221
Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA),
xl-xli
steel industry, xxviii, 139, 141, 156-57;
government emphasis on, 144, 150
Steinberg, David I., 97, 98, 143, 147, 177
sterilization, 78-79
Story ofLady Sa, The (Kim Man-jung), 17
strikes, 175, 226, 242, 249-50, 305; gov-
ernment policies restricting, 238-39; by
Hyundai workers, 226, 242; in late
1980s, 175, 220
Struggle Committee for the Liberation of
the Masses, the Attainment of Democ-
racy, and the Unification of the Nation
(Sammint'u), 241
Student Defense Corps, xxxvii; abolished,
xxxviii, 280
student demonstrations, 54, 121-22, 226,
307, 308; as cause of Chun's demise,
62; under Chang, 37; in Choson Dy-
nasty, 121; against Chun, 63; against
Japanese rule, 20, 121; in Kwangju,
55, 241, 308; for new constitution, 53;
against Park, 121; against relations
with Japan, 39; against Rhee, 121;
against Roh, 221; tradition of, 90, 114,
121; against United States, 63; violence
during, 240-41; women in, 107-8; after
Y.H. Incident, 42
student dissidents, xxvi, 62, 241-43; cam-
paigns by, to amend 1972 constitution,
40; concept of minjung promoted by, 99,
121; conscripted as punishment, 240,
279-80; detained, 314; folk drama by,
17; as followers of Kim Dae Jung, 53;
hypothesized control of, by North
Korea, 304-5; police treatment of, 322;
political agenda of, 221; public sympa-
thy for, 62; released by Ch'oe, 52; re-
strictions on, 40; revisionist history of,
62-63; Rhee government overthrown
by, 240; violence by, xxxiii, 241-43
students, xxxvii; limited job opportuni-
ties for, 116, 119; in 1980, 54; opposi-
tion of, to Chun, 54; opposition of, to
Park government, 46, 54; as percentage
of population, xxvi; political demands,
54; status of, 114; violence renounced
by, 242
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Study Group for Peaceful and Democratic
Reunification (P'yongminyon), 233
suicide, 119-20
Sui Dynasty, 7, 272
Sunkyong, 147, 258
Supreme Council for National Recon-
struction (SCNR), 38, 246-47, 306,
312
Supreme Court, 211, 223-24, 313, 323,





Tacoma Boatbuilding Company, 277-78,
297
Tactical Air Control Center, 286
T'aebaek Range, 5, 71
Taedong River, 4, 7
Taegu, 77; administration of, 214; popu-
lation of, 84; religious believers in, 127;
student demonstrations in, 42
Taegu Seven Stars, 316
Taejo (King), 272
Taejon: administration of, 214; govern-
ment agencies moved to, xxv; military




Tale of a Yangban (Pak Chi-won), 17, 92
Tale ofHong Kil-tong, The (Ho Kyun), 17
Tang Dynasty, 7, 272, 323
Tan'gun, 109; worship of, 109, 126
teachers, 116, 117, 118; examinations for,
213; union for, 117-18, 236
teachers' associations, 236
Team Spirit exercises, xl
Tears of Blood, 22






television, 182-83, 250; in rural areas, 47;
under Sixth Republic, 248
temperature, 75
terrorism: by North Korea against South
Korea, xxxv, xxxvi, 269; against United
States representatives in South Korea,
60, 221; measures to counter, 280
textile industry, xxviii, 161; exports by,
161, 189
Third Army, xxxviii-xxxix, 281-82, 283
Third Military Academy, 290, 291
Three Kingdoms period (see also Koguryo
Kingdom; Paekche Kingdom; Silla
Kingdom), xxiii, 4-7, 76, 323; central
government in, 19; cultural expression
under, 15-18, 19-20; religion in, 123;
society under, 15-20; stratified social
system in, 19
timber, 167-68, 257
TK Division (TK Mafia), 229
Tonga ilbo (East Asia Daily), 246, 247,
248, 250
Tonga Press, 250
Tonghak Movement (Eastern Learning
Movement), 124, 243
Tonghak Rebellion, 12, 14, 273
t'ongil. See reunification
T'ongilgyo. See Unification Church
Tong-nip simmun (The Independent), 12
Tongui University incident, 226, 227
torture, 243, 244, 311, 322
tourism, 171
trade, foreign: under constitution, 204;
dependence on, 184; disputes over,
186; diversification of, 252, 254; poli-
cy, 188; record, 254; surplus, 188, 255;
value of, 188
trade deficit, 183
traditional culture: attraction of, 108-9;
government use of, 109; revival of, xxvi
transportation systems, 178, 181-82; bus
system, 181; civil aviation, 182; rail-
roads, 181-82; roads, 178-81; sub-
ways, 181-82
Trans-Siberian Railway, 14, 181
Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, xli
Treaty of Portsmouth, 273
Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895), 14
Truman, Harry S, 24
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